




A HISTORY OF
ITALIAN¹ UNITY




Piedmont in April, 1859.



Piedmont in August, 1859.



KINGDOM OF ITALY IN MAY, 1860.



KINGDOM OF ITALY IN NOVEMBER, 1860.

A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY

BEING

A POLITICAL HISTORY OF ITALY

FROM 1814 TO 1871

BY

BOLTON KING, M.A.

"Now all these things happened unto them for ensamples"

VOL. II

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A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY

CHAPTER XXIV

THE CONGRESS OF PARIS

1853-1856

Piedmont in 1853-54. THE DISSOLUTION OF THE MONASTERIES; the bill; the bishops' proposals; the bill passes. Piedmont and France; the war in the East; THE TREATY WITH ENGLAND AND FRANCE. The Piedmontese in the Crimea. Condition of Italy, 1852-55: Rome: the *motu-proprio* a dead-letter; the misrule. Naples: Ferdinand's tyranny. Milder rule in Lombardy-Venetia. The Duchies. THE CONGRESS OF PARIS; Cavour at the Congress; English policy; Napoleon's policy; Cavour's proposals; results of the Congress.

EACH successive difficulty seemed to leave Piedmont stronger. The year 1853 was full of trouble and distress; the cholera was raging, the phylloxera ruined the vine-crop, bad harvests and a commercial crisis brought widespread misery. The high taxes and clerical intrigues led to serious disturbances in the Val d'Aosta (December 1853), and a mob at Turin attacked Cavour's house and placed his life in momentary danger (October).¹ In spite of the boast that the finances had nearly reached equilibrium, new loans and new taxes came with every budget. But the abolition of the remaining duty on cereals relieved the distress; the great majority of the Piedmontese were unshakable in their loyalty to the constitution, and when the Senate threw out Cavour's bill for the regulation of the national bank, and

¹ It was thought that he had shares in some mills, which were charged with cornering in wheat; on the whole I think he had not. See Cavour, *Lettere*, V. cccx-cccxi; Castelli, *Cavour*, 15.

he, less deferential to them than of old, appealed to the country, the ministerial majority was returned, almost unimpaired (December). In spite indeed of the dearth, the prosperity of the country had made a solid advance. In the five years from 1850 to 1855 the imports nearly trebled, the exports increased by one half. The railways were being rapidly extended, and early in 1854 the line from Turin to Genoa, then unrivalled in Europe for mountain engineering, was opened. And notwithstanding distress^c and taxation and the never ceasing intrigues of the priests, the government stood stronger than ever in the country and in parliament.

Rattazzi had lately joined the Cabinet, and his adhesion marked its complete reliance on the Centre. The strength of the "Great Ministry"¹ encouraged it to new developments at home and abroad, to carry on the work of emancipation from the church, to rivet the French alliance. Early in 1855 the government brought forward the third great measure of ecclesiastical reform. The Siccardi Laws had destroyed the church's interference in the machinery of the law. The Civil Marriage Bill had aimed at liberating family life from clerical meddling. Since its temporary suspension there had been a lull in ecclesiastical legislation, though seminarists had been made partially liable to conscription in spite of the doubts of men like Lanza, who questioned the wisdom of an irritating measure, which had little practical utility. The country as a whole acquiesced in the postponement of the civil marriage question, but was insistent for placing the income of the church under state control (*incameramento*). The government had promised directly after Rattazzi's entry into the Cabinet that they would dissolve the monasteries, redistribute clerical incomes, and withdraw the annual subsidy paid by the exchequer to the clergy. With a population of five millions, the kingdom had 604 monasteries and convents with over 8,500 inmates. There was an ecclesiastic to every 214 inhabitants, while

¹ Cavour, Rattazzi, La Marmora, Cibrario, Paleocapa, Dabormida, Deforesta; Ponza di San Martino had lately left it; Dabormida retired in January 1855; Giacomo Durando and Lanza entered in the same year.

Belgium had one to 500 and Austria one to 610. The disproportion of bishops was even greater, for an average diocese had 146,000 inhabitants, while in France it had 420,000, and in Belgium over 600,000. The income of bishoprics, chapters, monastic houses, and benefices without cure of souls exceeded 17,000,000 lire, and yet with all this wealth, more than half the parish priests had miserable stipends of less than 400 lire a year.¹ There was a general consensus that, especially in view of the straitened condition of the exchequer, the state subsidy² could not be justified. But this brought on the whole question of the relation of the state to the church's property. Those who were more tender to the clericals, or who like Cavour believed in a "free church," would have left it the undisturbed control of its own property, regarding the distribution of clerical incomes as a question for the church alone to regulate. On the other side were church reformers and anti-clericals, who wished to make the state the administrator of the ecclesiastical fund, and give it authority not only to suppress monastic houses, but reduce the number of dioceses and equalise clerical incomes. To such a policy Cavour was strongly opposed; a state-paid clergy, he argued, without families or private property, would become a caste, with no social links to bind it to society, without interest in the order of the state, and a standing menace to it.³ But Cavour's arguments told as much against the existing system, and he could not prevent some action being taken. It was the price he had to pay for the support of the Liberals, and the country, he knew, would "rather submit to Austria than the priests." A government, always in financial difficulties, with a steady deficit and taxation pressing hard, could not resist the temptation to relieve the treasury by attacking the fat prebends, that absorbed one-fifteenth of the national income, or the monasteries, whose useless inmates swarmed in the cities. Even D'Azeglio's government had proposed to take some action, and held out the threat of worse things to come, if the Pope

¹ Tivaroni, *L'Italia*, I. 384-385; Boggio, *Chiesa e stato*, 378-406.

² See above, Vol. I. p. 392.

³ Artom e Blanc, *Cavour*, 277, 498.

refused his consent. But Pius was true to his policy of no compromise, and the later negotiations, through which Cavour still hoped to bring Rome to terms, only resulted in a fierce Encyclical (January 26, 1855), which branded the proposals as communistic, and threatened excommunication if they were carried out. D'Azeglio proudly replied to its charges of broken loyalty, and indicted the artificial conscience, which had stifled the natural conscience at Rome, and made the canon law of more weight than equity.¹ The government had already introduced the long-threatened bill (January 9). Going much further than D'Azeglio's earlier proposals, it suppressed all religious corporations, whether monasteries or benefices without cure of souls or chapters of collegiate churches, excepting chapters in the larger towns and certain scheduled houses devoted to education, preaching, or the care of the sick; and it levied a quatum on the revenues of bishoprics, the excepted monasteries, and richer benefices. The sums thus raised were placed in the hands of a government department, and after providing pensions for the disestablished monks and nuns and canons, were to replace the state subsidy and the Sardinian tithes, and raise the stipends of the poorer clergy. The buildings of the suppressed monasteries were to be devoted to secular purposes, but the existing inmates were allowed to inhabit their cloisters during lifetime. Though the measure was a compromise, and public opinion would have liked at least to see the educational houses included and the number of bishoprics reduced, it was received with enthusiasm. In the Chamber the Centre and Left were unanimous in its support, and the bill was carried by an overwhelming majority (March 2). But the clericals were counting on the Senate and the King, and hoping to repeat their tactics on the Civil Marriage Bill with an equally successful issue. The King had been in friendly correspondence with Rome for a compromise, and a terrible misfortune came to strengthen his scruples. Within a month he lost mother, wife, and brother, and the clerics pointed to his affliction as the mark of the divine displeasure. His mother had, it is said, reproached

¹ D'Azeglio *Il Governo di Piemonte e la corte di Roma*

him on her deathbed for his government's attack upon the church, and while his conscience was still shaken with the recollection, the clerics laid an insidious bait before him. Led by the more moderate of their number, who had long been working to reconcile the government to Rome, the bishops offered to contribute provisionally from their own incomes a sum equivalent to the exchequer subsidy, on condition that the Dissolution Bill was dropped. The King was won, and Cavour resigned, probably knowing well that the intrigue must fail, and himself return to power with freer hands.¹ Giacomo Durando, the minister of war, tried to form a Cabinet, but the feeling of the country was roused to a pitch that made it impossible to find colleagues, who would share the responsibility. The King found his popularity compromised and Turin in a dangerous state of unrest. So strong was the excitement, that, had the crisis continued, riots and bloodshed were almost inevitable, and the King, solemnly warned by D'Azeglio of the risk he was running, recalled Cavour (May 3). Even now the danger was not over, and it was only by accepting amendments that excluded nearly half the monastic houses from the law, that Cavour passed it through the Senate by a narrow majority (May 29). Public opinion condemned the compromise, but Cavour had to choose between the amendments and a constitutional crisis, which might have shaken the throne and wrecked his foreign policy. The principle had been won, and the Pope's excommunication had little heed paid to it either by King or country.

Their interest was absorbed in the momentous step that the government had taken in its foreign policy. Cavour's aim was to push actively and strenuously on the lines which D'Azeglio had indicated; to court the good-will of France, that perchance some day the French would pour their armies over the Alps to drive Austria from Lombardy and Venetia. He had convinced himself that Piedmont alone could never hope for victory in an offensive war, and he

¹ Bianchi, *Politique de Cavour*, 67; Ghilardi, *Legge Vacca*, II. 23-24; Bianchi, *Diplomazia*, VII. 85; Massari, *Vittorio Emmanuele*, 186.

had little faith in a popular rising. But right as he was in his prudent scepticism, he probably hardly foresaw how thorny was the path he had chosen, how great the temptation to trickery, how dangerous it was to place his country in the debt of an ambitious and unscrupulous ally. A finer conscience would have hesitated to ask the help of Louis Napoleon. But Cavour was no man to shrink from dubious means, so long as they led to the great goal. He had chosen to travel by diplomatic and not by revolutionary roads, and, the choice once made, he was impelled onwards by a fatal necessity. The war in the East forced him to make his decision. Hitherto there had been a good deal of coolness between Turin and Paris. The Emperor was not proof against the Viennese theory that Piedmont was a hiding-place for the incendiaries of Europe, and though he had little share in French sympathy for Rome, he did not dare to disown it. The war with Russia changed the position. The Allies were ready to buy or beg help from any quarter that offered, and above all were anxious to win Austria, who could paralyze a Russian advance in the Balkans. But Austria wished to keep her hands free, if she could do so with dignity, and she dallied with the proposals of the Allies, giving as one pretext that if she concentrated her army in the East, Piedmont would take the opportunity to fall on Lombardy. The Allies had from the first offered to guarantee her Italian frontier during the war, but they saw that the most effective answer to her excuse was to persuade Piedmont also to join the alliance and send part of its army to the East. From the first days of 1854 onwards they assiduously courted the Turin government, holding out hopes that Austria might be persuaded to exchange Lombardy for new possessions in the East, and hinting that if Piedmont hung back, they would allow Austria to occupy Alessandria. There were yet stronger reasons for listening to the Western Powers. If Austria and not Piedmont became their ally, Piedmont would be isolated again; France and England would be in her enemy's debt and irritated with herself. Cavour saw that his whole policy was at stake; he responded even precipitately to the

suggestion of the Allies, and proposed to send a contingent to the Crimea.¹ But though the King sided with him, he found no support for his scheme in the Cabinet, and Rattazzi and La Marmora threatened to resign. It seemed quixotic for Piedmont to waste in another's quarrel the strength, which she needed to husband for her own ambitions. But Cavour was content to wait, perhaps at times he had his own misgivings, and before the autumn had gone by, he had his colleagues with him. When in December (1854) France and England made a formal request for the alliance of Piedmont, the government decided to adhere on certain conditions. England was to lend at least a million sterling, but Piedmont was to rank as an ally and not as a subsidized mercenary; she was to take her place in any Congress that might be held after the war; the Western Powers were to bind themselves by secret treaty to make a fresh effort to get the Lombard sequestrations removed, and at the Congress take the condition of Italy into serious consideration. But they were terms, to which England and France would not accede; for Austria had just joined the Alliance, and they dared not alienate her. In spite of the hopes they had held out, they refused to include any pledges in the treaty,² and the ministry had to choose between unconditional alliance and isolation. The danger of the latter was now clearly recognised; the King intended to dismiss the ministry rather than give up the treaty; the Lombard refugees begged that the condition as to the sequestrations might be waived. Placed in the hard alternative, the ministry signed the one-sided treaty (January 9, 1855).

The Piedmontese public was much puzzled. The step seemed so novel and daring, the advantages not obvious. Few were really convinced of its wisdom, and it needed all

¹ Bianchi, *Diplomazia*, VII. 161-166, 169; Bosio, *Villamarina*, 146-147; Tavallini, *Lanza*, I. 144; Sclopis, *Cavour*, 471; Massari, *op. cit.*, 159; Id., *La Marmora*, 142; Chiala, *Dina*, I. 128. I do not believe in Farini's claims to have originated the idea; dates seem fatal to it: Castelli, *Cavour*, 53-55; Chiala, *Alleanza*, 29-38; Farini, *Lettere*, xix; Badiali, *Farini*, 175-177; Finali, *Contemporanei*, 274.

² Chiala, *Alleanza*, 129-133; Bianchi, *Diplomazia*, VII. 546; Cavour, *Nuove Lettere*, 206-208.

Cavour's personal ascendancy to carry it in the Chamber. Piedmont had nothing to fear from Russian ambition, and could not fairly be called on to fight against the supposed common enemy of Europe, while Prussia was neutral and Austria inactive. It meant a loss of men and money, a heavy drain on the overtaxed state, the prospect of terrible sufferings for its soldiers from cholera and cold. It seemed fantastically strange that Piedmont should be ranged in the same camp as Austria, should help to prop the oppressor of the struggling Slavs. But all the country felt vaguely the danger of isolation, the possibility of territorial gain, the moral certainty that it would force the Powers to consider the condition of Italy. To give Piedmont a voice in the councils of Europe, to make her the honoured ally of the Western Powers and the acknowledged mouthpiece of Italy seemed worth a heavy sacrifice. Though the Left voted against the treaty with some misgivings and the Right with none, the Chamber approved it by 95 votes to 40 (February 10).

The summer of 1855 was an anxious time in Piedmont. No news of victory came from the Crimea, and failure meant the almost certain triumph of the clericals at home. The small Piedmontese force of 17,000 men played an inactive and unimportant part in the campaign, and the cholera made havoc in its ranks. But it performed well the task assigned to it of guarding the right of the Allies. Its excellent commissariat and ambulance were the more noteworthy, from their contrast with the disorganisation of the English supplies. La Marmora, who was in command, asserted his position among the allied generals with some excess of dignity; and when at last his men came into action in the valley of the Tchernaja (August 16), though the chief brunt of the fight was borne by the French, they did their part well and bravely. It was natural enough that at home the battle was magnified into a great Italian victory, and that Cavour boasted that the shame of Novara was wiped out. It was partly true that "the Crimea was the road to Lombardy," and the instinct of the nationalists told them, that the sacrifice of men and money (the campaign cost the Piedmon-

these £3,000,000) was a cheap price to pay for the recovery of martial prestige.

But Piedmont had still to justify the cost by using its new honours to advantage. It was as "a pistol-shot in Austria's ear," that the alliance had been hailed in Italy. The laurels of the Crimea, as Cavour said, would help her destinies more than all the speeches and writings, that had pleaded her cause to a deaf Europe. Piedmont's wars and constitutional government had proved that "the Italy of Byron and Macaulay had passed away," that she had found courage and confidence and self-control. There seemed at length to have come a dawn of hope for the suffering states.

It was with good reason that Cavour had asked that the Powers should consider the condition of Italy. It was a story of rottenness and anarchy at Rome, of hard military despotism in Lombardy and Romagna, of sheer tyranny at Naples. At Rome even the petty programme of the *motu proprio* was a dead letter. The Council of State was seldom consulted, and only on minor matters. The Board of Finance attempted to assert its nominal right to supervise the budget, but the government harassed or ignored it, till year by year it sank into more utter insignificance. The repeated promises that all offices should be thrown open to laymen remained a dead letter. It is true that laymen held the great majority of subordinate posts, but every head of a department, except that of war, all the prefects, all the higher judges were ecclesiastics, and though at first three laymen were appointed to provincial delegacies, a spurious agitation secured the easy removal of all but one. Under the new municipal law the communal councils, though their powers were large, were tied hand and foot to the government; the franchise was confined to those who were "irreproachable in politics and religion," and a high property qualification kept them in the hands of a small oligarchy.¹ Even so the government was afraid to let the law work freely, and when

¹ Despatches—Lyons, 1, 19, 38, 60; *Histoire des états*, 26-27; *Sujet du Pape, Question romaine*, 17-18, 24; Rayneval's *Mémoire*; Farini, *La diplomazia*, 46.

the time for the triennial elections returned in 1853 and 1856, it forbade the polls, and ordered the new councils to be nominated by the outgoing ones.

Good government was of secondary importance to the men who ruled at Rome. The Pope had persuaded himself that he had granted his people all reasonable demands; he led the genial life that sat so well on his shallow cultured nature, and found his interests in evolving the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, or in the epidemic of weeping crucifixes and Madonnas who moved their eyes. The obscure and boorish priests, whom Antonelli raised to the cardinalate,¹ were intent on suppressing free thought, keeping the Jews under medieval restraints, "preserving medical science from materialism." The Inquisition was alive; a man was sent to the galleys for five years for not removing his hat in church; a citizen of Fermo was tortured to death for blasphemy; a few years later a Jew child, Edgar Mortara, was secretly baptized and afterwards stolen from his parents, to the scandal of Europe.² And while Antonelli and the political cardinals threw dust in the eyes of Europe, or played off Austria against France, their patronage threw the state into the hands of the Sanfedist gang, who, after four years' eclipse, found favour once more smiling on them in high quarters. Galli's dishonest control of the exchequer enriched Antonelli and himself, till scandals relating to his connection with the *Banca Romana* compelled his retirement. The notorious Alpi was chief comptroller of customs till he had to fly from justice; his confederate Nardoni, once condemned for forgery and theft, was chief of the secret police. The law courts lent themselves to the passionate zeal with which the Liberals were hunted down, and judicial murders at Fermo and Sinigaglia, and the conviction on unreliable evidence of the men who were charged with Rossi's murder, were but the worst samples of the prostitution of the law. About four in every thousand of the population were in prison,

¹ Curci, *Vaticano regio*, 279; Liverani, *Il papato*, 85; D'Ideville, *Journal*, II. 209.

² Gennarelli, *Lutti*, lxvii; Zini, *Storia, Documents* I. 631, 635; Tommasoni, *Epoca seconda in Il Cimento*, VI. 52; Balan, *Continuazione*, II. 71.

and in 1853 there were over 1000 political prisoners, housed in filth and fed with garbage.¹ The Austrian military courts shot nearly two hundred in the province of Bologna alone, condemning impartially the brigands, who robbed the defenceless peasantry, and the peasants who broke the law to arm for their own protection.

Here and there there were a few reforms. The apologists of the government could point to a few economic improvements: to some encouragement of agriculture, to the belated introduction of gas and telegraphs, to a little care for education and the dwellings of the poor, to a considerable development of trade, consequent on a reform of the customs' tariff. But the railways made hardly perceptible progress, and public improvements stopped short at Rome and its immediate neighbourhood. The taxes per head exceeded those of prosperous Piedmont. Save in a few country districts, where the priests still kept their hold, the disaffection was universal. The government could rely neither on its troops nor its police. The Moderates who looked to Cavour, the Republicans who looked to Mazzini, between them had the mass of the population at their back, and Antonelli knew well that it was only the presence of the Austrian and French troops, that saved his government from immediate collapse.

The Pope's government had its spasmodic fits of interest in the poor, at all events of the capital. At Naples there was not even the pretence of zeal for good government. Ferdinand had been drawing the reins of power ever tighter. He had convinced himself that he alone had the secret, which could save European society; that the Revolution could be fought only with an iron hand, that concession encouraged sedition. And little he recked, if the public voice of Europe branded him an inhuman monster. Palmerston's resignation he considered "a great victory for the moral order of the world," and relying on the support of the

¹ Farini, *op. cit.*, 42-43; Gennarelli, *Lutti*, xxxv; Id., *Governo pontificio*, I. 42; II. 604; Zini, *Storia*, I. 337-341, 469; Margotti, *Vittorie*, 542; Paya, *Cachots du Pape*, 124, 129-133; Despatches—Lyons, 44-45, 52.

Czar and Austrian Emperor, he defied France and England to do their worst. At home no faintest taint of Liberalism was suffered. Fortunato, his premier, who had some progressive feeling of a narrow kind, made way for Ferdinando Troya, Carlo's ultramontane brother. Filangieri, who had won Sicily for him, next came under his ban; the Viceroy, after a beginning of cruel repression, had endeavoured to reconcile the island by softening the worst rigours of the reaction, and developing the roads, which were its prime economic want. But he quarrelled with the home government over the details of their construction, and Ferdinand, suspecting perhaps with cause that his Viceroy, like every one who understood the island, was a convert to Home Rule, bullied him into resignation (February 1855). A creature of the court took his place, and from his seclusion at Gaeta Ferdinand, left without a capable servant, gathered into his own hands every thread of government. Even the Jesuits criticized and quarrelled with him, and his only instruments were his spies and police and the clerical grip on the schools. All appointments to the civil service went through his private secretary, and he commenced a register to note the political conduct of every employee. When the impending quarrel with the Western Powers gave him new alarms, the police were spurred afresh to watch suspects, especially those "who wore long beards or strange hats." The one virile element in the country was the middle classes, and Ferdinand made it his system to depress them, and ostentatiously patronize the degraded semi-criminal classes, who looked to him and his police to let them live without work. The *Camorra* and the government hunted in one leash.¹

Now, as always, everything in the North was on a higher plane. Austria, alarmed at the outcry which had followed the sequestrations, had made some small effort to justify her rule. The worst atrocities had ceased. Martial law came to an end (May 1854); the sequestra-

¹ Monnier, *Brigandage*, 154; Id., *Camorre*, 166-168; Villari, *Lettere Meridionali*, 47; *Affaires étrangères* 1861, 14-15.

tions were taken off many of the smaller estates; even the Central Congregations had been restored. There was a certain amount of educational activity and journalistic freedom; there was no longer the constant sense of personal danger, the same fear of the police agent and the informer. Lord John Russell in the English Parliament had warmly praised the milder rule; but it made no difference in the eyes of Italian nationalists. "We do not ask Austria to be humane and liberal in Italy," wrote Manin, "for that is impossible, even if she wished it; we ask her to go." And the provinces still had their practical grievances. The crudities of the military rule had dealt a heavy blow to trade, and joint-stock companies were still discouraged from fear of ulterior political aims. The landed proprietors, hard hit by the phylloxera and silk-disease, were weighed to the ground by the heavy land-tax, which took from a third to a half of their income;¹ and it was calculated that in the ten years of Austrian rule after 1849 nearly three hundred million lire were raised in extraordinary taxes and compulsory loans. But there was probably no deliberate intention to exhaust the provinces; the financial difficulties of the government compelled it to impose the heavy burdens. There was certainly no such misrule, as obtained at Rome or Naples, and, despite the nationalists, the policy bid fair to lull the country into a heavy-eyed acquiescence. There was a sense of general gloom and weariness. Mazzini sent the gallant Calvi, the hero of the Cadore passes in 1848, to make a senseless attempt at revolt in the same district (September 1853), and leave his life on the scaffold. The mad escapade and its collapse only discouraged the patriots the more. Some of the refugees, weary of long exile, begged and obtained leave to return to their sequestered estates. But the acquiescence was only passive; underneath the calm there lay a sullen hatred of the Austrians, far deeper and wider-spread than in the '40s. At Milan since the disastrous revolt of 1853 there had

¹ Meneghini, *Imposte*, 29; Bonghi, *Pasini*, 689; Jacini, *Proprietà*, 108; Ricasoli, *Lettere*, VIII. 223-224.

been a drawing together of all sections of the patriots, and a steady preparation for the day of deliverance.

And while Lombardy was content to pause, the neighbouring Duchies had been lashed by the tyranny into retaliation. Charles III. had found his doom from an assassin's knife (March 26, 1854), and though the duchess-regent began her rule with a promise of better things, it only needed a wild rumour that Garibaldi was on the march to provoke a hopeless rising in her capital. The two following years saw the assassination of two of her officials, and an attempt on the life of Anviti, one of the most degraded panders to the late duke's vices. Francis of Modena found himself in constant strife with the marble-workers of Carrara, a rough immoral race, but of a proud patriotism, that bitterly resented their forced transference from the milder sway of Tuscany. Carrara was the favourite starting-ground of Mazzini's ill-fated risings, and despite the savage repression of Francis and his Austrian officers, it remained a focus of discontent, that made it hereafter play a part in more important schemes.

Such was the condition of Italy, on which Cavour intended to appeal to the judgment of Europe. After the fall of Sebastopol, Victor Emmanuel visited the allied sovereigns. In England he found himself, much to his surprise, welcomed as the patron of a new Reformation;¹ and at all events, the ovations, that greeted him, proved how popular his policy was there. At Paris the Emperor came under Cavour's spell, and asked "what he could do for Piedmont and Italy." But the Eastern Question had taken an unfavourable turn. Piedmont would have gladly seen the war continue, to earn more laurels and place the Allies under greater obligations. But the adroit manœuvring of Austria, aided by more sinister influences at Paris and the unpopularity of the war in France, won the Emperor to a policy of peace; the Viennese cabinet had imposed its terms on Russia, and the meeting of the Congress of

¹ "A great hero with Exeter Hall:" Greville Memoirs, VII. 308. Cavour was always careful to pull the wires there.

Paris, which was certain to lead to peace, marked the triumph of its diplomacy. For the moment Austria commanded the situation, and France was apparently ready to follow her lead. Cavour recognised the danger that she might retrieve her recent discredit, and that Piedmont's sacrifices would be in vain. It was all the more needful that his country's voice should be heard at the Congress. All through 1855 he had been fighting the Austrian intrigues to exclude Piedmont from the conferences at Vienna, and France and England had been too intent on winning Austria's armed assistance to offend her by humouring her enemy. And now at Paris they would consent to admit the Piedmontese plenipotentiaries only to such of the negotiations as immediately touched their interests. Cavour could not consent to take an inferior position; and it was perhaps without any certainty of being admitted and with faint hopes of doing good, that he went to Paris. But it was impossible for the Powers to deny the justice of his claim, and when the Congress opened (February 25, 1856), he was at once admitted to a full voice in the deliberations.

Cavour had four immediate objects before him; to secure, if possible, some territorial gain for Piedmont, to get the Austrians out of Romagna and give it at least Home Rule, to use European pressure to extort reforms from the Pope and Ferdinand, and above all to make Piedmont loom large as the champion of Italy. His chances of success hinged on the support of France and England. Palmerston, now and always, was the sincere friend of Italian aspirations, and Italian Liberals had hailed his return to power at the end of 1852. His keen dislike of Austria, his sympathy for Louis Napoleon, his anxiety to spread constitutional government on the Continent might possibly have won him to lend the armed strength of England, had his hands been free.¹ But the English Court had already checked his bolder policy; he was no longer Foreign Secretary, and he knew that the country would never sanction a war with Austria for the sake of Italian freedom. Still English feeling, educated by the "Friends of Italy,"²

¹ Bianchi, *Politique de Cavour*, 172.

² A society founded by Stansfeld and Peter Taylor.

ran high against the misrule in Rome and Naples. Hudson, the British Minister at Turin, lent all his great influence to assist and advise the Piedmontese government; Panizzi kept the Cabinet in touch with the Italian nationalists; and Lord John Russell and Mr. Gladstone felt a sympathy as true as, if cooler than, that of Palmerston. The English government was willing to bring its influence to bear on Ferdinand and the Pope, and would probably have liked to see the Legations go to Piedmont;¹ but Cavour knew that he would look to it in vain for practical help in Northern Italy.

The sympathy of France was at this time hardly less platonic, though the Emperor's restless schemings had long included the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy, and since the *coup d'état* he had several times hinted that some day he would lend his army to Piedmont. The war in the East had made the Austrian alliance a necessity for the time, but in the midst of the Crimean campaign he had threatened that if Austria and Prussia deserted him, he would recall his troops from the East and send them to the Rhine and Po. And though it was still his policy to keep on good terms with Austria, he hoped by friendly pressure to persuade her to withdraw her troops from Romagna, to cede Parma to Piedmont, even, so he was utopian to believe for a moment, to exchange her Italian possessions for the Danubian Principalities. At all events he could act at Rome and Naples. He would do nothing indeed to alienate the Pope, for he already feared the hostility of the French Catholics, and the Empress was resolved to have Pius for godfather to the Prince Imperial; but he was keenly anxious to extricate himself from his false position at Rome, and for this end to heal the misrule and discontent, that compelled the Pope to lean on foreign arms. He was ready to voice the disgust of civilized Europe at Ferdinand's tyranny, and he had his secret means of pressure in the intrigues that were being woven to place his cousin Lucien Murat on the throne of Naples.²

Encouraged by the Emperor and Clarendon, the English

¹ Cavour, *Nuove Lettere*, 335.

² See below, p. 35.

representative, Cavour pitched his hopes high in the early days of the Congress. He hoped to gain Parma or Massa-Carrara for Piedmont, and see Romagna made into an independent state or annexed to Tuscany or Modena.¹ But when Austria's absolute non-possumus wrecked his bigger projects, he changed his tactics, and in a memorial to the French and English Ministers (March 27) proposed Home Rule for Romagna and the Marches under Papal suzerainty and with something of a representative constitution. The project² had little to recommend it, for it left Umbria unaffected, and even D'Azeglio dubbed it "a pie-crust scheme." But Cavour must have recognized that Austria would no more accept it than his earlier proposals, and it served for a text on which to hang the Italian question and preach the hopelessness of reform under the Pope's government. The English and French Ministers had promised that when the main business of the Congress was over, opportunity would be given to discuss the condition of Italy, and Cavour's picture of the Roman and Neapolitan misrule, and his threats that till Italy had reform she would be a hotbed of revolution, had stirred a real anxiety to help. Prussia was friendly, Russia had "the same wrongs to avenge" on Austria. Before the Congress broke up, Walewski, the French Minister, introduced the case of Rome and Naples (April 8). His mild censures were followed by Clarendon's indignant indictment of the Pope's government as "a disgrace to Europe," and of Ferdinand's misrule as crying for the intervention of the civilised world.³ Angry words passed between him and the Austrian Minister, but the latter's refusal to consent to any vote deprived the discussion of practical issue. Cavour however had so far won his end, that the majority of the Congress were openly sympathetic, and he had obtained in a way an European condemnation of the misrule. To rivet the matter home, he addressed, as soon as the Congress broke up, a memorandum

¹ Cavour, *Lettere*, II. 170-174; D'Azeglio e Gualterio, *Carteggio*, 228.

² It was in the main a repetition of Aldini's scheme: see above, Vol. I. p. 9.

³ Minghetti compared his attack to the charge of the Light Brigade.

to the French and English governments (April 16), pointing out the all-potent position of Austria in Italy and the difficulty of preserving peace in the face of her provocations. The gist of the memorandum was, as Mazzini noted, that if diplomacy could not secure reform, it should have revolution. Cavour in fact, irritated at the seeming fruitlessness of his endeavours, was seriously planning war. If no peaceful solution could be found, he threatened insurrection at Naples or Palermo and war to the knife with Austria, and he had convinced himself for the moment that Piedmont was ready for the conflict.¹ Clarendon had revised the memorandum, and some passing words of his Cavour misconstrued into a promise of English help; with that once secured, he was anxious to fight at once.²

As a matter of fact England was reverting to her traditional friendship with Austria, and was no more willing to come to extremities with her than France was willing to alienate the Pope. The Congress had brought no positive results for Italy; Cavour was deeply chagrined, and the opposition naturally taunted him with the seeming waste of the Crimea and the disappointed hopes. But, as all Italy recognised, the moral gain was enormous. The Italian question had advanced to a new plane. Austria was discredited by the cowardly part she had played during the war and her feeble defence at the Congress. The cause of Italy, as Cavour told the Chamber, "was before the bar of public opinion," and Piedmont was recognised by Europe as her advocate. When Cavour, returning from Paris, declared that the policies of Piedmont and Austria were more remote than ever, his words were received with passionate endorsement. Though he recognised by now that England was not prepared to fight, and that therefore immediate war was impossible, Piedmont was afire with war-fever, and the troops from the Crimea were welcomed home with a fervour, that was meant and taken

¹ Cavour, *Lettere*, II. 215, 217, 371; Bianchi, *Politique de Cavour*, 134.

² Bianchi, *Cavour*, 39-40; Id., *Politique de Cavour*, 159; Cavour, *Lettere*, II. 217, 222-223; Id., *Nuove Lettere*, 331; Minghetti, *Ricordi*, III. 107; Lords' Debate of February 17, 1862 (Hansard, CLXV. 350).

as a menace to Austria. After the Chamber had risen, the government spent a million lire on the new fortifications at Alessandria, knowing well that it need have no fear as to parliamentary indemnity; and a subscription, started by a popular Turin paper; to supply the fortress with 100 cannon brought in innumerable contributions from all Italy and Italians the whole world over.

CHAPTER XXV

THE NATIONAL SOCIETY

1855-1857

Cavour's defects. Decline of the republicans, and democrats. The new nationalists; Manin; THE NATIONAL SOCIETY; the "neutral banner"; the Society's propaganda; the conversion of Piedmont; Cavour and the National Society; Victor Emmanuel; Garibaldi. Anglo-French intervention (1) at Rome; Rayneval's Memoir; the Pope's visit to Romagna; (2) at Naples. LUCIEN MURAT; Cavour and Murat; the Unitarians and Murat. Plans of revolution in the South; Pisacane's expedition; the "Cagliari." Piedmont, 1855-1857; Lanza's Education Act; rupture with Austria; the elections of 1857; Rattazzi's resignation.

So far as his limited programme went, Cavour had practically won what he wanted. It is futile to conjecture whether, if Piedmontese troops had not fought in the Crimea, Napoleon would have attacked Austria four years later. Suffice it, that Cavour's action was leading straight to that. He had secured the good-will of France; it was his work that France and England were about to intervene, however feebly, at Rome and Naples. Sooner or later, he knew well, Louis Napoleon's ambitions would bring his armies over the Alps to drive the Austrians out.* Public opinion recognised his success; and the Congress of Paris made Cavour dictator of Piedmont. He had a safe majority in the Chamber; the Senate, perhaps overawed by threats to create new senators, was compliant now; and throughout Italy he personified the policy, which promised redemption at no distant date. But Cavour's programme was too cold and opportunist to serve as a great word of advance. Splendid tactician as he was, he could not give the rallying cry. There was a danger that he would have no moral force behind him, no inspiration,

that would convert the national movement into a vital and organic evolution. Its march needed pioneers, principles, programme; and contemporaneously with the Congress a new party was springing into life, which was to supply the motor-power for his policy, by wresting the moral initiative from the republicans and giving it to the great Liberal party, which owned him as its leader.

The disastrous rising at Milan in 1853 had been the death blow to Mazzini's influence. The prestige of the Roman Republic had gone; the *coup d'état* had crushed the republicans of France; in Rome, in Naples, in Lombardy, his followers were deserting in mass to the nationalists, who looked to Victor Emmanuel and Cavour. Their leader still helped or organised the petty risings, whose day had past; still abounded in confident and numerous predictions, which generally proved wrong. But his phrases, once full of life, had lost their savour from over-repetition, or were found on analysis to have more rhetoric than substance. Henceforth Mazzini only hurt the cause he loved; but if he shut his eyes to the new spirit that now ruled Italian politics, his obstinacy is of higher stamp than the intolerance of Cavour and his followers, who banned the man who had taught them to believe in Italy. In England Mazzini would have been a great and generous and stimulating leader; in Italy he was condemned to sordid agitation and conspiracy, which wasted his great powers, twisted his common sense and common honesty, and made him more foe than friend of his own ideals.

Mazzini's decline was typical of much more than the fall of the republican party. It meant the close of the era, which had culminated in 1846-49, the era, whose ideas and inspirations, whether republican or royalist, were democratic, idealist, religious. It had been on the very threshold of success, but it had failed. Unarmed enthusiasm had proved powerless against the bayonets of standing armies. Not all the nobleness of the cause had saved it from suffering violence, and it had come nearest to success, when it had the help of an alien element, the

army and diplomacy of Piedmont. Undisciplined enthusiasm and advanced political speculation had had their day and failed, and in the early '50s the progressive party felt all the disillusionings of defeat. Though many of its leaders had belonged to the Democrats, they put behind them the ideals of the earlier movement. The new policy aimed at attempting less and achieving more. The social theories of Mamiani and Montanelli and Brofferio made way for the pure Liberalism of Cavour. The movement, that Mazzini and Gioberti and Pius had inspired, had been essentially religious; it had gone forth under the blessing of the church, and the volunteers had worn the cross on their breasts. Their generation praised God; the new generation thought more of keeping its powder dry. The former had had its poetry, its great literary works, its appeals to history; the latter wrote leaflets and pamphlets, and spoke through the press, which had come into power since 1847. The sweet thinkers, Tommaseo and Bassi and their kin, were silent; the heroic idealism had gone, and rationalism and science took its place. The new spirit was matter-of-fact, thinking more of the present than the future, fearful of pitching its hopes too high, quietly, cautiously laying the foundations, determined to go on no quixotic ventures, but slowly prepare, and only fight when the odds were on its side. Mazzini flinched from no sacrifice; he was ready to surrender the present convenience and happiness of the whole community, its family life, its trade, in a desperate struggle. The new movement shrank from the terrible and impossible appeal; but it put its faith in discipline, it was willing for the sake of union to sacrifice spontaneity, to be unfair to opponents, to crush minorities. It was resolved to have no more such divisions, as the feud between royalists and republicans, which had paralysed Lombardy in the summer of 1848, or the suspicions that had made the Conservatives half glad at the disaster of Novara. Eschewing all *a priori* politics, all constitutional questions, it proclaimed the King of Piedmont the one sole chief, its constitution the model for all Italy, its army the only instrument of redemption.

In one respect indeed Mazzini's ideals had triumphed. Half the leading men of Italy had been nurtured on his writings, and though they had shed their republicanism, they assimilated more and more his faith in an united Italy, and again and again we find his phrases repeated by Manin. Circumstances had made the movement of 1847-49 federalist. Unity had been at the best the pious hope of a few; hardly a politician of repute had committed himself to it, and the league of princes had been the symbol of the imperfect national union. Now, whatever the Piedmontese government and press might profess, and however distant the ultimate triumph might seem, Unity under the House of Savoy was coming to be the ambition of the great mass of Italian patriots. And alike among the Unitarians and the narrower Piedmontese school the conviction was gaining, that the quiet patient work of reconstruction must soon make way for a more active policy, that the time was approaching when another cast must be made to fulfil the nation's destinies.

• In a sense Gioberti was the father of the new school. As his "Primacy" had created the New Guelfs, his "Civil Regeneration" was the precursor of the new Unitarians. But Gioberti had expressed the thoughts of others rather than his own, his faith in Piedmont was more of rhetoric than fact, and when he died in 1852, his traditions passed into the hands of two men of much staid and more sterling worth. Giorgio Pallavicino was a Lombard noble, who for fourteen years had been Pellico's fellow-prisoner in the Spielberg. He had come to Piedmont with the Lombard emigration of 1848 a convinced republican, but Piedmontese environment and his somewhat close relations with the King had made him a royalist; and it was he who had inspired Gioberti's panegyric.¹ But he was now as always a pronounced radical, perennially fresh and hopeful, with no great measure of political wisdom, strongly drawn by Garibaldi's honest impulsiveness, and distrusting Cavour's more cautious statesmanship; a candid, honourable veteran, whose good word went for much. His fellow-pioneer was Manin. After the

¹ See above, Vol. I., p. 403.

fall of Venice Manin had taken refuge at Paris, stricken by poverty and the loss of his daughter, but commanding the deference of the exiles there by the nobleness of his life. Manin had the rarest gifts of statesmanship; he had all Cavour's breadth and accessibility to facts; his conceptions were as bold, his economic view, his standard of morality higher. Cavour might sway people by their reason, Manin could touch their hearts. Like Pallavicino, and at his instance, he had renounced republicanism. Italy, he recognized, had "two living forces, Italian public opinion and the Piedmontese army," and the latter must be gained by organising the former and through it compelling Victor Emmanuel to put himself at the head of the nationalist movement. His work therefore was to fix the floating nationalist sentiment, which was more and more turning to Piedmont, which had watched her constitutional development and struggle with the Papacy, had applauded her protest against the sequestrations, her alliance with the Western Powers, and, though with hopes temporarily dashed by the abortive issue of the Congress, still recognized that she was the champion of Italy, irrevocably committed to a policy of national redemption. Their propagandism found its organiser in La Farina, the historian and ex-minister of Sicily in 1848. Honest, unselfish, energetic, a quiet persistent worker, who for three years wrote all the correspondence of their Society with his own hand, he was a man capable of accomplishing much, except when his partisanship overcame his judgment and subordinated policy to pique. Undeterred by the indifference of politicians and the press, they founded the "National Society," with the motto of "Independence and Unity; out with the Austrians and the Pope." It was the first organisation outside the ranks of the revolutionists, that placed an united Italy in the front of its programme. Opposed alike to the pure Mazzinian, who preferred the republic to Italy, and the pure Piedmontese, who would sacrifice Italy to Turin, they promised loyalty to the House of Savoy, but only on condition that the King accepted the policy of unity; and they threatened another flag, if he hung back. "Make Italy," Manin wrote

to him, "and we are with you; if not, not." As the King's sympathies became more declared, they rallied strongly to him. "Unity, Independence, Victor Emmanuel King of Italy," these were their only formulas, and they welcomed all who accepted them, whatever their other differences.¹

It is necessary even at the present day to repeat the argument for Unity. It is perhaps sufficient apology that the irresistible current of opinion set towards it, that on principles of nationality and democracy, if the Italians desired Unity, it was right and inevitable that they should have it. But there was much to urge besides the argument of sentiment. Federalism, their opponents said, would bring a substantial economic and social gain; it would destroy the customs-barriers, it would give common coinage and weights, and permit an uniform and reformed law. It would have brought a show of diplomatic and military union; it might have quickened the mutual relations of the states, and created something of a moral unity. But federalism was impossible. A federation of ancient and monarchical states is only workable, where one member of the confederation is so predominant in power that it can impose its policy on the whole body. Even if Piedmont had gained all North Italy, it would still have had no such preeminence over Naples as to preclude a struggle for mastery. And in Italy federation had its special difficulty in the Temporal Power, for, whatever may have been possible in 1848, it was clear that after the Reaction the Pope would never come into a system, which meant constitutional liberties and a limitation of his own independence. A federation, now as in 1848, would have been the arena of rival and divergent policies, which would have reduced Italy to impotence, and worked its own speedy dissolution. Unity of course had and still has its dangers in the gulf between North and South, the chance that the South may drag the North down to its own lower level, the mischief worked by an irritated and irrecon-

¹ Manin e Pallavicino, *passim*; Zini, *Storia, Documents I.*, 606-608. At first at all events Manin would not have excluded federalists, and preferred the formula "unification" to "unity." See his letter to the *Presse* of December 14, 1855, quoted in Chiala, *Dina*, I., 161.

cilable Pope and clergy, the temptation that comes to a great Power to neglect humbler and more real duties for unprofitable ambitions. It is easy to demonstrate that an united Italy has had its disappointments; it would be easier to prove that a divided Italy would have had more. Italy, burdened with the evil heritage of the past, has done much in one generation; it is futile to speculate how much more she might have done. Not only has Unity been the only alternative to the old intolerable heptarchy, but on its own merits its advantages outweigh its losses. The same economies that make for large production and dense population, make materially and spiritually for large nations. The concentration of force, the pride of citizenship, the larger air of a great state count for more than the somewhat smug and sordid prosperity of a little country. Trade and society depend largely on uniformity of law, and uniformity would be impossible where the central executive was liable at every move to be thwarted by its subordinate executives. If the North of Italy has suffered temporarily from contact with the South, it is necessary even for it that the South should be lifted from its degradation. And Italy's secular enemy at Rome is more impotent to wound, than if it had the jealousies and rivalries of half-a-dozen little courts and little capitals to play upon.

Manin was confident that the republicans would follow him into the new camp; and alienated from Mazzini, hopeless of their own policy, they flocked over, some of them hitherto uncompromising enemies of the monarchy, others, who like Valerio and Depretis, had long veneered their republicanism with a belief in the constitution of Piedmont. Manin hoped to win Mazzini; but the utmost concession he could obtain was a revival, under the new name of the "neutral banner," of the old promise to drop for the time all programmes beyond independence and leave the future government to be decided by the parliament of the freed nation. Mazzini had rare fits of trust in the King; he admitted now that the Austrians could only be driven out by the Piedmontese army;¹ he

¹ Mazzini, *Opere*, IX. lxxxiii.

began to see that his generous dream of a people thirsting to spring at the Austrian's throat was but an illusion. But he believed that Piedmont would never stir till forced by an outside movement, and that if insurrection began in Naples or Sicily or at Carrara, Victor Emmanuel and his army would be forced to step in and support the revolutionary rising. His position was plausible enough on the surface, but Manin and Pallavicino objected that the neutral banner would be inevitably a cloak for the autonomist spirit everywhere, for Murattism at Naples, separatism in Sicily, the republic at Genoa and Rome. It meant the divisions of 1848 over again and the triumph of federalism. Victor Emmanuel and his government were hardly likely to look kindly on a programme, which left itself free to throw them aside when the work was done. And Mazzini himself, while appealing for compromise in the name of union, was proclaiming his deep distrust in the King and his conviction that Italy was destined to be a republic.¹ A bitter dispute between him and Manin, who had charged him with advocating assassination,² turned Mazzini into an angry opponent of the National Society. In rivalry with the fund for the cannon of Alessandria, he appealed for subscriptions to purchase 10,000 rifles "for the first Italian province, that rose against the common enemy."

Mazzini's opposition did little injury to the Society. An energetic propagandism, taking the Anti-Corn-Law League for its model, carried on the work, which had been fitfully begun. The Piedmontese party was already strong in North Italy, and breaking ground elsewhere. Gioberti's influence and Prati's poems had done much to counteract Giusti and Berchet, and win Italy to the House of Savoy. Victor Emmanuel's loyalty and Cavour's statesmanship were doing more, and in Lombardy and Venetia and the Duchies the National Society carried all before it. In Tuscany the Liberal autonomists were still powerful, but their influence was already waning, the bulk of the Mazzinians came over to the Society, and young Tuscans began to enlist in the

¹ Manin e Pallavicino, 186-189, 540-543; Mazzini, *Opere*, IX. 254-255.

² See below, Appendix B.

Piedmontese army. Ricasoli was looking for "the great times that were coming," and preaching revolution and unity. In Romagna the Society made steady headway, though Moderates, like Minghetti, would still have contented themselves with Home Rule, and it had to fight the exploded Carbonaro tradition, that wanted formulas and secret oaths, and a big paper programme of reform. In Rome itself the bulk of the Mazzinians joined it. In Naples and Calabria and the Basilicata its influence was considerable through the Piedmontese party that already existed there and the semi-attached "Society of Italian Unity." In Piedmont, where most might have been hoped for, the new gospel at first made little ground. The National Society had carried the programme altogether beyond the North Italian Kingdom, which till now had marked the limit of subalpine ambition. The balance of power would shift to the centre, and not even Milan, much less Turin, but Florence or Rome would be the future capital. The whole movement seemed to smack of Mazzini's utopias, and from Della Margherita to Brofferio the politicians had no good word for the Society.¹ Save for one unimportant journal, the press of every shade conspired to silence. And while the war fever was still high, while the Alessandria fortifications and the new arsenal at Spezia were hailed as the prelude to a struggle for Lombardy, the same public looked askance at the men who pointed to Sicily and Rome.

The government reflected this suspicion of the bigger programme. Cavour's policy, when the excitement of the Congress had passed, dropped again into its old watchful, cautious grooves. Its keynotes now and later were to adhere at all costs to the French alliance, and for this to keep clear of revolutionary taint and be content to wait; to put down the republicans and capture the national movement for the monarchy; to push on others to break fresh ground, and only follow if they succeeded. So far as he could travel without risking the Emperor's friendship, he would go; he refused, despite the King's excessive

¹ Manin e Pallavicino, 181, 212, 258; Zini, *Storia*, I. 839; Chiala, *Dina*, I. 159-161, 201.

anxiety, to yield to the Pope on essentials; he was ready to pick quarrels with Tuscany and Parma, and though he offered to resume diplomatic relations with Austria, if the initiative came from her, he would make no advances himself. But when his policy threatened to cross the Emperor's path, he was careful to beat time. Much as he disliked it, he refused to oppose, at least officially, the claims of Lucien Murat to the Neapolitan throne.¹ "All our ambitions," he said at the end of 1856, "are limited to this side of the Apennines."

But this was merely an official statement of his present policy. He intended to prepare the ground for a bolder advance, should circumstances allow. "I have faith," he told La Farina in the same year, "that Italy will become a single state with Rome for its capital."² He welcomed the National Society, not only as an antidote to republicanism, but because it was willing to take the risk of a harder programme. But he was ignorant of the movement that was going on outside Piedmont, and doubted whether Italy were ripe for Unity. The "fatal dualism" of his position compelled him to pose before Europe as the enemy of revolution, while he was using revolutionary instruments. As he said at a later time, his "compass was public opinion": and if the National Society could create a force in Italy, which would enable him to dispense with the Emperor and lead the revolution to save the throne, well and good. He was "waiting for accidents"; "it is useless," he said, "to make plans, all depends on an accident, and then we shall see if we can take opportunity by the forelock";³ in the meantime for the sake of the country he must not compromise the government or himself. He gave no support to Bentivegna's rising in Sicily,⁴ he refused to countenance any revolutionary movement in Tuscany, he helped to suppress the Carrara rising, and harassed the subscription for the 10,000 rifles. But this did not prevent him from giving secret encouragement to the men in the van; at

¹ See below, p. 36.

² La Farina, *Epistolario*, II. 426; Mme. Rattazzi, *Rattazzi*, I. 338.

³ Castelli, *Carteggio*, I. 158.

⁴ See below, p. 38.

daily secret interviews with La Farina he soon came to direct largely the operations of the National Society; he saw Garibaldi and told him to make others hope; he held out prospects of ultimate action in Tuscany and perhaps in Romagna;¹ he encouraged the annexationist movement in Sicily and Panizzi's scheme for liberating Settembrini and his fellow-prisoners.² Even Mazzini confessed that he "was Italian at the bottom of his soul."

In the earlier days, however, of the National Society, before he had disclosed himself to La Farina or learnt the strength of the movement, he seemed the mere political sceptic, "laughing at everybody and everything"; his dislike of programme-makers made him half-contemptuous of the Society's amateur politics. Pallavicino, to whom the French alliance was abomination, distrusted him and wanted to overthrow him, strangely expecting that Manin would succeed him as premier. "To hope to make Italy with Cavour," he wrote, "is absurd." But Manin's calmer judgment knew that if the National Society could convert public opinion, Cavour would follow, and that the better policy was to force his hand, and compel him to come boldly over to the flag of unity. But Manin, in common with the rest of the forward school, was too puzzled by Cavour, too suspicious of his policy, to place his main reliance in him. He thought more of winning the King. Victor Emmanuel's more expansive and direct nature led him into expressions of sympathy, from which Cavour was careful to abstain. Though Cavour's sympathies with the national movement were as real, the King's were more impulsive, more impatient, more easily guided into the path of big ambitions. A soldier by every instinct, hating Austria with his whole soul, he looked eagerly forward to the day of war and revenge. "If you do not begin soon," he told Pallavicino, "I will."

But though Victor Emmanuel might be the figurehead of the movement, it needed its popular hero, and Pallavicino

¹ La Farina, *loc. cit.*; Cavour, *Nuove lettere*, 337; Canth, *Cronistoria*, III. 126; Manin e Pallavicino, 172. I much suspect the accuracy of Mazzini, *Opere*, IX. 352; a year later Cavour "would shoot Mazzini if he could."

² See below, p. 34.

knew that he could find him best in Garibaldi. The fame of his valour in Montevideo and at Rome, his generous direct nature, in which mingled the democrat and the gentleman, the faith in his supreme courage and genius of generalship made him still the idol of Italy. His clear sincerity, the benignant good-nature that shone in his face, his perfect grace and strength of body gave him the magnetism, that made men ready to follow him to any danger, and proud to put their lives and wills in his keeping. Not Cavour's wisdom, not Mazzini's high idealism and long patient work could give the fascination, which Garibaldi's heroism had won. In private life he was no saint. His intellectual power was small; as D'Azeglio said, he had "a heart of gold but the brains of an ox." His political conceptions were elementary; his mind was a chaos of noble ideas, his resolutions came at haphazard, sometimes to die away as quickly, sometimes to stay with a stubbornness that took no account of facts; his methods were often effective in their simplicity and directness, but had no mark of balance or big outlook. He came with difficulty to a decision, where the arguments were evenly balanced, or where opposing influences were brought to bear on him. His was a nature that learnt little, and forgot or forgave little; really honourable at bottom, he would yet break promises lightly or sacrifice truth to passion; personal flattery, personal pique always weighed much in his undisciplined mind. But when once roused, he was decisive, rapid, resolute. His instinct was to go straight to his point or not at all; subtlety, patience, management savoured to him of finesse; the arduous work of preparation and detail was always irksome to him; he preferred a dictatorship to parliamentary government. But his very impatience was akin to the directness, the hatred of trickery and diplomacy, which was an essential part of his hero nature. His intense sympathy with every form of suffering, his eagerness to succour the oppressed, his deep reverence for Christ's teaching,¹ that went hand-in-hand with a fanatical hatred of priests, made him the knight-errant of forlorn causes and downtrodden peoples.

¹ Vecchi, *Garibaldi*, 238.

He was a tremendous but ungoverned force, capable of epoch-making heroisms, capable too of immense mischief.

He had been banished from Piedmont by D'Azeglio in 1849; four years later he was allowed to return, and settled at Caprera, a rocky islet off Sardinia, to the solitary farmer's life he loved so dearly. He was still a republican with a consuming hatred of Austria and still more of the Pope, but everything conspired to draw him towards the new school. His old dislike of Mazzini was still strong; he had nothing of the conspirator, no taste for the forlorn enterprises of the great agitator. Though supremely brave, he was no would-be martyr, but a soldier with a strong liking for victory. Like many another republican, he had come to believe in Victor Emmanuel, and more or less in Cavour; and though somewhat suspicious that the government did not mean business, he saw that the army and treasure of Piedmont were necessary for the war, for which he fretted. He was ready to fight Austria "with any ally, even the devil himself, if the devil were anti-Austrian." Busily beleaguered by La Farina's agents, he joined the Society in the summer of 1856; but the republicans would not loose their hold of him without a struggle, and it was only after a year of wavering that he signed its manifesto.

While the National Society was preparing for the final solution of a future day, the populations of the South were crying for some more early if partial relief. And it was not so much to the direct help of Piedmont, as to the Powers, whose sympathy Cavour had enlisted, that they looked. England would do nothing to help Northern Italy, but both she and France were morally pledged to interfere at Rome and Naples. Sometimes the Emperor half took courage to withdraw his troops from Rome and compel Austria, by force if necessary, to evacuate Romagna; more often he was under the bondage of the Empress and the clericals, and muttered mild pleas for reform.¹ Clarendon, whose hands were freer, used strong words about the misrule, but Antonelli adroitly retorted that the excitement

¹ Bianchi, *Diplomazia*, VII. 278, 307; Minghetti, *Ricordi*, III. 155.

caused by the Congress made concession difficult, and hoped to parry the Emperor's plea by an apology, which was probably drafted by himself,¹ but had the signature of Rayneval, the French minister (May 1856).² But Rayneval's disingenuous memorial failed to convince the Emperor; his cousin Pepoli of Bologna, a grandson of Murat, controverted Rayneval's facts, and Napoleon, recalling his minister, used firmer language to the Pope. For a moment he was inclined to advocate Home Rule for Romagna and the Marches; and though he softened his demands to an amplification of the programme of Portici, Antonelli saw that he must make a show of concession. A reformed criminal code was printed, though it was never published; the railway to Civita Vecchia was commenced; the Austrians were persuaded to reduce their army of occupation to the garrisons at Bologna and Ancona. To convince Europe how much his government was maligned, the Pope went on a lengthy progress through Romagna (May–August 1857), and the officials were carefully prompted to prepare loyalist demonstrations. But the Liberals had laid their counter-mines in concert with Cavour and Hudson; the communal councils prepared petitions for reform, and when the government, scenting the project, forbade the councils to meet, unofficial memorials took their place. The Pope was received respectfully but very coldly; at Perugia he was greeted with cries of "Bread and the Statute"; at Bologna the archbishop was hooted by the students. Some of the Moderates, half won by Pius' courtesy and pathetic gentleness, tried to persuade him to the one course that could save his rule; but he had convinced himself that the mass of the people did not want reform, and that concession would lead to ultra-democracy and attacks on the church. He thought that Mazzini preached massacre and rapine, and his dread of the agitator was only excelled by his intense anger against the "vulpine" Turin government. When at last he was half won over, he mournfully con-

¹ Salvagni, *Corte romana*, III. 318.

² Cavour got hold of a copy and sent it to the *Daily News*, which published it on March 29, 1857: D'Azeglio e Gualterio, *Curteggio*, 239.

fessed that he "had not the courage" to reform. He had sealed his doom; his refusal destroyed the last hopes in him, and even Rome joined in the petitions.

But the Pope's government was now more indolent and corrupt than cruel, and it was felt impossible at Paris and London to take strong steps against it for the present. It was otherwise at Naples. Ferdinand was a sort of diplomatic outlaw, and Walewski and Clarendon sent him a sharp remonstrance, urging him to grant an amnesty and reform his government. They had a right to interfere, they claimed, for the condition of the kingdom was an encouragement to revolution and a peril to the peace of Europe (May 1856). Ferdinand set his face against all reform; there were still practically no railways; trade stagnated, while the government smothered it with its hostility or protection. The political prisoners, despite the outcry of civilised Europe, were treated with the same savagery that Mr. Gladstone had denounced; and a plan to raid the prisons and free them, concerted by Hudson and Panizzi, came to nothing, though it had the connivance of Cavour and perhaps of Palmerston.¹ Besides the claims of humanity, England and France had their special grievances. Ferdinand had shown his unfriendliness during the Crimean war; he had refused to allow the Allies to buy Sicilian sulphur, and permitted petty insults to their flags. And when the joint representation came in, he stiffly replied, that though he had prepared an amnesty, he intended to suspend it rather than seem to act under compulsion; his was an independent state, and he would make no terms with governments that patronized revolution. He prepared for war, probably hoping for Austrian or Russian backing; but when even Austria counselled concession, he toned down his first angry answer, and offered to deport the political prisoners to the Argentine. And the Allies, though they withdrew their ministers (October 1856), were not ashamed to accept the base compromise, rather than irritate Austria and Russia

¹ *Lettere ad A. Panizzi*, 267; Mario, *Bertani*, I. 211-212; Id., *Mazzini*, 372; *Mazzini, Opere*, IX. cxxx; Malmesbury, *Memoirs*, I. 133.

by declaring war. Even when the deportation scheme broke down, they declined to go beyond the suspension of diplomatic relations. Clarendon was "ready to do anything rather than allow it to be thought that he encouraged revolutionary tendencies."

Napoleon was hardly so prepared to sacrifice consistency and humanity; but now, as ever, he preferred to travel by tortuous paths. There was living at Paris Lucien Murat, son of King Joachim, an idle, cowardly, incapable man; but whose parentage gave him special claims on Naples, while his cousinship to the Emperor made him an obvious puppet for the Imperial policy. He had as tutor to his sons, Saliceti, Ferdinand's ex-minister of 1848, and at Murat's incitement Saliceti published a pamphlet,¹ to test whether Murat would attract any following at Naples, if he appeared as a candidate for the throne. It made a skilful appeal to the nationalists by suggesting a partition of Italy between Naples and Piedmont, which should exclude Austria and the Dukes, and leave only Rome and the Comarca to the Pope. Though the Emperor publicly disclaimed responsibility for the pamphlet and suppressed its circulation, there seems little doubt that he was secretly encouraging Murat,² and the scheme was all in keeping with his policy of planting Napoleonic princes on Italian thrones. The claimant had in fact a considerable chance of success. The whole country, except the *lazzaroni* of Santa Lucia, was praying for Ferdinand's fall. But the Unitarians were weak, Cavour had discouraged any annexationist programme at Naples, and the feeble Liberals would make no serious effort of themselves. There was an obvious immediate gain in accepting Murat, for it promised an early respite from the tyranny. England and France would gladly see the Bourbons driven out, but would countenance no movement towards unity; and though England was suspicious of French designs at

¹ So probably, though D'Ayala, *Memorie*, 202, assigns it to Francesco Trinchera.

² Cavour, *Lettere*, VI. 42, 44; Id., *Nuove Lettere*, 329, 409; Bianchi, *op. cit.*, VII. 329-330; Nisco, *Ferdinando II.*, 327; Mazzini, *Opere*, IX. cxxviii; contra, Veroli, *Pepoli*, in *Riv. Eur.* XXVIII. 405; Minghetti, *op. cit.*, III. 156; Greville Memoirs, VIII. 62. See below, p. 48.

Naples, she would probably content herself with securing independence for Sicily. Murat promised the moral and material support of France; and it was a sense of this, that won him a large section among the nobility and the Moderate exiles at Paris and Turin. As Grand-Master of the Freemasons, he was likely to secure the support of their organisation, which was powerful both at Naples and Palermo; and though "Murattism" seems to have made little headway in the provinces, it was strong in the capital, where the appearance of a French fleet in the bay would probably have rallied to the pretender the multitude, that were ready to side with the strongest. Even in Sicily he had a few adherents.

Cavour himself was carried more or less with the stream. He did not like the project, he would give Murat no assistance, and stirred up English jealousy. But when after long doubt he convinced himself that the Emperor was at Murat's back, he dared not openly thwart him. "Murat is a bad solution," he wrote, "but it is the only one that can succeed, and we must submit with a good grace." Once he seems to have hoped to win Ferdinand to a national and liberal policy; but when the short-lived delusion died, and he knew too that there was no likelihood of an unitarian movement at Naples, he felt that he could not oppose anything, which "put Italian Independence on its flag" and promised to free Naples from her misery. He no doubt counted on Murat's alliance against Austria, and perhaps hoped that English influence would allow him to annex Sicily in the event of a Bourbon downfall.¹

But while Cavour was thinking chiefly of the coming struggle for Northern Italy, the Unitarians were seriously alarmed by Murat's plans and their probable consequences. If Murat once reigned at Naples, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to dispossess him; for even if Sicily declared for

¹ Cavour, *Lettere*, II. 391; VI. 41-42; Id., *Nuove lettere*, 329, 339, 349, 409, 411, 418, 426, 554; Bianchi, *Cavour*, 46-47; Id., *Politique de Cavour*, 169; Id., *Diplomazia*, VII. 329; Manin e Pallavicino, 155, 160; Minghetti, *Ricordi*, III. 386. For other views of Cavour's policy see Veroli, *op. et vol. cit.*, 405, and Cavour, *Lettere*, II. ccxii

annexation to Piedmont, on the mainland Murat would have behind him not only the support of France, but all the antipathy to the North, which, under a Liberal rule, would carry the mass of the population into opposition to unity. Manin contended that Murat on the throne would by force of circumstances become the rival of Victor Emmanuel, and therefore openly or secretly the ally of Austria. All who cared for unity realised that the pretender's success meant the indefinite postponement of their hopes. The best of the exiles protested; the political prisoners declared that they "would rather die in prison than stretch out their hands to this foreign adventurer." Manin prayed the Neapolitans to rely upon themselves. Mazzini, solicitous to defeat at once Manin and Murat, was planning a revolution, which, beginning in Naples or Sicily, would spread through the peninsula, and sweep away Ferdinand and Pope and Austrians. All parties realised how hopeful a seedbed of revolution the Bourbon rule had made. In Sicily the old separatist party was almost dead, and made room for a policy that would merge the people in the common body of Italians. To the revolutionists Sicily was "the island of initiative," the "starting-point for Italian Unity." For five years past Niccola Fabrizi, the brave, gentle, self-sacrificing pupil of Mazzini, had been busily organising from Malta the elements of discontent and aspiration; and Crispi since his expulsion from Genoa in 1854 had been strenuously assisting. Mazzini and Garibaldi discussed an expedition to rouse the island to revolt, but Garibaldi would consent to go only if Cavour promised to cooperate, and though Cavour seems at first to have promised funds, he soon drew back.¹ But he had his own plans of annexation;² and La Farina was organising the Piedmontese party in the island, and half persuaded Palmerston to allow the Anglo-Italian legion to land there on its return from the Crimea.³ It was as a result of Crispi's work, that towards the end of 1856 the young Baron Benti-

¹ Mario, *Mazzini*, 368, 372; Id., *Garibaldi*, 436; Oddo, *I mille*, I. 153-154.

² Cavour, *Lettere*, II. 215; Bianchi, *Politique de Cavour*, 134; La Farina, *Epistolario*, II. 28. See La Masa, *Fatti*, ii, and the curious story in Greville *Memoirs*, VII. 293.

³ La Farina, *op. cit.*, I. 550; II. 30. See also Villari, *Cospirazioni*, 292.

vegna raised the tricolor near Termini, in the trust that England and France would intervene in his support; but his appeal to the Sicilians found little response, and Bentivegna was hunted down and shot. But though the Liberals stood aloof, probably thinking the rising premature, their "Committee of Order" had its agents and secret press active through the island. A more formidable conspiracy was maturing on the mainland. It was generally agreed that a rising in the capital had no hope of success, but the Liberals of the Basilicata and parts of the Capitanata and Puglia were well organised and ready to put at least several hundred armed men into the field. Murat had no following here, and the Mazzinians and Piedmontese party were working well in common. They had convinced themselves, and the events of four years later justify their belief, that at the first success a large number of the native troops would come over to them. How intense was the hatred of the Bourbons was shown a month after Bentivegna's rising, when a Calabrian soldier, Agesilao Milano, emulous of classic tyrannicide, attempted the King's life at a parade (December 8, 1856), and but for Ferdinand's coolness the Swiss and native troops would have fired on one another. Milano had no accomplices in his plot, but within another month two explosions, which can hardly have been accidental, wrecked a powder magazine close by the palace and a frigate anchored in the bay. Even Ferdinand's own brother and uncle were in correspondence with the Liberals.

It was the knowledge of the disaffection, that encouraged Mazzini to action. He himself, it would seem, was ^{more} eager to start a revolutionary movement at Genoa and Leghorn.¹ But he decided to connect it with a scheme, which had been combined between the Liberals of Naples, and the Basilicata and a few of the Neapolitan and Sicilian exiles at Genoa. Carlo Pisacane, a Neapolitan duke, a man of highest character but crude and sanguine mind, in politics a revolutionary socialist, intended with a few followers to take passage on board the *Cagliari*, a steamer plying between Genoa and Sardinia, seize the vessel when

¹ Mazzini, *Opere*, XI. xxix; De Monte, *Sapri*, xci, 53, 58.

at sea, make for the penal settlement of Ponza off Gaeta, and releasing the convicts there, land with them at Sapri in the Gulf of Policastro, where they would join hands with the insurgents of the Basilicata and advance on Naples. Meanwhile the Genoese democrats were to seize the city and forts, and send him reinforcements. The conspirators denied any intention of upsetting the government at Genoa, and many of them no doubt intended no more than to find arms and men for the expedition; but to all purposes, and probably in Mazzini's deliberate intention, it was a republican revolt.¹ Under any light the Genoese part of the plot was a mad scheme, fatuous in its conception, ill-directed in its execution, and the saner democrats like Garibaldi and Bertani were careful to hold aloof. Pisacane's project had more hope of success; and though the conspiracy was confused for the moment by the terrorism that followed Milano's attempt, it only needed one real shock to bring down Ferdinand's crumbling rule. Pisacane was successful in seizing the *Cagliari* (June 25, 1857), but his release of 400 refractory soldiers and common criminals at Ponza² discredited the expedition. When he landed at Sapri, he found the Basilicata, thanks to his own carelessness, quite unprepared, and the peasantry of the Principato roused to fanaticism against the men, who were justly painted as marauders. After weary wanderings in the neighbourhood of Cilento, Pisacane's little band, outnumbered and disillusioned, was borne down by the militia and armed peasantry at Sanza; Pisacane fell with half his men, and the survivors came into the clutches of Ferdinand's judges. Meanwhile the plots at Genoa and Leghorn had ended in futile scuffles and aimless loss of life; and the Piedmontese government proceeded with a severity hardly less than Ferdinand's against the arrested conspirators. The folly of the movement may well have roused Cavour's indignation,³

¹ Compare Mazzini, *Opere*, IX. 344, with the minutes of the trial in Zini, *Storia, Documenti* I. 668-669, 683-684.

² There were at most fourteen political prisoners: Lacava, *Basilicata*, 183, 205-206, 210; according to Mario, *Nicotera*, 7, Pisacane thought that all were political prisoners. See De Monte, *op. cit.*, xl, ccxxiii.

³ According to Mario, *op. cit.*, 15, he sent Pisacane's papers to the Neapolitan government.

but it says little for his honesty or chivalry that he punished so ruthlessly the men, who in part at all events were preparing the way for himself. And the expedition, disastrous failure as it seemed, was the forlorn hope of victory. Pisacane, in Victor Hugo's words, was greater than Garibaldi, as John Brown was greater than Lincoln. It was indeed the final blow to Mazzini's influence, for the most loyal could not look for leadership to the man who had blundered so often. But it dispelled the fatal fascination that tied the Moderates to Murat's plans, and gave a new impetus to the Unitarian movement in the South.

A minor result of the expedition was a natural development of the tension between Naples and Piedmont. The *Cagliari* had been captured after Pisacane's landing on the high seas by the Neapolitan fleet, and the crew, which included two English engineers, were thrown into a Neapolitan prison. Ferdinand may be excused for his belief in Cavour's complicity, but the seizure was contrary to maritime law, and his desire to provoke Victor Emmanuel's government was sufficiently apparent. The Turin ministry claimed the vessel, and the English government demanded the release of the two British subjects. Ferdinand refused to surrender either ship or crew, and the matter threatened to end in war, when the Derby cabinet came in. It readily caught at an excuse for deserting the Piedmontese, when Ferdinand released the two Englishmen; but English public opinion was indignant at the tame acquiescence, and the government was forced to put in a claim for indemnity and act again in unison with Turin. Ferdinand, at last frightened by the imminent danger, restored the ship and indemnified the engineers (June 1858). The incident added another laurel to Cavour's diplomacy.

His authority in Piedmont was more absolute than ever. The session, which had opened at Turin in January 1857, reflected the confident courage of the country. In spite of the deficits on every year's budget and the steady and serious increase of the national debt, the country was still advancing in prosperity. There had been good harvests;

free trade and the railways (there were now 600 miles open) were bearing their fruit in a rapid expansion of commerce. The silk trade had doubled, the cotton trade quadrupled since 1848. There had been a notable advance in agricultural enterprise and produce. Agricultural wages had risen twenty-five per cent., and, though the land-tax weighed very heavily on the peasants, all classes benefited in the reduction of duties on food. Parliament had passed votes for the Mont Cenis tunnel and the new docks at Genoa, and the seaport was recovering its prosperity. Lanza, now minister of education, tried to raise the standard of the elementary and secondary schools. By a law of 1848 every commune was compelled to maintain an elementary school, and the attendance was now fairly good, over ten per cent. of the whole population being on the registers. But there was a great lack of good teachers, and the salaries were miserably low;¹ while the curriculum of the numerous old-fashioned "Latin schools" was quite unsuited to modern needs. Lanza's bill proposed to leave the private schools untouched, but gave his department limited powers of control over them, made teachers pass an examination, established normal schools, and fixed a minimum salary; it more or less regulated and modernized the Latin schools, and provided for the foundation of technical colleges. But he found strong opposition. The clericals objected to interference with the private schools, though less than one-tenth of the children attended them; and Cavour and a considerable section of the Liberals supported them in the name of "freedom of teaching." But men less bound to the strict Liberal creed pointed out the necessity of state supervision, and showed what a weapon "freedom of teaching" had placed in the hands of the clericals in France and Belgium. Cavour, as in the question of the *incameramento*, was obliged to sacrifice his individual convictions, and the bill was carried. Its effect on the secondary schools was instantaneous, and the number of pupils quadrupled in three years.

¹ Averaging £15, 12s. per annum; in 1852 it was given as £13 for males and £7, 4s. for women teachers. The men earned their living largely by the spade.

Domestic politics however were more and more overshadowed by the coming war. Parliament accepted La Marmora's scheme of a network of fortifications between Alessandria, Casale, and Valenza, which would delay an Austrian advance till French help could arrive. Across the Ticino the Milanese had marked the Emperor Francis Joseph's visit by subscribing for a statue at Turin in honour of the Piedmontese army. It was impossible for Austria to overlook the incessant provocations, and after an angry correspondence, its *chargé d'affaires*, who had been left at Turin since Buol's withdrawal in 1853, was recalled (March 29, 1857). The diplomatic rupture was complete, and all Palmerston's sophistries in defence of Austria¹ failed to induce the Piedmontese to take any steps to heal it.

So far the nationalists had carried all before them. The propagandism of the National Society had drawn together the Liberals of all Italy, and sown the seeds of revolt in every despotic state. The final collapse of the republicans had minimised the danger of division in the nationalist ranks. Even some of the Extreme Right were ready to support the national dignity against Austria. Piedmont was steadily making ready for the war, and French support, if not yet finally assured, was at least probable. With the prospect of the allied army in the field, and the support of all that was best in Italy behind her, Piedmont looked forward with confidence to the struggle. But the reactionaries had decided on one final effort. Reform in Lombardy and Romagna might satisfy England, where the Derby cabinet, even more than its predecessor, was leaning to Austria and suspicious of French designs. Even France itself might possibly withdraw its support, for the Emperor was very loath to find himself in conflict with Rome, and the criticisms of the advanced press of Turin and Genoa galled him sorely. And a great attempt might be made to capture the enemy's citadel by returning a reactionary majority at the coming elections in Piedmont. It seemed a forlorn enterprise, for the trust in Cavour and the King was apparently unshaken,

¹ Bianchi, *Diplomazia*, VII. 365-368.

and the nationalist feeling was growing ever intenser. But the plot was well and carefully laid. The heavy taxation created an easy lever of discontent among the peasantry; Savoy had little sympathy for Italian aspirations, and the clericals and nobles were all powerful there. In Piedmont the Liberals were unprepared and divided, expecting a repetition of their easy victories, and the different groups were more intent on fighting one another than on resisting the common enemy. The word of order came from Rome to prepare secretly and vigorously.¹ The cry of danger to the church was raised at confessional and altar; the attack on the monasteries, the polemics of the anti-clerical press, the threat of excommunication made the ears of every devotee tingle; "the priests were authorized to draw large credits on heaven and hell"; the sacraments, the rites of burial were refused to Liberals by the more militant clergy. The aristocracy, who since 1848 had lived more on their estates, and by leading the peasants against the middle classes had made themselves masters of the local councils, now for the first time came into the arena. Even the more patriotic of the bishops and the moderate Right were swept away by the tide, and forgot their country for their church. Rome showed the enormous latent powers that she possessed, and the superstition of the peasantry, a vague sense of uneasiness among the devout of every class, all the conservatism that was irresistibly attracted to her, proved that she might become as great a danger in a constitutional state as under a despotism.

The elections were held in November (1857). Up to the last the Liberals had scented no danger, and the government, partly from Cavour's comparative scrupulousness, had not used its usual electoral influence. At the last moment clerical candidates were nominated in almost every constituency; Savoy and the Riviera, even Genoa, hitherto the stronghold of the Extreme Left, returned an almost unbroken rank of reactionaries; and in Piedmont, where the franchise was higher, though most of the towns

¹ Cavour, *Lettre*, VI. 88; Zini, *Storia*, I. 735.

stood firm, there were losses in the rural districts. If the Liberals had not closed up their ranks at the second ballots, the new Chamber would have had a clerical majority. The peril had been very great, but the forces of reaction had tried their worst and been defeated; and the unscrupulousness of the tactics, the abuse of spiritual arms, the disclosures in the election petitions had a lasting effect on the minds of moderate men. And the whole political atmosphere was cleared; the Extreme Left and the moderate Right had almost disappeared. The two great parties of Liberalism and Reaction were face to face. The presence of forty-one nobles in the Chamber marked at once the ultra-Conservatism of the opposition, and the fact that the aristocracy had come into political life; while Cavour had behind him a homogeneous majority, pledged to his leadership. Even Brofferio and Valerio, warned by the elections and a sense of the coming struggle, were inclined to mitigate their criticism. But the ministerial ship had been so near to foundering, that a victim was called for; and on various grounds the majority demanded Rattazzi's resignation. Cavour, irritated because he had broken his promise to help to part the King from his mistress, and caring more for expediencies of state than for any chivalry of friendship, requested him to resign office, and he did so with dignity and self-control. But he felt Cavour's ingratitude bitterly, and gradually gathered round himself a cove of the discontented, inclined to waver towards the Left.

CHAPTER XXVI

PLOMBIÈRES

1858—APRIL 1859

The Orsini plot; Napoleon III. and Piedmont; HE MEETS CAVOUR AT PLOMBIÈRES; the Emperor and Europe. Cavour and Central Italy; he organizes the national movement. Maximilian in Lombardy. The National Society's propaganda. The Emperor's words to Hübner; the "cry of woe"; THE TREATY WITH FRANCE; "*Napoléon III. et l'Italie*"; the conversion of the republicans; "To Piedmont"; Tuscany; Piedmont. The Emperor in March; German policy; English policy; proposed Congress; proposed disarmament; Austrian ultimatum; France declares war.

It seemed the fate of Cavour's policy that a succession of crises should test it for its final issue, and that from each ordeal it should emerge more tempered. The elections were hardly over, when another peril, equally unexpected, put it to severer proof. Eight years before we have seen Felice Orsini acting for the Roman Republic, and by his audacity and promptitude crushing the anarchist outbreak at Ancona. He had been Mazzini's most trusted agent in the petty outbreaks of the early '50s, and, though he had little hope in their success, his noble unselfish nature never allowed him to refuse a call to danger. Banished from Piedmont, the restless agitator fell into the hands of the Austrian police, and from his prison at Mantua made an escape that won him European fame. A rupture with Mazzini brought him the vindictive spleen of his master's baser followers, and it was perhaps their taunts that resolved him to silence criticism by some great deed. He wrote to Cavour, offering his help, but the premier deigned no reply. Thrown back on himself, he resolved to kill the Emperor. To him Louis Napoleon was the man of December 2, the successful hypo-

critical tyrant, who had trampled on the republic at Rome and Paris, whose power held back the revolution, and threw its shield over the despotisms of Europe. He believed that the Emperor had allied himself with Austria to crush Italy, and that only when he fell, would Italy find her chance of freedom.¹ All the spirit of the tyrannicide was in him, and he was ready to take his life in his hand, if its sacrifice would save his country. He had few accomplices, and himself took the chief risk. On an evening in January 1858, as the Emperor and Empress were driving to the Opera, three bombs were thrown at their carriage. The horrible carnage spared the intended victims, but killed or wounded over 150 of the crowd.

The first result was sheer panic. Paris and the Emperor lost their heads. And while the Parisian press vented its wrath on England, which had sheltered Orsini, and on Piedmont as a nest of regicides, the government demanded at London and Turin that the refugees and their press should be curbed. There was a real danger for the moment, that Napoleon's fears would be too many for his Italian sympathies, that as he had sacrificed his Polish scheme to Russia, its twin project might be pushed aside for his own pique. Cavour's position was a very difficult one. He had already before Orsini's attempt gone far to pacify the Emperor; he had prosecuted the Genoese conspirators with unworthy severity; he had expelled refugees by the hundred, and was contemplating the suppression of the Friendly Societies at Genoa, which he suspected of revolutionary aims. But he would not, dared not humiliate the country by bowing to the Emperor's demands, and the reception of Palmerston's Conspiracy Bill came as a warning. It was felt to be intolerable that the peace of neighbouring countries should be upset, because the Emperor went in fear for his life. There were already murmurings of his more advanced supporters, and even of some of his colleagues. He was probably himself restive at the importunate despot, to whom he had yoked himself; and when the Emperor wrote a threatening autograph to Victor Emmanuel, the King at

¹ Orsini, *Memoirs*, 190; Kossuth, *Memories*, 51.

his suggestion replied in terms of offended pride that he would tolerate no pressure. All that Cavour would or could consent to was an amendment to the press law, which punished on the requisition of the government concerned any publication excusing plots against the life of foreign potentates, while another clause temporarily modified the jury lists, for juries were very unwilling to convict in government prosecutions of the press, whether clerical or democrat. The bill, mild as it was, found little sympathy from the Left, but Rattazzi supported it, and it passed the Chamber by a large majority (April 29).

But as soon as the first panic was over, the Orsini plot, so far from estranging the Emperor, spurred him to more practical sympathy. Face to face with the possibility of war with England, he was anxious to make it easy for Piedmont to make propitiation to himself. Before his execution Orsini had written two letters to the Emperor, in which, after retracting his faith in assassination, he appealed to Napoleon's Italian blood, and warned him, that only when Italian aspirations were realised, would he secure the peace of Europe and the safety of his own throne. "Deliver Italy," he wrote, "and the blessings of twenty-five millions of Italians will follow you." The appeal to the Emperor's generosity and fears sank deep, and Cavour probably pressed home his old moral that an unsatisfied Italy was a hotbed of revolution. In appearance the Emperor had France at his feet, but there were grave symptoms of disaffection, that might drive him to another war, to turn attention from the despotism at home. Now that Poland was sacrificed, he was the more eager to fulfil his other dream of freeing Italy and Hungary.¹ Cavour had won his gratitude by supporting him in opposition to England and Austria on the minor questions that arose out of the Treaty of Paris. Now, after the brief fit of anger that followed Orsini's attempt, the Press Law and the heavy sentences on the Genoese conspirators went far to satisfy

¹ Martin, *Prince Consort*, IV. 353; Ashley, *Palmerston*, II. 179; Greville *Memoirs*, VIII. 219-220; Bianchi, *Diplomazia*, VII. 360; Della Rocca, *Autobiografia*, I. 392.

him, and Prince Napoleon,¹ who led the Liberal and anti-clerical party in the court, used all his influence to cement a French-Italian alliance. In the summer the Emperor invited Cavour to meet him secretly at Plombières, a watering-place in the Vosges, to arrange the final compact for the deliverance of Italy (July 20). The terms of the memorable interview were long wrapped in mystery, but we have now abundant light as to the more important details.² The Emperor spoke "more like a real Italian Liberal than like the Emperor of the French." He promised that at the fitting moment he would attack Austria, himself to find 200,000 men, Piedmont half as many; he was confident of Russian help and English and Prussian neutrality, and if necessary the Allies would march to Vienna and dictate peace there. Austria would be required to surrender all her Italian possessions; the Emperor was unwilling to touch Papal territory, but Cavour insisted on it, and it was agreed that not only Lombardy-Venetia and the Duchies, but the Legations, and perhaps the Marches, should be annexed to Piedmont, and form the Kingdom of Upper Italy with a population of eleven millions. Umbria and Tuscany were to form a Kingdom of Central Italy, perhaps under the Duchess-regent of Parma. The Pope was to retain Rome and the Comarca under the protection of the French garrison. Ferdinand was to be left to the tender mercies of his subjects, and the Emperor preferred that after the inevitable revolution Murat should be placed on the throne of Naples. The four states thus constituted were to be formed into an Italian Confederation. Then came the price of the Emperor's assistance. First he stipulated that the war should not be for a revolutionary idea, that it should be capable of diplomatic justification in the eyes of his own country and England, and it was

¹ Prince Jerome Napoleon, "Plon-Plon," son of the ex-King of Westphalia.

² We have now three contemporary records: (1) Cavour's letter to the King, published in the *Perseveranza* of August 24, 1853, and reprinted in Cavour, *Lettere*, III. 1; (2) his letter to La Marmora in Massari, *La Marmora*, 204; (3) his letter to Lanza in Tavallini, *Lanza*, I. 194-195, 199. See also Minghetti, *Ricordi*, III. 219; Castelli, *Cavour*, 77; Kossuth, *Memories*, 53, 90-93.

decided that the easiest pretext might be found in the condition of Massa-Carrara, always in a state of semi-revolt against the Duke of Modena. Secondly he asked that Victor Emmanuel's eldest daughter Clotilde should be married to Prince Napoleon, and the proud Savoy blood flow into the veins of his own family. But these were minor matters, and the Emperor's real price was the cession of Savoy and Nice. The fate of Nice, it is probable, he was willing to leave an open question, but he was resolved to have Savoy. To round off France with the Alps and reach its "natural frontiers" at least on the South-East, both satisfied his self-imposed mission to destroy the Treaties of 1815 in the name of nationality, and might do much to secure for his dynasty the doubtful affections of his people. The frontier of the Alps might be a stepping-stone to the frontier of the Rhine.

In spite however of Cavqur's success at Plombières, the position was one of enormous difficulty, and it proved his rare hardihood that he had pledged his country to a situation, from which there was no retreat. Piedmont was heading fast for war; within a few months she must fight, or lose honour and prestige; and if French help were not forthcoming, it would be her inevitable fate to be swallowed up by the hosts that Austria would pour across the Ticino. All the gallantry of Piedmont would avail little against her giant neighbour, unless the legions of France fought for her. And French help was still by no means assured. The Emperor's intentions were loyal, but the difficulties of his position might prove too strong for him. The whole strength of the clerical party in France would muster to prevent a war, which was bound to lead up to an attack on the Temporal Power; and the Emperor dared not alienate the party, which had hailed him as the "new Charlemagne," and who despite a growing coolness were still the chief bulwark of his throne. The financiers of Paris dreaded war and its effects on the money market; the Liberals suspected a policy, which would win prestige for the Empire and drown discontent at home. His ministers, though they had their suspicions, had been kept as much in

the dark as the rest of the country as to the negotiations with Cavour, but their hostility was certain, when the secret once oozed out.

The external obstacles promised to be even greater. The Emperor had not the courage to proclaim himself boldly the champion of nationality, and shrank from the diplomatic shriek, that would follow an avowed intention to upset the public treaties of Europe in the name of an *a priori* principle. England, he knew, would strain every effort to keep the peace, and he could not as yet afford to lose her friendship. The Prussian cabinet was at the moment dominated by suspicion of Vienna, but at any time pan-German public opinion, which regarded Lombardy and Venetia as federal territory, and Verona and Mantua as outposts of the Fatherland, might force the Berlin government into an alliance with Austria. Russia was hot in her new friendship for France, and would gladly see Austria punished by the loss of Lombardy, but she was unlikely to give material assistance or sympathy to a war for nationality. To win the good-will or silence of Europe the revolutionary principle must be cloaked in the language of diplomacy. The diplomatists clung to their formulas with a timidity worthy of theologians, and even the political latitudinarians, who wished to recast the public law of Europe, used the phrases of the worn-out creed of 1815. Cavour hoped to cut the knot by provoking Austria into commencing hostilities; failing this, he trusted to the chapter of accidents, to new developments of the Eastern question, or to some movement at Carrara, which might be twisted into a *casus belli*. He fell in with the Emperor's tenderness to diplomatic etiquette. Whatever were his ulterior hopes, he deprecated any unnecessary raising of difficult questions till the war was over, any talk of annexing Tuscany or Romagna or Naples. Sometimes he seems to have hoped to undermine the Lorrainers, and when the opportunity came, secure Tuscany for Piedmont. More often he put aside any early hope of acquiring the state, thinking it hopeless to expect the consent of the Powers; he was preoccupied with the fear that the Emperor might

try to carve out a Kingdom of Central Italy under a French prince, and the Lorrainers at all events were a safeguard against so fatal an event. BonCompagni, his minister at Florence, was instructed to try to win the Grand Duke to the nationalist side.¹ His schemes in regard to Romagna were equally unambitious; if Europe consented, he would of course gladly annex; if Catholic sentiment proved too strong, he might win the substance of his aim by persuading the Pope to grant Home Rule to Romagna, and appoint Victor Emmanuel his Vicar under Papal suzerainty.² It was a variant of his project of two years earlier; now as then, he could hardly have expected that the Pope would accept it of free will, but he may have hoped that Europe would force it on him as the least thorny solution of the Romagnuol question. Possibly after the Emperor's assurances at Plombières, he may have looked forward to annexation pure and simple, whether the Catholic Powers consented or not.

Most dexterously and unscrupulously he finessed to keep the Emperor in tow and hoodwink Europe. And for the moment he was reassured as to the Emperor's support, and turned his attention to the almost equal difficulties of the situation at home. He had no fears about Piedmont; the little state would face any odds at his own and the King's call. A new loan of forty million lire had been carried by a large majority, and though the Left had voted against it, their opposition was not to its national import, which had been recognized by all. He had asked Rattazzi to join the cabinet again, and Rattazzi, though he refused, knew about Plombières and promised his support. The compliancy of the Senate showed how completely the old Conservative nationalists had been won. But the support of Piedmont was not enough. It was not enough to have with him the active and enthusiastic, he needed the timid and half-hearted and calculating majority, whose defection had been so largely responsible for the failure of 1848.

¹ Bianchi, *op. cit.*, VIII. 14-16, 77-81; Cavour, *Lettere*, III. 23; see below, pp. 60, 84.

² Pasolini, *Memoirs*, 169; the date of the conversation was June 1858.

He must create such a consensus of opinion in Italy, as would with its irresistible moral force bear down the diplomatic opposition, compel France to help, and strengthen Piedmont to make fair terms with her ally. It may be that he hoped that it would force his hands to outpass the comparatively near goal, that was all he dared avow. The National Society had done much to organise such a consensus, and Cavour applied himself to complete its work. For the moment, though, he was face to face with a new peril. His whole policy was based on the assumption that Lombardy-Venetia was groaning under an unbearable tyranny. Had he lost the call from Lombardy, the war would lose half its justification. It was such a danger that now met him.

Austria, with no ally but England, with France and Russia more and more hostile, and Prussia only waiting for an opportunity to rob her of the hegemony of Germany, was bound to do something to remove the scandal of her misrule. Cavour's indictment at the Congress had been a great moral defeat to her. At the end of 1856 the sequestrations were removed, and early in 1857 the Archduke Maximilian, the Emperor's young brother, was sent as Governor to lay the discontent. Maximilian's own politics were sufficiently broad. He would have given the Duchies to Piedmont, saved Romagna from misgovernment by incorporating it in the Empire, and promoted an Italian Federation under the Pope's presidency. He would have allowed Lombardy-Venetia a large measure of Home Rule and representative institutions with a separate Italian army; perhaps his ambitious wife made him hope at times to wear an independent crown.¹ Railways and irrigation works, reforms in taxation and education and local government would develop the material prosperity of the country. Maximilian perhaps had the stuff of a ruler; his popular manners, his lavish expenditure, his readiness to take native advice, his real anxiety and energy to remedy the wrongs of the provinces

¹ Bonfadini, *Mezzosecolo*, 393-394; Cantù, *Cronistoria*, III. 158, 293-295, 304. He was of course afterwards the Emperor Maximilian of Napoleon's Mexican scheme.

disarmed not a little of the opposition. A section of the Conservative nobles and the remnants of the fast-waning anti-Piedmontese party were won; the French Emperor was known to have a strong personal regard for the young Archduke; and in the summer of 1858 the nationalists and Cavour were becoming seriously anxious lest Lombardy should become half-reconciled to the alien. But their fears were exaggerated. Home Rule and reform would have had a chance of success twelve years before. But the iron of the past decade had sunk into the souls of the Lombards and Venetians, and adversity had tempered Milanese mildness to sterner metal. The Liberals shut their ears to Maximilian's blandishments, and felt with the aged Manzoni that the Austrians only gave them "the choice of being fried or boiled." And the last hope of reconciliation died, when Maximilian found himself thwarted at every turn by the home government. The military party was again all powerful at Vienna, and General Giulay, who had succeeded Radetzky shortly before his death early in 1858, revived the army opposition, which had wrecked Karl von Schwarzenberg. The bureaucracy and army coalesced to rush the Austrian rule to the doom, from which Maximilian might possibly have saved it. Two acts of fatuous folly undid the Archduke's work at a stroke. The currency was depreciated by making it uniform with that of the rest of the Empire; the liability to conscription was extended, and coupled with a prohibition of marriage before the age of twenty-three to all who were liable to be drawn. The indignation was strong and deep, and the peasants, hitherto only half touched by the nationalist feeling, were alienated for ever.

Cavour was now free, without any anxiety as to Lombardy or Venetia, to carry out his schemes in the rest of Italy, and bring together every possible element of the nation for the coming struggle. He could not indeed hope to win the clericals. It seemed almost equally difficult to bring the various Liberal and nationalist sections into line. In Piedmont, Lombardy-Venetia and the Duchies his immediate adherents, who would have been content with a strong North Italian kingdom, were in the majority. But the Unitarians,

who formed the backbone of the National Society, were daily gaining strength, and at the opposite pole there was still a considerable sprinkling, especially in Tuscany and Naples, of autonomists, who cherished the independence of the petty states and feared the military and conservative Piedmontese spirit, or were loath to lose the lustre that a court and seat of government gave to their little capitals. They were willing enough to see the House of Savoy rule in all the Po valley, perhaps even in Romagna, but they looked jealously on an advance that might cross the Apennines. And, outside all, there were the republicans, steadily dwindling in numbers, but still counting in their ranks some of the most virile elements of the nation, whose enthusiasm and energy would be invaluable in the great day of trial. Cavour hoped to win the autonomists by his careful suppression of any official policy of annexation in Central or Southern Italy, by trying to enlist the princes in the national cause, by starving the suspicions, which Albertism had excited in 1848. He looked to the National Society to do the rest. After Manin's death in the autumn of 1857, it had been entirely under the control of Pallavicino and its unrelenting secretary La Farina; and though far from being a mere tool of Cavour, it was prepared during the crisis to take its marching orders from him. The motto of Italian Unity was dropped for that of Italian Independence, and instructions were issued to discountenance political controversy till the war was over. In the Austrian provinces and the Duchies it was now all-powerful; so strong was the nationalist feeling in Lombardy, that the chief difficulty of the Society was to restrain the impatience. The Milanese demonstrated against smoking,¹ gave ovations to Verdi, whose initials made a patriotic anagram;² childish manœuvres, but helping to drill the patriots and prevent a premature outbreak. In Romagna the various nationalist organisations had come into line, and had their network of committees through the province. In Sicily the Society steadily won ground from the Mazzinians,

¹ Till an enterprising tobacconist brought out a "Cavourian" brand of cigars, which were smoked by all patriots.

² *Vittorio Emanuele Re D'Italia.*

but neither here nor at Naples was it able to make any effective preparation.

Cavour was using the Society to gather a volunteer force from every part of Italy. It was not that he set any great value on its military uses; but he saw the importance of putting as many men as possible into the field, to prevent the Emperor from claiming all the laurels of victory, and give Piedmont a more effective voice in the settlement that would follow. It might help to provoke Austria into declaring war; it would win the confidence of the radicals, it would fuse the nationalists of the different provinces and be the forerunner of an Italian army. Following up his plan of making the troubles in Massa-Carrara a pretext for hostilities, he approved (October 1858) a scheme of La Farina to prepare for a rising there at the end of the coming April, and send Garibaldi and the volunteers to assist it, confident that this would force Austria to a decisive step. In December Garibaldi, who at this time trusted Cavour and the King implicitly, was summoned to Turin. He readily accepted the part assigned to him, and returned jubilant at the prospect of early fighting.

But despite the work of the National Society, despite Garibaldi's adhesion, there was still a certain diffidence among the majority of tepid patriots. It was the necessary defect of Cavour's secret workings, that though among the initiated it was an open secret that there would be war in the coming spring, he had failed to convince the masses that he meant action. There was a strong repugnance to the French alliance, a fear that it would end in some feeble compromise, which would leave Italy in little better case than before. Lombardy was fretting for war; but elsewhere there was more expectancy and suppressed excitement than confidence or enthusiasm. The doubters had not long to wait. At the Emperor's reception on New Year's Day (1859), he brusquely told Hübner, the Austrian minister, that he regretted that "the relations between the two Empires were not as good as they had been." It is probable that he did not intend the words as a menace;¹ but the friction between France and Austria was steadily growing,

¹ Compare the Cowley incident: Martin, *Prince Consort*, V. 39.

and despite an official explanation in the *Moniteur*, the words were taken through Europe as a threat of war. Cavour was troubled at the premature declaration; but the die was cast, and Piedmont must not be behindhand in bold language. The opening of Parliament had been fixed for January 7; Cavour had already drafted the speech from the throne, in which he spoke of the new year as "not being entirely serene." His colleagues objected to the words as being too strong by the diplomatic standard of speech, and the matter was referred to the Emperor, who suggested as emendation a phrase that the King "was not insensible to the cry of woe that reached him from so many parts of Italy." The phrase was stronger than the original, but Cavour and the King eagerly adopted it; and the enthusiasm, with which the Chamber and its galleries hailed the speech, showed that the bold words had gone home.

It was clear now to all the world that the Emperor intended war before many months were out, and Austria was already sending another army-corps into Lombardy. And though the Emperor was anxious to postpone hostilities till his army was more ready and Austria more definitely isolated, he secretly ordered the troops at Lyons to be ready to cross the Alps,¹ and Prince Napoleon started for Turin (January 13) to claim Princess Clotilde as his bride. On his arrival he concluded an offensive alliance between France and Piedmont (January 18), stipulating that in the event of victory Lombardy-Venetia and the Duchies and if possible Romagna and the Marches should go to Piedmont, while France took Savoy, and Nice was left for future settlement.² A military convention of the same date provided that war should begin between the middle of April and the end of July, and that France should send 200,000 men. The Clotilde marriage was apparently an essential part of the pact. The princess was barely sixteen; Prince Napoleon

¹ La Gorce, *Second Empire*, III. 4; D'Almazan, *Guerre d'Italie*, 54.

² I think there can be no doubt as to the treaty, though Bianchi does not explicitly mention it (see *Diplomazia*, VIII. 6, 11), and Chiala, in Cavour, *Lettere*, III. xxxii, gives no authority for his quotation of it. According to Massari, *Cavour*, 279, it was a defensive alliance only.

was a cowardly, unscrupulous, middle-aged rake, and the cold-blooded sacrifice of the young girl revolted the best feeling of the country. Victor Emmanuel was not an affectionate father to his legitimate children; but the immolation of his daughter touched his self-respect, perhaps some fonder sentiment, and his pride revolted against marrying one of his family into the parvenu Bonapartes. But to Cavour the girl was an unconsidered pawn in the game, and the King's objections were "scruples of rancid aristocracy." His insistence bore down Victor Emmanuel's opposition, and the marriage took place on the last day of the month.

Events followed fast. Early in February the Emperor astonished his ministers by telling them that he was at the point of issuing a manifesto on the Italian question. The manifesto (February 4) was a pamphlet written by his friend, La Guéronnière,¹ but it was corrected by the Emperor himself, and was well understood to express his views. The gist of *Napoleon III. et l'Italie* was the necessity of satisfying Italian nationality and rescuing the Pope from his present impossible position by a scheme of Italian Federation. Italian Unity was declared to be impossible; the thrones of Tuscany and Naples were specifically safeguarded, and a triple partition of Italy at the expense of Austria and the Pope was hinted at not obscurely. Rome was to be the seat of the federal government, but the city, with an undefined amount of territory, was to be left to the Pope, under a reformed government, and with a native army, which would enable the French garrison to withdraw. The pamphlet pointed at Austria as the great obstacle to reform at Rome or any scheme of federation, and though it said nothing directly as to her expulsion, it hinted pointedly that she must go, and that if war came, France would fight for "the mother of nations."

Meanwhile the Emperor's words to Hübner and the King's speech had set Italy ablaze. The "cry of woe" was an epoch-making phrase, which echoed and re-echoed

¹ Cavour, *Lettere*, III. 385, *et seq.* He was assisted by E. Rendu, but Minghetti is wrong in saying (*Ricordi*, III. 222), that Rendu wrote it. For the Emperor's part in it, see Kossuth, *Memories*, 116.

through the land, and woke all the latent patriotism to enthusiasm and action. All lingering hesitation, all suspicion of Cavour's earnestness, scruples as to a foreign alliance, distrust of the Emperor's tainted help vanished when the King's speech publicly pledged his government to certain and imminent war. Its first result was to complete the republican conversion. The defections to the National Society had already taken over the great majority, but there was still, centring at Genoa, a small but influential group, which wavered between Garibaldi and Mazzini. Medici, Nino Bixio, and Bertani, men who had a big part to play in the coming struggle, now definitely decided to support the Piedmontese government.¹ Nothing but the blindest fanaticism, they felt, could keep them from sinking for the moment at all events their republican faith, and helping to strike the great blow for independence; and Genoa, hitherto divided between the clericals and republicans, both equally bitter opponents of Cavour's policy, suddenly became enthusiastic for him and for the King. Mazzini, though willing to waive his republicanism, refused to give any countenance to the French alliance, or to a policy that declared for less than unity. He stood aloof in his perverse isolation, and a few irreconcilable pedants, as Crispi and Pilo, followed him to sulk in their tents. But for the time at all events the republican party was extinct.

Even more than the republican conversion, the volunteer movement showed how deep and strong the national feeling was. Cavour's arrangements with Garibaldi had prepared the way for a volunteer force, but up to the end of the year they had no practical result. The movement began in January with the escape of some Lombard conscripts; the intense feeling against the new Austrian conscription law gave a lever on the masses, that the Lombard nationalist committees were quick to take advantage of, and all the efforts of the authorities were powerless to check a people's conspiracy. The ostentatious welcome given to the fugitives by the Piedmontese government was new proof that it was bent on war, and the movement spread to the other states.

¹ Mario, *Bertani*, I. 290-297.

"To go to Piedmont" became the test of patriotism, and from all Italy the young volunteers poured across the frontier by hundreds a day, while the governments looked on, impotent to prevent. From Modena and Parma and Tuscany, from Romagna and Umbria and the Marches they came. A regiment of Papal dragoons deserted; the Carrara marble works were nearly at a standstill, for the masons had crossed the frontier; from Naples and Sicily men escaped in fishing-boats. Before the war began, probably between 20,000 and 25,000 had enrolled themselves in the regular army or in Garibaldi's regiments. The military authorities frowned on the irregular corps, and Cavour had infinite difficulties in procuring uniforms and arms for them. But the country was behind him; Garibaldi had had a fresh interview with the King (March 2), and shortly afterwards was appointed to the command with liberty to choose his own officers, and a promise that there should be no enquiry into the politics of his men. Cavour had secured for the movement all the half-mythical cult, that surrounded Garibaldi's name, that made him a terror to the Austrian private, and a venerated hero to his own countrymen. The "Hymn to Garibaldi," written at this time by Luigi Mercantini, became the Marseillaise of Italy.

Meanwhile the moderate nationalists of Tuscany had been trying to win the Grand Duke to the cause. It says not a little for the comparative mildness of his absolutism that a constitutional agitation was possible; in Lombardy or Romagna or Naples it would have been stamped out in blood. Tuscany had been very quiet since the abolition of the Statute in 1852. In 1855 the last Austrian troops had left; the government was not bad enough to cause much active discontent, and the Liberals, without confidence in themselves and unsupported by the masses, had been only too ready to acquiesce. Gradually there came longings for a freer life, and with the spread of the National Society a strong popular party grew up, which looked to Piedmont for leadership, and would have welcomed Victor Emmanuel for their sovereign. But many of the Liberal nobles had been taught little by the

past eight years; they were autonomists, "little Tuscans," anxious to stave off revolution, and save the dynasty by drawing the Grand Duke into some measure of Liberal and national policy. There was one man however among them, who, though working with them at present, belonged to a very different school. Ricasoli had learnt that no real reform could come from the House of Lorraine; he had learnt that Italy could only be regenerated when the Austrians were expelled, that therefore she must put her trust in Piedmont, and that, if need be, Piedmont must lead a revolutionary war to win the independence of the land. "I want," he said, "to make Tuscany a province of Piedmont, for that is the only way for her to become a province of Italy"; and at all events since the Crimean War this had been his fixed faith. But he saw that the Tuscan movement must take its orders from Turin; and though he, in common with the other nobles, rejected Cavour's advice to agitate for a constitution, fearing that it would bring out the latent divisions among the nationalists, he was willing at his bidding to try to save the Grand Duke by pledging him to war.¹ The pamphlet on "Tuscany and Austria" (March 15), which he and the other leading nobles endorsed, was a strong and reasoned indictment of Austrian influence in Tuscany, and an appeal to the state to free itself from the foreign suzerainty, which had robbed it of its independence. "We have waited ten years, because Piedmont must complete its mission, and show that Italians are worthy of freedom; now Tuscany must take her post by the side of Piedmont." Nothing was said for or against the House of Lorraine, and the pamphlet faithfully carried out Cavour's policy of trying to enlist the Grand Duke in the cause. Cavour himself had already a month before been organising at Florence through the National Society an agitation for the conclusion of a military alliance with Turin. BonCompagni offered the guarantee of Piedmont for the Grand Duke's throne, if he would formally side with her and entrust her with the

¹ Ricasoli, *Lettere*, II. 466-469; Zobi, *Cronaca*, I. 103; Castelli, *Ricordi*, 232.

government of Tuscany during the coming war. It was a dangerous offer, and it was fortunate that Leopold's blindness or his fidelity to Austria kept him from an engagement, which might have saved his crown.

While Tuscany was rallying with one will to the nationalists, there was a lull of excitement in the North. But the smell of powder was already telling in Piedmont even on those who were most opposed to the war. It was impossible of course that the parliamentary warfare should altogether die down; there was an undercurrent of bickering between the old Piedmontese party and the Unitarians of the National Society; there was a strong suspicion abroad that Savoy was to be sacrificed, and Cavour's equivocations in the Chamber did nothing to allay it. There were many no doubt, who disliked much of his policy, who rebelled against the diplomatic finessing, or who feared lest the movement should of its own impetus go too far. Even in the cabinet itself there were those who looked with anxiety to the terrible risks of the coming conflict, and would not have been sorry, if European complications made it impossible.¹ But they allowed themselves to drift with the stream, or felt with D'Azeglio that it was not a question of the merits of Cavour's policy but how to make it succeed. And the majority, who gladly accepted it as at least a first instalment of their hopes, were willing to leave everything in his hands. Apart from the Savoyard politicians, there was a general understanding that party struggle must be dropped. Garibaldi summed up the universal feeling; "all," he said, "want a military dictatorship, parties disappear, Cavour is omnipotent." And so slowly the war-cloud crept on amid trepidation and enthusiasm, with calm on the surface and feverish excitement beneath, and one grim dominant resolve to win or lose all in one supreme attempt.

In Italy everything was ready. But while at home the nationalists had been successful beyond all hope, difficulties were thickening abroad. In January the French alliance seemed safe; only a pessimist would have doubted the

¹ Tavallini, *Lanza*, I. 197; C. D'Azeglio, *Souvenirs*, 551; Massari, *La Marmora*, 210, 216; *contra*, Castelli, *op. cit.*, 260-261.

certainly that a French army would be in Italy in the coming spring or summer. Now at the beginning of March it seemed more than doubtful whether the Emperor would hold by his promises. His subterranean diplomacy makes it more or less a matter of conjecture what his real intentions were; it is probable that up to March he was, despite his public professions, resolved on war.¹ But his habitual indecision, his love of procrastinating gained on him, as his bold schemings changed to sober calculations of the risk. His war policy had raised a host of critics, determined to head him back if possible. His ministers told him that war would be dangerous to the Empire; the funds fell fast, and the Chamber, when it met early in February, spoke plainly its suspicions. The Emperor was probably prepared to defy feeling at home, confident that war would rouse the latent militarism of the country, and victory prop his throne more than all the goodwill of the Bourse. But it was matter of life and death to him that war should end in victory, and of this he dared not feel secure, till his unready army was more prepared, and Austria more isolated. By the diplomatic canons an attack on Austria in the name of nationality would be deemed indefensible, and his enemy would have the moral, perhaps the material support of Europe. He must wait till some pretext recognised by international law could be found, or until Austria could be provoked into taking the offensive, and put herself diplomatically in the wrong. He had laid the foundations for a diversion from the East. Some sort of alliance, whose particulars are not certainly known, but which probably sealed the sacrifice of Poland, had bound Russia to at least a benevolent neutrality and a promise to mobilise a force on the Galician frontier, which would compel Austria to divide her forces and threaten Prussia, should she wish to go to her rescue.² The Emperor had been intriguing with intermittent seriousness with the Hungarian exiles, and Montenegro, where French

¹ Greville Memoirs, VIII. 227; Della Rocca, *op. cit.*, I. 396.

² Correspondence—Italy (1859), 56, 346, 358; Martin, *Prince Consort*, VI. 353, 433; *Nouvelle Revue*, October 1, 1884, 463-465; Veroli, *Pepoli*, in *Riv. Eur.*, XXIX. 755; Cavour, *Lettere*, VI. 303.

influence was strong, might become a focus of agitation among the Austrian Slavs.

But the odds were still too heavy, if Prussia stood by Austria, or if England showed an unfriendliness, that might grow into hostility. The new Prussian ministry, which had come into office when the Crown Prince assumed the Regency (October 1858), was opposed to any alliance with Austria; and a pamphlet, recently published at Berlin and supposed to come from Bismarck's pen, bespoke Prussian sympathy for Italy. But the smaller German courts were more under Austrian influence, and anxious to compel the Federal Diet to espouse her quarrel as a question that touched the Fatherland. Public opinion all over Germany, irritated by the patronizing and aggressive tone of the French press, and instinctively recognizing that sooner or later France would attempt to "rectify" the Rhine frontier, was eagerly clamouring to share in a war, which would "defend the Rhine on the Po." If Napoleon could be sure of the sympathy of England, her influence might fortify the Prussian cabinet in its policy of neutrality. But the Derby cabinet had little share in the popular enthusiasm for Italy, and was threatening its high displeasure to whoever broke the peace. It was sincerely desirous to save Europe from war, but was equally moved by fear of the Emperor's ulterior designs, and anxiety as to what might issue from a triumphant Franco-Russian alliance. Malmesbury, the Foreign Secretary, was woefully ill-informed on Italian politics,¹ and though far from sympathizing with the misrule, was entirely indifferent to the hopes of Italian nationality. Since the beginning of the year he had been trying to scold France and Austria into reconciliation. His policy was to make war impossible by removing its pretexts. These he summarized under four heads (February 13): the foreign occupation of the Papal States; the misrule there; the strained relations between Austria and Piedmont; and the treaties of 1847, which bound Austria to put down any rising in the Duchies. If the "amicable interference" of England

¹ He thought that the Orsini plot was the work of the Carbonari, and that Cavour was privy to it!

could secure some settlement of these points, war might be avoided. The Emperor gave a qualified approval to the English programme, though he hinted that reform implied Home Rule for the Legations, and some kind of representative institutions throughout Italy. The evacuation of the Papal States seemed facilitated by a mysterious move of Antonelli, who announced his intention to ask France and Austria to withdraw their garrisons, though it may be doubted whether he really meant it.¹ Austria seemed disposed to compromise; Lord Cowley was sent on a special mission to Vienna (February 27), and won from the Buol cabinet a promise to negotiate, though its simultaneous resolution to place the army in Italy on a war footing showed its deep-rooted suspicion of Napoleon's plans.

But the Emperor was now really hesitating. He and Cavour had again and again denied any intention of attacking Austria. Most of it was pure duplicity, and in the midst of it the Emperor instructed his prefects to direct the press to support him in a war policy. But he was coming to a conviction that hostilities might have to be postponed, perhaps indefinitely. Germany was more and more menacing; his own ministers, who were still ignorant of the treaty of January 18, were doing their best to hold him back; the English government used every argument to work on his fears. On March 5 an article in the *Moniteur* asserted that the Emperor was under no obligation to assist Piedmont, unless she were attacked. But when Victor Emmanuel wrote, threatening to abdicate if the Emperor deserted him, Napoleon, alarmed at the prospect of a crisis at Turin, veered back and sent reassuring messages.² Frightened at the difficulties that hemmed him in, caught between his engagements to Piedmont and his fears, he hoped to find a way out by referring everything to a Congress of the Powers. Perhaps he hoped that their pressure would relieve him perforce of his obligations; at all events he would gain time, and if war came, it would find him more prepared and Austria more exhausted by the strain of

¹ Correspondence—Italy (1859), 55, 88, 129; Vitzthum, *St. Petersburg*, I. 326.

² Kossuth, *Memories* 123.

a war footing. At his prompting Russia proposed the Congress (March 18); Malmesbury, though suspicious that it was only intended to gain time, assented on the basis of the four points; Prussia followed his lead, and Austria gave a very qualified assent (March 22), on condition that before the Congress met, Piedmont should disband the contingents and the volunteers. England hastened to urge Piedmont to comply, and offered in conjunction with France to guarantee her against Austrian attack. Cavour had practically declined to disarm, though he had promised not to attack Austria, if Austria abstained from further aggression. But he felt that it was impossible to flaunt all Europe, and refuse point-blank to acknowledge the Congress. Yet if it met, and the Five Powers agreed to a settlement, it would be the death-blow to his hopes. It would no longer be possible to provoke Austria into declaring war, and Piedmont would find herself isolated and helpless. Outwardly calm and cheerful as ever, he was tortured with anxiety; overwork and his awful responsibility had weakened his moral fibre, and in his fierce earnestness for his big ends he forgot the bigger ends of honour. He seemed the embodiment of a remorseless will; all scruples as to means, even common honesty had gone. If the Congress were merely a blind of the Emperor to hoodwink diplomacy and gain time, he was willing to rival him in duplicity. But he was doubtful of the Emperor himself, and again he threatened "some desperate act," if Napoleon proved faithless. "I will fire the powder," he told the French minister, "and when Italy runs with blood, you will have to march." The Emperor temporized again; he sent for Cavour to come to Paris, and probably tried hard to induce him to disarm. But Cavour again threatened that the King would abdicate, and that himself would retire to America and publish the Emperor's letters and the notes of the Plombières meeting.¹ Napoleon felt himself at the mercy of the man, who could bring on

¹ Correspondence—Italy (1859), 192, 207; Martin, *op. cit.*, IV. 421; Cavour, *Lettres*, VI. 377, 379; C. D'Azeglio, *op. cit.*, 552; Malmesbury, *Memoirs*, II. 163; Bianchi, *Politique de Cavour*, 330; Greville *Memoirs*, VIII. 244; Vitsthum, *op. cit.*, I. 359; Geffeken, *Casa di Savoia*, 133; Rothan, *France en 1867*, 78.

him the indignation of Europe; and Cavour returned to Turin satisfied that war, though it might be postponed, was certain. It was probably understood between them that the Congress should be made impossible; in fact the scheme was breaking down under its own inherent contradictions.

Austria from the first had agreed to it against the grain. She could not afford to meet Cavour, and be publicly rated in the eyes of Europe. She was suspicious that the proposal was only to give France time to get her army ready; and the "armed peace" was "bleeding the country to death" with its expense. Everything tended to weaken Buol's half-hearted policy of peace, and throw power into the hands of the war party. Though the English government had declared that under no circumstances would it lend its armed help, Cowley's mission had encouraged the Austrians to hope that England would not refuse her support at the last. There was a better-grounded expectation that the excitement in Germany would force Prussia and the smaller states into an alliance. Francis Joseph and the military party were longing to punish hated Piedmont for her studied provocations, and were confident that they could crush her before French help arrived. And though Buol had formally promised not to attack Piedmont, the power to keep his undertaking was fast slipping from his hands. Austria persisted in demanding the disarmament of Piedmont and refused to admit her representative to the Congress; and this gave Cavour his chance to formally refuse to disarm, or attend the Congress unless Piedmont were on an equality with the other Powers (April 2). Malmesbury recognized that his refusal was fatal to the scheme, and as a last resource took up (April 7) a proposal first made by Austria, that the three armies should be simultaneously reduced to a peace footing. France professed to accept the principle, and officially asked Piedmont to assent. But at the Emperor's own prompting Cavour eluded the demand, and insisted on conditions that he knew it would not be easy to satisfy. Success was nearer than he knew; he had had to wait long, but his policy of provocation was bearing

its fruit. On the same day that Malmesbury proposed a general disarmament, Austria called out her reserves; and though she agreed to his proposals (April 12), it was either a feint, or Buol's last stand against the war party.¹ As early as April 9² the government had decided to send an ultimatum to Piedmont, requiring her to reduce her army to a peace footing and disband the volunteers; and Napoleon, either because he feared that the Piedmontese would be crushed before his troops could arrive, or anxious to help Austria in her false step, sent a peremptory telegram to Turin, insisting on disarmament. Cavour received it on the night of April 18; he had heard rumours of the ultimatum but apparently did not credit them,³ and he thought that the Emperor's message meant checkmate in the long game. Half-distraught, he talked of suicide, but sullenly answered that Piedmont must bow to the will of Europe. His grief turned suddenly to joy. Before it was known at Vienna that Piedmont had agreed to disarm, the ultimatum had been sent. On April 23 the bearer of Buol's note arrived at Turin. It demanded that within three days Piedmont should disarm, and threatened that a refusal would be followed by prompt invasion. It asked for no more than Cavour had consented to, but the threat, with which it ended, could have only one reply from a self-respecting nation. At the moment when Cavour seemed to find check on every side, his enemy's false move put the game into his hands. Austria had broken the peace, and Cavour knew well that France was bound to help, and that the enemy had forfeited the diplomatic sympathies of Europe. "The die is cast," he said, when the Austrian messenger left, "we have made history." One last effort Malmesbury made for peace, but its only result was to delay the Austrian invasion for two days. Napoleon would not draw back now, and on April 29 he formally declared war.

¹ Loftus, *Reminiscences*, II. 25; Correspondence—Italy (1859), 257; another, but I think improbable, explanation, in Debraux, *Villafranca*, 12-14.

² Cavour, *Lettere*, III. cxx; De Cesare, *Scialoja*, 100.

³ Cavour, *Lettere*, III. cxxiv; VI. 389, 391-394; Correspondence—Italy, 250, 277; Bianchi, *Diplomazia*, VIII. 58-62; Massari, *Cavour*, 315-317; Castelli, *Cavour*, 84.


CHAPTER XXVII

THE WAR OF 1859

APRIL—JULY 1859

Piedmont ready. The Austrian advance; the French come up; Montebello; Palestro; the Volunteers; Magenta; the Allies at Milan; revolt of Romagna and the Duchies; SOLFERINO. The armistice; the Emperor's motives:—military difficulties; the Emperor and Italy; Prussian policy; English policy. THE PRELIMINARIES OF VILLAFRANCA.

THE Austrian ultimatum was a grave error of diplomacy. It estranged her friends, and she stood isolated and condemned by the public opinion of Europe. English sympathy, for the moment even in the court and ministry, was alienated, and the London and St. Petersburg cabinets used all their influence to dissuade or frighten the small German courts from making common cause with her. Prussia, irritated by the foolish move, was "firmly determined not to allow itself to be dragged into a war against its will," and if the Federal Diet declared for war, intended to ignore its decision. The war suddenly became popular at Paris, and France, outside the clerical party, was enthusiastic for the noble and unselfish cause she had espoused. In Piedmont there was a feeling of deep relief that the long tension had come to an end. Parliament broke up, after appointing the King dictator as long as the war lasted. The little reactionary group made a last protest, but except in Savoy, it represented now an insignificant fraction of the country, and many of the nobles, who hated the nationalist policy, sent their sons to fight for the honour of Piedmont. With the great majority it was a battle for much more than Piedmont. "This," said Cavour when Parliament dissolved,



PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE CAMPAIGNS OF 1849 AND 1859.

————— Railways in working in May 1859.


 Scale in English Miles.

"is the last Piedmontese Chamber; the next will be that of the Kingdom of Italy." And so with desperate resolve the nation stepped down into the arena; the next week might see Turin in the power of the enemy; defeat meant annihilation of liberty and independence, victory meant untold sacrifice and suffering; but there was no faltering, nothing to disturb the calm confidence, the faith in King and minister, who had given so splendid a chance to Italy.

War began on the evening of April 26, but it was not till three days later that the Austrians began to cross the Ticino. It was obvious strategy for them to try to crush the Piedmontese before the French arrived, and for years past La Marmora had been preparing to meet the contingency. The little Piedmontese army of barely 60,000 men occupied what was practically a great entrenched camp in the triangle formed by Alessandria, Valenza, and Casale, between the Po and Tanaro. Here, though the Austrians outnumbered them by nearly three to one, they might hope to hold their ground till the French arrived; but the road lay open to Turin, or the enemy might advance along the right of the Tanaro, and thrust themselves between the Piedmontese position and the French advancing from Genoa. But whether in consequence of Malmesbury's last move or from their own unreadiness, the Austrians wasted two precious days, before the army of 160,000 crossed the Ticino between Pavia and Buffalora (April 29), and two days later reached the line of the Po and Sesia. They still had the start, but Giulai's incompetent generalship soon robbed them of what was left of it. For several days he wandered desultorily between Mortara and Vercelli, then massed his left wing round Tortona to attack the French detachments in detail as they crossed the Apennines; again suddenly changing his tactics, drew hurriedly back, and pushed on his right towards Turin. His van had reached Ivrea on May 8, and was only a few leagues distant from the capital. Cavour, dreading the political effects of its occupation, urged the King to fight for its defence, but from a military standpoint his advice had no justification, and the King, bitter though his resolution must have been,

refused to leave his position, trusting that the danger of a flank attack might make Giulay pause. Turin prepared to make a desperate defence with its National Guard and the 8000 French who had arrived under Canrobert; the country population, maddened by the brutalities of the Austrians in the Lomellina, armed in mass, and Garibaldi hurried down with his volunteers from Biella. Giulay, fronted with a desperate popular resistance, and fearing the flank attack, again lost courage and suddenly retreated on Vercelli.

It was now three weeks since the war opened. Giulay had wasted his opportunity in fruitless operations; the Piedmontese position was intact, and the French troops were hurrying up from Genoa, from Nice, across the Mont Cenis at the rate of 20,000 a day. In a few days more the allied army would be in full strength, and prepared to take the offensive. Giulay concentrated his main force between Mortara and the Po, and now that the opportunity had passed, made a fresh movement of his left towards Voghera, along the narrow slope between the spurs of the Apennines and the low grounds by the Po. On May 20 Stadion with 30,000 men made an unexpected attack on the allied outposts at Montebello, the scene of Lannes' victory in 1800. The splendid charges of the Piedmontese cavalry held the advance in check, till Forey brought his division up from Voghera, threw his whole strength on Montebello, and though very inferior in numbers, drove the Austrians back on Casteggio. The Emperor, who had now taken the supreme command, made no attempt to follow up the victory; it might have been his best strategy to advance down the right of the Po and attack the Quadrilateral at once; but he would have had to force the dangerous defile of Stradella, and storm the strong position at Piacenza, with the enemy in full strength on his flank. He decided on the safer plan of changing his front and advancing by his left on the Ticino in the direction of Milan. While the Piedmontese and one French corps on his left wing covered him from a flank attack, a skilful movement took his right and centre across the Po to a position behind the Sesia between Casale and

Vercelli. To make a feint towards Vigevano and secure the passage of the Sesia, the Piedmontese were ordered to attack the villages south-east of Vercelli on the other side of the river. On May 30 Cialdini stormed Palestro, while Durando took Vinzaglio, but while Niel was crossing the Sesia at night to support them, the river suddenly swelled with the rains, and prevented part of the French from passing it. The Austrians, partly aware of this, tried next day to recover their lost positions and drive Niel and the Piedmontese into the river. But Giulay, who might have thrown overwhelming numbers on them, sent only 20,000 men. His blunder saved the Allies from a serious defeat, and as it was, the victory was hardly won. But none the less it had a great moral effect. It was an Italian victory, for comparatively few French had been engaged; Victor Emmanuel led the charges in person, and his superb courage won from all Italy an enthusiastic devotion mixed with solicitude for the life that was so precious to his country.

Meanwhile Garibaldi with the volunteers had been making a fine fight round the lakes. He had about 5000 men under his old lieutenants of South America and Rome, and the *Cacciatori delle Alpi* were of the very flower of patriotism;—men of every class and state, nobles, artists, medical students, workmen, who had left home and ease to strike a blow for freedom. Such men, undisciplined, ill-equipped, inexperienced as they were, with few cavalry and no artillery, would go far under good leading. As soon as Turin was safe, Garibaldi was ordered to advance into Lombardy, with a free hand to direct his own movements and stir the Lombards to revolt. Crossing the Ticino at Sesto Calende, he advanced boldly into the enemy's country, cutting himself off from any base of operations, and trusting to the friendliness of the inhabitants and his own audacious strategy. Defeating Urban in front of Varese (May 26), he marched on to Como, and with 3000 men again routed Urban's trebly superior force at San Fermo. But he was playing too hazardous a game with his little army; he failed in a night attack on the fort at Laveno, and hurrying back to relieve Varese, which had been reoccupied, he was nearly

surrounded and only escaped by a daring retreat. Left without information as to the movements of the main army, apparently forgotten and deserted, his position was a perilous one, when Urban's recall relieved the volunteers from their danger. They had done little from a strategical point of view, but all Italy rang with the gallant fights at Varese and San Fermo, with Garibaldi's dazzling manœuvres, with the contemptuous daring by which he had puzzled and baffled Urban's forces.

Urban had been recalled to effect a junction with the main army. After Palestro Giulay began to suspect some unexpected movement on the part of the Allies, and at length discovered that he had the enemy in full strength on his right, intending to force the passage of the Ticino. He dared not risk a great battle with his back to the river, and hoped, if he repassed it, to take the Allies at a disadvantage on the crossing. Retiring beyond the Ticino, he began to move his army northwards towards the point where the railway crosses the river near Buffalora and Magenta. He occupied the latter in considerable force, and the town with its sloping gardens and canal in front formed a strong position. But more than half his forces had been delayed, it was said because the Emperor Francis Joseph sent counter-orders, and he had less than 80,000 at hand on the morning of June 4. Macmahon's corps, followed by the whole Piedmontese army, had crossed the river the day before at Turbigo, and was advancing on Magenta from the north, while the French Guards, followed by Canrobert's and Niel's corps, were approaching the railway bridge, which with strange want of precaution the Austrians had only partially destroyed. The Guards, crossing the bridge, attacked early in the afternoon; but though at first they carried all before them, they found themselves unsupported, and their position became a very critical one. Niel and Canrobert had not yet come up, and Macmahon's two columns had got separated and had enough to do to avoid being crushed in detail. The Guards held their ground with splendid stubbornness, and the Emperor refused to withdraw them. But the Austrians poured their strength upon them, and the tardy

succour arrived barely in time to save them. Soon after four o'clock, Niel's and Canrobert's troops began to come up, and at five o'clock Macmahon united his columns and threatened the Austrian right at Buffalora. But it was not till two hours later that the French were able to make much ground; and though Magenta was captured by nightfall, Giulay withdrew his troops to the south in good order. Had not two of his corps through some misunderstanding retired on Milan, he would have renewed the fight next day. The battle did little credit to Napoleon's tactics, though the heroism of the Guards and his unflinching resolution to hold to his position on the canal atoned for the ill-concerted attack. The Piedmontese, advancing in Macmahon's rear, came up too late to take much part in the fight.¹

The road was now open to Milan. As soon as the news of Magenta reached the city, the municipal council proclaimed union with Piedmont, and it was only the hurried departure of the Austrians, that prevented a repetition of the scenes of the Five Days. On the 7th the French troops began to arrive, and on the following day the two sovereigns made their triumphal entry amid the wild joy of the population. The reception touched the Emperor, and his proclamation (June 8) seemed to sanction the highest aspirations of the Italians. "My army," he said, "will be concerned only to fight your enemies and maintain order at home; it will place no obstacle to the free manifestation of your legitimate wishes." Italy took him at his word. Massa-Carrara had already risen, as soon as war broke out, and Tuscany had driven out the Grand Duke and declared for the King.² Victor Emmanuel proclaimed Lombardy re-annexed to Piedmont; the Dukes of Modena and Parma fled with their Austrian garrisons, and both states renewed the annexationist decrees of 1848 (June 13). The Austrian garrison left Bologna (June 11), within a week the revolution spread

¹ I have generally followed Lecomte's account of the battle (*Campagne d'Italie*). It is impossible to reconcile the various descriptions, especially as to the hours of the different incidents.

² See below, p. 85.

through Romagna, the Marches, and part of Umbria, and though the Papal troops repressed it in the two latter provinces, Romagna was left free to proclaim Victor Emmanuel dictator.¹

Meanwhile the Austrians were retiring on the Quadrilateral. For a moment Giulay had hoped to strike from Pavia at the flank of the Allies, but he could not concentrate his forces sufficiently. It only delayed his retreat, and before he could reach the Mincio, the French van under Bazaine caught his rear at Melenano (June 8). Had the Allies been a day or two earlier, they might perhaps have cut the Austrians to pieces before they reached the fortresses. As it was, the retreat had no further interruption, and by June 18 the whole Austrian army was behind the Mincio. Giulay was superseded, and Francis Joseph took the nominal command with Hess as his chief of the staff. The Allies advanced cautiously, preceded by Garibaldi's men and Cialdini's corps. As the main army came up, Garibaldi was sent to clear the Valtelline and guard the passes of the Stelvio and Tonale. The passes were not threatened, and Garibaldi had perhaps good reason for thinking that his mission was a ruse of the Emperor to remove the irregular forces, whose revolutionary character he feared, and whose formation he had tried in vain to prevent.

The Allies took up a strong position on the hills round Castiglione to the south-west of the Lago di Garda. Two more French divisions were coming up through Lombardy, and Prince Napoleon's corps was slowly advancing from Tuscany. It was obvious strategy for the Austrians to attack before the reinforcements arrived, and Hess hoped to surprise the Allies, and drive them back on the Tyrol, where they would be caught between the enemy and the Alps. Early on June 23 the whole Austrian army began to recross the Mincio, and by evening its right and centre had occupied the heights of Solferino and San Martino, while on the left large numbers were coming up by the lowlands from Goito.² An accident prevented it from surprising the Allies in their quarters next morning. The Em-

¹ See below, p. 88.

² See Map, Vol. I., p. 231.

peror had decided to advance in force on the 24th, and occupy the heights, not knowing that the enemy had forestalled him. Early in the summer morning the advancing French found the whole Austrian army in front of them. The Emperor at once converged Baraguay d'Hilliers' and Macmahon's corps and the Guards on his centre in front of Solferino, while on the left the Piedmontese attacked the adjoining heights of San Martino, and on the right Niel held the flat country between Medole and Guidizzolo. All through the morning and afternoon the French centre advanced slowly and with terrible loss, and it was not till five o'clock that they were in safe possession of the heights. Niel held his ground against the main strength of the enemy with desperate persistency, and when towards five o'clock a great storm hid the armies and stopped the fighting for a time, the Austrian left had made little way and could do no more than cover the retreat of the centre. Meanwhile the Piedmontese had been fighting a practically independent battle round the heights of Pozzolengo and San Martino. Their first attack, badly combined and against greatly superior numbers, failed at most points, and the danger of being cut off from their base at Desenzano compelled the retreat of the greater part of their forces. But before noon the attack was again renewed; the splendid courage of the Piedmontese carried San Martino five times, and after a struggle of fourteen hours they dislodged the Austrians at nightfall from Pozzolengo. It was a fiercely contested battle, and had the Austrians held the heights in greater strength, or Francis Joseph not interfered with the command, the result might well have been different. The better tactics and equal courage of the Allies won the battle against slightly superior odds and a strong position. But it cost them dear; the French lost 12,000 killed and wounded, and the Piedmontese losses were relatively nearly as heavy.

Solferino seemed to promise the early conclusion of the war. The fortresses of the Quadrilateral might yet hold out for some months, but Venice could be captured from the sea, and a victory beyond the Mincio would open the road to Vienna, secure the independence of Italy, probably

the secession of Hungary and the destruction of Austrian influence in Germany. Suddenly on the eve of triumph the Italians found the cup dashed from their lips. The Emperor had made peace, and Venetia was left to the Austrians.

The motives that determined him to this sudden pause in the midst of his triumph were very complex. The difficulties of the war were greater than appeared to the public. Neither Magenta nor Solferino had been very decisive victories, and both might easily have been fatal defeats. The Emperor had learnt to distrust his generals and question his own military capacity. His War Office, from whatever cause, had sent little either in reinforcements or ammunition, and the men who were coming up would not do much more than replace the gaps which fever and battle had made. And though Austria was in sore straits, with her finances exhausted, with Hungarians and Slavs at the point of rebellion, yet she still had vast military resources. There were 150,000 men in Venetia, another 100,000 between Trieste and Vienna. The next battle might have a different issue, and the Emperor knew his danger, if he lost again the prestige he had won. His zeal for Italy had considerably cooled. He was irritated by the semi-independent position of Victor Emmanuel's army, sceptical as to the King's military skill, jealous of the contrast between his dashing bravery and his own collected but uninspiring coolness. He complained bitterly and unjustly of the want of enthusiasm in Italy, because the freed provinces could not at once send drilled troops into the field, because false reports told him that the peasants of the Mincio country were hostile. Most of all he resented the events of Central Italy, which threatened not only to upset his scheme of federation, but involve him in unwelcome bickerings with the clerical party at home. Public feeling in Tuscany and Romagna had declared strongly for annexation to Piedmont, Umbria and the Marches were certain to follow their example at the first opportunity, and the Emperor knew that Cavour was working as far as he dared for the union of all Northern and Central Italy into one

great kingdom. If the Italians came out of the war completely triumphant, it would be impossible to hold them in. But he had come to Italy declaring that he "was not going there to shake the Holy Father's power." Though the compact of Plombières bound him to allow Piedmont to take Romagna, fears of the clericals made him sometimes anxious to evade his promises; and though he had at last decided to let Romagna take its course, he was firmly determined to leave Umbria and perhaps the Marches to the Pope, and veto Piedmont from annexing Tuscany.¹

But it is improbable that his discontent with the Italians would have stopped him, had not the attitude of Germany threatened real danger to France. During the first period of the war he had been safeguarded by the policy of Prussia. The Berlin government had been threateningly warned by Russia not to stir,² and it knew that it had everything to gain in Germany from an Austrian defeat. But if France were victorious, Prussia herself might be sooner or later attacked; German sentiment regarded it a betrayal of the Fatherland to look on, while a German state was being defeated by the hereditary enemy. The government solved the dilemma by a policy equally unfriendly to both belligerents. It mobilized part of the army, and after Magenta offered Austria its armed mediation, if she would leave Prussia mistress of the Federal Diet, and satisfy European opinion by the surrender of her treaties with the Duchies. And though the Austrians were too suspicious of her aims to accept the offer, she called out the four federal army-corps (June 24), and asked Russia and England to join her in the mediation. Russia, increasingly distrustful of the Italian movement,³ and suspicious that a Hungarian insurrection might spread to Poland, agreed to join in a peaceful mediation, and the Prussian cabinet strenuously pushed on its efforts to secure a peace. After Solferino it again made it clear to the Austrians that they must not expect armed

¹ See below, pp. 86, 89.

² Bianchi, *Diplomazia*, VIII. 132-133.

³ Bianchi, *op. cit.*, VIII. 142; *Nouvelle Revue*, Oct. 1, 1884, 465; *contra*, Zobi, *Saggio delle mutazioni politiche*, quoted in Tivaroni, *L'Italia*, II. 76.

support from Germany, but at the same time the mobilization on the Rhine frightened the Emperor, who knew that if mediation were offered and refused, it might perhaps be followed by an invasion of the unprotected frontier.¹

Thus everything was tending to make the Emperor anxious to bring the war to a close. It is impossible to weigh exactly the relative weight of each influence; it is probable that military difficulties, the fear of defeat in Venetia, anxiety as to the attitude of Prussia weighed most with him. All Europe, except England, was more or less leagued against his schemes. There is a half truth in Mrs. Browning's picture of the hero beaten by a world, that could not reach to the greatness of his designs; his "great deed was too great" for governments, that hated and dreaded nationality.² But his idea was too great for himself; he was afraid of it, for Napoleon III. was always less in execution than in design. And the little personal facts had their force. He was worn out with the tropical heat; the carnage of Solferino, though relatively not great, had made him weep;³ the Empress wrote exaggerated accounts of the discontent at home and the danger that threatened from Germany.⁴ For some time past he had been debating, whether Prussian unfriendliness might not compel him to pause; and his ministry, if not himself, had already before Solferino been disposed to accept mediation.⁵ But he did not wish the initiative to come from Prussia, and a few days after the battle he telegraphed to Persigny, the French minister in London, to sound the English government, whether it would propose an armistice as the preliminary to a peace; Lombardy and Parma, he suggested, should go to Piedmont, and Romagna be governed by Victor Emmanuel

¹ The Prussian and other despatches are printed in Zini, *Storia, Documents* II. 249-285, 289-297. See also Beust, *Memoirs*, I. 161-162, 181-191. I do not believe Un Italien, *Crispi*, 397.

² Mrs. Browning, *Poems before Congress*; Bianchi, *op. cit.*, VIII. 160; Veroli, *Pepoli*, in *Riv. Eur.*, XXVIII. 569; the Emperor's Address to the Chamber on his return.

³ Geffeken, *Casa di Savoia*, 134.

⁴ Della Rocca, *Autobiografia*, I. 460; Cavour, *Lettere*, VI. 406.

⁵ Massari, *La Marmora*, 236; C. D'Azeglio, *Souvenirs*, 606; Gortschakoff's Despatch of June 26.

under the Pope's suzerainty; Venetia and Modena would be an independent state under an Austrian Archduke (doubtless Maximilian), Tuscany would be restored to the Grand Duke, and all the Italian states form a Federation under the Pope's presidency.¹

Three weeks before the suggestion reached London, the Derby cabinet had fallen, and Palmerston was back in office with Lord John Russell as his Foreign Secretary. Palmerston wished to see a strong Italian kingdom, powerful enough to hold its own alike against Austria and France, and he and his Foreign Secretary refused to have a hand in anything that might save Austria from her apparently hopeless position. The Emperor's scheme for Venetia, he saw, was a mere farce of independence, which would inevitably lead again to Austrian interference and all the old train of misfortune. Persigny however appears to have misunderstood Russell, and telegraphed to the Emperor that the English government was prepared to mediate on his terms. Already before Persigny's message reached him, Napoleon had probably determined to make immediate overtures to the Austrian Emperor.² His policy seems to have been to prove to Francis Joseph how hopeless was his position, how generous the offer of his enemy. He made preparations for a vigorous renewal of the struggle, should it be forced on him. He had seen Kossuth, and promised to send an expedition to Hungary, if the war continued.³ His fleet was off the Lido, and

¹ Bianchi, *op. cit.*, VIII. 155-156; Vitzthum, *St. Petersburg*, I. 365.

² The statements as to the date of Persigny's telegram are conflicting, but I think the evidence leans to its being sent on July 6 or 7: Malmesbury, *Memoirs*, II. 200-201 (*vide* Persigny); Ashley, *Palmerston*, II. 158-160; Vitzthum, *op. cit.*, I. 306-307; Greville *Memoirs*, VIII. 263-264; Hansard's *Debates*, CLV. 1106, 1222; Martin, *Prince Consort*, IV. 458-460. From Hansard, *vol. cit.*, 1222, it is clear that the interview between Russell and Persigny took place on a Wednesday, and this would seem to fix it for July 6. The Emperor's messenger left for Verona in the afternoon of that day. I am inclined to discredit Vitzthum. There seems to have been an acute struggle between Palmerston *plus* Russell and the Court, and this may account for the strange gap in the Blue Books at this time.

³ Kossuth, *Memoires*, 382; Cantù, *Cronistoria*, III. 265. In May he had pleaded that he dared not send an expedition to the Danube, while the Tories were in office.

ready to attack the forts of Venice. The siege guns for Peschiera were coming up, and the Allies prepared for a demonstration in force along the heights from Peschiera to Valeggio. At the moment when Francis Joseph learnt that he could not save Venice, and that Prussia had deserted him, Napoleon's messenger arrived at Verona with proposals for an armistice¹ (July 6). The armistice was signed two days later, and on the morning of July 9 the two Emperors met at Villafranca. Napoleon had all the vantage-ground in making terms. But he was anxious to come to a settlement at any price, and his weak nature failed him, when he came face to face with his rival. Francis Joseph at once refused Napoleon's offer of an independent Venetian Kingdom with Maximilian for its prince;¹ he offered to surrender Lombardy to the Emperor, on the understanding that it was to be passed on to Piedmont, but, though he was willing that Venetia should enter an Italian Federation, he preferred to fight on rather than surrender it or the fortresses of the Quadrilateral. Parma was tacitly given up to Piedmont, but it was stipulated that Modena and Tuscany should return to their Dukes, and Romagna was implicitly abandoned to the Pope. Napoleon wished to insert a phrase that the Dukes were not to return by force of arms; but again he yielded to Francis Joseph's insistency, believing probably that they would be able to take peaceful re-possession of their thrones. The Emperors pledged themselves to promote an Italian Federation under the presidency of the Pope.²

The news of the armistice was a bolt from the blue to the Italians. It had been concluded with hardly a hint to Victor Emmanuel,³ and when the King heard of the betrayal, he talked indignantly of carrying on the fight alone. But he soon saw its hopelessness, and resigned himself to sign "the infamous treaty." Cavour refused to bow to the inevitable; he had hurried to the camp on hearing the fatal

¹ Bayard de Volo, *Francesco V.*, III. 49; Correspondence — Villafranca, 8.

² Bianchi, *op. cit.*, VIII. 151-154; Bayard de Volo, *op. cit.*, III. 51; Debraux, *Villafranca*, 44, 181.

³ See Della Rocca, *op. cit.*, I. 461.

rumour. Overstrained by the labour of government, (he had held the War and Finance, Home and Foreign Offices since hostilities began), the prospect of losing all he had worked for broke down his self-control. Again and again he urged desperate courses on the King, and when the King refused, spoke hot and insolent words. But Victor Emmanuel's indignation, though he kept it in check, was no less real, and though he could not refuse his signature to the Preliminaries, he added "so far as it concerns me," to show that he did not endorse the federation clauses.

CHAPTER XXVIII

AFTER VILLAFRANCA

JULY—SEPTEMBER 1859

- Retrospect : Tuscany, April to July ; the revolution ; Prince Napoleon in Tuscany ; conversion of the autonomists : Romagna, May to July ; sack of Perugia ; the Emperor and Romagna. AFTER VILLAFRANCA. Farini. RICASOLI. The Commissioners recalled ; Central Italy solid for Unity ; the Military League ; the Emperor vetoes intervention ; the votes of annexation ; annexation refused.

THE news of Villafranca produced something like panic in Italy. For the moment it seemed as if, except for Lombardy, the war had been thrown away, and all its cost of life and money, all the enthusiasm and effort spent in vain. Venetia, Tuscany, Romagna had breathed for a few weeks, only to have their hopes ruthlessly dashed. Their great ally had proved false, and all Europe, except England, was more or less in league against them. Naturally they vented impotent anger on the Emperor, whose courage had failed at the supreme moment. Gratitude vanished in the great disappointment ; Milan and Turin received him in silence, where a few weeks before he and his troops had had such a mighty welcome ; and Orsini's portrait took his place in the lithographers' windows. And so he slunk away from Italy, already knowing all the magnitude of his mistake, conscious that the hopes he had raised would not crouch at his word, and might prove a Frankenstein. "France," said the Parisians, "has made a superb war, and Austria a superb peace." The King, it is said, told him that he would never sign it. Cavour indignantly resigned office ; "the Emperor," he said to Kossuth, "has dishonoured me before my King ; this peace shall not be made ; I will, if I must, take Della

Margherita in one hand, and Mazzini in the other, and turn revolutionary and conspirator." Their determination reflected the second thoughts of the nation. Villafranca had made the Italians stagger, but it was only for a moment. They fell back on themselves, and found that they were strong to resist. Mazzini's dream of the self-reliant nation was never nearer fulfilment than now. It was a conspiracy of the whole people to baffle the Emperor, and work out their own salvation. To understand how this was possible, we must trace the events of Central Italy since the outbreak of hostilities.

On the eve of the war, the Grand Duke was still resolute in his policy of neutrality. He had refused Austria's offer of a regiment, but recollections of 1849 turned all his feeble sympathies to her. BonCompagni, in Cavour's name, formally asked for his alliance; both the French and Piedmontese governments were anxious to make acceptance easy, and they offered in return to guarantee his throne. Some of the nobles still hankered for autonomy; they wished to save the Lorrainers, if it were possible, and even the democrats would have tolerated them for a time, if the Grand Duke accepted BonCompagni's terms. But nothing could move Leopold, neither the warnings of the loyalist nobles and his own ministers, nor the plain evidence of disaffection and the wavering faith of the army. His refusal of the alliance made the revolution inevitable. There are strong grounds for suspicion that Cavour offered the alliance with a hope that it would be refused, and had sent secret agents to prepare the rising.¹ It needed however no incentive from without. The two nationalist sections had coalesced on the vital point of securing a government, which would be the ally of Piedmont. Even the Mazzinians were willing to let the Liberal nobles be the figureheads of the movement, knowing that their names would win the mass, in whose imagination revolution raised the spectre of socialism.

¹ Castelli, *Ricordi*, 226; Mazzini, *Ad A. Gianelli*, 103. BonCompagni was probably himself quite loyal, in spite of Further Correspondence (1859), 12, and *Casi della Toscana*, 18, 33; see *Lettere ad A. Panizzi*, 309.

The Grand Duke's obstinacy forced them to immediate action. The populace and army would have moved on their own account, and the knowledge of this and Cavour's prompting made the nobles agree to a demonstration, that would compel the Grand Duke to choose between the Piedmontese alliance and at least temporary abdication. Next morning (April 27) Leopold learnt that the troops had proclaimed their defection by demanding leave to hoist the tricolor; that when his son attempted, perhaps without his knowledge, to persuade the artillery of the Belvidere fort to prepare to fire on the city, he had been met by a flat refusal from the officers.¹ The frightened prince forgot his obstinacy, and offered to grant a constitution and conclude the Piedmontese alliance. But it was too late; the demonstrators refused to accept the surrender and demanded abdication. The Grand Duke's pride refused it, but he knew that his cause was doomed. At sunset he left Florence among the good-humoured farewells of the citizens, and "the revolution went home to dinner."

The other Tuscan cities followed Florence, and 217 out of 246 communes sent in their ready adhesion. A provisional government was appointed; Victor Emmanuel was declared military dictator during the war, though the fears of the autonomists peeped out in the condition that Tuscany should preserve its civil independence. Cavour would at once have accepted the dictatorship, but he found himself fronted by Napoleon's veto. The Emperor intended, if he could do it without exciting the outcry of Europe, to foist a French prince on the throne of a Central Italian Kingdom, and his partisans at Florence had drawn a fanciful picture of the state falling to pieces, an easy prey to the Mazzinians. The Emperor, anxious above all things to prevent a republican movement, sent his fifth army-corps under Prince Napoleon to Tuscany, to make a Mazzinian agitation impossible, and prepare the road which might eventually bring the Prince to the throne. In the meantime he

¹ Zobi, *Cronaca*, I. 403-407; Zini, *Storia, Documenti II.*, 118-128 (the date on p. 127 should be 1858); Mrs. Trollope, *Social Aspects*, 113. The notorious instructions did not order the garrison to actually fire on the city.

would not allow Victor Emmanuel to do more than accept the protectorate of Tuscany; and the King had to refuse the dictatorship on "grounds of high political expediency," and promise to preserve the political autonomy of the state. On the other hand Cavour was successful in obtaining from Napoleon a disclaimer of any design on the Tuscan throne. The disclaimer was half sincere, for though the Emperor never relinquished an idea, he had realised that for the present his scheme would excite too much suspicion in Europe;¹ and the Prince, when he landed at Leghorn (May 23), announced that "Napoleon III. will never let himself be guided by family interests." He seems to have sounded the ground as to his chances, but he soon convinced himself that he had no prospect of success, and touched by the splendid reception he had had, became a strenuous advocate of annexation to Piedmont.² Everything was making straight for union. BonCompagni, an useful, reliable, second-rate man, had been made Piedmontese commissioner, and proved that the difference between the dictatorship and the protectorate was one of words only. His ministry consisted chiefly of autonomist nobles, who still perhaps hoped for the return of the Lorrainers. But they were too patriotic to abandon him, and Ricasoli at the Ministry of the Interior was fast coming to be autocrat of the cabinet. Events had only confirmed his belief in Unity; "Tuscany's duty," he said, "is to make the new Kingdom of Italy." He rejoiced in the growing feeling for annexation, which would lift Tuscany out of a squalid and dangerous isolation; and, when after Palestro the Tuscans sent an address to Victor Emmanuel acclaiming him King of Italy, he and his colleague Salvagnoli signed it to the great anger of the autonomist section of the ministry. But when Cavour, dreading a revival of the Emperor's schemes, promoted a vigorous annexationist

¹ Ricasoli, *Lettere*, III. 34; Poggi, *Memorie*, III. 14; Bianchi, *Diplomazia*, VIII. 498; *contra*, Tabbarrini, *Cupponi*, 309.

² Poggi, *op. cit.*, I. 76; Manin e Pallavicino, 33; Bianchi, *op. cit.*, VIII. 96; Cavour, *Lettere*, VI. 403; Kossuth, *Memories*, 185-189; *Lettere ad A. Panizzi*, 307; Zobi, *op. cit.*, I. 378; Rubieri, *Storia*, 144, 171; Bianchi, *Mattucci*, 282.

propaganda, which roused the old local pride and dread of absorption in the stronger state, Ricasoli protested against its obtrusively Piedmontese origin and bias. It was not a mere fusion with Piedmont that he desired, the reduction of Tuscany to a mere province, the loss of its more advanced social legislation, of its "civil primacy" in education and the arts. Tuscany must be an equal and component member of a great Italian Kingdom. Some such conception as this, perhaps even more the inexorable force of events, was rapidly converting the autonomists. Men like Capponi, who had long been wavering between their nationalist feelings and their love of Tuscan customs and Tuscan independence, began to declare for union with Piedmont, if it were on conditions and without fusion. The thoroughgoing autonomists themselves were anxious to prevent a Napoleonic state at any cost, and annexation would safeguard them alike against Prince Napoleon and Mazzini. The ministry followed the drift of opinion, and even Ridolfi, dear as Tuscan autonomy was to him, was prepared to sacrifice it, if necessary. Within a week of the Milan proclamation the cabinet voted unanimously for Victor Emmanuel's sovereignty. The Emperor was wavering, realising that for the time his cousin's chances had gone, and feeling bound by his Milan promises. Cavour thought that he might win him, if he could prove that Tuscany was unanimous for annexation, and with this in view, and apparently with the Emperor's approval, he asked for petitions in favour of union.¹ Tuscany readily responded; Siena was the first to sign, Pisa, Lucca, Leghorn followed, and eventually petitions came in from 225 of the 246 communes, representing eleven-twelfths of the population.

While in Tuscany the nationalist movement had prospered and strengthened with each successive week, it had had a chequered course in the Papal States. The revolution had been as unanimous as in 1831 and 1848. Every city

¹ Poggi, *op. cit.*, I. 76, 96-104; III. 14-15; Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, III. 126-127 Bianchi, *Diplomazia*, VIII. 100; *contra*, Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, III. 139.

in Romagna followed the example of Bologna, and within a week the insurrection had spread through the Marches to Ancona and as far as Perugia in Umbria. The Pope excommunicated the authors of the revolution and prepared to recover his territory by force. The Swiss troops stormed Perugia (June 20), and though the best men of the city had gone to fight in Lombardy, and the defenders had only a few hundred old muskets, they made a stiff defence. The Papal government had given Schmidt, the Swiss colonel, orders to make an example of the city, and his men were promised leave to loot it. Desecrated churches, burnt and plundered houses, women and old men massacred in cold blood made up the shameful tale of outrage. The Pope rewarded the brutal soldiery, and, like the English government after Peterloo, coined a medal in memory of the infamous deed.¹ The fall of Perugia carried with it the submission of Umbria and the Marches, and by June 24 the Papal government had recovered all up to the borders of Romagna at La Cattolica. Farther they did not dare to advance, for there were a few Piedmontese troops at Bologna, and the nationalist volunteers were mustering to resist invasion.

The first act of the Provisional Junta at Bologna was to offer the dictatorship to Victor Emmanuel without conditions. There was little or no autonomist party in Romagna; ever since it had formed part of the Kingdom of Italy, its aspirations had been for union with the provinces of the Po basin. The Turin government was prepared to accept the dictatorship, despite the King's scruples, and D'Azeglio was appointed Commissioner in Victor Emmanuel's name. But again the Emperor put his veto. It was not that he had any prepossession in favour of the Papal power. He had promised

¹ Zini, *Storia, Documenti II.*, 195-224; Zobi, *op. cit.*, II. 67-74, 130-144, 150-167; Bonazzi, *Perugia*, II. 620-630; Gennarelli, *Governo pontificio*, I. xovi; II. 650, 664, 677-682. The above are based largely on *Narrazione storica dei fatti accaduti nel Perugia dal 15 al 20 giugno, 1859*, and *Relazione della giunta del governo provvisorio*. There is a weak apology in the *Dublin Review* of September 1859, based mainly on the *Giornale di Roma*. Balan, *Continuazione*, II. 133, and O'Reilly, *Leo XIII.*, 180-181, barely allude to the matter. See also Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, IV. 184; Mrs. Trollope, *op. cit.*, 42-43; *Times* of July 2, 1859.

Cavour at Plombières that Piedmont should have Romagna; he had bound himself anew by the treaty of January; he had told Pepoli, who was in the Junta, that he would never restore the Pope's authority at Bologna; and Prince Napoleon had boasted that the Pope would have nothing left him but Rome and the country up to Tivoli "as a kind of garden."¹ But he had to count on the clerical opposition in France; he had publicly disclaimed any intention to touch the Temporal Power; he was hoping to withdraw his troops from Rome, as soon as the expulsion of Austria from the peninsula removed one reason for the occupation,² and if the Pope's territory were attacked, it would be difficult to get his consent to evacuation. Napoleon indeed had a feeble hope that he might solve the dilemma by persuading the Pope to voluntarily resign part of his state, and allow its incorporation into a Central Italian Kingdom. But the prospects of such a kingdom were daily smaller, and he knew that it was hopeless to expect Pius to concede anything of his free-will to hated Piedmont. Driven to break his word either to the Italians or the clericals, he was inclined for the moment to throw the latter over. The French Liberals were fulminating against the atrocities of Perugia, and the Emperor's game of balance made it necessary to throw them a sop. Generosity and policy alike bade him content the Italians, and just before Villafranca he appears to have given Cavour to understand that he would allow him to have Romagna (July 9).³ But he probably still intended, to couple his consent with conditions of Papal suzerainty, hoping perhaps that this would win the Pope to acceptance, and that he could reconcile the Catholics by forbidding any attack on the Marches or Umbria.⁴ A few days later D'Azeglio made his tardy appearance at Bologna,

¹ Veroli, *Pepoli*, in *Riv. Eur.*, XXVIII. 567; Senior in *Fortnightly Review*, Aug. 1879.

² Drouyn de Lhuys' despatch of September 12, 1864; Pantaleoni, *Idea Italiana*, 30.

³ Cavour, *Lettere*, III. 106; Veroli, *op. et vol. cit.*, 571; Bianchi, *op. cit.*, VIII. 110; Masi, *Fra libri*, 124; Massari, *Vittorio Emmanuele*, 279; Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, III. 126-127; Canth, *Cronistoria*, III. 342.

⁴ *Affaires étrangères 1860*, 87; Zobi, *op. cit.*, II. 94.

with powers toned down to meet the Emperor's wishes. But quietly putting his instructions on one side, he took the practical direction of the government, and Cavour, surrendering for the moment his plans on Umbria, boldly encouraged the Marches to revolt.¹

Thus it was that before Villafranca the feeling for unity had grown strong in all Central Italy. The dispossessed princes had lost their few supporters. The discovery of the Belvidere plot and the presence of the Grand Duke's son in the Austrian army at Solferino had discredited the Lorrainers even among those who felt most tenderly towards them. The sack of Perugia had made Romagna arm to resist the Pope's mercenaries at any cost. And sentiment and practical necessities combined to make all sections of the nationalists daily keener for a strong kingdom, which should comprise all Northern and Central Italy. Cavour had talked boldly after Magenta of the rise of a great Italian state, based on unity of race and tongue and tradition. But there was still an undercurrent that made for autonomy. Men like Capponi and Ridolfi were willing to accept annexation, because they saw no alternative, but it was against the grain. Union with Piedmont would still be somewhat of a *mariage de convenance*, and leave behind it hankerings for the old state-independence to be the seed of future trouble. Villafranca changed all this. Federation was impossible with the Austrians in Venetia, with the Papal army threatening at La Cattolica, and the Duke of Modena waiting with his troops for an opportunity to cross the Po. The federal body would be either a lifeless form, or a battleground between the two principles, which must sooner or later end in war. The princes must be kept out at any cost, the republic must be outbid; the freed provinces must stand together and stand by Piedmont. Unity was no longer a counsel of expediency but a faith; and when Rattazzi, who had succeeded Cavour, attempted to carry out the terms of Villafranca, he found himself in front of an universal conspiracy to defeat them.

¹ Bianchi, *op. cit.*, VIII. 111; Massari, *op. cit.*, 277; Alessandri, *Fatti delle Marche*, 73, quoted by Balan.

* The Central Italians found two leaders of the stamp they needed: men of dogged, unbending resolution, not afraid of responsibility, whom neither threats nor flattery, intrigue nor danger could move. Cavour had had the prescience to send his friend and colleague Farini to Modena, when the province revolted after Magenta. Farini was a doctor of Ravenna, who had been mixed up in the network of Romagnuol conspiracy, which culminated in the Rimini movement. After a brief exile he returned under Pius' amnesty, and took a leading part among the moderate Liberals of his province; he overdid his party's dislike of radicalism, and the book, which he afterwards published on the recent history of the Roman State, was venomous and unfair. In 1849 he took refuge in Piedmont, became perhaps Cavour's first parliamentary follower, and gave him to the end a faithful but dignified obedience. He was not a popular man; he was vain, opinionative, fond of display and luxury. But he was an honest, brave patriot, with a rapid intuitive power of grasping a situation, and a quick, strong, unhesitating resolve in execution. Probably like Cavour's, his belief in unity was at first a pious faith, which developed slowly and as events encouraged it. But whatever may have been his doubts before the war, the events of the last two months had made him a fervent disciple of the Unitarians, and Villafranca had roused him to defy French dictation and Austrian threats.

Tuscany had for its leader one of the noblest figures in the history of modern Italy. Bettino Ricasoli was one of the Liberal nobles, who made the Georgofil Society, and led the constitutional movement in Tuscany in 1847-8, till the power passed from them to the democrats. His early political career was neither successful nor quite consistent. Since the restoration he had lived in proud seclusion on his estates, teaching and training his peasants, reclaiming land in the Maremma, reviving the manufacture of Chianti wine. He was roused from the dejection that followed his wife's death in 1852 by the drama that was unfolding in Piedmont. As early as 1856 he had become an enthusiast for unity, dreaming that Italy would win her freedom for

herself, disdaining reliance on diplomacy and foreign help. But as Cavour's programme developed, he saw that every patriot must rally round it, and however ill to his liking the French alliance may have been, he resolved that Tuscany must set an example of discipline and abnegation for the sake of union. But he had no desire to see the new Italy a Piedmont writ large. He was not willing to surrender Tuscany with its old civilisation and ancient pride and humane institutions to anything less than Italy. The Kingdom that was to be must take what was best in the laws and institutions of each province, and from them all evolve a better common constitution, in which Tuscany with its advanced civil legislation would supply the model for much.

Ricasoli was heir of an ancient feudal race, and his lineage stamped his nature. He was an autocrat by every instinct; proud, fearless, self-reliant, he "felt strong enough to have lived in the twelfth century"; a stark, energetic man, who, as landlord, ruled his tenants with exacting sternness, while he civilised and enriched them; who as statesman, preferred to "work by himself and with himself," distrustful and contemptuous of others, refusing to bow to King or people, and who in after days, as premier of Italy, disdained to draw his salary or wear a court dress. But the man, who was a patrician in every fibre of his being, who had none of Cavour's free and genial manners, was a thoroughgoing democrat in creed, with a republican contempt for courts,¹ and a readiness to work with every honest man, however extreme a politician. His was a very earnest passion to serve his country; in youth his ambition had been "to give head and heart to Tuscan agriculture"; in later life his hope was to help in making Italy great and respected, prosperous and religious. To a zeal for morality as keen as any devotee's, he joined a strong practical concern for agriculture and railways, for all that touched the material condition of the people. He was sometimes called a Protestant. He disclaimed the name, but his whole moral equip-

¹ He had a theoretic belief in republicanism, but thought it impracticable: Gotti, *Ricasoli*, 123.

ment was evangelical and Puritan. His letters sometimes startlingly resemble Cromwell's; he had the same austere piety, the same mixture of introspection with resoluteness in action, the same habit of sententious but quite genuine moralizing. At one period of his life he wished to be a missionary, and he loved to expound the Bible to his peasants in the hall of his feudal castle at Brolio. And though a Catholic by profession, he was a Protestant in spirit; he had an erastian contempt for the clergy, he was a friend of the Protestant Guicciardini,¹ he detested the Papal court as "an abominable and rotten bier." But with all his democratic beliefs, he was not a man to be a popular hero. Though his speeches and circulars had power to move, though men instinctively followed him, he was never likely to be the idol of a nation in the sense that Cavour was. He was a pedant for political decorum, and his cold propriety of manner, his disregard of his colleagues, his loathing of all finesse made him a leader more respected than liked. He was a brave, supremely honourable man, who went straight to his end without flinching, the Leonidas of a political Thermopylæ. But his strength was of will more than of intellect; he had the faults of a man, who had lived apart from public life, an obstinacy in details, a temper that was easily ruffled, an insistence on his own importance. He could command, but he could not argue, and when brought face to face with a clever opponent, he either took refuge in unpersuasive silence, or yielded with a facility that contrasted strangely with his usual strength. But in a station of command he had an iron nature; his want of suppleness, his pedantic regard for forms, his occasional incapacity to grasp the kernel of a matter, if they unfitted him for parliamentary life, made him all the stronger, where the issue was simple and the danger great.

Directly after Villafranca the Turin government telegraphed instructions to the Commissioners at Bologna, Florence, Modena, and Parma to resign and return. But Cavour was resolved not to leave office without another effort to save his work. To Farini he telegraphed "arms

¹ See above, Vol. I., p. 373.

and money," he told D'Azeglio to go on his way without regard for Villafranca, and with more hesitation advised Ricasoli to hold on to power and summon a representative assembly. The King encouraged them to stand firm; "if any one doubted my loyalty," he told the Tuscan agent, "I would blow my brains out." The Commissioners were men to rise to the occasion; BonCompagni might retire, for he left in Ricasoli a better man behind him; but D'Azeglio, who had been only four days at Bologna, refused to return, till he could leave a settled government behind and a force of volunteers to protect the frontier from the Swiss troops in Umbria; and Farini, left without troops or money, resigned his commissionership to be appointed next day dictator at Modena (July 28), and soon afterwards at Parma. "I will lose my life," he declared, "before any one drives me out." "I am master of the people," he telegraphed to Ricasoli; "we shall triumph with union, energy, and, if necessary, audacity; I have it." They knew that if they abandoned their posts, there was little hope for Central Italy; there would be disorder, perhaps a futile struggle, then reaction, and all the work of the last year to be done over again. They had the people solid behind them; "Italy," Farini said, "has not signed the peace of Villafranca," and they knew that to defeat it, Central Italy would stand by them almost as one man. There was no difference as to this between Conservatives and Liberals; while Ricasoli's democrat friend, Dolfi, the Florentine baker,¹ improvised a national guard, Ridolfi, hitherto so undecided, proposed a levy in mass, if it proved necessary to fight. "While diplomacy is treating," the government announced, "Italy must arm." All the efforts of the Grand Duke's friends found no response. There was some danger of disorder in Tuscany, but it was the expression of exasperation against the Emperor and of alarm for Leopold's return. "If Tuscany is allowed to decide its own fate," wrote Ricasoli, "I guarantee perfect order." On this side was a resolute people, led by men who flinched at no danger, determined to surrender to nothing but overwhelming force; on that the ministry at Turin, without

¹ See the sketch of him in Martinengo-Cesaresco, *Characters*, 42.

courage or conviction, swayed hither by its own cowardice, thither by shame of surrendering the nation's hopes. And behind it loomed the would-be arbiter of nations, whose great refusal had made the dilemma, full of schemes of more or less generous conception, but tortured by a sense of failure and the knowledge how rotten was the base on which his own throne stood, urging his restless mind to find some loophole by the tortuous diplomacy he loved.

The four states at once drew together for common protection. The Papal mercenaries, perhaps with the Neapolitans or Spanish¹ behind them, might at any moment burst into Romagna, or the Duke of Modena cross the Po from Venetia and make a dash for his capital. It was equally necessary to have a force to put down disorder, and avoid the pretext for intervention that any disturbance would give. There were already 8000 volunteers on the Umbrian frontier at La Cattolica, and Farini with Ricasoli's consent stopped the Tuscan troops on their way from the seat of war to guard the line of the Po. At D'Azeglio's suggestion he proposed to form a military League of the four states, and raise an army of at least 25,000 men. Both he and Ricasoli hesitated for a moment whether to admit Romagna, and weaken the case of Modena and Tuscany by mixing them up with the thorny Papal question;² but they preferred the risk to the cowardice of deserting the sister state, and a military convention was signed between Modena, Tuscany, and Romagna (Parma adhering at a later date), though the contracting governments were still careful to guard themselves from any obligation to defend Romagna, should the Catholic Powers intervene. The Turin ministry with considerable hesitation sent Fanti, perhaps the ablest of the Piedmontese generals, to organise the army of the League, with Garibaldi as his second in command.

Central Italy was now secure from a raid. It would of course have been impossible for the slender forces of the League to make a prolonged resistance, if Austria moved to restore the dispossessed princes. But the danger of Austrian

¹ Correspondence—Villafranca, 46.

² Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, III. 171, 203; Bianchi, *op. cit.*, VIII. 574.

intervention soon passed. Napoleon found that restoration was impossible without force of arms, that contrary to his calculations not even Tuscany would take back its Grand Duke. The clause relating to the Dukes in the Preliminaries of Villafranca had purposely left it ambiguous whether force might be employed for their restoration, and the Emperor had from the first vetoed any foreign intervention. He was glad enough to find an excuse for escaping from his promises to Austria, provided he could plead that the stubborn attitude of the Central States had forced his hand. He would summon a Congress of the Powers, and shelter himself behind their verdict from his irreconcilable obligations. Backed by Russell's energetic protests, he let it be known that he would allow no Austrian intervention either in Tuscany or Romagna; he had left 50,000 men in Lombardy, and he knew that the threat was sufficient to deter Austria with her ruined finances and domestic difficulties.¹

Reassured as to the Emperor's intention, the Central governments felt that they only needed to be firm and not allow themselves to be frightened. The Emperor's veto had put a ring-fence round them, and safe from Austrian intervention they were masters of their own destinies. Whatever might be the Emperor's theories as to their future fate, they knew that sooner or later he must accept the position they made for themselves, and that public opinion would force the Piedmontese government to follow. It was their obvious policy therefore to compromise themselves and him. They had already decided to summon a representative Assembly in each state, and the elections, on a restricted franchise in Tuscany and Romagna, on manhood suffrage in Modena and Parma, had everywhere resulted in the triumph of the nationalists.² By unanimous

¹ *Riv. stor. del risorg.*, III. 126; Poggi, *op. cit.*, III. 163, 167; Veroli, *op. cit.*, 570; Kossuth, *op. cit.*, 418; Correspondence—Villafranca, 10, 15, 57, 95; Capponi, *Lettere*, III. 292; Bianchi, *op. cit.*, VIII. 207, 550, 564; Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, III. 158, 169.

² The figures as to the heaviness of the Tuscan polls are conflicting: Galeotti, *Assemblea*, 9-12, 21; Zobi, *op. cit.*, II. 552; Correspondence—Villafranca, 54-55, 99. The successful deputies had very large majorities. Dupan-

votes (only three deputies were absent in Tuscany and one in Romagna) the Assemblies pronounced the downfall of the old governments and the annexation of their states to the kingdom of Victor Emmanuel. Parties had disappeared; with admirable self-control the latent political divisions were kept under, and Central Italy showed an united front, that won the astonishment and admiration of Europe.

It remained to be seen what course the Piedmontese government would take. It was recognized that Rattazzi's cabinet was only a provisional one, to tide over the interval till Cavour's return to power. Its origin implied that it must accept the terms of Villafranca, and more or less follow the Emperor's lead. But though to a certain extent it represented the narrower Piedmontese school, Rattazzi had a tepid belief in unity,¹ and it could not altogether abandon the nationalists. To so much the King had committed them; he had promised "never to abandon the people, who had trusted in him," and his friendliness to Garibaldi pointed to a wish to employ him for bigger developments some day. His scruples as to touching the Pope's dominions had, it would seem, vanished under the stress of feeling, that Villafranca had produced. His ministers cared nothing for Papal thunders, but they dared not alienate the Emperor. They knew how difficult it was to disembarass themselves of the ally, who had fixed himself so tightly on their back, that if Central Italy were annexed, he would insist on compensation in Savoy; and Rattazzi himself knew that with Savoy Nice would have to go. There was a real danger too that, if the Emperor were irritated, he might withdraw his troops and his guarantee against intervention, and Piedmont be left alone to a terrible struggle with Austria. Bolder men would have accepted the first and risked the second, knowing how crippled Austria lay, how improbable it was that Napoleon would leave Italy to be overrun by his old enemy. But though Rattazzi would perhaps have taken

loup's figures (*Souveraineté*, 382) are inaccurate, at all events as regards Modena. A plebiscite at Parma gave a vote of 56,000 for annexation, and less than 500 against it: Correspondence—Villafranca, 93.

¹ Mme. Rattazzi, *Rattazzi*, I. 338.

a bolder line, and was prepared to surrender Savoy, if Nice could be saved,¹ his colleagues dared not risk the possibility of a crushing defeat, dared not face the clamour that would descend on them, if they sacrificed the cradle of the royal house and the home of Garibaldi. So like the weak men they were, they steered a middle course, waiting on the Emperor's pleasure, but refusing to commit themselves to his schemes, and trusting that the chapter of accidents would some day find them a solution. From the first indeed they refused to accept the principle of federation, hoping that at the Congress of the Powers, which, it was assumed, would meet before long, they would get European sanction for the votes of annexation. If Naples sent troops into Central Italy, they would fight; but beyond this they would do nothing without the Emperor's approval.² Before the deputations from the four Assemblies reached Turin to lay the votes before the King, they sent to sound Napoleon's wishes (August 28).

Though the Emperor had declared against intervention, though he was reconciling himself to the annexation of Parma and perhaps of Modena, though there were moments when he was inclined to let Italy have her way, his policy was on the whole set against permitting Piedmont to take either Romagna or Tuscany. It was not alone the fear of the French Catholics which influenced him. All the traditional policy of France forbade the formation of a strong Italian Kingdom, which, as he foresaw himself, might some day enter an anti-French coalition. A federation of constitutional states possessed no such danger; it would, he trusted fondly, acquit him of his promises to the Italians; and though Italy and Austria were conspiring to make it impossible, he had still the pride of authorship in the unhopeful scheme. His agreement at Villafranca to promote reforms in the Papal States was a tacit engagement to repudiate his promises to the Romagnuols, and he pledged

¹ Cavour, *Lettere*, IV. 255.

² Bonfadini, *Arese*, 202-203; Bianchi, *op. cit.*, VIII. 171, 546; Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, III. 170; Poggi, *op. cit.*, I. 142; III. 105; Castelli, *Carteggio*, I. 203, 211; Mme. Rattazzi, *op. cit.*, I. 434. Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, III. 240, is incorrect.

himself freshly and deeply to the Pope and the clericals to suffer no violence to the Temporal Power. But he hoped to win Pius to some scheme of Home Rule for Romagna, which would at once preserve his suzerainty and satisfy the nationalists, vainly dreaming that the promised headship of the Federation might lure him to the concession.¹ Perhaps at a future day, if he felt strong enough to break with the Pope, Romagna and the Marches and possibly Umbria might join a kingdom of Central Italy. But at all events he would allow no annexation even of Romagna; and he was even more opposed to Piedmont taking Tuscany, knowing that if Victor Emmanuel's kingdom crossed the Apennines, it meant sooner or later Italian Unity, and a yet more troublous stirring of the Roman problem. He had indeed quite relinquished all expectation of placing Prince Napoleon on the throne of Tuscany; but whether it returned to the Grand Duke, or went to a prince of the Savoy House, or to the young Duke of Parma, at all events the King of Piedmont's writ must not run there.² No doubt his plans were in a state of constant change, and drifted with the impression of the moment. Much depended on his power to defy the French clericals and outwit his own ministers; much depended on the attitude of England, more on the temper of the Italians. At present at all events he clung to his scheme of federation, and when the message reached him from Turin, put his prompt veto on annexation. When therefore the Tuscan deputation³ came before the King (September 3), the Turin government had decided not to accept. An evasive reply was put into the King's mouth, but in private conversation he encouraged the deputies to read between its lines, and act and speak as if union were accomplished.

¹ Veroli, *op. et vol. cit.*, 570; Bianchi, *op. cit.*, VIII. 599; *Affaires étrangères* 1860, 87.

² Poggi, *op. cit.*, I. 184; III. 88, 95; Veroli, *loc. cit.*

³ Its spokesman was Ugolino della Gherardesca, descended from him of the Tower of Hunger; Verdi was a member of the Parmesan deputation.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE ANNEXATION OF THE CENTRE

SEPTEMBER 1859—APRIL 1860

Central Italy firm ; Farini projects a political League ; " Piedmontising ; ' the Regency question ; Napoleon III. in October ; Piedmont and the Regency. The democrats ; plans for attacking Umbria ; Garibaldi recalled. Election of Regent ; the BonCompagni compromise. Napoleon III. and the Congress ; English policy ; "*Le Pape et le Congrès.*" Cavour and the ministry ; the Free Committees ; Rattazzi resigns ; CAVOUR PREMIER. SAVOY AND NICE ; Cavour, Napoleon III., and England ; the treaties of cession ; the plebiscites for ANNEXATION. The Italian Parliament.

It was impossible for Central Italy to be wholly contented with the King's reply. It was willing indeed to take his and Cavour's assurance that at present no more could be dared. But while the Turin government might have to make allowances for the diplomatic difficulties and avoid a rupture with the Emperor, Ricasoli and Farini could boldly disregard his mandate. They took the broader interpretation of the King's words, and assumed that Victor Emmanuel was " King by right of election and his own consent." Meanwhile much might be done to prepare for the day, when union would be a reality. The army of the League now numbered 45,000 men. Except for a small movement among the peasants round Ferrara, there was absolute order. Tuscany, so backward when action was needed, showed that she possessed fine virtues of patience and persistence. Not all the intrigues that were industriously set on foot by the partisans of the dispossessed princes disturbed Farini's and Ricasoli's rule. Ricasoli was in fact dictator in all but name. He had won the people by his steadfastness, his plain speaking, his refusal to wrap his policy in mystery ; and they

hardly grumbled at the indefinite prorogation of the Assembly and the curbs which he put on the freedom of the press. Farini was reforming with feverish activity at Modena and Parma; purging the civil service, expelling the Jesuits, enfranchising the Jews, introducing the commercial code of Piedmont. At Bologna D'Azeglio had been succeeded by Cipriani, the commandant at Leghorn in 1848, who owed his appointment to an old friendship with the Emperor; and though his harsh rule caused much heartburning, it was kept below the surface, to avoid weakening the hands of the government.

Farini's policy was to draw the Central States together, giving them a more or less common government, and assimilating their laws to those of Piedmont, so that when Victor Emmanuel actually assumed the government, he would find the consolidation of the old and new provinces virtually accomplished. His proposal was to graft on the existing military League a single political direction, which, without superseding the four existing governments, would be a symbol of their solidarity and a safeguard against discord. The government at Bologna supported him for its own special reasons, hoping that his scheme would prevent the fate of Romagna being sundered from that of the other states. Ricasoli objected, his flimsy pretexts cloaking a fear that an union of the four states would encourage the partisans of a Central Italian Kingdom. He felt, as Cavour did for the same reason, that the League might prove more of an obstacle than a help to union with Piedmont; and he was still afraid of complicating the fate of Tuscany with that of Romagna. It is very questionable, however, whether, dangerous as was the diplomatic move for a Central State, the adoption of Farini's mild scheme would have increased the risk; and Ricasoli's opposition was probably due in part to a growing rivalry with the dictator of Modena, in part too to a conviction that fusion meant an early adoption of Piedmontese law by all the component states. Farini was gradually introducing it, even where the native law, as in Parma, was in many respects more advanced. In Tuscany the democrats and a section of the

cabinet, encouraged by Rattazzi, were trying to "Piedmontise" the native institutions. Ricasoli successfully resisted them. It was not that he wanted to postpone reform. He was introducing many practical industrial and administrative improvements, and Ridolfi was trying to make Florence the educational and artistic centre of the new kingdom.¹ But reform, he urged, need not necessarily be on Piedmontese lines. Unity to Ricasoli meant something quite other than a tame acceptance of the laws and institutions of Piedmont. He was willing, however, though not with the best of grace, to recognize Piedmontese money, to abolish customs-lines and passports, to form a postal union; and by the middle of October the economic fusion of North and Central Italy was accomplished.

But the whole question to Ricasoli was of infinitely smaller present moment than that of annexation. Whatever might be their differences on other matters, he and Farini were at one in absolutely refusing to bow to foreign pressure. In fact it required no great acuteness to see that the Emperor must ultimately defer to them, nay perhaps would not be loath to have his hands forced again. He had let it be understood that Walewski's diatribes in the *Moniteur* were only intended to fool the diplomatists. His views as to Tuscany were rapidly changing, and at the end of September he sent a private message, urging the four governments to be firm in maintaining their independence (September 28).² Next day it was secretly agreed among them, that, if the King would not assume direct sovereignty, the Assemblies should be convoked, and his cousin, the Prince of Carignano elected Regent. From this date oaths were taken to "the elected King," the coinage was stamped with his profile, the acts of government were headed with his name. On the last day of September the Piedmontese flag floated from the Palazzo Vecchio.

But the sorely-perplexed Emperor was still far from

¹ 500,000 lire were appropriated for the encouragement of historical pictures and statues. The Bargello was made a national museum. The restoration of S. Lorenzo was decreed.

² Ricasoli, *Lettere*, III. 361; but it is very difficult to reconcile this with Cavour, *Lettere*, VI. 451-452.

reconciling himself to annexation. His message had merely expressed one of his ever-shifting moods. He was still faintly hoping to persuade the Pope to give Home Rule to Romagna and appoint Victor Emmanuel his Vicar.¹ He promised that Parma should go to Piedmont; but though he repeated his guarantee against an Austrian intervention, he told a Florentine deputation that they must accept Ferdinand's son (October 15). The deputation boldly answered him that Tuscany would never take the Lorrainers back, and warned him that, if the Italians lost faith in his intentions, they would spread the revolution to Naples and Sicily. The threat went home; but he was angry at the bitterness of the Turin press, irritated because Rattazzi was repressing the separatist papers in Savoy, miserably oppressed by his engagements to Vienna, and hoping that the Congress would take the whole responsibility out of his hands. Perhaps he would have been glad if Rattazzi had defied him; as it was, the indecision at Turin only vexed him,² and he was still clinging to federation as the happy *via media*, which would satisfy everybody. A few days later (October 20) he wrote an open letter to the King, insisting strongly on federalism, and again vetoing the annexation. If Piedmont would accept his terms, he offered to insist on Home Rule for Venetia and compel Austria to make Mantua and Peschiera federal fortresses.

The Turin ministry, blown to and fro by every wind from Paris or Florence, was winning for itself universal contempt. Rattazzi, stung by the taunt of cowardice, would, it seems, have approved of the Carignano scheme.³ But his colleagues were still unwilling to risk a rupture with France, and perhaps in their hearts disliked a movement, that promised to sink Piedmont in Italy. They had truckled again to the Emperor by sending Dabormida, the Foreign Minister, to the oracle, drawing on themselves D'Azeglio's taunt that "on a question of honour it was not like a Piedmontese to ask

¹ Correspondence—Villafranca, 148; VielCastel, *Mémoires*, V. 187.

² Castelli, *Carteggio*, I. 230-231.

³ Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, III. 370, 431; Correspondence—Villafranca, 175; Castelli, *op. cit.*, I. 220.

advice." And though in reply to the Emperor's letter they again repudiated federation, they allowed the annexation question to drift in almost absolute inaction.

Even the most patient began to despair of them. When men of the stamp of D'Azeglio and Minghetti wished to force their hands, there is little wonder that the ultra-democrats, who had sunk their suspicions under the enthusiasm of the past year, revived their old distrust in the royalist movement. Mazzini had been unwisely and ungenerously excluded from the amnesty, that had been granted to political offenders at the beginning of the war. After Villafranca he had come to Florence, where Ricasoli allowed him to remain on his parole that his presence there should remain unknown. Mazzini was willing to support Victor Emmanuel with the usual reservations. To raise the cry of the republic at this moment, he confessed, would weaken the royal nationalists without helping his own party. But he exaggerated the danger of a Napoleonic kingdom in the Centre and hoped to precipitate annexation by a forward movement. He sent Crispi to stir a rising in Sicily,¹ and urged the reconquest of Perugia, which, he believed, would spread the insurrection through Umbria and the Marches to the Abruzzi, and catch the Bourbons between two fires. If Italian Unity were completed before the Congress met, the Congress, he was confident, would recognize the accomplished fact.

Independently of him La Farina and the National Society were spreading their committees through Romagna, and across the frontier into Umbria and the Marches, collecting arms and preparing for a rising in the enslaved provinces. There was imminent danger of an explosion on the frontier; if the Umbrians revolted, it would be impossible to prevent the patriots of Romagna from going to their help; or the Papal troops might make a raid into Romagna,² where they could count on a certain amount of sympathy among the peasants. So acute was the reaction against the halting policy of Turin, so intense the desire to force the pace, that it carried away men who had little in common with the democrats. Farini and Fanti, without

¹ See below, p. 123.

² See below, p. 128.

consulting Ricasoli,¹ advanced the Tuscan and Modenese troops to the frontier, and placed them under Garibaldi's command, giving him orders to repel any attack and follow it across the frontier, or, should the revolution break out in the Marches or Umbria, to go to its support. Garibaldi had recently started a subscription to buy a million rifles for a national arming; he was already planning the conquest of Naples and Rome;² and in close correspondence with La Farina's committees, and probably with the King, he made no secret of the intended invasion, and kept feeling at fever-heat with his proclamations. Ricasoli was frightened and incensed at the news; it was not only anger at Farini's disloyal action, but fear lest the rash step might complicate the annexations with a development, which would render all Catholic Europe fiercely hostile, and force the Emperor to recall his guarantee. He and Cipriani ordered Fanti to withdraw his troops from the frontier, and when Farini and Fanti defied him, appealed to the Turin government to save the situation. The ministry, probably alarmed by messages from Paris, would apparently have gone so far as to dissolve the Military League and disband half the troops. But though Ricasoli himself hesitated for a moment, he soon recognized the folly of their scheme, and his strong opposition killed it.³ The King now stepped in; in all probability there had been a secret understanding between him and Garibaldi;⁴ but he had come to recognize the danger, and summoned Garibaldi to Turin (October 29), while with more doubtful wisdom he called on Fanti to resign. Fanti at once obeyed; Garibaldi came to Turin, but Victor Emmanuel's strong liking for him, or a common wish to force the pace, seems to have prevented the King from imposing obedience on his impatient general. Garibaldi refused to promise not to cross the frontier, on the ground that he was pledged to help

¹ Cipriani seems to have wavered as to supporting Farini: Finali, *Contemporanei*, 78-80. For Farini's relations with Mazzini see Pianciani, *Dell'andamento*, 28-29.

² Melena, *Garibaldi*, 95, 97; Spaventa, *Dal 1848*, 265.

³ Finali, *op. cit.*, 78-80, 291.

⁴ Mazzini, *Opere*, XI. lii; Ricasoli, *Lettere*, V. 57; Mario, *Bertani*, I. 401-402; Melena, *Garibaldi*, 73.

the insurrection, if it broke out, though he undertook to do what he could to keep the Marches quiet.¹ On his return to Rimini, hoping no doubt that Fanti's resignation would place himself in supreme command, he threw even this promise to the winds and pushed on the preparations for invasion, while his agents fanned the insurrectionary embers in the Marches. Meanwhile the Assembly at Bologna had compelled Cipriani to resign, and conferred the dictatorship on Farini, who at once united Romagna and the Duchies under the name of Emilia.² Fanti was persuaded to recall his resignation, and the forward party seemed triumphant. But Farini and Fanti had awoke to the terrible risk of their policy; complaints and protests rained in from the courts of Europe; Cavour threw all his weight against the project, and the Umbrians proved unready for revolt. Farini and Fanti decided to stop the raid, and summoning Garibaldi to Bologna, extracted from him a promise to desist (November 12). But again the extremists, who surrounded him, worked on his suspicions; a false telegram that the insurrection had broken out did its work; and within two hours of his promise to Farini he ordered the troops to cross the frontier. Fanti sent them peremptory counter-orders; and it proved how completely Garibaldi had discredited himself, that there was no attempt to disobey. Garibaldi in hot anger hurried to Bologna, and demanded that Fanti and Farini should resign, leaving him military and civil dictator. They indignantly refused, and Garibaldi, powerless to defy them, was two days later again summoned to Turin, where at the King's persuasion he resigned his command, and retired into private life (November 16).

It may seem strange that a movement, which aimed at an object so dear to the patriots, which a year later had such unbroken success, should now have met with general reprobation. But the public felt that it was supremely inopportune; while the destinies of Tuscany and Emilia

¹ I give more credit to Minghetti's report in Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, III. 493-494, than to Ib., IV. 12, and Guerzoni, *Garibaldi*, I. 495-496. See also Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, III. 475; Garibaldi, *Memorie*, 324-325; Correspondence—Villa franca, 175.

² Of course so called from the *Via Emilia*.

were still unsettled, it was the highest imprudence to complicate them with the yet more prickly question of the Pope's remaining territory. Had Garibaldi advanced, he would have found the combined forces of Rome and Naples in front of him; and if Austria had yielded to the temptation to step in, he would have been caught in a trap, from which escape was impossible. The Emperor could not have used his influence to shelter a raid, and Rattazzi would almost certainly have left Garibaldi to his fate. And the glamour of the movement faded in Farini's disloyalty and Garibaldi's abrupt and dishonest changes. Bitterly as he resented the desertion of Farini and Fanti, the wrong was greater on his own side, and he had only himself to thank for the alienation of men like La Farina, whose belief in him had been overpowered by disgust at his tempestuous want of self-control.¹

The Garibaldi episode however, as Ricasoli insisted, was only a secondary matter. But it showed convincingly the danger of the unsettlement. A provisional state of things encouraged every kind of peril; the forward movement might again raise its head; the murder of Anviti² at Parma, his mutilation by the mob, and Farini's slackness in punishing it had created an exaggerated sense of insecurity; there was a small reactionary conspiracy in Tuscany, and the Papal and Neapolitan troops might attack at any moment. With Ricasoli the vital point was to compromise the government at Turin by completing the abortive project of a month before and getting the Prince of Carignano appointed Regent. In the midst of the Garibaldi trouble he thought he saw his chance. Neri Corsini, who was his agent in London, telegraphed that Lord John Russell was in favour of the Regency, and that the Emperor, anxious above all things

¹ For the incident generally see Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, III. 228, 349; Carandini, *Fanti*, 286-294; Guerzoni, *op. cit.*, I. 493-504; Pallavicino, *Memorie*, III. 547, 560; La Farina, *Epistolario*, II. 210, 256, 431; Cavour, *Lettere*, III. cclv; Badiali, *Farini*, 221; Mazzini, *Opere*, X. xciii-cii, cxxii; Id., *Ad A. Gianelli*, 123; Mario, *Bertani*, I. 401-412; Castelli, *op. cit.*, I. 235; Oddo, *I mille*, I. 121; Poggi, *Memorie*, I. 349; *Lettere ad A. Panizzi*, 372; and the authorities quoted above, pp. 105-106.

² See above, p. 14. Political assassination was traditional at Parma.

for the English alliance, would recall his veto (October 27). Corsini's message proved to be an error; Russell had expressed himself privately to Panizzi in favour of the Regency, but Palmerston thought it premature, and the Emperor was still opposed.¹ Ricasoli and Farini none the less decided to act in the spirit of the telegram, and found themselves encouraged by the King and Cavour. On November 7 the four Assemblies met and elected the Regent by all but unanimous votes.

The Turin ministry had done everything to prevent the election; failing in it, they insisted that Napoleon's advice should be taken, and the Emperor sent a strongly-worded message that if the King allowed Carignano to accept the Regency, the Congress would not meet, and Piedmont must take the consequences of the provocation to Austria. It was mere bluff on his part,² but Rattazzi did not know this, and Austria had threatened to make it a *casus belli*, if a single Piedmontese soldier entered the Central States. The ministers perhaps would have refused to yield, if they could have secured English support;³ but this was not forthcoming, and as usual they tried to find a middle way. At Cavour's suggestion, they decided that Carignano, while refusing the Regency for himself, should delegate BonCompagni to take the supreme government of Emilia and Tuscany. They stiffened themselves, and announced the decision to Napoleon as an accomplished fact; and the Emperor, finding that threats had no effect, accepted the position with good grace. But Ricasoli would have none of it; it must be "the prince or nothing," and he haughtily boasted that "Tuscany was in his hands and he alone was judge of what was necessary." He resented with all his soul the truckling to the Emperor; save for a Savoy prince, he would surrender no tittle of his power, or tie his own strong hands, which alone, he believed, were able to keep order. Only on one condition would he take BonCompagni, that he came as viceregent of the prince. Ricasoli's misplaced stubbornness

¹ Poggi, *op. cit.*, I. 348, 350; Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, III. 475, 483, 492, 501.

² Correspondence—Villafranca, 200.

³ Walpole, *Russell*, II. 314.

put the government in a dilemma; but they humoured him by offering to make BonCompagni's powers nominal, and at length (December 3) the King brought him to a compromise, by which BonCompagni was appointed governor-general of the two states, with a merely nominal control over their governments. At Florence the new governor found himself almost ignored by the ministry, and after little more than a month resigned from an intolerable position.

Thus the election of the Regent failed of its mark, and left matters practically as they were before. But the whole tangled business was beginning to unravel at the will of the Imperial arbiter. He was slowly realising that not only the princes could not be restored, but that federation was impossible, and that, nothing short of force would compel the Central States to relinquish annexation. Austria, despite her threats, was too weak to intervene, and even had she the strength, the Emperor could not afford to see her influence again predominant in the peninsula. The present suspense, as the Tuscan deputation had warned him, might fire the powder-barrel, and the movement for unity extend the more rapidly to the South; or Italy might become a hotbed of revolution which might breed another Orsini or spread the contagion to France. The peace had been signed at Zürich (November 11), and left his hands freer towards Austria. If a plebiscite of Central Italy decided for annexation, it would finally quit him of his engagements to her, by proving that there was no other possible solution. But if the traditional policy of France were broken, and Italy became a first-rate state, France must have her compensation by rounding off her boundaries. Savoy and Nice would be the price of Central Italy. He was feeling stronger to defy the clericals; he was very anxious to escape from his false position at Rome; and Romagna must go to a government, strong and liberal enough to save it from anarchy. Victor Emmanuel might even send troops to Rome, if disorders broke out there, when the French left.¹

His change of front necessitated a complete reversal of

¹ Castelli, *op. cit.*, I. 237.

policy. Hitherto he had used all his influence with England to secure the meeting of the Congress. But a Congress would be fatal to his new schemes; he dared not avow his designs on Savoy and Nice, and the other Catholic Powers, he knew, would never consent to the curtailment of the Pope's dominions. He must make the Congress impossible, and throw himself on the English alliance to support him in an anti-Papal policy. It was a hazardous game, for he must have known that any avowal of his designs on Savoy would alienate England; but they could be kept secret for the present, and meanwhile the alliance would have done its work. While he allowed Walewski for yet another month to talk of restoring Tuscany to the Grand Duke, he was sounding the English government (November 22), whether it would support him in allowing Victor Emmanuel's little son, the Duke of Genoa, to be his father's Regent in Tuscany and Romagna.

The Italian policy of the Palmerston cabinet had three ends in view; to satisfy Italian aspirations by the expulsion of Austria, to clip French influence in Italy, to weaken or destroy the Temporal Power. Lord John Russell had spoken out his indignation at "the Tuscans and Modenese being disposed of as if they were so many firkins of butter," had implicitly encouraged the Tuscans to reject Leopold, and pleaded the cause of annexation at Paris. And though Walewski retorted by threats of compensation in Savoy, and the English court, always morbidly afraid of Napoleon's ambitions, tried to hold the cabinet in check,¹ by the end of October Russell had been able to consent to the Congress, and made no secret of his intention to use it as a screen for Italian designs. But while he insisted that before it met, the Powers should formally renounce all intention of armed intervention, Austria declared roundly for restoration, and Russia and Prussia seemed inclined to follow her lead. The improbability that the Congress would hatch any scheme acceptable to all the Powers no doubt encouraged Napoleon to give the unhopeful project its deathblow.

Just before Christmas an anonymous pamphlet ap-

¹ Martin, *Prince Consort*, IV. 487, 489; Walpole, *op. cit.*, II. 312-314.

peared at Paris, entitled "The Pope and the Congress." Like its fellow of last January, it was written by La Guéronnière, and there was no secret as to the source of its inspiration. Its whole gist was to advocate a reduction of Papal territory. Professedly it wished to obtain at the Congress an European guarantee for the Temporal Power; but the smaller the Pope's dominions, the greater, it argued, was his spiritual authority, and France could not allow either herself or Austria to undo the *de facto* separation of Romagna. And though the pamphlet avoided all reference to the Marches and Umbria, it suggested that the European guarantee should be confined to Rome and the Comarca. It was clear that the Emperor's doubts as to Romagna at all events were at an end; and on the last day of the year he wrote to the Pope, reproaching him for his rejection of the Home Rule scheme, and telling him that this had made the separation of Romagna inevitable. He pushed on the commercial treaty with England; and, dismissing Walewski, whose tenure of the Foreign Ministry had been one long struggle to hold the Emperor back, he appointed in his place Thouvenel, who was an anti-clerical and a friend of the English alliance (January 4, 1860). The new policy at once succeeded in its primary object. The invitations to the Congress had gone out, and the pamphlet had spoken of it as at the point of meeting. But the Emperor knew that the inevitable result of the sensation would be to make it impossible. Austria asked if he intended to advocate the principles of the pamphlet at the Congress, and being informed that such was his purpose, at once withdrew.

The pace had quickened in Italy as well as at Paris. A fortnight after Austria's refusal to enter the Congress, Cavour was again Prime Minister. The strain between him and the Rattazzi cabinet had been steadily growing more tense. "In times like the present," he wrote to La Marmora, "states and their rulers are undone, unless they are bold." He was ill and irritable and unfair, ready to imagine slights where none were meant, and the kind of independent power, which he exercised from his retirement at Leri, only increased the difficulties of the government. Still his

criticism was right in the main, and his growing hostility only reflected the general disgust felt for the "ignoble valets," who truckled to the Emperor, and seemed so lukewarm in the national cause. Their "fabulous unpopularity" was increased by discontent at the drastic and unfortunate changes, which Rattazzi, using the King's temporary dictatorial powers, was introducing into Lombardy. Rattazzi had always more or less represented the school, which aimed at modelling Italy on Piedmont; and great as was the need of reform, the hasty ill-digested character of his "organic laws" courted criticism. It was certain that when the Chamber met, the ministry would fall at once; or if Cavour were sent to represent Piedmont at the Congress, he would return with a prestige, that would make his accession to office inevitable. His friends mustered their forces to secure his appointment, bitterly and unfairly attacking the ministers, who with admirable absence of party spirit wished to nominate him. It is certain now that the mysterious delay in his appointment, which filled the country with anger and suspicion, was due to the King's reluctance to see him back in power.¹ He had never forgiven him for his attempt to part him from his mistress, and long before the war he had wearied of his domineering premier; during the campaign he had shown a marked preference for Rattazzi, and Cavour's language after Villafranca could not be forgotten. It seems as if he hoped to escape ever calling his great minister to office again, for he had welcomed to court men like Brofferio and Valerio, whose ultra-radicalism was weaker than their fanatical hatred of the ex-premier. Whether openly encouraged by the King or not, they and their followers of the Extreme Left were straining every nerve to prevent Cavour's return to office. With strange short-sightedness, if it was not indeed pure partisan animus, they preferred Rattazzi's pseudo-progressive domestic programme to Cavour's bolder national policy, and formed a cave, to which out-of-date politicians like Guerrazzi rallied. Early in December they organised

¹ Massari, *La Marmora*, 260; Cavour, *Lettere*, III. ccxcviii; VI. 508; Castelli, *Ricordi*, 130, 298, 301, 318.

themselves under the name of the Free Committees. A good deal of mystery hangs over the intrigue. The ministers were freely charged with encouraging the plot, and though there is no positive proof of their complicity, there is strong evidence to implicate at least Rattazzi.¹ At all events the object of the cabal was to crush Cavour, and if Cavour went, with him would go his national policy. His friends in the Chamber promptly met the plot by forming a "Liberal Union," and its success alarmed the King into sanctioning Cavour's appointment to the Congress (December 22). The intriguers saw that their only hope of preventing Cavour's return to power was by stirring a vigorous agitation outside parliament. To serve the unscrupulous move they hoped to enlist Garibaldi. He had left Romagna sore and angry, declining the promotion, which the King offered him, and after a month of quiescence bursting into violent invective against the priests. In his explosive state of mind, trying to find a vent it little mattered in what direction, it was not difficult for the caballers to capture him. There can be little doubt that Rattazzi and the King had their part in this stage at all events of the unsavoury business, and held out hopes (December 28) that they would back him in a forward policy, perhaps in an attack on Umbria. The King was probably sincere; Rattazzi was fooling him for his own party ends. Intent on his Umbrian project, Garibaldi appealed to the Free Committees to change their title to that of the "Armed Nation," hoping no doubt to get their help for his fantastic scheme of the million rifles. They acquiesced with suspicious alacrity, and appointed Garibaldi their President.²

•¹ La Farina, *op. cit.*, II. 271-272, 585-586; Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, IV. 157; Cavour, *op. cit.*, VI. 530. The evidence, however, is not so strong as that relating to the second stage of the plot.

² *Lettere ad A. Panizzi*, 403, 407-408; Garibaldi, *Memorie*, 328-329; Mario, *Bertani*, I. 421-425; La Farina, *op. cit.*, II. 272; Cavour, *op. cit.*, VI. 526; Castelli, *Carteggio*, I. 280, 283; Revel, *Da Ancona*, 34; Guerzoni, *op. cit.*, I. 506-507; Pianciani, *op. cit.*, 57.

In this, as in the projected raid of October, there is a good deal yet to be explained. I do not think that there is any connection between the plot and Crispi's interview with Rattazzi on December 27, for which see below, p. 124.

But the ignoble intrigue was still-born. Neither in parliament nor the country did it find the smallest response. The ministry made haste to discountenance it, and Garibaldi, puzzled and angry at the whole business, dissolved the association (January 4, 1860). It had only proved how irresistible was Cavour's hold on the nation. The ministry was clearly tottering to its fall. In Central Italy the impatience was threatening to become dangerous. Rattazzi again had to suffer for his colleagues' cowardice,¹ and not only the members of the Liberal Union, but nationalists of every colour outside parliament felt with D'Azeglio that nothing could be done so long as he was minister. A baseless suspicion that Hudson was interfering in a dispute between Cavour and the Cabinet gave it an opportunity of retiring under a show of dignity. On January 16 Cavour was again prime minister. A great outburst of relief and joy hailed his return; the country felt that the time of suspense was over, and that it could again march on to its destinies.

It has sometimes been said that Cavour only reaped the fruits of Rattazzi's patient waiting. There is this much truth in the theory, that the pertinacity of the Central States and the Emperor's change of front had made the path much smoother than it had been during all the first period of Rattazzi's administration. What would have been temerity in the early autumn, now required only a prudent courage. But it was just this courage that Rattazzi, or at all events his colleagues, lacked; not even the Emperor's declared desertion of the Pope had spurred them to action. Cavour exploited to the full the favourable conjunction, which shone on his return to power. His policy, he promised, would be "Italian to the extreme bounds of possibility." He ignored Garibaldi's nascent hostility; he encouraged Medici; he was ready to cooperate with the men of the Extreme Left, whose patronage by Rattazzi a few weeks before had roused his indignation. Probably he was already aiming at unity in its fullest sense;² when Tuscany and

¹ Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, IV. 160, 164.

² Cavour, *op. cit.*, III. 400; Chiala, *Politica segreta*, 110; La Rive, *Cavour*, 401.

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Romagna had been annexed, the Revolution would add Naples and Sicily, and Umbria and the Marches with free Italy on both sides of them would abjure the Pope; then there would be a breathing space, till the united strength of the nation poured on the Quadrilateral and won Venice. And though a year ago he had prayed that he might not be involved in "the hornet's nest" at Rome, facts were leading him to set his eyes as earnestly as Mazzini did on the eternal city. But one step must come at a time, and come slowly. Though he was secretly encouraging the unitarians of Sicily, he was anxious to prevent complications there at present, and willing if necessary to wait some years before attempting to win Southern Italy.¹ Though it was "only a truce" with Austria, he was working to prevent a premature plunge into the war of deliverance. His immediate object was to win Emilia and Tuscany, and on this he took an uncompromising stand. When parliament met, the deputies of Central Italy must be there to take their seats; and already Fanti's appointment to the War Ministry, while he still commanded the army of the League, marked the *de facto* union. That Nice and Savoy must both go, unless indeed some fortunate accident rescued them, he knew; but

customs-lines along the Alps. And the more the idea of nationality was abroad, the more the Savoyards were likely to gravitate either to France or the French-speaking cantons of Switzerland. Before 1848 there had been a strong French party both among the clericals and Liberals. Charles Albert's Statute had reconciled the latter to Piedmontese rule, but the clericals were in the majority, and Savoy became the headquarters of the ultramontane opposition. That separation must come some day, had long been accepted by thinking Italians. Mazzini and Durando had foreshadowed it, Manin would probably have welcomed it, and though the exigencies of office made Cavour repudiate it from time to time, he had believed in its necessity as early as 1847. Had the question been settled on its merits, hardly a serious voice would have defended the retention of the province, despite the common military tradition, despite its being the cradle of the royal house.

Nice stood on a different footing. It was Italian in language, Italian in the main in sentiment, strongly attached to the Liberal movement, commercially as much in touch with Italy as with France. An ancient treaty pledged the King not to part with it without consulting its inhabitants. Probably no definite arrangement had been agreed on at Plombières or in the January treaty respecting it. Rattazzi had drawn a sharp distinction between the two provinces, and though he was prepared to give up Savoy, thought it ignominy to surrender an Italian land. Cavour felt bitterly the cruel need; but, if the Emperor insisted on it, it was, he thought, the greater policy to barter the little province for safe possession of the glorious heritage in Central Italy. That it was likely to cost him his popularity, he knew full well, but he was prepared to lay that on the altar of his country's weal. He had sold himself for the Unity of Italy; friends, conscience, good fame,—all he had resigned himself to throw away, if they served to bring Italy to the fulfilment of her fates.

With Nice and Savoy as his gift, and "The Pope and the Congress" for his brief, Cavour hoped to come to easy terms with the Emperor. He would not truckle to him;

he was determined to have the Central Provinces at any cost; but they must be had, if possible, with Napoleon's good-will, for the risk of a single-handed struggle with Austria was so terrible, that to avoid the possibility of it, he was ready to make any sacrifice short of surrendering the national advance. Everything seemed to favour him. The English government had proposed an Anglo-French understanding to settle the Italian question. Palmerston and Russell would have gone so far as to make an alliance of the two countries in defence of Italian interests; but the Queen, as before, opposed a pro-Italian policy, and Mr. Gladstone was the only other member of the Cabinet who supported them.¹ Still Russell's "Four Points," which took the place of his bolder schemes (January 15), promised English recognition for annexation, so soon as the united assemblies of the Central States had again declared for it. The Emperor accepted the Four Points in principle but with reserves; and Cavour, overjoyed at the news, and trusting that Napoleon had specifically consented to annexation,² believed that the difficulties had cleared themselves from his path.

But his policy had wound itself thread within thread of diplomacy and trickery, and any misadventure promised entanglement beyond repair. At the very moment of its completion the Anglo-French understanding snapped. Stronger than love of Italy, distrust of France was supreme in English foreign policy, and it had only been by dexterous concealment of his designs on Savoy, that the Emperor had brought about the recent negotiations. Suddenly the secret leaked out, and it was in vain that Thouvenel and Cavour attempted to conceal it by frank lying. England felt that she had been duped, and the indignation was strong and deep. The Emperor saw that Cavour might throw himself into the arms of England, win Central Italy under countenance of her support, and then defy him to take Savoy and Nice. But their possession was more than ever necessary to him. His pamphlet and

¹ Walpole, *op. cit.*, II. 315; Ashley, *Palmerston*, II. 177; Martin, *op. cit.*, V. 7; Greville Memoirs, VIII. 288-289.

the letter to the Pope had brought down a storm of angry and threatening remonstrance from the French Catholics. The Papal Encyclical of January 19, refusing all compromise on Romagna, had been the signal for an ultramontane movement in France, which had thoroughly frightened the government. There was little love among his people for the Emperor's dreams of nationality or a policy that made for a strong Italy. He needed some big success to hush the hostility, and he hardly ever faltered again in his resolve to have Savoy, if not Nice as well, at any price; provided he got these, perhaps he would let Piedmont go as far as she could in Italy.¹ While still playing with England, he began a game of bluff with Cavour. To frighten him from an understanding with England, perhaps too because he planned a half surrender to the clericals, he suddenly broke away from his qualified adhesion to the Four Points, and went back to his earlier schemes, which he had never entirely abandoned, of the Vicariat for Romagna and a separate kingdom for Tuscany, though he was willing to see a Savoy prince on the Tuscan throne. At first (February 13) he dangled the alternative of Tuscany or Savoy and Nice, Piedmont might choose between them; but soon, to make sure of his bargain, he raised his terms, and refused, whatever the fate of Tuscany, to waive his claims to the border provinces. Though at heart he probably intended not to abandon Italy, a "rose-water ultimatum" threatened, that unless Piedmont complied at once, he would withdraw his troops from Lombardy, and leave the country to take its chances of an Austrian attack (February 21).²

Cavour's policy was far from clear. He might throw himself on the English alliance, annex Tuscany and Romagna, and refuse to surrender Savoy or Nice. Or he might concede all the Emperor's demands, reflecting that the Pope's shadowy suzerainty in Romagna would go for nought, and

¹ Bonfadini, *Arese*, 228-229.

² Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, IV. 304-305, 352-353, 359-360, 366-369; Bonfadini, *op. cit.*, 227-247; *Affaires étrangères 1860*, 19, 37; Poggi, *op. cit.*, III. 277; Cavour, *op. cit.*, VI. 543. The last reference shows that Cavour heard of the Emperor's change as early as February 3, though probably he did not then attach much importance to it.

that with the little Duke of Genoa on the throne and Ricasoli as his Regent, Tuscany would be practically a part of the kingdom. But the one course was too perilous, the other too pusillanimous. To give up annexation was to wound the national sentiment, alienate the Tuscans, and give a chance for the autonomists to raise their heads again. On the other hand he dared not alienate the Emperor. He had resigned himself to the sacrifice of Savoy, and, if necessary, of Nice. He was willing to humour Napoleon in all non-essentials; he carefully abstained from fanning the war spirit in England, and prepared for a new plebiscite by universal suffrage in Central Italy, knowing that the Emperor could ill refuse to recognize the same popular mandate, by which he had climbed to his own throne. He would even, if driven back on it, have accepted the Pope's suzerainty in Romagna.¹ But he flatly declined to consent to any surrender of Tuscany. He no doubt calculated that the Emperor would not in the last resort desert him. He could count on the moral support of England, and to some extent of Prussia. If worst came to worst, he would fight Austria single-handed, rather than haul down the nationalist colours. And, as Ricasoli told the French agent, Italy had not thrown off the Austrian oppression to take a French oppression in its stead. "If France betrays the principles of nationality," Cavour said a few weeks later, "we will have coalition against coalition," and he was planning a revolution in Hungary, which would take the Austrians in the rear.² He urged Fanti to push on the armaments with speed and secrecy, and estimated that the kingdom would soon have 200,000 men under arms. "We shall go to Vienna," he boasted in his more expansive moods. In the meantime he hurried on the plebiscites. On March 1 a royal decree ordered that they should be taken at once in both the Central States; should they prove favourable to annexation, the election of deputies to the Italian parliament would follow immediately.

¹ See below, p. 131.

² Cavour, *op. cit.*, III. 210, 212; VI. 544, 551; Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, IV. 313, 391, 407; Chiala, *op. cit.*, 93; Bianchi, *Diplomazia*, VIII. 257; *Id.*, *Politique de Cavour*, 357. The despatches of February 29 to Farini were evidently not intended to be taken seriously.

The French confessed that they had been outwitted, and the Emperor saw that it was useless now to veto annexation. His later objections had been mainly pawns in the game to win Savoy and Nice, and his anxiety was lest he should lose these. He had promised Russell to consult the Great Powers before taking the provinces, and he suspected an agreement between Italy and England to defeat his plans. He had pledged himself that a plebiscite should be taken both in Savoy and Nice and that he would abide by the result, and he feared that the Turin government would procure, as it easily might, an anti-separatist vote. Cavour no doubt was still hoping to save Nice and the eastern border of Savoy, and he had promised not to abandon the provinces, if their vote went in favour of Piedmont. The Emperor determined to clench the matter at once. Throwing to the winds his promises to England, he peremptorily demanded that before the plebiscites were taken in Central Italy, Piedmont should bind itself by secret treaty to cede Savoy and Nice. Cavour did not dare to decline; he knew all the odium he was drawing on his head, that the secret treaty was "highly unconstitutional," that though he might cloak the cession of Savoy under a plea of nationality, Nice was an Italian province, loyal to the throne and the cause of Italy. But till Italy was better able to fight Austria alone, interest as well as gratitude told him to help Napoleon in his struggle to keep his throne; perhaps he felt that the cession would quit Italy of her obligations to France, making her morally independent, and easing the road to Southern Italy. The secret treaty was signed on March 12. But the higgling was not yet finished; Cavour, encouraged by a vigorous anti-separatist movement in Nice, made one more effort to save it. But the Emperor was determined not to loose his prey. He demanded a public treaty, that could be used to appease the growing discontent in France, and sent his agent, Benedetti, to Turin to conclude it. Cavour, it is said, refused to sign, till Benedetti threatened to occupy Bologna and Florence with the French troops, which were still in Lombardy. It was the cruellest moment of Cavour's public life. To have the news of his defeat launched on the eve of the elections

was of evil augury for his influence in the new kingdom, which his genius had created. He still hoped that the chapter of accidents, perhaps a new war in the East, would allow Italy to win back Nice. But it was with a heavy heart that he signed the treaty on March 24.

Meanwhile the plebiscites had resulted in triumphant success (March 11-12). •The government had circulated annexationist appeals broadcast, and no doubt a certain pressure was exercised by proprietors and employers. But the unsupported charges of intimidation, that were brought on both sides, may be left to balance one another; there was far too much enthusiasm to allow of its successful use. The decree for the plebiscites had given the vote to all males of age; the ballot papers gave the choice of voting for annexation or "a separate kingdom." Twenty per cent. of the population voted, or about three out of four of those on the register. In Emilia the vote was almost unanimous for annexation; in Tuscany the autonomists mustered 15,000 votes out of 386,000. In less than a fortnight royal decrees proclaimed Emilia and Tuscany integral parts of the new kingdom.

The elections took place on the day after the signing of the treaty, and the first Italian parliament met on April 2. Piedmontese and Lombards, Tuscans and Romagnuols gathered at Turin to inaugurate the new kingdom, that their resoluteness and patience had brought into being. The little state of less than five million souls, though it had lost 700,000 across the Alps, had won tenfold as many, and now counted eleven millions, or nearly half the population of the peninsula. And though the shadow of abandoned Nice hung over the Chamber, pride and triumph in the greater gain shone through it. The elections had been a great victory for Cavour. The clericals for the most part abstained from the polls, and henceforth disappear as a political party. The democrats had been hardly more successful. Two or three score of deputies followed Rattazzi, but they had no settled policy saving the personal opposition to Cavour, which had been handed down from the Piedmontese Chamber; and on points of clear nationalist policy their votes could be counted on for the government. Cavour, apart from some great

revulsion of feeling, could rely on the steady following of two-thirds of the Chamber, and the only danger lay in the inexperience of the non-Piedmontese members and the lack of parliamentary discipline.

This lent a certain hazard to the debate on the treaty. The cession, as Cavour had foreseen, brought down a storm of wrath on his head. Shame at the abandonment of the hereditary provinces, indignation that their peoples had been bartered away to please Napoleon, dislike of the unconstitutional character of the whole business, its trickiness and dishonesty, mingled with all the bitter antagonism to Cavour, which had inspired the Free Committees. There seemed some risk that parliament might inaugurate the new kingdom by throwing over the one man who could guide it. It was known that Rattazzi would attack the government, and on April 10 Garibaldi forced on the discussion in parliament. He had known of the intended cession for the past three months, but had taken no notice of it, till in the workings of his incomprehensible mind his passion suddenly grew hot. The Chamber took his impatient intervention rather coolly, and passed what was practically a vote of confidence. The plebiscites in Savoy and Nice took place a few days after (April 15-22). They showed an almost unanimous vote for annexation to France, but it was notorious that the figures were no index to the wishes of the inhabitants. The government had without any semblance of decency exerted all its influence to secure the vote that it wished for.¹ The majority of the Savoyards indeed were probably more than half disposed to separation, or cared little which way their fate went, though the northern portion of the province would have preferred to be joined to Switzerland. At Nice the feeling was strong against separation, and the people made pathetic efforts to escape the destiny imposed on them. But the mass of Italians felt that it was wasted time to kick against the pricks, and when the treaties were finally debated in the Chamber, Garibaldi was fighting in Sicily, and the question of Southern Italy had thrown all else into the shade.

¹ Further Correspondence, VI. 157-158, 206-207; D'Ideville, *Journal*, I. 118; Zini, *Storia*, II. 554; Loftus, *Reminiscences*, II. 135.

CHAPTER XXX

THE UNITARIANS

JANUARY—MAY 1860

THE UNITARIANS; Mazzini; Bertani; Cavour; the King. Venetia. ITALY AND ROME; ecclesiastical reforms; the nationalist clergy; the Papal Volunteers; the Temporal Power; Umbria and the Marches; the Vicariat; the French garrison. NAPLES: Francis II.; the Piedmontese-Neapolitan alliance; plans of revolt in Sicily; the Della Gancia rising; GARIBALDI AND SICILY; Cavour's policy to Naples; he decides to help the revolt; Garibaldi's indecision; he decides to go to Sicily; Cavour's attitude.

In fact, beside the onward march of Italy, every other question sank into insignificance. The federalists, Montanelli, Cattaneo, and their friends, were reduced to a negligible academic clique. All sections of nationalists recognized that the work was only half completed, that the annexation of Central Italy was only a stepping-stone, that till South Italy and Venice and the remainder of the Papal States were added to the kingdom, there could be no pause or but a brief one. They only differed as to when and how the next step should be taken.

Mazzini was still loyal, though much against the grain, to his acceptance of the monarchy; but he had persuaded himself that no initiative would come from Cavour, and he was picking up the work, which had been interrupted, when Garibaldi was recalled from Romagna. His plan was the same as then, to prepare simultaneous risings in Sicily and Umbria, and converge the insurrectionary forces on Naples. When once the revolution had begun, he counted on public opinion to force the Piedmontese government to come to its support. Crispi, one of the few who still worked with him, had again been weaving projects of insurrection in

Sicily (December), had won Farini to his schemes, and, it would seem, nearly persuaded Rattazzi to lend him the countenance of the government.¹ Both Mazzini and Crispi wished to secure Garibaldi's lead, but they would have dispensed with it, if it were not readily given. The more balanced members of the extreme party, such as Medici and Bertani, feared that the rising, wherever it broke out, might share the fate of Mazzini's earlier ill-starred projects. They made it an essential that Garibaldi should lead the insurrection, and that the moral support of the government should be secured. They were eager to procure a reconciliation between Cavour and Garibaldi, which would secure the wise guiding of the former, and prevent Garibaldi's energies from running to waste.

Cavour in fact was bent on unity more even than they knew. After Villafranca he had said, "They have stopped me from making Italy by diplomacy from the North, I will make it with the revolution from the South." And though he was now sometimes inclined to think that the South must wait, that perhaps the attack on Venice must come first, his whole soul was bent on sooner or later realizing the whole programme of unity. The other Liberal chiefs shared his resolution. "Union has become our beacon," wrote Robert D'Azeglio; Ricasoli was fretting to see Rome and Venice free, and his eagerness to settle the annexation of Central Italy was largely prompted by his belief that the decisive war was imminent; the Unity of Italy, he said, with all its far-reaching consequences in religion and civilization was written in the decrees of God. The King was as impatient; he had almost certainly given Garibaldi hopes of backing in his Umbrian scheme; he had subscribed largely to the million rifles fund; the latent democrat was coming out in him, and he extolled the people at the expense of aristocracy and clergy. There was no difference between Cavour and Mazzini, between Ricasoli and Garibaldi and the King as to the need for going on. But should it be Venetia or Papal territory or the South that they should aim at first?

¹ Crispi, *Scritti*, 302-303; Mazzini, *Opere*, XI. xli-xliii; Mario, *Bertani*, I. 423; *Lettere ad A. Panizzi*, 372; and above, p. 113 n.

Venetia had been tempted to despond after Villafranca, and its inhabitants had fled by thousands across the frontier to enlist in the Italian army or fan the conspiracy from Modena and Milan. But as the national cause prospered in Central Italy, the betrayed province breathed again, and a network of secret societies spread through it. The systematic repression of the government and the extravagant taxation helped the conspiracy, and Cavour dinned its sufferings into the ears of Europe. From time to time he hoped that Napoleon would be driven into war on the Po and Rhine, and give the chance of an attack on the Quadrilateral; but more often he was loath to bring French troops into the land again, and looked to the time, when the forces of united Italy would win Venetia without the foreigner's help. For this the province must wait, till Sicily and Naples and Umbria had been gathered to the kingdom. For the moment the question of Venice, like that of Nice, went into the background behind the more urgent problems of Rome and the South.

The nationalist movement was necessarily anti-Papal. Sooner or later it meant the destruction of the Temporal Power. The attack had already begun with ecclesiastical reforms in all the freed provinces. It was necessary to bring them at least to the level of Piedmont, to repeal the recent reactionary legislation in Tuscany and Lombardy, to sweep away the whole apparatus of theocratic government in Romagna, perhaps to go further than Piedmont had yet done, by legalizing civil marriage and completing the dissolution of the monasteries. There was a wide feeling among the laity, and to a less extent among the clergy, that the church must be reformed, that the laity should have a share in its management, that the incomes of the clergy should be equalized. Everywhere the Jesuits had been expelled, and their property nationalized. In Lombardy the Concordat naturally disappeared, and liberty of worship was made legal. In Modena and Parma Farini had put the Siccardi laws into force. In Romagna Cipriani

had decreed liberty of worship, had taken the control of education and charities from the clergy, and made an inventory of church property. In Tuscany Ricasoli and Salvagnoli abolished the Concordat and restored the Leopoldine laws; their colleagues defeated their attempt to free the schools from clerical control, but, backed by the Turin government, they passed a law to redeem the tithes and throw them into a common fund to equalize clerical incomes. A large number of the lower clergy and a few of the higher accepted the national movement.¹ The bulk of the Lombard priests, who perhaps stood first in Italy for character and patriotism, had never liked the Austrian rule, had opposed the Concordat and the admission of the Jesuits, and now welcomed the rule of Piedmont. The Tuscan priests found themselves free from the heavy yoke, which the Concordat had allowed the bishops to lay on them. The poorer clergy everywhere hailed legislation, that promised to increase their miserable incomes; the secular priests looked not unkindly on a rule, that meant the expulsion of the Jesuits and the depression of the regular orders. There were many, who shared the bigger hopes of the nation, who had no sympathy with ultramontaniam, who felt in the words of a Sicilian priest that "the Pope was ruining himself and ruining them," and kept alive the fire of Christian patriotism, that Gioberti and Ventura and Bassi had kindled.

But Rome would listen to no words of peace. She could not forgive the loss of Romagna or the new laws against the church. A few Liberal priests, like Lacordaire, would have accepted the solution proposed in La Guéronnière's pamphlet, and been content, if Papal territory were restricted to the neighbourhood of Rome.² But with the bulk of the Papalists there could be neither less nor more in the Pope's rights, and to surrender their claims on Romagna meant giving up the case for the remaining provinces. Not even in exchange for a French guarantee for the Pope's

¹ Zobi, *Cronaca*, I. 788-794; Cantù, *Cronistoria*, III. 281; Poggi, *Memorie*, I. 56; Cavour, *Lettere*, VI. 548; *Cronaca politica*, II. 155, 831. See below, p. 204.

² Capponi, *Lettere*, III. 337.

remaining territory would Antonelli waive the title to Romagna. The Pope had long ago excommunicated all who took part in the revolt (June 20, 1859); he had condemned as blasphemous D'Azeglio's boast to the Bolognese, that God made man free in his religious and political opinions. Loquacious and indiscreet, he attacked La Guéronnière's pamphlet in bitter phrases, and in answer to the Emperor's letter refused to surrender what he claimed as belonging to all Catholics.

The Papalists reserved their hottest wrath for Piedmont. In their eyes Piedmont and the Revolution were identical. Piedmont's absorption of the territory of the church seemed an attack on all that was sacred in religion and legitimate government, the offspring of a vulgar conspiracy that had been hatching for the past twelve years; and to come to terms with her was "to recognize the right of the thief." In October the Piedmontese agent had been given his passports, and in March the Pope, declining all overtures for reconciliation, launched the Greater Excommunication¹ against all who had promoted or abetted the separation of Romagna. "God in his wrath," wrote the Pope, "will destroy the new Sennacheribs." Antonelli trusted more in the army. He could put small dependence indeed on the native troops, for he could only fill their ranks by recruiting from the scum of the population; but he appealed to Catholic Europe for men and money to defend the Papal throne from impious attacks, and though the Catholics stinted their offerings of money, from Austria and Switzerland, from Belgium and France and Ireland volunteers flocked in to fight in the church's cause against "the revolutionary Islamism, that threatened Europe." Their case was indefensible, for they came to protect abuses, that they would not have tolerated at home, to trample on a sorely oppressed people struggling to be free; but the travesty of Italian politics, that passed current in Catholic literature, blinded them to the ugly facts around them, and many of them felt only the pious impulse, that bade them defend religion and the Pope

¹ In July 1859 Antonelli told the English agent at Rome that the Greater Excommunication had not been put into force since the Middle Ages, and would not be used against Piedmont.

from enemies, whom fanaticism painted as worse than infidels. In character they were the counterpart of Garibaldi's volunteers, though less disciplined and perhaps less brave. Fine enthusiasm mingled with love of adventure and sometimes of disorder and rapine. It was a pinchbeck crusade; but side by side with the refuse of the Austrian army and Irish peasants, who were lured on false pretence of finding work and brawled in the streets of Rome,¹ were the brave pious youths, of culture and historic names, who left their quiet chateaux in Brittany and Belgium to fight and die in a cause all unworthy their devotion. By the end of March Antonelli had 15,000 volunteers, besides the 5000 regulars of the Papal army. With the French garrison to keep Rome quiet, and the Neapolitan army as his second line, he could concentrate his forces in Umbria and the Marches and hope to regain Romagna. He had planned this in the autumn, and it was only the imposing muster of the League's army that had saved Romagna from invasion. In the spring he felt strong enough not only to resist attack, but renew his designs on the lost province, 'probably believing that he had only the army of the League to deal with, and that Europe would prevent the Piedmontese from moving.'² As commander of his forces he appointed the French general, La Moricière, whose chequered career had seen him a disciple of St. Simon, the conqueror of Abd-el-Kader, a victim of the *coup d'état*, and now found him transformed to a champion of the Papacy. La Moricière's appointment was probably mixed up with Orleanist intrigues against the Empire;³ but he himself was a single-minded enthusiast, easily discouraged perhaps, and puzzled how to reconcile his devotion to the Papacy with the daily evidence of misrule, but a brave loyal man, with something left of his old liberalism, and a hero nature that won love and allegiance.

But the nationalists were determined not to abandon Umbria and the Marches for all the hostility of the Catholic

¹ Lecomte, *L'Italie en 1860*, 131; Loftus, *Reminiscences*, II. 139; Liverani, *Il papato*, 216.

² Bonfadini, *Aree*, 237-238; Thouvenel, *Le secret*, I. 135; Castelli, *Carteggio*, I. 289; Sullivan, *New Ireland*, II. 36.

³ Pantaleoni, *Idea italiana*, 36-38.

world. Compromise was impossible between the national and the Catholic ideal. In Italian eyes the sacrifice of two millions of their fellow-countrymen to the fancied interests of the church was foreign interference of the most intolerable kind. Perugia was not forgotten; the matter, bad enough in itself, had been exaggerated, and Cavour rejoiced that "the Pope appeared as butcher and not as victim." The excommunication roused all the latent spiritual revolt. The government unwisely struck back at the more hostile of the bishops; and Garibaldi's diatribes voiced the anger of the more iconoclastic section. Many of the Piedmontese threatened to stay away from mass; at Bologna the feeling against the priests was wide and bitter; at Florence the evangelicals made considerable headway;¹ "the agitation in men's minds was deep, and serious perils threatened the Catholic church, as in the days of Leo X." To devout Liberal Catholics, who saw the danger, the remedy lay in the destruction of the Temporal Power, and with it of the worldly policy of Rome. No sophistry could conceal the rottenness of the plea for the Pope's independence, while his throne was propped by French bayonets or leaned on Austria to support it against its own subjects. What value, they asked, has "the prestige of a sceptre, that has so often fallen from the weak hands that hold it, and been as often taken back an alms from the hands of Europe?" And all hope of making the theocracy tolerable had vanished. La Guéronnière's simulated apology confessed that it could not progress. The corruption, that Antonelli patronized, had discredited it more than all Gregory's obscurantism. The feeling was becoming universal that the Pope would not and could not reform; that he could not accept representative institutions or liberty of the press or lay schools or equality of laymen and clericals before the law. Antonelli had turned a deaf ear to the Emperor's appeals for better government; "if we are obliged to promise reforms, we shall pretend to give way,"² he told the Neapolitan minister, but he believed that the Emperor was not serious in his demands. And it was not a case that touched the Pope's own subjects

¹ See below, p. 200.

² Bianchi, *Diplomazia*, VIII. 381.

only. So long as Rome remained the focus, where the dispossessed princes centred their intrigues, so long as Antonelli tried to draw the clergy into a vast conspiracy against Italian liberty and independence, the Temporal Power was a standing menace to the new kingdom. Till the Papal volunteers were disbanded, and Rome became the capital of Italy, the danger of a civil war of fanaticism was always present. "You are calling down the storm that you may fish in troubled waters," was Gramont the French minister's grave rebuke to Antonelli.

For the present, however, while the French garrison remained, it was only hot heads, who had any hope of advancing to Rome. At this time probably not even Mazzini or Garibaldi contemplated any early possession of the capital. Nationalist aims only reached to Umbria and the Marches. Their momentary freedom in the summer had proved that the great majority of the Pope's subjects were impatient to throw off his rule. There was, indeed, a minority under the influence of the priests, and La Moricière is said to have collected 3000 volunteers from them; but the daily desertions from the Papal troops to join the nationalist volunteers across the frontier, the general abstinence from smoking and the lottery, the bold protests of the Perugians showed the feeling of the provinces. Even at Rome the carnival had been deserted by all except the rabble and the English, and a brutal attack of gendarmes on a holiday crowd (March 19) widened the gulf between government and people. The nationalists outside were impatient to free their compatriots. The opposition to Garibaldi's expedition in the autumn had been to its opportuneness not to its principle. Blind to the finer side of La Moricière's volunteers, even moderate men like Capponi and D'Azeglio bitterly resented the new kind of foreign interference, which this "mob of adventurers" had brought. "If we are attacked, we can defend ourselves and become the attackers," said Ricasoli, and he was in close touch with the Umbrian patriotic committees, urging them to prepare for the rising, when the government should give the signal. This he hoped would be as soon as parliament met, and

Cavour had concurred, till the Emperor's altered attitude on the Tuscan question convinced him of the danger, and made him delay for the present any irrevocable step.

He was trying again to win Umbria and the Marches with the Pope's consent. It seems hardly credible that, in the present temper of the Papal court, he can have seriously hoped for success.¹ But he always underrated its obstinacy and unwisdom, and thought it would be compelled to take counsel of its desperate position. Possibly, however, it was a diplomatic move to put the Pope further in the wrong; it may have been a concession to the King's scruples or the Emperor's secret promptings, or a last resource in a moment of despondency after Napoleon's veto on annexation. On February 7 Victor Emmanuel wrote to the Pope, asking him to concede the Vicariat under Papal suzerainty not only of Romagna, but of the two other provinces, professing at the same time his devotion to the church, and his desire to reconcile it with his duties as King. But the appeal made no impression on Pius,² his answer only threatened excommunication, and though the King wrote again after the plebiscites, offering "in the interests of peace" to recognize the Pope's suzerainty over Romagna, and making no mention of the other provinces, Antonelli refused absolutely to negotiate.¹

Nobody but Cavour had had any hope of success from the overtures; and before he received Antonelli's final answer, he too came to see that there lay more hope in the Emperor's anxiety to withdraw his troops. However much Napoleon might have to veil his feelings from fear of the French Catholics, he was more and more exasperated with the Pope. Pius had paltered with all his appeals for reform, had broken into unrestrained invective in his answer to the pamphlet, had allowed Rome to become a hotbed of legitimist intrigue; and the Emperor in retaliation took strong measures against the French Catholic press, and threatened to withdraw his troops, if his advice were not accepted. For years he had

¹ Bianchi, *op. cit.*, VIII. 397-403; Massari, *Vittorio Emanuele*, 320-321; Thouvenel, *op. cit.*, I. 23, 38, 73-74, 78; Cavour, *Lettere*, III. 202-203, 231; Ghiron, *Primo re*, 154; Zini, *Storia, Documents II.*, 615.

been aiming at this, feeling more and more acutely the irreparable blunder of 1849. He had welcomed Antonelli's suggestion of withdrawal in the previous spring; he had kept evacuation in mind all through the summer and autumn,¹ and the increasing danger of collision with Italy, perhaps some thought of an Italian alliance against Austria and Prussia,² made him now more than ever anxious to carry it out. In April he proposed the substitution of Neapolitan troops for his own; and when Francis refused, knowing that it meant war with Piedmont,³ he suggested that a native force should be organised sufficient for defence, that the Catholic Powers should subsidise the Papacy, and that the French should then withdraw. Antonelli, who detested the French patronage, welcomed the proposal; Austria, Naples, Spain approved; and though the Pope and La Moricière wished to keep the French at Rome and leave the native regiments and volunteers free to operate against Romagna, Gramont at last (May 12) got a convention signed for the departure of the French troops on the first of July.⁴ But events had already happened, which made the convention nugatory.⁵ The day before it was signed Garibaldi landed at Marsala, and Zambianchi was preparing to cross the Papal frontier. The Roman question was forgotten for the moment in the drama that was unfolding in Sicily.

The tyranny in Naples and Sicily, the universal detestation of the Bourbons, the Sicilian tradition of revolt had for years past turned the thoughts of the nationalists to the revolutionizing of the South. Cavour and Mazzini alike had included it in their schemes,⁶ and Mazzini had given feeble execution to his ideas in Pisacane's expedition. Time had taught Ferdinand nothing, and the administrative chaos grew worse, as sickness paralyzed the King's brain. A

¹ Randon, *Mémoires*, II. 34; and above, pp. 109, 111.

² Greville *Memoirs*, VIII. 312.

³ See below, p. 136.

⁴ Bianchi, *op. cit.*, VIII. 281, 405-409; Thouvenel, *op. cit.*, I. 80, 94, 134-136, 145-154; Cavour, *op. cit.*, III. 233-235; *Affaires étrangères 1860*, 111, 116.

⁵ Thouvenel, *op. cit.*, I. 154; *Affaires étrangères 1860*, 117; Further Correspondence 1860, VII. 8; Ricasoli, *Lettere*, V. 111.

⁶ See above, p. 37.

fearful and loathsome disease struck him, and he lived just long enough to hear the doom of his race in the declaration of war with Austria (May 22, 1859). The new King, Francis II., had been trained in blank ignorance of state affairs. Devoted to his father, honest and well-intentioned, but young, weak, absolutely inexperienced, he was bound to follow Ferdinand's policy in the main. Filangieri was made prime minister, and would have given a constitution, had he had a free hand; but the whole strength of church and army mustered to defeat him, and early in 1860 he resigned. The King was still feebly anxious to rule well; the English and French governments urged reform, and even Prussia and Russia, afraid that misrule would give wings to the revolution, counselled moderation. A few weak reforms were made; the imperfect amnesty of the beginning of his reign was extended to political prisoners; a concession was granted for the Naples-Brindisi railway; and a great advance was made towards free trade. But the abuses of the police remained intolerable as ever, and Russell solemnly warned Austria of the inevitable consequences of the contrast between Northern justice and Southern misgovernment.

To a certain extent Francis' accession had raised the hope of better things. A small section of the exiles hoped to save the Bourbons, as the Florentine nobles would have saved the Grand Duke, by forcing on the throne a liberal and nationalist policy. Comparatively few of them in the summer of 1859 thought that the union of North and South was within the range of practicable politics; and to keep Murat off the throne, they would gladly have met Francis half way. Cavour, anxious to put as many Italian troops as possible into the field, had even before Ferdinand's death, and still more after it, proposed an offensive and defensive alliance,¹ and forswore all projects against the Bourbons. France, it seems, went so far as to promise the Marches and Umbria as the price of his acceptance.² Filangieri would

¹ In 1757 the elder Pitt wanted Sardinia and the Two Sicilies to combine against Austrian predominance in Italy: *Chatham Correspondence*, I. 254.

² Nisco, *Francesco II.*, 17; Memor, *Fine di un regno*, 329-330. Nisco says that England joined in the offer, but this seems improbable, especially in view of De Cesare, *Scialoja*, 101, 107.

have readily consented ; but, though Francis, as his father had advised, rejected Austria's overtures for alliance, Italian Independence was a thing that had no meaning for him, and the court party won him back from Filangieri's hold. In the autumn he was trying to form an anti-Piedmontese coalition, and but for Napoleon's veto, would have sent his troops to win back Romagna for the Pope.

The scheme of the exiles had in fact little following at Naples. There were few there who put any trust in the perjured race. Murattists and nationalists alike opposed a policy, which promised to strengthen the Bourbons and make Piedmont morally responsible for their safety. After Villafranca the South came anew into prominence. The Unitarians were angling for the floating nationalist sentiment, which, vague and undecided as it was, was bound to gravitate to them. Murattism was involved in the discredit of Villafranca, and only lingered on for want of a better policy. And the acceptance of the Piedmontese monarchy by all parties in the North, the attitude of Tuscany and Emilia, the influence of Garibaldi were rapidly bringing the Southern nationalists over in mass to the Unitarians. In Sicily Fabrizi and Quadrio had woven a widespread conspiracy, and after Villafranca La Farina urged the branches of the National Society in the island to revolt at once. At the same time Crispi, who was still a republican in principle and loath to accept the royalist programme, went there in disguise and organised the secret societies for a rising in October.¹ But the leaders had been impressed into the plot against their judgment ; they believed that Sicily could not rise successfully without the help of Piedmont ; La Farina had changed his tactics, and was urging his friends to wait, till Central Italy was annexed ; and in spite of Garibaldi's promise of help, the insurrection dwindled down to a petty outbreak in the neighbourhood of Palermo.

But Crispi was not discouraged, and after his failure to win Rattazzi's support,² he prepared for a new attempt in the coming April. Some encouragement came from Cavour

¹ He had large stores of bombs made on Orsini's model.

² See above, p. 124.

and his friends,¹ but the plot was mainly the work of the democrats. Mazzini, who was in hiding at Genoa, threw himself into it and asked Garibaldi to lead the insurrection, but Garibaldi had small belief in the chances of a popular rising, and would promise nothing but a supply of arms from the Rifle Fund, and these only on condition that the movement was under the royal flag (February 24). At last he wrote (March 15), that if the Sicilians rose spontaneously in Victor Emmanuel's name, he would go to their help.² Mazzini, always half suspicious of Garibaldi, and perhaps not sorry to see the movement in other hands, had already selected as leader, in the event of Garibaldi's refusal, a young Sicilian noble, Rosalino Pilo. A few days after the receipt of Garibaldi's letter, Pilo started with one companion and a very little money to be the forlorn hope of Sicilian liberation. When he landed near Messina the revolution had already broken out. Arms had been collected during the winter in the patriotic monastery Della Gancia at Palermo, and at dawn on April 4 the convent bell gave the signal to the conspirators. But the plot had leaked out, and the government was on the watch. The troops stormed and sacked the monastery, and Palermo had to content itself with empty demonstrations. But the whole surrounding country had risen in response; Girgenti, Noto, Caltanissetta, Trapani enjoyed a momentary freedom. "My fellow conspirators are all Italy and God," said to his captors Riso, the master-mason, who had organised the rising. But though there was serious fighting at Carini, the insurgents could make no prolonged stand, and the German and Swiss mercenaries took their revenge with a fiendish brutality. Before Pilo joined the remnants of the bands, the rising, though not crushed, had lost any hope of success. Except indeed Mazzini and the Sicilian exile La Masa, both jealous of Garibaldi, few had any confidence in Pilo's mission. The saner heads recognized, that there was only one man who could make the rebellion successful. The majority of the

¹ La Masa, *Fatti*, ii; Farini, *Lettere*, xlviii; Oddo, *I mille*, I. 78; and above, p. 115.

² Mario, *Garibaldi*, 534; Mazzini, *Opere*, XI. lvi; see Crispi, *Scritti*, 322.

Genoese Committee, irritated by Mazzini's incapacity to understand anybody's policy but his own, resolved to go their own way and bind Garibaldi to his promise. When the first favourable news of the rising arrived, Garibaldi again reluctantly consented to go (April 7), and asked the King to put a brigade from the royal army under his orders. In common with most of his friends, he saw that nothing effective could be done without the help of Cavour's government.

Cavour's actions and statements at this crisis are so contradictory, that his real intentions must remain an unsolved problem, unless indeed, as is most probable, they varied from day to day. On his return to office, he did not contemplate any early rupture with Naples; he instructed Villamarina, his minister at the Bourbon court, to promise that Piedmont would abet neither revolution nor annexation in the South; and though he was encouraging the Unitarians in Sicily, it is probable that at present he had little hope of successful revolution there, still less at Naples. But towards the end of March his policy began to change. Annexation was virtually assured in the Centre, and the cession of Savoy and Nice would make him more independent of France. He had heard of the proposed occupation of the Marches by Neapolitan troops (March 22), and expecting that it was the prelude to an invasion of Romagna, he had determined to regard it as a hostile act, unless Francis would recognize the annexation of Romagna and allow Piedmont to occupy Ancona.¹ At a later date he said that immediately after the annexation of the Centre he made up his mind to dethrone the Bourbons. Whether or not his plans had gone so far, he sounded Villamarina (March 30) as to the chances of annexation at Naples, though expressing a hope that the *status quo* might continue for the present. A few days later (April 4) La Masa told him of the plot that was maturing at the Della Gancia convent. The main lines of Cavour's policy were the same as they had been for the past four years, to prevent any movement which might divide the nationalists, and keep each development attached to

¹ Bianchi, *op. cit.*, VIII. 281; Cavour, *op. cit.*, III. 253; Carandini, *Panti*, 320. *Affaires étrangères 1860*, 98-99 is incredible.

strings that the government could pull. Doubtless he saw that it was impossible to stop revolution in Sicily, as it had been stopped in Umbria in the autumn. It would at all events effectually prevent a Neapolitan invasion of Romagna. Therefore he must connive at it and guide it, but the government must have no responsibility, must do nothing to risk the ground that had been won, or hazard the great march onward. If the free lances would take the risk, and in case of failure pay the cost, the main movement could not lose, and it might greatly gain. He promised help vaguely, and saw how great the risk was, if an undisciplined revolt were led by incompetent chiefs. His first effort to find a leader failed, and a few days later Garibaldi's appeal to the King must have been known to him. Forgetting Garibaldi's bitter attack on him at this very moment, he saw that he was the one man who could bring victory out of so much danger. It was impossible to give him the brigade, but he told La Farina to let him have the help that had at first been destined for La Masa, and supply him with muskets from the National Society's magazines; and he gave permission that the rifles at Milan belonging to Garibaldi's fund, which the government had practically taken charge of, should be used for the expedition.¹

Garibaldi meanwhile, after his unfortunate appearance in the Chamber, had returned to Quarto on the coast near Genoa. In spite of his promises he was still very irresolute. He was more inclined to go to Nice and head a desperate resistance to the French; and his reluctance grew with the unsatisfactory news from Sicily and the difficulties that crowded on the preparations for the expedition. He had had the King's answer refusing the brigade; D'Azeglio, revolted by Cavour's double play, laid an embargo on the rifles at Milan; Cavour, Medici, La Farina, all now threw their weight against the expedition.² Garibaldi had no wish

¹ La Farina, *Epistolario*, II. 313; Guerzoni, *Garibaldi*, II. 31; Vecchi, *Garibaldi*, 116-117; Cavour, *op. cit.*, III. 242; IV. cxxviii; Oddo, *op. cit.*, I. 168. Pianciani, *Dell' andamento*, 40 is quite wrong.

² D'Azeglio, *L'Italie*, 162; Cavour, *op. cit.*, IV. cxxviii; Un antico parlamentare, *Crispi*, 161; Mario, *Bertani*, II. 39-40; Guerzoni, *op. cit.*, II. 31, 38; Persano, *Diario*, I. 81; Mazzini, *Opere*, XI. lxxix.

to imitate the fate of the Bandieras and Pisacane, and La Farina left Genoa on April 20, convinced that he had given up all intention of going.

The news came probably as a relief to Cavour. He was distracted by a royal visit to Florence: he dreaded a fiasco, which the bad news from Sicily made appear only too probable, or the recurrence of some more serious complication of the *Cagliari* type; he had doubts whether Garibaldi would be proof against Mazzinian influence; still more he feared the attitude of France, and the indefinite occupation of Rome, if the expedition once started. On the other hand, he had received Villamarina's report that the rebellion promised to succeed in Sicily; he knew that Austria would not intervene; La Farina had reassured him as to Garibaldi's loyalty to the crown. He was anxious to provide for either contingency, and when the Genoese Committee sounded his intentions on April 23, he seems still to have held out promises of help.¹

While he was hesitating, Garibaldi was yet more torn by indecision, persuaded and dissuaded by each new influence, but on the whole leaning more to going. He was longing for action, in which he could forget political and domestic disappointments; unhopeful as he was of the chances of the expedition, he "thought it his duty to go, where Italians were fighting their oppressors." But he was puzzled as to Cavour's attitude, and saw how grave was the position, if the Emperor frightened the government into inaction or opposition. Three times within a week he changed his mind, and it was only the knowledge that others would go without him, combined with Crispi's insistence and a false telegram bringing better news from Sicily, that finally decided him.² On May 1 he announced his intention to start

¹ Cavour, *op. cit.*, VI. 559; Bianchi, *op. cit.*, VIII. 290; Sirtori's speech in the Chamber on June 19, 1863. For another account of Cavour's words see Bertani, *Ire politiche*, 61. It is certainly strange that (if Mario, Bertani, is correct) Sirtori opposed the expedition on April 30; see however Vecchi, *op. cit.*, 120.

² (a) Mazzini, *Opere*, XI. lxxvi-lxxvii; Mario, *op. cit.*, II. 40-42; Mazzini, *Ad A. Gianelli*, 130; (b) Mironi, *Fabrizi*, 54; Guerzoni, *Bixio*, 154; Mazzini, *op. cit.*, 131; Cavour, *op. cit.*, IV. cli; (c) La Masa, *Fatti*, v, vii; Vecchi, *op. cit.*, 119-120; Türr, *Risposta*, 6; according to the two latter, and Elia, *Note*, 51, the telegram was forged by Crispi.

as soon as possible. Meanwhile Cavour's doubts were settling in the opposite direction. In view of the bad reports from Sicily the expedition seemed mere madness. The foreign governments were raising questions as to the meaning of the preparations at Genoa, and he had told the French minister that the enterprise had been abandoned. Now the news came that Garibaldi was leaning towards going. The disappointment upset his judgment. Hurrying to meet the King at Bologna, he proposed (May 1) that Garibaldi should be arrested. The King, who had been giving Garibaldi direct encouragement,¹ and had spoken at Florence of "new tasks and new wars," refused;² and Cavour, perhaps realizing that in the excited state of public opinion his proposal was an impossible one, saw that nothing remained to be done, except to give the expedition every chance of success. La Farina was sent to Genoa to deliver up the National Society's muskets, though through some strange under-handed manœuvre, explicable only by La Farina's petty suspicions and jealousies, Garibaldi received only a portion of them. Instructions were sent to the authorities at Genoa to connive at the loading and departure of the steamers. Indeed without the help of the government it would have been impossible for the expedition to start.³ Persano, the Piedmontese admiral, was ordered to arrest the expedition, if it put in at a Sardinian port; but he knew that Cavour only wished to save appearances, and he was careful to let Garibaldi's steamers pass on unmolested.⁴

¹ Cavour, *op. cit.*, IV. clvii, clxiii; see however Mario, *op. cit.*, II. 48. I cannot reconcile and hardly believe D'Ideville, *Journal*, I. 55.

² D'Haussonville, *Cavour*, 420; Castelli, *Cavour*, 88.

³ Oddo, *op. cit.*, I. 169, 173; Guerzoni, *Garibaldi*, II. 31, 38; Mazzini, *Opere*, XI. lxxx; Vecchi, *op. cit.*, 123-124; La Farina, *op. cit.*, II. 313, 427; Mario, *Garibaldi*, 542; Bianchi, *Cavour*, 94; Cavour, *op. cit.*, IV. clxii-clxiii; *Riv. stor. del risorg.*, I. 188-190. The statements to the contrary by Bertani, *op. cit.*, 53, and Pianciani, *op. cit.*, are certainly untrue.

⁴ Cavour, *Lettere*, III. 245-246; Persano, *Diario*, I. 14-16; see *Affaires étrangères* 1860, 141, for the official version. See also Chiala, *Dina*, I. 379. Some doubt attaches to the letter in Bianchi, *Cavour*, 94, as Persano does not mention it; there is nothing improbable in it, but Persano did not act on any such instructions.

CHAPTER XXXI

GARIBALDI IN SICILY

MAY—AUGUST 1860

THE "EXPEDITION OF THE THOUSAND"; Zambianchi's raid; Marsala; Calatafimi; Palermo. The Sicilians; Crispi's government; Cavour and Sicily; question of annexation; La Farina's mission, and banishment; Cavour and Garibaldi in July. The reinforcements; Milazzo. CAVOUR AND NAPLES; he wishes to anticipate Garibaldi; Francis grants a constitution; Cavour's intrigues at Naples; the nationalists fail to rise there; rising in the provinces. CAVOUR DECIDES TO OCCUPY UMBRIA; the Bertani-Nicotera expedition; Cavour gets the Emperor's sanction.

AT dawn on May 5 the little expedition left Genoa in two of Rubattino's steamers. There was no lack of men to fill them. Bertani's Committee and the prestige of Garibaldi's name had drawn volunteers from all Italy, and the only difficulty was to keep down the numbers to the odd thousand that Garibaldi could take. They were mainly North Italians, for of the 1072 that started in their red-shirt uniforms, 850 came from Lombardy, Emilia, and Venetia. They were a strangely mixed band of patriots and adventurers, with little in common save their devotion to Garibaldi and a boundless courage.¹ "There came," in the words of one of them, "the Sicilian in search of his country, the rejected lover looking for forgetfulness, the hungry looking for bread, the wretched for death;" most of them, though, the pick of the *Cacciatori*, some of them veterans who had served in the Crimea. It was a splendid hazard and great was its reward; and the glory of its initiative must go to the Committee at Genoa—to Bertani and Crispi and Mazzini, whose blind faith had

¹ Forbes says that he never saw or heard of a volunteer, who was the worse for drink.

overborne Garibaldi's hesitation, and dragged the King and Cavour in their wake. But at the moment it seemed a venture of heroic folly. The Bourbons had 23,000 troops in Sicily, and 100,000 more on the mainland, with a powerful artillery and well-nigh impregnable fortresses. The prospects of effective support from the population were very doubtful. Reinforcements might be sent, but this depended on the favour of the government, and it was all too probable that Garibaldi would be crushed before they could arrive. The sequel will show how, despite the extraordinary collapse of the Bourbon defence, the risk was again and again a very terrible one. There was probably no man in Europe except Garibaldi, who could have fought through beginnings so unpromising to victory; and even against him the odds came often all but too heavy. The "Expedition of the Thousand" made Italy; but it might easily have ended in disaster, that would have thrown back the national cause for years to come.

With all Italy hanging in suspense on their fate, the two vessels were coasting southwards. A strange piece of treachery, whose authorship can only be surmised, prevented them from taking up the ammunition for La Farina's muskets, and thus the expedition was almost unarmed. Partly to supply the deficiency, Garibaldi made land at Talamone, a small Tuscan port, and obtained from the compliant commandant of Orbetello the ammunition he required and three cannon. He had another object in stopping here. Mazzini and his friends had persuaded him to embrace their schemes for a simultaneous expedition to the Papal States; and though he had occasional misgivings, he had thrown himself heartily into the project, and had made it part of his schemes for some time past.¹ He intended it as a feint to mislead the enemy as to his destination; but with strange lack of wisdom he landed only some sixty men under a discredited officer, Zambianchi. No doubt he expected reinforcements to join from Tuscany, and intended that Cosenz

¹ Garibaldi, *Memorie*, 374; Mazzini, *Opere*, XI. cxi; Mario, *Bertani*, II. 33; Mazzini, *Ad A. Gianelli*, 130. I do not think probable the explanation given in Vecchi, *Garibaldi*, 134.

or Medici should soon follow from Genoa with a larger force. But it was an incomprehensible blunder. Zambianchi's tiny band courted disaster; and though Garibaldi was doubtless ignorant of the negotiations for the French evacuation, he must have realized something of the trouble he was creating for the government. Mazzini's foolhardy obstinacy and Garibaldi's light compliance postponed the departure of the French garrison, and made Italy wait ten more years for Rome. As soon as the news reached Cavour, he sent strong orders to Ricasoli to prevent the violation of Roman territory;¹ but the sympathies of the people were with the expedition, and Zambianchi crossed the frontier (May 20), to be attacked near Acquapendente by the Papal gendarmes, while he and his men were half intoxicated, and driven back into Tuscany, where Ricasoli "disarmed and arrested them.

Meanwhile Garibaldi, steaming to the south, arrived at Marsala on May 11. He had eluded the Neapolitan ships on the open sea, but when nearing land two cruisers sighted him, and pursued him closely into harbour. One of his vessels grounded, and had not the Neapolitan firing been wide and wild, half his men would never have set foot ashore.² There was no garrison at Marsala, but the expedition was in danger of being hemmed in at the corner of the island, and Garibaldi decided to make a prompt advance on Palermo. Hailed with delirious enthusiasm by the inhabitants, and proclaiming himself dictator of the island in the name of Victor Emmanuel, he pushed on along the road to Palermo, while La Masa spread the revolution through the rural districts, and the *squadre* that had survived the Della Gancia insurrection came in by detachments.

Half-way to Palermo he met the Neapolitans in strong position on the hills of Calatafimi (May 15).³ He had only

¹ I do not believe Guerzoni's statement (*Garibaldi*, II. 54) that the authorities connived.

² There was no truth in the Neapolitan assertion that their firing was prevented by the English men-of-war stationed there. See Correspondence—Garibaldi; Guerzoni, *op. cit.*, II. 62.

³ The spot was called Pianto de' Romani, in memory of the defeat inflicted by the Egestans on Appius Claudius in 263 B.C.

800 of his own badly-armed men and 1500 undisciplined *squadre* to meet Landi's 3500 well-armed and disciplined troops. But one after another, the seven terraces of the hill-slope were stormed, and bravely as the Neapolitans fought, they could not stand before the desperate bayonet rush. On May 19 Garibaldi was on the hills above Palermo. His first move had succeeded, but the real difficulties of the campaign had yet to come. His position was full of hazard. He had only his own 800 to depend upon, for though Termini and Misilmeri had risen, and by the 21st the whole centre of the island was free and had sent in 5000 men, the indiscipline and liability to panics of the improvised bands made them of small value except as scouts. In front of him at Palermo were 20,000 Neapolitans, their officers uneducated, cowards, promoted through court favour or the influence of the camorra, but the men, ignorant and brutal as they were, fairly brave and ready to fight well under good leadership. Despite Calatafimi, despite the superstitious terror that believed Garibaldi leagued with supernal or infernal powers, the superiority of the royal troops in numbers, in arms, in discipline was so immense, that under tolerable generalship they would easily have crushed the little band of heroes.

Garibaldi knew well the immense odds against him; he knew that his one chance lay in the audacious, brilliant strategy, that had so often confounded a superior force. He was afraid to attack Palermo from the west, and by two wonderful and hazardous marches he took his men by a long arc through the mountains to Misilmeri south-east of the city (May 21-25), while two strong columns of the enemy went off in hot pursuit on a false scent to the south. His plan was to attack Palermo by night; once in the city, he would have the houses for fortifications and the populace behind him. His hopes of a surprise were spoilt by the panics of the *squadre*, and it was not till after dawn on the 27th, that he was able to attack and capture the Termini gate. The odds were still overwhelmingly in favour of the Neapolitans, and the least energy on the part of Lanza the commandant must have crushed the assailants. But he contented himself with a furious bombardment, which

wrought terrible havoc in the city, but did little to check the attack. The church bells clashed back defiance; the people began to stir, and inch by inch the city was won, till the soldiers were confined to the Castellammare fortress and its vicinity and an isolated group of buildings round the royal palace. It was a fearful scene of destruction; "every barricade," says an eye-witness, "rose under a tempest of shells, every foot of ground was won amid the crackling of the flames, the crash of falling houses, the shrieks of victims buried beneath the ruins or murdered by the savage soldiery in their flight."

The bombardment ceased on the morning of the 29th, to allow the garrison to make a sortie; but the attack broke ineffectually against the barricades, and Lanza's fast-waning courage failed him. Garibaldi's unconventional tactics paralyzed him; he was doubtful of the loyalty of the fleet; his soldiers, more hungry for plunder than fighting, were beginning to desert. He was only anxious now to come to terms with the "filibusters." On the fourth day of the fighting he appealed to Mundy, who commanded the British squadron in the bay, to mediate, and Garibaldi, welcoming the offer to suspend hostilities, agreed to a twenty-four hours' truce. The Neapolitans little knew how desperate his position was. His powder was almost exhausted, the *squadre* were again more or less demoralized, twenty acres of the city were a smouldering heap of ruins, and the situation was so perilous, that even he was thinking of evacuating Palermo and retreating to the mountains. Next morning the truce was prolonged to enable Lanza to communicate with Naples. Francis' ministers knew that Palermo could be recovered only by a yet more terrible bombardment; they dared not incur the odium, and the King, recognizing that his only hope was to conciliate England and France, sent back orders to evacuate. By June 20 the last Neapolitan troops had sailed, and before this the revolution had spread through all the island. Except Messina and Syracuse, which were held down by the fear of bombardment, and the fortresses of Milazzo and Agosta all Sicily was free from the hated rule. In less than a

month 1000 men had conquered 24,000, and won an island of two million inhabitants. Their own splendid fighting, the cowardice and incapacity of the Neapolitan generals, the unanimity of the population had accomplished the seemingly impossible task. But again and again victory had trembled in the balance, and had Lanza been aught but a poltroon, or Sicilian patriotism less universal, the heroic attempt must have ended in almost certain disaster.

The tyranny had succumbed through its own inherent vices, and it was a more arduous task to organise another government in its stead. The Sicilians had indeed welcomed the revolution with heart and soul; every islander had learnt from his cradle to hate the Bourbons, and the rejoicing was common to every class and section. Even the clergy made common cause, and priest and friar went through the island preaching the holy war. Garibaldi's own benignant personality made him in Sicilian eyes a half-divine hero, and the people cheered for him and the *Madonna Santissima* in one breath and believed him descended from the holy virgin Rosalia.¹ But there was no disposition to make sacrifices. Their own island was free, and what cared they beyond for the deliverance of the abhorred Neapolitans, or theories of Italian Unity? They organised their own local government with some energy, but few came forward to help in the tremendous problem of central organization. The well-to-do, selfish and suspicious of the men who surrounded Garibaldi, held aloof. The conscription, which the dictator had decreed, broke down before the passive resistance of the people, and only a few thousand volunteers were collected. The *squadre* were clamorous for pay, and had to be broken up and re-organized. Outside Palermo indeed there was no anarchy, such as Garibaldi's enemies depicted. Save for agrarian disturbances at Bronte, sternly suppressed by Bixio, and an occasional breaking out of old feuds or resistance to the tax-collectors, the country was quiet. But the central government was almost powerless everywhere, and in

¹ A whole convent of nuns at Palermo insisted on kissing him: Mario, *The Red Shirt*, 9; incense was burnt in his honour: Adamoli, *Da San Martino*, 99

Palermo itself there were dangerous materials. The *mafia* had probably helped to organise the *squadre*. Prisons had been opened during the fighting, and the criminals were at loose in the streets, threatening their private enemies. Thirty *sbirri* had been detected and massacred, despite Garibaldi's efforts to save them, and more innocent victims went in terror of their lives. It was only the dictator's all-commanding prestige, that saved Sicily from the usual criminal sequel of its revolutions.

In fact the task of government, which seemed on paper so easy to the democrats, proved altogether beyond their powers. Garibaldi's political ideas were always primitive. Crispi, who was the real chief of the government, had not yet learnt from his political studies how to manage men. He was a man little loved; self-confident, strong-willed, energetic, without tact or wish to compromise, restive under any leadership. "I am Crispi," was said to have been his reply, when asked two years later to what political party he belonged. A bitter enemy, unscrupulous in his ambitions, inconsistent not with Cavour's robust indifference to appearances but from real carelessness for principle, with little regard for political morality either in ends or means, he was a man who might accomplish much, but that much was as likely to be evil as good. Under him the whole attempt at government by amateurs broke down. Garibaldi, with the best and humanest of intentions, but bored and worried by administrative details, tried to found schools¹ and reform foundling hospitals, while the very elements of government were falling into atoms. All the veneration and love, that the people felt towards him, did not make them pay their taxes. Nominally dictator, he was the tool of the men he trusted, and merely signed the decrees which Crispi laid before him. And Crispi, headstrong and autocratic, made the difficulties greater by his own impetuous folly. He set himself to pick to pieces the whole existing machinery of administration, and flooded the country with new laws, that only added to the confusion. The summary suppression of

¹ See the delightful picture of his military school for the Palermo *gamins* in Mario, *op. cit.*

the grist-tax and other unpopular burdens, while it did nothing to stir the people to effort, impoverished the treasury. He nominated turncoats and adventurers to office, and jobbery thrived as in a hotbed. There were hardly any law-courts, for the magistrates had been dismissed. There was no police, no national guard, and the only security for person and property lay in the self-restraint of the people. And though their unanimity and enthusiasm, however passive, kept the country quiet, and saved the government from many embarrassments, it was a black outlook for the future with the old order broken up, and a mob of intriguers and place-hunters in office. Crispi's misrule was the first of the series of blunders, which marred the early years of Italian rule in the South.¹

Reports of the misrule caused grave disquietude to Cavour. He had rejoiced at the news of Garibaldi's landing. Now that the die was cast, his perplexities disappeared; "Garibaldi's expedition may be right or wrong, but at all events it is inevitable," he said; "we cannot hesitate, we must help him." Inopportune as he probably still thought the move was, it was "another great stepping-stone to final unity." The diplomatic storm had burst, and had been less severe than he anticipated. Russia indeed had told him menacingly, that only geographical distance prevented her from interfering; but England was stoutly friendly, and France accepted the plea, that the government could not have stopped Garibaldi without grave peril to itself. He decided therefore, after a moment's hesitation, to allow private help to be freely sent. He went further; Persano was left with instructions so open, that even before the surrender of Palermo he felt at liberty to sail there (June 4), and give every kind of indirect assistance. On the premier's specific orders he made an unsuccessful attempt to win over the Neapolitan fleet. A few days later (June 10) Cavour was hoping that Garibaldi would cross into Calabria; towards the end of June he allowed the Garibaldian reinforcements

¹ Guerzoni, *op. cit.*, II. 121-124, 131; La Farina, *Epistolario*, II. *passim*; Ricasoli, *Lettere*, V. *passim*; D'Ancona, *Amari*, II. 110, 117-118; Forbes, *Garibaldi*, 78-81; Mundy, *H.M.S. Hannibal*, 81; Olivieri, *Una pagina*.

to arm themselves from the government's stores at Genoa, and Persano, who now saluted Garibaldi with viceregal honours, was instructed to escort them to Sicily. "If once the Italian flag flies at Taranto," the premier wrote to Ricasoli (June 27), "it means the end of the Temporal Power and the liberation of Venice."¹

It was not an honourable policy to encourage revolution against a government, with which he was at peace; and the depth of its dishonour has yet to be seen. It is an open question, whether, morality aside, it would not have been better strategy to attack Naples at once and complete the work. But Cavour would not break from his established rule to let the free lances take the risk. He was ready to use and sacrifice Garibaldi, as he would have used and sacrificed himself, for the common cause. He would have no irruption into the Papal States, and he persuaded Medici and Cosenz, despite Garibaldi's orders, to surrender any designs on Umbria and take their reinforcements to Sicily. He was still more preoccupied by the fear that ultra-democracy, possibly the republic, might gain a footing in the island. Of a republic, at present at all events, there was no danger; but the sequel proved how real was the risk of a democratic, anti-Piedmontese development, which would split the nationalists, which might in the future lead to civil war, and be driven in spite of itself to republicanism. Cavour was determined to check it, if he could, at the start; and to fortify Garibaldi against the democratic influence, to "organise and regulate government," to push on annexation, he sent La Farina to Palermo.

That immediate annexation to Piedmont was the wise policy for Sicily can hardly be questioned; it would have secured an experienced and orderly administration, it would have cut away the ground for intrigue and faction, and checkmated the party, which was sowing dissension and civil strife. In the cool judgment of after years no excuse is possible for the men, who, led by Crispi² at Palermo and

¹ Persano, *Diario*, I. 21-22, 39, 42; Cavour, *Lettere*, III. 266, 272, 274; VI. 565; Bianchi, *Cavour*, 98; Pianciani, *Dell' andamento*, 84; Mundy, *op. cit.*, 180; Adamoli, *op. cit.*, 80; see however Bianchi, *op. cit.*, 94.

² I cannot credit D'Ancona, *op. cit.*, II. 113.

Bertani at Genoa, were trying to postpone annexation indefinitely. Their plea of saving the sovereignty of the people was futile in face of the almost universal eagerness of the Sicilians to be annexed.¹ Their real object was to leave a thorn in the side of the government, to build up in South Italy a power which would be fatal, if not to the monarchy, at all events to the party which had hitherto guided the national movement. That their opposition had some ground may be conceded; many besides themselves were weary of the French alliance, were revolted by the devious paths of Cavour's diplomacy, and longed for a franker and nobler policy. But theirs was the antagonism of men, who were wantonly endangering the whole movement, because it had not gone on their own lines, or because it had brought personal disappointment and resentment. Garibaldi, no doubt, was free from base motives; he thought that Italy needed "an honest temporary dictatorship"; he only intended to defer annexation, till he had accomplished his work. If Victor Emmanuel took over the government of Sicily at once, diplomacy, he thought, might step in and prevent him from crossing to the mainland and completing the unity of Italy.

His fears probably originated in the suggestions of Crispi and his party. They had no foundation in fact. Cavour was prepared to annex not only Sicily but Naples as soon as the opportunity arrived. But La Farina was the worst possible agent that he could have selected to push his cause. He was honest and capable, but boastful, tactless, ambitious, a personal enemy of Crispi, unpopular with the whole democratic party as "Cavour's evil familiar"; and it was easy to persuade the dictator, that a man who was the premier's friend and had voted for the cession of Nice, could be no friend of his. La Farina, without waiting to sound his ground, began an uncompromising attack on Crispi's government; and it became a base personal struggle between them, in which Cavour vainly tried to hold his hot lieutenant in. La Farina knew that he had the public opinion of the island

¹ Nisco, *Francesco II.*, 43; La Farina, *op. cit.*, II. 333-334. D'Ancona, *op. cit.*, II. 99.

behind him. Crispi was unpopular; the Sicilians were impatient for a settlement. Persano and some of Garibaldi's best generals supported them, and the pressure was so strong, that Garibaldi was obliged to dismiss Crispi. But Crispi still had the dictator's ear; and Garibaldi, already meaning to march to Rome and give no hostages to Cavour, was resolute to have no annexation yet. And though he had moods, when he was eager for general reconciliation, and even talked of decreeing annexation by virtue of his dictatorial powers, he banished La Farina from the island (July 7), and the victorious partisans added circumstances of studied indignity.

The high-handed intolerance of the act angered Cavour greatly. His anxiety had increased with the continued reports of the misgovernment; he was suspicious of Bertani's work at Genoa, and threatened Garibaldi (June 28) that if the ultra-democrat remained his agent, no more reinforcements would be allowed to start. As soon as La Farina returned (July 10), he stopped the supplies from the government's stores,¹ though he still permitted the volunteers to start. But he would not openly thwart Garibaldi; he wanted still to use him; he hoped no doubt to wean him from his mischievous surroundings, or leave him to wreck his reputation as a statesman. He corresponded with him through Persano as to La Farina's successor, and sent Depretis (July 21), who was acceptable to Garibaldi, because he had resigned office in protest against the cession of Nice. Depretis had some cleverness of a minor order; but his indecision, his rather elastic principles, his liking to go with the stream made him more of a tactician than a statesman. He succeeded fairly well as "pro-dictator," effecting a great improvement in the administration, and securing a step towards Unity by the introduction of the Piedmontese Statute. But Cavour, over-tolerant, insisted that he should work with Crispi, and Crispi took office again only on condition that there should be no talk of annexation till Naples was free. Inevitably Depretis became the leader of the annexationists, and the old struggle with all its dangers went on below the surface.

¹ Cavour, *op. cit.*, VI. 569; see Mario, *Bertani*, II. 93.

Cavour's great error was in not taking a stronger line. Had he been less deferential to Garibaldi, and boldly ordered a plebiscite for or against annexation, he would have saved Italy from much of the subsequent trouble. Such a course would have been hailed with delight by the great majority of the islanders; even as it was, Garibaldi was sometimes inclined to give way from sheer weariness.¹ But a bold policy required a stronger agent than Depretis. Cavour failed to secure the one man, who could have rescued Sicily from the slough of disorder and misrule. Ricasoli alone among Italian statesmen was strong enough for the post; the firm hand, the bold progressive mind, that had brought Tuscany through her crisis, would have quelled the elements of disorder, hushed the bitter feuds, and thrown the wasted energies of the island into material and social progress. It was an evil day for Italy, when Ricasoli refused to be governor of Sicily.

Meanwhile Garibaldi was completing the conquest of the island. After the capture of Palermo the want of sufficient forces and the troubles of government had prevented him from advancing. But there was soon no lack of troops. Garibaldi's success had sent a thrill through Italy, and to fight under him was the ideal of half the high-souled youths in the land. In Bologna alone, it is said, 7000 put down their names. Piedmontese soldiers deserted to go; Tuscans, though they hated conscription, were eager to enrol under Medici or Cosenz. Money poured into the Rifle Fund²; and Bertani at Genoa was giving his great organising powers to the despatch of reinforcements. Before July 20 over 9000 had arrived in Sicily, and Garibaldi was in a position to push forward. Medici had been skirmishing with Bosco's troops near Milazzo (July 17), and Garibaldi had to hurry up every man he could collect, to save him from being overwhelmed

¹ Mario, *Garibaldi*, 583; D'Ancona, *op. cit.*, II. 96; La Masa, *Fatti*, lxxxiv.

² It paid a million lire for Medici's expedition: Guernoni, *op. cit.*, II. 126; according to Mazzini, *Opere*, XI. xciv, 855,000 lire were collected after Garibaldi's departure.

by heavy numbers. Taking the offensive, he attacked Bosco's strong position on the isthmus of Milazzo (July 20). It was a stiff fight, for the Neapolitans were well posted behind walls and cactus-hedges, and the Garibaldians dashed themselves in vain all morning against the half-hidden enemy. But they succeeded at last in turning the Neapolitan flank, and in the afternoon they won the town. Bosco might have held the castle for an indefinite period, for Garibaldi had no siege guns, but three days later he tamely surrendered. Syracuse and Agosta had already been evacuated, and the citadel of Messina was all that remained to the Bourbons in Sicily.

Garibaldi's progress forced Cavour to rapidly mature his plans. It was clear now that, but for some improbable accident, the Bourbon rule in Sicily was doomed, and everything pointed to its speedy collapse on the mainland. The oranges of Sicily, wrote Cavour, were ripe for eating, and the macaroni of Naples would soon be cooked. The enthusiasm, which Garibaldi had called out, was not confined to the youths, who hurried to fight under him. Cautious men like D'Azeglio and Lanza felt the wave; "the coolest-headed, the most moderate, the most conservative," Cavour wrote, "have become Unitarians." Their timidity had been dissolved out of them, as their minds became possessed with the vision of a great and united country. Ricasoli appealed to Cavour to break away from diplomatic entanglements, and let the King place himself boldly at the head of the movement. For the splendid hopes were dashed by the fear of anarchy and collision, and the prestige, that Garibaldi was winning, promised infinite trouble in the future. "Victor Emmanuel must be the real Garibaldi," was Ricasoli's formula, and he urged again and again, that the government "should make an end of it alike with Garibaldi in Sicily, the Bourbon at Naples, and the Pope at Rome; better a war with three Powers than Garibaldian anarchy." Cavour saw that the unity, for which he had expected to wait for years, was almost in his grasp. But the difficulties were greater than Ricasoli knew. It was Cavour's fixed maxim never to break with diplomacy, if it could be avoided. But

though he had lived in the world of diplomatists, and all his prepossessions made that way, he was not hide-bound by the diplomatic tradition. It was a more real danger that made him pause; he had ever before his eyes the fear of an Austrian attack, an attack before which he knew Italy could not yet stand alone; and because of this, the predominant necessity of keeping the Emperor's favour governed all his policy. He knew how slippery was Napoleon's throne, how hard it would be for him to continue his friendship, if the Italian government became frankly revolutionary. And to hoodwink the diplomatists, to preserve the Emperor's protection for Italy, he was willing to lie boldly and often. The moralist is bound to remember that he did it for no personal end, that he felt acutely that he was blotting his own good name; "if we did for ourselves, what we are doing for Italy," he told D'Azeglio, "we should be great knaves." Cavour, said La Marmora, who knew him well, was "never a trickster, on the contrary he was confident, open, impetuous." It was an overweening sense of national peril, that made him repay the Bourbons in their own coin of treachery. Whether his subterfuges helped his country's cause may be doubted, in spite of his own strong conviction that they were necessary. Had he, instead of trying to justify his actions to diplomacy, boldly defied conventions and broken openly with the Bourbons, he would probably have gained his end sooner as well as more honestly. But the real condemnation of his policy is that, to gain present success for his country, he sacrificed the more precious possession of her honour, that he subtly influenced for evil the traditions of Italian statesmanship, and made it easier for baser men after him to drag her good name in the dust.

After the loss of Palermo, Francis almost in despair¹ had appealed to Napoleon to save his tottering throne, and mediate between him and the Revolution. The Emperor refused to act (June 12), unless he promised complete independence under a Bourbon prince for Sicily, a constitution in Naples, and an offer of alliance with Piedmont. The

¹ He is said to have telegraphed five times in twenty-four hours for the Pope's blessing: Walpole, *Russell*, II. 323.

latter condition, on which the Emperor insisted most, was the sorest. Francis had been moving heaven and earth to deal Piedmont a blow in Romagna, and tried hard to evade a step, which meant practical vassalage to the hated rival and an early war with Austria. But his ministers had lost all courage, and it was decided after some delay (June 22) to accede to the Emperor's requirements, saving the substitution of home rule for independence in Sicily. The Emperor pressed Cavour to accept the Neapolitan overtures, and tried to induce the English government to join in imposing an armistice, and send the two fleets to the Straits to prevent Garibaldi from crossing. Cavour knew that to accept the overtures meant checkmate to annexation, and public opinion had declared loudly against a Neapolitan alliance. He determined to make the negotiations come to nothing, "to let the King of Naples fall, while safeguarding appearances." But he dared not reject the Emperor's advice outright; he professed his adhesion to the principle of the alliance (though on the same day (June 27) he was writing his hopes that Garibaldi would cross the Straits), but he bargained for hard conditions, that he knew Francis would be loath to grant.¹ When the Emperor asked that the King should use his influence to check Garibaldi's advance, Cavour, after some fencing, consented (July 6) that Victor Emmanuel should write to the Dictator, but only if Francis would forswear all attempts to reconquer Sicily; and secure of English support, he refused to waive the condition. At the same time he sent word to Garibaldi, that he was resolute to complete the great work, provided they could act in concert. Francis on his side was equally insincere, and while the negotiations were proceeding, ordered Bosco to attack Medici; but growing desperate, as the toils narrowed round him, he lowered his conditions, then, throwing obligations to the winds, proposed a partition of Papal territory between himself and Piedmont. Francis' facile

¹ Cavour, *op. cit.*, III. 274, 277; Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, V. 130; Bianchi, *Diplomazia*, VIII. 307, 663, 666; Spaventa, *Dal 1848*, 295. The expressions of sincerity in Bianchi, *Politique de Cavour*, 368, 371, must be false. See also Chiala, *Dina*, I. 309.

acceptance of more than his terms drove Cavour to bay; he did not dare any longer to delay the letter to Garibaldi, and the King wrote (July 22), advising him to surrender his designs on Naples, if Francis would leave Sicily free. But the letter was so worded as to court a refusal; and Cavour let Garibaldi know that this would be welcome.¹ He trusted to England to defeat the proposals for an armistice; and Russell, whether from suspicion of French designs on Sardinia, or from friendliness to Italy, flatly rejected the Emperor's proposals (July 26). Napoleon saw at once that this sealed the doom of the Bourbons; he was probably glad to find the matter taken out of his hands, and wrote (July 27) an open letter, in which he said that "he hoped that Italy would obtain peace, never mind how, provided that he could withdraw his troops from Rome and foreign intervention could be avoided." Prince Napoleon sent a private message to Garibaldi, that the Emperor advised him to outstrip diplomacy with accomplished facts.² Cavour's clever, unscrupulous waiting game had succeeded in making events responsible for the failure of the Neapolitan proposals.

He could now go ahead. He was confident that Garibaldi would refuse to obey the King, and that the French would make no attempt to prevent his crossing; he sent, it is probable, a large sum of money to the Dictator, and though he instructed Persano (August 1) to delay Garibaldi's crossing as long as he could, it was only to forestall him in overthrowing the Bourbons. It was impossible, even had he wished it, to stop Garibaldi; but he must contest with him the championship of Unity. He was still suspicious of his loyalty, and determined, if possible, to prevent his amateur politicians from spreading anarchy through the Southern mainland as they had done in Sicily. He realized the danger, which Ricasoli had been pressing on him so earnestly, that if Garibaldi triumphed at Naples, it would mean a dualism of authority, that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for Victor Emmanuel's government to preserve its

¹ Persano, *Diario*, I. 89; Bianchi, *Politique de Cavour*, 375; Vecchi, *op. cit.*, 177.

² Forbes, *op. cit.*, 137.

prestige, that there would be all the elements of discord between North and South, between the monarchy at Turin and a hardly veiled republic at Naples, followed by an advance of the Garibaldians on Rome with all its tremendous complications and risks. All this might be prevented, if he could anticipate Garibaldi by inducing the Neapolitans to revolt and annex themselves to Piedmont, before the Dictator arrived. If they initiated the revolution themselves, he could plead to the Powers that circumstances forced him to step in. All negotiations with the Bourbons were now at an end, and his attitude was one of frank hostility. "We must either become conspirators to make Italy," he said, "or perish with the nation."

There seemed a fair hope that Naples would respond. The Piedmontese party there, hitherto undecided and afraid, suddenly took strength and consistency. When in deference to Napoleon's insistence, Francis proclaimed the constitution (June 25), his tardy concession was received with almost universal contempt. It was the fourth time that the Bourbons had promised a constitution,¹ and nobody believed in the sincerity of the motives that prompted it. A "Committee of Order," which had been formed at the end of 1859 to discipline the various sections of nationalists, was in correspondence with both La Farina and Bertani, and under its auspices, the Basilicata was as early as April planning revolution in the name of Victor Emmanuel. And though there was the same hesitation and suspicion, that had wrecked the movement in 1848 and 1857, there was sufficient agitation to show that it was fear and not loyalty, that postponed the revolution.

But Cavour was relying more on the conspirators in the heart of the government itself. He had had information, that showed how eaten through it was with faction and treachery. Civil servants betrayed state secrets to the National Society. There was little loyalty even among the favourites of the hated race, and a stampede began to make peace with the new rule, which seemed so near. A faint conception of Italian patriotism may have helped to influence

¹ See above, Vol. I., pp. 16, 24, 206.

some, but for the most part it was the base desertion of a failing cause. The Bourbons had their own measure meted them for the long tale of treachery to the nation. Nunziante, son of the man who harried Calabria in 1848, and one of Francis' most trusted generals, promised Cavour to secure a military pronouncement against the Bourbons. The king's uncle, the Count of Syracuse, followed him into the conspiracy. A more important caballer was Liborio Romano, the Minister of the Interior, an able ambitious barrister, who had been implicated in every rising from 1820 downwards, and now in his aging years had won his way to favour and office. He was practically master of the city, for he had organised a national guard and had won the *Camorra*, which, after being used by the absolutism for its own ends, had probably already sold its help to the Revolution. By a daring stroke he turned the camorristas into police, when the old force was disbanded in June, and secured them to the conspiracy. And whatever may have been the after-effect of his strategy, at all events it saved Naples from a repetition of the bloodshed of 1848.

Directly after the breakdown of the negotiations for alliance, Cavour instructed Villamarina (July 30) to put himself into communication with the conspirators. If only Nunziante could fulfil his promises, it would save the Neapolitan army for Italy, and Venetia might be attacked in the spring. On the same day he ordered Persano to steam to Naples with part of his fleet, and in concert with Romano secretly land a store of rifles, while a troop of *bersaglieri* was kept on board the squadron in readiness. While the Committee of Order under Romano's patronage were preparing a popular rising, Nunziante, perhaps helped by Piedmontese gold, was actively intriguing in the army. But he had exaggerated his powers; Romano hesitated at the critical moment, and Villamarina probably played his part badly. By August 23 the conspirators informed Cavour that their hopes of winning the army had been disappointed. The prospects of a rising in the capital seemed equally dark. The provinces indeed had begun to stir; some of the Piedmontese rifles reached the Basilicata; on August 16

Corleto proclaimed the revolution, and next day Potenza, the capital of the province, organised a provisional government in the name of Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi. As soon as Garibaldi crossed the Straits the revolution spread to Puglia on the East, and Salerno on the West, and before he advanced beyond Calabria, the Bourbons had lost their kingdom, and perhaps 10,000 volunteers of the mainland were under arms.¹ But though the provinces showed a good front, everything so centred in the capital that the rising did nothing to serve Cavour's plans, while Naples remained inert. Discord had grown up between the Moderates and Democrats in the Committee of Order, and though there was no open friction, the want of loyal cooperation paralysed its efforts. While Cavour's friends wanted to drive Francis out at once, and seize the government for Victor Emmanuel, the more democratic element, seceding at Mazzini's instigation, formed a Committee of Action, which aimed at delaying the movement till Garibaldi's arrival, that the glory of expelling the Bourbons might go to him, and the new government fall into his hands. The same want of common sense, which lost the Neapolitan cause in 1848, killed any hope that Naples would make a spontaneous effort to free herself. By August 24 Cavour had convinced himself that a rising there was impossible. "It is no longer at Naples," he wrote, "that we can acquire the force necessary to overawe the revolution." His failure made him turn to a move, which he had probably been keeping in reserve since June,² a bold but risky stroke, that might win all Italy and win it for the monarchy. His plan was to send a strong expedition to occupy Umbria and the Marches, regain prestige for the royal army by breaking up La Moricière's force and completing the rout of the Bourbonists, and, if necessary, send the King to Naples in such strength, that Garibaldi would be forced to take the second place. "If we are not at the Volturno before Garibaldi is at La Cattolica," he said, "the monarchy is lost."

¹ Lacava, *Basilicata*, 413 et seq.; Nisco, *op. cit.*, 97, 102-105; *Riv. stor. del risorg.*, I. 223; Tivaroni, *L'Italia*, II. 289-291.

² Chiala, *Politica segreta*, 110; see Massari, *Cavour*, 383.

There were other reasons for his decision. The Bourbons had an army of 100,000 men still intact, and it was probable that La Moricière would lend them part of his forces. Garibaldi might have a desperate struggle to reach Naples, perhaps a terrible disaster, unless an attack from the North kept La Moricière at home, and divided the Bourbon forces. And he knew that a cast for Umbria could not be long delayed. The provinces were exasperated by the volunteers, especially by the overbearing and disorderly Irish. The nationalist volunteers, who were gathering in Romagna and Tuscany, could hardly be held in from crossing the frontier. Mazzini had been working busily through the summer to prepare an expedition to Umbria. Undeterred by the fiasco of Zambianchi's raid and the diversion of Medici's force to Sicily, he was agitating for a movement, that would not only gain the rest of Central Italy and be a step towards Rome, but would create an influence independent both of Cavour and Garibaldi, which might perhaps in the chapter of accidents upset the monarchy.¹ Bertani's single-hearted loyalty to the cause kept him above the petty jealousies that influenced Mazzini; but he too had kept the Umbrian plan in mind ever since Garibaldi started, and had 6000 men at Genoa destined for it, while 2000 were waiting in Romagna, and as many more near Signa under the republican Nicotera with a promise from Ricasoli to supply them with rifles conditionally on his help not being vetoed by Cavour. Garibaldi threw himself warmly into the scheme, intending no doubt that the insurrectionary armies should converge on Rome.² So far the government at Turin had either connived, or thought that Bertani's men were another batch of reinforcements for Sicily.³ But about July 22 Cavour first got wind of their real destination; or, if he already knew of it, the angry remonstrances, that poured on him

¹ Mazzini, *Opere*, XI. xcvi-cxxxi; Pianciani, *op. cit.*, 85; see Thouvenel, *Le secret*, I. 165.

² Mazzini, *Opere*, XI. cxii; Mario, *Bertani*, II. 163; Id., *Nicotera*, 47; Guerzoni, *op. cit.*, II. 157-158; Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, V. 171. His repudiation in his *Memorie*, 374, and *Les Mille*, 141, is as unreliable as many other statements in those books.

³ Probably the former: see Pianciani, *op. cit.*, 119, 121.

from abroad, frightened him. He knew what delicate ground he was treading on, for he wanted to keep on good terms with the Garibaldians, and no doubt hoped to utilize the Tuscan volunteers for his own schemes. Bertani appealed to the King, promising that, if the expedition were allowed to start, he would take the responsibility upon himself and attack no point that was held by French troops. Farini was sent to tell him (August 1-2) that the government intended "to blow their own trumpets in a few days," but that they must save appearances, and on no account would allow the volunteers from Genoa to sail directly for Papal or Tuscan coasts; if however they started in small bodies, they might muster in the Golfo degli Aranci, off Sardinia, and provided they touched first in Sicily, the government would wash its hands of their subsequent destination. On these conditions it would supply funds and every facility for enrolling men and chartering vessels. Bertani agreed to the terms, but nothing was decided as to the volunteers at Signa, and he started with his expedition, intending to break the compact, if he could, and confident that he could persuade Garibaldi to come himself, and lead the volunteers to their original destination. Mazzini went to Florence, apparently in ignorance of the agreement, and as soon as the news of it reached Tuscany, he and Nicotera decided to cross the frontier, and make a desperate attack on Perugia. Nicotera issued what Cavour designated with reason "a republican programme," and the premier, frightened at the complications he was drifting into, took strong measures. Farini issued (August 13) a heated circular, fulminating against illegal intrusion into affairs of state. No more volunteers were allowed to sail, and Cavour sent a peremptory order to Ricasoli that Nicotera's men should be disbanded. Ricasoli protested against the sudden rigour, and came to an arrangement with the volunteers, under which they quietly disarmed and were conveyed by the government to Sicily.¹

¹ Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, V. 184, 189, 206-223; Mario, *Bertani*, II. 145-153; Mazzini, *Opere*, XI. cxxxii-cxxxiii; Pianciani, *op. cit.*, *passim*. Ricasoli was charged with disloyalty to the agreement, but I think the evidence shows that Nicotera did not understand its terms.

The incident no doubt strengthened Cavour's conviction of the need for speedy action. But Farini's statement to Bertani was a little premature. Cavour had determined on invasion at an early date, but he knew the tremendous risk, and he was waiting till he could discount some of its dangers. If he advanced in defiance of Napoleon, the French withdrawal from Rome would be even more indefinitely postponed; it was even possible that the Italian army might find itself in front of a French force, and be compelled to retire ignominiously, or face an impossible contest, with Austria hanging round in the background to pick up the spoils. Even if Cavour could win the Emperor, there was the greater risk that, while the best Italian troops were absent in the South, Austria would take the opportunity to attack. If La Moricière and Francis joined hands and crushed Garibaldi, the Italian army might find itself between a powerful force in the South and the whole strength of Austria in the North. And even if the French were eventually drawn into the struggle, a terrible disaster at the beginning of the war was almost inevitable. Cavour was prepared, as a last resort, to take the risk of an Austrian attack,¹ which at all events would dispel the fears of civil war. But he dreaded so terrible a trial, and hoped to safeguard himself both from Austria and France by securing Napoleon's approval beforehand. The Emperor could ill afford for his own prestige's sake to allow his ally to be crushed and the results of the war undone. It happened that at the moment he was visiting Savoy. Cavour sent Farini and Cialdini to Chambéry, to sound him as to his views respecting Umbria. They told him (August 28) that the insurrection was at the point of breaking out, that Garibaldi's success threatened to throw Italy into the arms of the revolution, that the danger could only be met, if Victor Emmanuel outbid Garibaldi and occupied Central Italy. They promised that, if the Emperor gave his approval to the invasion, the government would consider Rome itself inviolable, and they probably also undertook that the Piedmontese would not enter Papal territory, till an insurrection

¹ Cavour, *Lettere*, III. 331.

had broken out. Napoleon was in a mood to listen; he had well-nigh lost patience with Papal obstinacy, he knew that La Moricière's army was a nest of Legitimist conspiracy against his own throne, that the white cockade was worn openly at Rome. He was anxious as ever to withdraw his troops, and perhaps hoped that the Piedmontese advance would frighten the Pope into flight, and remove the chief pretext for their presence. He readily gave his consent, going so far as to discuss the limits of the Piedmontese occupation. "Do it, if you want to, but do it quick," were his parting words.¹ Farini and Cialdini returned to Turin on August 29. Two days later the ministry decided to invade. The insurrection was to break out on September 8, and on pretext of preventing a repetition of the Perugian massacre, the Piedmontese army would at once cross the frontier. "With God's help," Cavour said, "Italy will be made before three months are out."

¹ Cavour, *op. cit.*, III. 354, 372; IV. 3; VI. 582-583, 590, 687; Thouvenel, *op. cit.*, I. 160, 192, 237; Revel, *Da Ancona*, 23; Pantaleoni, *Idea italiana*, 36-38; Castelli, *Carteggio*, I. 312, 320-321. The French official version was that the Emperor allowed the Italians to enter to restore order and if necessary fight the revolution at Naples, but not to touch the Pope's authority. Beust, *Memoirs*, I. 203, is opposed to all the evidence.

CHAPTER XXXII

THE ANNEXATION OF THE SOUTH

AUGUST 1860—FEBRUARY 1861

- Garibaldi crosses the Straits; his advance through Calabria; the Bourbonists desert Francis; GARIBALDI AT NAPLES. THE PIEDMONTESE INVADE UMBRIA AND THE MARCHES; La Moricière; Castelfidardo. Garibaldi wants to march to Rome; the dictatorship at Naples; agitation for annexation; battle of the Volturno. Garibaldi demands Cavour's dismissal; the King to go to Naples; the plebiscites. Austria threatens attack. The King in the Abruzzi; the two armies; battle of the Garigliano; the King at Naples; Garibaldi retires to Caprera. The siege of Gaeta.

GARIBALDI had already gone far to make it. He had taken the King's letter at its worth, and replied that his obligations to the Neapolitans prevented him from obeying. After the victory at Milazzo he had encamped his men on the Straits near Messina. He was puzzled how to cross, for the Neapolitan cruisers held the sea, and though Persano had sent a man-of-war to assist him as far as a show of neutrality allowed, this was of little use.¹ On August 8 a small body of 200 men succeeded in crossing, but they were obliged to retreat into the forests of Aspromonte. A few days later Bertani arrived with the news that the expedition destined for Central Italy was at the Golfo degli Aranci, and at the same time Garibaldi learnt that the government had disarmed Nicotera's men, and were intending to advance themselves into the Marches.² Despairing perhaps of crossing, while the Neapolitan fleet

¹ Apparently Persano acted contrary to Cavour's instructions; positive orders to assist did not reach the Admiral till after Garibaldi had crossed: Persano, *Diario*, II. 23, 57, 89; Cavour, *Lettere*, III. 321.

² Forbes, *Garibaldi*, 123.

remained intact, perhaps wishing to play check to Cavour's new move, perhaps persuaded by Bertani, he hurried to Sardinia, intending to use the expedition for a blow at Naples. When, on arriving at the Gulf (August 13) he found that part of the expedition had already sailed, he rapidly changed his plans, and returning to Palermo, decided to attempt the crossing without further delay.

On August 20 he eluded the enemy's cruisers, landed with 4000 men near Melito at the south end of the Straits, and stormed Reggio. There were 30,000 Neapolitan troops in Calabria, but, as he had done in Sicily, he hoped to stun them with his bold and rapid movements. He succeeded, beyond hope. Nine thousand men at San Giovanni tamely surrendered, and after murdering Briganti, their general, dispersed. Garibaldi was now master of both sides of the Straits, and the remainder of his forces crossed without difficulty. The insurgents from the Greek and Calabrian villages round Aspromonte came in,¹ and as he marched on along the lovely coast, several thousands of Calabrians joined him. The Neapolitans might still have made a good defence. They had 20,000 troops still intact in the province, and the road abounded in strong places, which might have been easily defended. But the rot spread fast; discipline had crumbled away under the Liberal propagandism and Nunziante's intrigues, and officers and men only wanted to be disbanded and sent home. At Cosenza Caldarelli's brigade, 7000 strong, laid down their arms at the first bravado summons of the populace; Viale with 12,000 more at the pass of Monteleone was threatened with Briganti's fate and hurriedly retreated; his successor, finding himself surrounded by Stocco's Calabrian bands, surrendered without a blow. The Basilicata had risen a fortnight before, and half the kingdom was free, though the Garibaldians had hardly fired a shot since Reggio. It was the very comedy of conquest; Garibaldi drove on with hardly an escort, miles ahead of his soldiers, amid the huzzaing populace, master of a kingdom won without arms.

¹ They thought that Garibaldi was the brother of Christ.

In the Bourbon court all was confusion. Garibaldi's mere crossing had created a panic, and Francis sent him word (August 27), that if he would suspend hostilities, he would lend him 50,000 men to fight the Austrians or La Moricière;¹ so low had the champion of Legitimacy been brought. The King's one chance of success was to put himself at the head of his troops, but his generals, less than half loyal, and bitterly jealous of one another, discouraged him. It was the last act of the sordid drama of treachery, that brought the Bourbons to their doom. The Count of Syracuse had gone to Turin; Liborio Romano was openly conspiring, and at last went to meet Garibaldi and invite him to Naples. When the news came that the troops near Salerno were mutinying, and that the fleet was at the point of going over, Francis left Naples (September 6), and the Savoy arms were put up in the city even before he went. Next morning Garibaldi arrived by rail with a few attendants. The royal troops were still in possession of the forts, and Garibaldi and the city were at their mercy. But he drove unheeding through the streets, and the troops marched away unmolested and unmolested. It was a scene of fantastic carnival medley. The people, so lately too cowed to help themselves, were delirious with delight, when others had won their freedom, and Romano's camorrist police took care that the ovation should be unanimous, sparing, it is said, neither life nor limb of those who would not shout for the dictator. Garibaldi, the hater of Pope and priests, went with the crowd to offer thanks at the festival of Piedigrotta, and reverently watched the liquefying of St. Januarius' blood.

On the same day that Garibaldi entered Naples, Cavour sent his ultimatum to Antonelli. On the pretext that La Moricière's volunteers were a standing offence to Italian sentiment, and a menace to the safety of the Umbrians, he demanded that they should be disarmed and disbanded. Two days later Fanti, who was in command of the mobilized

¹ Zini, *Storia*, II. 658; Bianchi, *Diplomazia*, VIII. 322; Mario, *Garibaldi*, 591; Arrivabene, *Italy*, II. 96. Perhaps Garibaldi was half inclined to accept: Türr, *Risposta*, 15.

troops on the frontier, sent a despatch to La Moricière to warn him that any attempt to intimidate or suppress nationalist agitation would be followed by immediate occupation. The two messages reached Rome on September 10, and the Cardinals at once accepted the challenge. It was a brave but hopeless resolution. La Moricière's cosmopolitan force numbered only 20,000, the majority of them undisciplined volunteers. The Irish were semi-mutinous; the regulars were full of disaffection; the Pope's government had thwarted La Moricière at every step. He was "humiliated and disgusted" by the disorder he found in every branch of the administration, by Antonelli's personal unfriendliness, by the obstructiveness of the local authorities. He had been led to believe that the Emperor would send troops to assist him,¹ and in disposing his forces, he had assumed that the French would at least protect Western Umbria, and leave him free to operate with his full strength in the East. He was determined to severely repress any signs of disaffection, and though his rather savage intentions had little result, the dread of another massacre checked the projected insurrection in the greater part of the province.

The Italian volunteers crossed the frontier on the day fixed for the rising, preceding the overwhelming Piedmontese force, that followed two days later (September 10), without waiting for Antonelli's answer. Fanti, with Cialdini and Della Rocca for his lieutenants, had 35,000 men mobilized under his command. Della Rocca advanced into Umbria towards Perugia, while Cialdini crossing into the Marches at La Cattolica took the coast road towards Pesaro and Ancona. La Moricière, misled by his expectation of French support, scattered his forces through the Marches and Eastern Umbria, making his base at Ancona, and running the risk of being hemmed in between the Piedmontese and the sea. Nothing checked the victorious advance of the invaders. Cialdini took Pesaro and Sinigaglia without difficulty; Della

¹ Zini, *Storia, Documents II.*, 668; Bianchi, *op. cit.*, VIII. 341-345, 679-680; Veuillot, *Piémont*, 33-36, 528; Balan, *Continuazione*, II. 231, 253; Thouvenel, *Le secret*, I. 273-274; La Gorce, *Second Empire*, III. 418-420. La Moricière's report is in Veuillot, *op. cit.*, pp. 481 et seq.

Rocca stormed Perugia. Spoleto was brilliantly defended by O'Reilly's Irish, but it could make no prolonged resistance; and before Della Rocca could cross the Apennines to effect a junction with Cialdini, the latter had intercepted La Moricière's retreat on Ancona, and forced him to give battle on the hills of Castelfidardo (September 18). It was a hopelessly unequal fight; Cialdini had 13,000 men against La Moricière's 5000 badly-armed, demoralized remnant. Some of the Papal volunteers made a fine but forlorn dash on the Italian lines, but part of the Swiss troops and the native artillery broke as soon as they came under fire, and La Moricière escaped to Ancona with a handful of men, leaving his disordered and leaderless force to surrender at discretion. Ancona made a spirited defence against Cialdini's batteries and Persano's fleet, but capitulated on the 24th. The brief campaign had ended in unbroken success; and though the odds were overwhelmingly on the Italian side, Fanti's operations stood in brilliant contrast to the strategy of the older school of Piedmontese generalship. Meanwhile Della Rocca's light columns were within three hours' march of Rome. Despite the French garrison, the city expected the early entry of the Piedmontese, and every house had its tricolor ready to welcome the King.¹ The Pope was eager to fly, and it was with the greatest difficulty that Gramont dissuaded him.² Had he gone, the French garrison would have followed, and the Emperor would have regarded Victor Emmanuel's occupation as the natural sequel.³ Italy was within an ace of escape from all the untold evil, that the presence of the Papacy at Rome has since brought to her.

With La Moricière's defeat the Unity of Italy was nearly accomplished. Excepting Venetia and the Trentino in the North, and Rome and the Papal coast-line, and the small district still held by Francis' troops between Capua and Gaeta, all Italy was free. The danger now lay in the discord between the two nationalist forces, whose victorious

¹ Further Correspondence 1860, VII. 93. The drapers' shops ran out of red and green stuffs.

² Thouvenel, *op. cit.*, I. 227; VielCastel, *Mémoires*, VI. 94.

³ *Affaires étrangères* 1860, 119; Cavour, *op. cit.*, VI. 607; Thouvenel, *op. cit.*, I. 320; Castelli, *Carteggio*, I. 237.

advance had nearly met. Garibaldi's distrust of Cavour, assiduously fomented by the mischief-makers round him, was strengthened by the credence he gave to a baseless rumour that the premier had promised to cede Sardinia to France in exchange for a free hand in Italy. Flushed by his triumphs, he resolved not to lay his sword down till Rome was free; and so long as the task remained unfinished, he intended to remain dictator in Naples and Sicily. Cavour, for his part, was equally suspicious of Garibaldi. He was sensible that public opinion alike in Italy and Europe would condemn any rupture with the dictator, that was not absolutely unavoidable; but he knew the danger of his mad design on Rome, he dreaded a repetition of the Sicilian anarchy at Naples. He had gauged all the weakness of Garibaldi's character, and though his suspicions may seem unworthy in view of the dictator's real loyalty to the King, Garibaldi's surroundings and exceeding pliability went far to justify them. Even after the failure of his agents at Naples, Cavour had tried to forestall him by getting Persano or Villamarina or the Count of Syracuse made dictator before his arrival; and when he was warned that this might lead to civil war, he still tried to anticipate him by a provisional government, which would drive out the Bourbons and keep the control in sane hands. At the same time (August 30) he wrote not very ingenuously to Garibaldi, asking him to return to the old terms of confidence for the sake of the common cause. The scheme of a provisional government in its turn practically broke down, for though the revolutionary committees appointed one, when Francis fled, it was on the understanding that it should in its turn proclaim Garibaldi's dictatorship under Victor Emmanuel.

Garibaldi on his arrival had been very angry at this mild attempt of the Neapolitans to act for themselves¹; he threatened to imprison the members of the day-old government, and brushed them off the stage. But his first acts might have satisfied the most exacting royalist. He handed over the Neapolitan fleet to Persano; he put the arsenal

¹ Though at the end of July he had backed Cavour's attempts to persuade the Neapolitans to rise: Carbonelli, *Mignona*, 198.

into the hands of the Piedmontese *bersaglieri*, and declared that all the acts of government should be in the King's name. A few days later he introduced by decree the Piedmontese Statute and jury and army laws, and abolished the separate consular service and the customs-lines with the rest of Italy. He had platonic dreams of tolerance for all parties; but Garibaldi's mind was always a battle-ground between a real aversion to partisanship and its own strong jealousies and suspicions, and the men who surrounded him soon brought the latter to the front again. Naples had become a very nest of Cavour's enemies, republicans in theory, though they had accepted Victor Emmanuel against the grain, and bitter opponents of the Piedmontese hegemony and the moderate liberalism of Parliament; men with noble theories of national dignity and social reform, but without any capacity to give their theories effect. Mazzini had hurried there; Bertani, impetuous, imprudent, generous, now Secretary to the Dictator, was irritating army and civilians by his unwillingness to moderate his sweeping schemes. Had Bertani been under a more balanced chief, his energy and thoroughness and intense sympathy with the poor might have made him a great administrator. He sketched a wide and wise programme of social reform,—the introduction of an efficient school system, the nationalization of church and demesne lands, the development of railways and telegraphs, the introduction of savings-banks, the reform of charities and public health, the clearing of the slums of Naples.¹ Unluckily Bertani was the centre of the party, which made settled government impossible, which tried to keep out of the South the one body of men who were capable of administering it, and wasted energies, that should have gone to a strong pull for reform, in a feud which threatened to plunge the new kingdom into civil war.

For Garibaldi was more than ever bent on going to Rome, and postponing annexation till Victor Emmanuel could be crowned on the Capitol. In vain Persano tried to dissuade him; in vain Elliot, the British minister, pointed out all the dangers of his scheme. He made light of them; he was

¹ Mario, *Bertani*, II. 198-202.

confident that the 40,000 men, who still were constant to the Bourbon flag, would dissolve as the armies of Sicily and Calabria had done. He believed that the French would never fight for the Temporal Power; England would secure their withdrawal, and "Bonaparte had a straw tail, and was afraid it should catch fire." Hungary would rise at a word, and Venetia fall an easy prey to the united Italian forces. Even Nice would be gathered back again to the fold. He heard of the decision to invade Umbria with mixed feelings, rejoicing that it sealed the doom of the Temporal Power in Umbria and the Marches, but fearing that it might "draw a cordon of defence round the Pope." He set his face more than ever against annexation. A few weeks before, when in Calabria, he would, but for Bertani's influence, have allowed Depretis to annex Sicily.¹ Now he would have none of it. Depretis, finding that annexation was the only alternative to anarchy, had bearded Crispi, and had the angry impatience of the island behind him. But Crispi kept his hold on Garibaldi, and the dictator, blinded by his passionate partisanship, tried to crush down opposition with a heavy hand, and dismissing Depretis, appointed Mordini, a strong anti-annexationist, to take his place (September 17).

The same struggle was fought on a bigger scale at Naples. The mainland was as impatient as Sicily for annexation. There was indeed no anarchy here as on the island, for the mad festive carnival never degenerated into serious disorder, and St. Januarius' blood liquefied three hours before time. Still there was danger, with a camorrist police, whose good behaviour rapidly disappeared, with all the capital's perennial elements of riot, with disbanded soldiers and escaped convicts sowing the seed of trouble, and the reaction already lifting its head at Ariano. The ~~civil~~ ^{garrison} service had grown, if possible, more corrupt since the revolution, for Bertani filled it with adventurers as light-heartedly as Crispi had done in Sicily. Pensions and sinecures were lavished on every real or professed "martyr" of the tyranny. Eighty thousand rifles, that had been sent for the national

¹ Bertani, *Ire politiche*, 74-76; Türr, *op. cit.*, 16; see D'Ancona, *Amari*, II. 131, which I am inclined to disbelieve.

guard, disappeared and fell into dangerous hands.¹ A railway concession was granted on terms scandalously unfavourable to the state. Crispi was Foreign Minister, and there was open friction between him and the Cavourians in Garibaldi's Cabinet, still more between the Cabinet and Bertani, till Bertani's independent power became intolerable, and the generals forced Garibaldi to dismiss him (October 1).

A brilliant victory did something to relieve the sombre situation. As soon as his men arrived at Naples, Garibaldi had pushed them on towards the Volturno, behind which Francis had collected the 40,000 or 50,000, who still remained faithful to him, with the strong fortress of Capua as a *tête-du-pont* on the left of the river. Garibaldi's position was a weak one at the best, and it was impossible for him to take the offensive. There was danger that the Bourbon army with good roads in front and superior strength of numbers would force its way through the volunteers and recapture Naples; and to guard the city Garibaldi had to keep a dangerously extended formation. His 24,000 ill-armed and ill-disciplined men, of whom over 10,000 were Calabrians and Sicilians, had to protect a line of over twelve miles from the railway at Santa Maria to the heights of Sant' Angelo and Castello di Morone on the Volturno, and bending back to the right far away to the south-east at Maddaloni. On October 1 the Bourbon forces attacked all along the line. They had recovered their morale; they had a powerful cavalry and artillery, and their numbers doubled those of the volunteers. It was with the utmost difficulty that Milbitz at Santa Maria and Medici at Sant' Angelo could hold their own against more than double odds. But Garibaldi held his reserves in hand till the critical moment, when he brought them up at two o'clock, the Neapolitans were weary with the long struggle. By five o'clock the Garibaldians had recaptured all their positions, and were pursuing the retreating enemy to the walls of Capua. At

¹ Revel, *Da Ancona*, 167-168, 191, 202, 210; De Cesare, *Scialoja*, 142; D'Ayala, *Memorie*, 335-338, 345; *Collezione delle leggi*, 378; Minghetti's speech of April 3, 1861. Dumas was given 30,000 francs to write a history of the Bourbons, according to Tivaroni, *L'Italia*, II. 336.

the same time Bixio with 5000 at Maddaloni routed the 8000 opposed to him, and Bronzetti's handful of 300 men at Castel Morone kept 4000 at bay all day, till every one of the brave defenders was killed or wounded. The whole Garibaldian loss was 1800, or treble that of the Piedmontese in the whole Umbrian campaign. When the battle was over, Villamarina had, apparently in spite of his instructions, sent forward the battalion of Piedmontese *bersaglieri* at Naples, but they came too late to take any part in the fighting, though they helped next day to repel a fierce attack on Caserta. A few Piedmontese gunners served the artillery at Santa Maria, when all Milbitz' gunners had been killed or wounded. But except for this small help, the Garibaldians won their great victory unaided.¹ And if a lay judgment may be trusted, the battle of the Volturno is the most brilliant of modern Italian victories. The volunteers had all the tenacity and more than the dash of the Piedmontese regulars; and Garibaldi's consummate generalship was finely backed by his lieutenants. The Bourbon troops, largely Swiss and Austrian mercenaries, fought well, and it needed the finest qualities alike in commanders and men to defend a weak position against such superiority of numbers.

The Volturno however did little to solve the dangers of the position—Garibaldi's want of power to bring the campaign to an end, the greater peril of collision with the monarchy. While he was allowing all South Italy to simmer in ever more critical confusion, he made a fatuous attempt to get Cavour removed from office. Garibaldi had no vulgar pride; he was hardly dazzled by his own wonderful success. But he had a supreme indifference for parliament and constitution; to him there were only two men in Italy, who counted for aught, the King and himself; and he was possessed by a fanatical hatred of Cavour and his party. In answer to the premier's approaches, he he had replied (September 15) that he would never be

¹ Bosio, *Villamarina*, 237-242; Guerzoni, *Garibaldi*, II. 195; Forbes, *op. cit.*, 304, 313; *Riv. stor. del risorg.*, I. 224; Lecomte, *L'Italie en 1860*, 124; Adamoli, *Da San Martino*, 160.

the friend of the man who had "humiliated the dignity of the nation and sold an Italian province." He had hardly entered Naples, when he wrote to the King, demanding the dismissal of Cavour and Farini; and undeterred by the King's curt refusal and the common censure of his strange presumption, he repeated the demand and offered immediate annexation as the price of the King's concurrence. But before the second letter arrived, Cavour had decided to take a step, which he knew meant checkmate to the Dictator. He found that Garibaldi's intention to go to Rome was strong as ever, and he was unreasonably afraid that the Dictator would proclaim the republic. He saw that the time had come to bridle him. Parliament was summoned to meet on October 2, and Cavour intended to ask for powers to incorporate the South into the kingdom. If the Chambers agreed, and Cavour knew he could safely count on that, for the irritation in the North was strong against Garibaldi, the King was to put himself at the head of the army at Ancona, as soon as the siege was over, and march south to Naples. If Garibaldi submitted, his power was at an end; if he defied the King, the government would at least send troops to Palermo and annex Sicily.

"If Garibaldi wants a struggle," said Cavour, "I accept it; I feel strong enough to fight him." But he was confident that the dictator would be magnetised by the King; though there would be no compromise with the system, there should be "infinite regard for Garibaldi himself," and he sent Persano (October 2) to make a last attempt to win him to friendship. "We will go to Rome some day," was his message; "now it is madness to think of it; we must accomplish the Venetian business together, and not lose ourselves in utopias."¹ On October 4 the Chamber by an almost unanimous vote gave power to the ministry to annex all provinces in Central and Southern Italy, which declared by plebiscite for annexation. Two days later the King was at Ancona. There was urgent need to hurry

¹ Cavour, *op. cit.*, IV. 32, 34; VI. 611; Persano, *op. cit.*, III. 87-88; Pallavicino, *Memorie*, III. 607; Bianchi, *Politique de Cavour*, 381; see also Mario, *Bertani*, II, 223, the accuracy of which I doubt.

his advance. Garibaldi's situation was still precarious, for he had no heavy artillery to reduce Capua and Gaeta, and meanwhile he was tied to his lines. The political struggle had been only interrupted by the battle. Pallavicino had come from Turin with another sharp refusal from the King. The rigid indomitable old patriot was no friend of Cavour; but he saw all the madness of Garibaldi's policy, and he was determined to have no dealings with the Bertani party and lend all his weight to the annexationists. Naples was in danger of anarchy, and impatient to bring the anomalous position to an end. Crispi had succeeded Bertani as Secretary to the Dictator, and was trying to put down the annexationists by force.¹ Garibaldi had little sense of the danger, and was trying to suppress beggary and secure better treatment for cab-horses instead of facing the whole critical position. There was imminent danger of collision between the two nationalist armies. Bertani had shown an insane wish to forestall the Piedmontese in the Papal States,² and a foolish telegram from him to the commander of the national guards on the Abruzzi frontier had been reported as an order to fire on the royal troops. The report was false,³ and Garibaldi followed up the telegram with instructions to "receive the Piedmontese as brothers," and wrote to the King asking him to hurry on his troops. But the false version was believed everywhere, and the exasperation was intense. Pallavicino saw that prompt action was needed to save the Dictator from some fatal step, that might bring the country to the brink of civil war. At his suggestion the ministry at Naples decided to bring matters to a head and take a plebiscite, believing that Garibaldi had given his consent. Probably he did give it; he was puzzled and impatient about the whole matter; "I am a man of war," he said, "and do not understand these things;" he wanted the King to come, but he was still bent on marching to Rome, and he knew that annexation would be fatal to his schemes. Crispi, though he seems to

¹ Raccioppi, *Moti di Basilicata*, quoted in Tivaroni, *op. cit.* II. 333-334.

² Bertani, *op. cit.*, 67-68.

³ Salazaro, *Cenni*, 58; Mario, *op. cit.*, II. 267.

have been a party to the decision of the ministry, now led the opposition, and proposed that in place of taking a plebiscite, a representative assembly should be summoned. Pallavicino strenuously resisted. An election would only prolong the crisis; if it were taken under Crispi's management, the Assembly might be hostile to annexation, and civil war would be the almost inevitable sequel. But Garibaldi declared for Crispi's proposals, and Pallavicino indignantly threatened to resign. Fortunately the public realized the gravity of the crisis. The Neapolitans demonstrated angrily for annexation, and Garibaldi, finding that he had an unanimous people against him, suddenly decided for Pallavicino and the plebiscite, and appealed to the country to forget political parties.¹

The plebiscite took place on October 21, and the poll was declared a fortnight later. The ballot seems to have been not really secret, and there was no opportunity given to vote for a separate kingdom without the Bourbons; but there was no open attempt at pressure, in Naples at all events there was perfect order, and the voting was heavy.² No intimidation, such as was charged to the Unitarians, could have produced the overwhelming majority. On the mainland 1,310,000 voted for annexation, and 10,000 against it; in Sicily 432,000 voted for it, and the opposition shrunk to a poor 600. In the city of Naples, where 106,000 voted, 31 made the total of the anti-annexationists. A few days later the plebiscites were held in the Marches and Umbria. In the former the vote for annexation was 133,000 to 1200, in the latter 97,000 to 380. Even the province of Viterbo, though reoccupied by the French troops, recorded its vote in their despite. A total of nearly two million votes, with a handful of twelve thousand against them, proved in the face of all cavillings, how universal at all events for the moment was the desire for Unity in South and Central Italy.

¹ Pallavicino, *op. cit.*, III. 609-627; Guerzoni, *op. cit.*, II. 217-222; Salazaro, *op. cit.*, 66-80; Crispi, *Scritti*, 329, 335; Un Italien, *Crispi*, 632-633; Türr, *op. cit.*, 22-24; Persano, *op. cit.*, IV. 19-25; Nisco, *Francesco II.*, 167-168.

² The percentage of population voting was 19.17 as against 23.25 in France in 1852, and 21.17 and 20.09 in Tuscany and Emilia respectively in the spring of 1860.

Meanwhile Cavour had been hurrying on the King's advance. It was not only the dangers of the position at Naples, that made him count every day. He dreaded an attack from Austria, and was tortured with anxiety to get the army back before she could fall on Lombardy. It was a terrible hazard, for though Bologna and Piacenza were strongly fortified, and Lombardy and Piedmont were prepared to rise in mass, the last French troops had left in June, and the slender Italian forces under La Marmora were bound to meet a great disaster. There seemed every probability that Austria would choose so favourable a moment for attack. Her desperate financial and domestic condition was likely to seek relief in war. She had indeed, despite all Antonelli's appeals, refused to interfere on behalf of the Pope. But the invasion of Umbria had drawn on Piedmont a fierce storm of indignation from the diplomatists. Russia had withdrawn its ambassador, Prussia had protested in strongest language. Even the Emperor, though he was secretly encouraging Cavour to go on,¹ officially threatened opposition, and withdrew his minister from Turin. England alone remained constant, but she was not likely to fight. Italy seemed utterly isolated, and Cavour was expecting from day to day to receive the Austrian ultimatum. Towards the end of October (October 27) he was so alarmed, that he urged the King and Fanti to return at once. Three days later he knew that Italy was safe. Again she owed her deliverance to Napoleon. He had won the Czar,² and made veiled threats to Austria, that if she entered Lombardy, she might find French troops in front of her. The English Cabinet probably used its influence at Berlin, and Francis Joseph, frightened by the French menace and dissuaded by Prussia and Russia, gave up the projected war.³ Meanwhile, with the awful cloud still hanging over his country, the King was marching South, taking Fanti as chief of his staff, and Farini as future governor of Naples.

¹ Cavour, *op. cit.*, VI. 601; for Cavour's discreditable fencing, see *Ib.*, VI. 595. See also VielCastel, *op. cit.*, V. 91.

² See below, p. 181 n.

³ Cavour, *op. cit.*, IV. 85; VI. 621-623; Bianchi, *Diplomazia*, VIII. 363-364.

In his fine enthusiasm for unity, he was prepared for any risk. He knew that if Austria attacked, it might cost him his crown; but better the republic, he thought, than the loss of the national ideal. "Leave Mazzini alone," he said, "if we make Italy, he is powerless; if we cannot, let him do it, and I will be *Monsù Savoia* and clap my hands for him." With the strange vein of religious feeling, that ran through his stained nature, he had convinced himself that he was "fulfilling a mission assigned by God, because it is willed by the people." He still disliked Cavour, and was perhaps half-fascinated by Garibaldi's designs on Rome. But jealousy of the dictator's popularity, irritation at his "impertinent" letter, a sense that Cavour was winning back for him the position he had nearly lost, had temporarily broken his regard for the great general. The reaction in favour of himself and his premier was already in full tide in the North and Centre. Castelfidardo and Ancona had recovered the prestige of the royal army, and Cavour's triumph in the Chamber showed how completely the effective public opinion of the North was with him.

The King crossed the Tronto and entered Neapolitan territory on October 15, the people everywhere acclaiming him their deliverer, and to his naive disgust thronging to kiss his hand. Even the clergy came in procession with their bishops at their head. The only exception was in the district round Isernia, where the loyalist peasants had risen in the name of the Bourbons, committing horrible atrocities on the Liberals and a small Garibaldian force, which had tried to repress the revolt. While Cialdini sternly put them down, the King advanced slowly through the Abruzzi and along the right bank of the Volturno to take the Bourbon army on the flank. Garibaldi's position was still far from safe;¹ but the regulars at Naples and 5000 men, who had been shipped from Genoa, were sent to the

¹ About this time there arrived a strong contingent of English volunteers to help Garibaldi. They got a bad name for disorderliness and pilfering, and nearly shot the King by accident: Arrivabene, *op. cit.*, II. 289; A. Mario, *The Red Shirt*, 280; Mario, *Garibaldi*, 652; Adamoli, *op. cit.*, 168; Revel, *op. cit.*, 70.

front, and as the forces with the King came up, the Bourbons lost their chance of successful attack. At Macerone Cialdini's van defeated a strong force of Bourbonist soldiers and armed peasants under Douglas Scotti (October 20). Next day he was threatening the Neapolitan rear at Venafro, and Francis, in danger of being caught between the two armies, left 12,000 men in Capua and retired behind the Garigliano (October 27).

As soon as Garibaldi heard of the King's approach, he went to meet him. The force of events had done much to sober him. As early as October 15 he had decided to lay down the dictatorship when the King arrived. The resolution of parliament made resistance to the government mean war, and Garibaldi had ever a present horror of shedding civil blood. He had convinced himself that, apart from the advance of the royal army, the protracted resistance of the Bourbons made an advance on Rome impossible for the present, and, though he clung as tightly as ever to the idea, he saw that its realization must be postponed at all events till the spring. His loyalty to the King had never really wavered. He felt that his own policy was beaten, possibly the counsel of his saner friends had made him doubt whether it was altogether wise. He never appeared more noble, than when he, who had won half Italy, laid down his conquest at the King's feet, to be ruled by his enemy; and, for the moment forgetting his rancour, turned his face to the two fortresses, that had yet to be won for his country.

The famous meeting between King and Dictator took place at Teano (October 26). The brief, barely cordial salute between them was typical of the uncomfatableness and strain of the situation. The Piedmontese army despised the Garibaldians, laughed at their indiscipline, their ragged uniforms, the pretensions and extravagant number of their officers; they resented angrily the unfriendliness, which existed only too much among the volunteers, and which mischief-makers on their own side had exaggerated. Farini's circular had done the same harm among the Garibaldians; they thought that the Piedmontese had come to rob them

of their victory; many of them republicans and democrats, they saw with bitterness that South Italy was given up to Cavour's rule; and indignation waxed hot, when the petty slander of the Moderates spread the fiction that the Volturno had been won by royal troops. But the common patriotism was strong, and the presence of the enemy on the Garigliano prevented the bitterness from finding voice. The immediate business was to complete the discomfiture of the Bourbon army. Capua was invested and surrendered shortly after; and the main body of the Piedmontese under Cialdini advanced to attack the Bourbonists in their strong position on the Garigliano. Three times the Piedmontese were driven back, but the guns from the fleet disordered the Bourbonists, and on November 3 Cialdini won a footing on the right bank, compelling the enemy to fall back on Gaeta. Persano had been ordered to blockade the fortress, when Cavour suddenly learnt that the Emperor was sending his fleet to prevent it, and the blockade was hurriedly countermanded. But Cialdini occupied Mola di Gaeta after a sharp engagement, and on November 5 the siege of Gaeta began.

Everything was now ready for the King's entry into Naples. The plebiscite had been counted, and Victor Emmanuel was King of South Italy by the will of the people. On a stormy November morning (November 7) the King drove through Naples with Garibaldi at his side. The crowds, that waited in the drenching rain, gave him a good welcome; but the cheers were loudest for Garibaldi. The Dictator had been nursing his bitterness, since the King's orders had sent him to the rear at Capua. "Squeezed like an orange and thrown into a corner," he was very angry that Farini, Cavour's confidant and friend, was destined to be governor of Naples. The King had broken his promise to review the volunteers at Capua, and Garibaldi relieved his feelings by attacking the Pope as antichrist. Victor Emmanuel on his part was nettled when he found that his popularity was second to Garibaldi's. Fanti and the military influence was, in spite of Cavour's wiser advice, opposed to concession to the volunteers; Farini had been

sent to protect the King from Garibaldi's ascendancy, and performed his duty with only too much zeal. On the day of the entry into Naples Garibaldi, after presenting the record of the plebiscites and resigning the dictatorship, asked for decorations for his generals and rank in the royal army for all his officers. The King refused to give an immediate answer, and Garibaldi left him in wrath at the rebuff. In vain the King tried to win him with delusory munificence; Garibaldi refused his gifts, and demanded the King's protection for the volunteers, and for himself the lieutenancy of the Sicilies for a year with dictatorial powers. The King promised to preserve the volunteers on their present footing,¹ but refused any concession as to the lieutenancy, and after one more desperate attempt to get Cavour dismissed and be himself allowed to march on Rome, Garibaldi sailed for Caprera with a few hundred lire in his pocket and a bag of seed-beans for his farm.² In his farewell address to the volunteers he spoke of the King in loyalist of phrases, and appealed for harmony and union. But he was bitter as ever against Cavour; he was looking to the spring, when a million men would be in arms to win Rome and Venice to the fatherland.

Gaeta had still to be reduced, and now that the danger from Austria had passed for the time, Cialdini could sit down to the siege. Francis had shut himself in the strong fortress with 20,000 men. The disloyalty was still not at an end, but, after the desertion of a few troops at the beginning of the siege, the remainder proved loyal though not enthusiastic defenders. Francis, as his father before him, believed himself to be championing the cause of order, and his brave resistance won him the respect of Europe. None the less the Powers left him to his fate, and Francis found his only friend in Napoleon, who, moved by some ostenta-

¹ See below, p. 216.

² Castelli, *Ricordi*, 340-346; Revel, *op. cit.*, 79; Bianchi, *Politique de Cavour*, 386; *Riv. stor. del risorg.*, I. 547; Persano, *op. cit.*, IV. 123; Arrivabene, *op. cit.*, II. 302; Mundy, *op. cit.*, 283; Cavour, *Lettere*, IV. 35. It is almost impossible to reconcile the different accounts. I withdraw what I have said in my introduction to Mr. Okey's translation of Mazzini as to Cavour's treatment of Garibaldi.

tious chivalry and the Empress' influence,¹ put his veto on a blockade by sea. It was not till the beginning of January, that the Emperor yielded to the insistence of the English government and withdrew his fleet. Meanwhile Cialdini had been conducting the siege with leisurely deliberation, perhaps to spare his men for a possible struggle with Austria in the spring. Francis' generals defended the fortress with an equal want of energy; the city suffered heavily from the bombardment, typhus broke out, and Francis saw that his cause was a hopeless one. On February 13 he surrendered. The citadel of Messina capitulated a month later after a nine days' siege, and with the fall of the little mountain fortress of Civitella del Tronto in the Abruzzi (March 21) the Bourbon power was extinct.

¹ Further Correspondence 1860, VII. 132; Castelli, *Carteggio*, I. 335, 338-339; Id., *Ricordi*, 340; Cavour, *op. cit.*, VI. 633. Cavour thought that the Emperor's action was to conciliate Russia (see above, p. 176): Further Correspondence 1860, VII. 135; Thouvenel, *op. cit.*, I. 270-271; Cavour, *op. cit.*, VI. 615; Chiala, *Politica segreta*, 164.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE NEW KINGDOM

1860-61

The Kingdom of Italy. CONDITION OF NAPLES ; Bourbonist reaction ; the Garibaldians ; Sicily ; constitution or dictatorship ? ; La Farina in Sicily ; Farini at Naples ; Carignano and Nigra ; BRIGANDAGE. PIEMONTE AND ITALY ; the "regions" ; Cavour postpones question. Venice.

THUS Italy was united, had become one of the great states of Europe. Though Austria still ruled in Venetia and the Trentino, and the Pope by the grace of his French protectors held Rome and the Comarca with the strip of coast from the Tuscan frontier to Terracina, the kingdom stretched "from the Alps to Lilybœum," and counted twenty-one millions of inhabitants. The united Italy, that had been the scoff of diplomatists, that Mazzini had preached to a believing few, that the great mass of nationalists had even lately thought of as a far-off possibility, had suddenly become a fact, a fact that even the apathetic multitude had hailed with delight, and that made the reactionaries and the autonomists forget their narrower ideals in the pride of being citizens of a great nation. In a brief eighteen months the great work had been accomplished ; the errors of 1848 had been forgotten, the ten years' waiting had taught discipline and made Italy march together. There had been tension, at one time a very dangerous one, but the common-sense and patriotism of all parties had saved the cause from the faction-fight, which had wrecked it ten years before.

But the young nation was unformed. It had problems to face, which would task its wisdom and self-restraint more than all the work of emancipation had done. The divisions,

which had been kept under surface in front of the enemy, were certain to appear in the task of civil consolidation. Most importunate, if not most serious of its problems, was the question of the South. "To harmonize North and South," said Cavour, "is harder than fighting Austria or struggling with Rome." Naples and its provinces had two terrible scourges, great poverty and great corruption. Feudalism, long abolished in law, survived in practice, and the peasant of the Capitanata or Basilicata still worked at the *corvée* and sold his daughters to his landlord. His lord was his employer and creditor, and ground him with starvation wages and usurious interest; he had the local government in his hands and abused it to his private ends; he wasted or mismanaged or misappropriated the communal lands.¹ Agriculture was depressed by heavy taxes and the want of markets. There was need of roads and railways, of afforestation and public works to reclaim land from the mountain torrents or drain malarious swamps; need of legislation to emancipate common lands and the vast stretches of estates in *demesne* or mortmain, to reduce the twenty-one thousand monks and nuns, nine thousand of them mendicants, who produced little and consumed much. The towns were struck by the commercial distress that followed the revolution, perhaps by the sudden introduction of free trade in Francis' later days. Misery and beggary were rampant as ever in the capital, and the government was still, in pursuance of one of Bertani's decrees, spending 5000 lire a day in bread-doles for its demoralized poor. The endemic brigandage of the mountain districts² sprang into vigorous life. Where the peasants had a tolerable lot, brigandage took shallow root, but the miserable landless labourers of the poorer provinces left their homes by the hundred to find in the more enviable life of the *banditti* independence and food and revenge instead of work and hunger. It was

¹ See above, Vol. I., pp. 88, 93; and Bianco di Saint Jorioz, *Brigantaggio*, 13, 48, 54-59; Report of the Parliamentary Commission in Ghiron, *Annali*, I. 328; Franchetti, *Province napoletane*, 21, 37, 151, 157; Cordova, *Discorsi*, I. 120-129; Arrivabene, *Italy*, II. 326; Ulloa, *Presenti Condizioni*, 21-22; Villari, *Lettere meridionali*, 86-87.

² See above, Vol. I., p. 94.

the fierce turning of the downtrodden and brutalized, whose rallying-cry was "down with the gentlemen." Garibaldi had promised the peasants a partition of demesne land; and at all events work for the unemployed, the improvement of the peasant's lot, the revival of trade were the first needs of Naples. "Unify to improve, improve to consolidate," was Cavour's motto for the South, but he knew that ten years were needed to accomplish the heavy task.

But more dangerous than the material depression was the universal corruption, that followed the Bourbon rule as night follows day, and made thoughtful men in the rest of Italy dread lest it should prove contagious. The enthusiasm for the Revolution had often found its spring in hopes of getting office, and a crowd of pension and place-hunters of every class crowded the stairs and ante-chambers of each minister. The dreaded hand of the mysterious *camorra* reached everywhere. It was mainly a secret society of the criminal poor, but it had its associates high and low, and there were camorristas in black coats and white gloves as well as those in rags. Liborio Romano had left it installed in office; it was powerful in the police, in the national guard, in the local bodies; its momentary good behaviour soon disappeared, and it used its power to shelter and foment brigandage, at times to plunder and assassinate under the eyes of its affiliates in the police. Garibaldi's administration had filled the civil service with a mob of disaffected, turbulent rogues, who had no desire to see the government work smoothly, and used their new position to hound down their private enemies.¹ A crowd of adventurers had hurried to Naples, professing themselves volunteers; and the "false Garibaldians," who had never smelt powder, clamoured for pay, blackmailed partisans of the Bourbons, and leagued to upset every ministry that would not fill their maw. In the provinces all was confusion; the Bourbon corruption had long ago destroyed any trust in the honesty of government, and the men, who were feebly trying to make the law respected, found themselves paralyzed by the dead-

¹ De Cesare, *Scialoja*, 145; Bianco di Saint Jorioz, *op. cit.*, 23-24, 96; Della Rocca, *Autobiografia*, II. 122-123; see Bonghi, *Finanze*, 35, and above, p. 170.

weight of local apathy and suspicion. And sober and patient and amenable as was the great bulk of the rural population, the weakness of the government allowed it to be cowed into a silence that was interpreted as sympathy with the banditti.

It was a fair field for intrigue and discontent. The unanimity, that welcomed the fall of the Bourbons, quickly vanished. Much of it had been a momentary enthusiasm, much of it the hope of personal gain, much of it mere pretence. Francis' resistance at Gaeta encouraged the Bourbonists to raise their heads again. Most of the great proprietors in the Abruzzi and the Basilicata and Calabria were partisans of the fallen dynasty, and their feuds with the smaller gentry reappeared as a struggle between Bourbonists and Liberals. The mass of the clergy both in town and country were on their side. The poorer peasants found they had no longer a government, which connived at plunder and blackmail; and the crude communism of the jacquerie formed a monstrous alliance with the clerical and aristocratic reaction. Though brigandage sprang from social causes, it became a political tool in the hands of the agents from Gaeta and Rome, who egged on the "bands" to plunder and massacre and ravish in the cause of throne and altar. And to a certain extent Bourbonism became the expression of the suspicion of the rule of Piedmont, of the divergence between South and North; and the very districts, which had voted unanimously for annexation as the signal of the Bourbon downfall, now swelled the reaction, that the Bourbon cause inspired. Often the only sincere Liberals were the artisans of the towns; and the Liberals themselves had no great love for Piedmontese rule. The history and politics of Piedmont, which had been as a beacon to the rest of Italy, were almost unknown here. There had never been a strong enthusiasm for Unity on the Neapolitan mainland, and in Sicily, though the old Home Rule spirit was kept more or less in the background, it was too strong and recent to have disappeared. Both Sicily and Naples had wanted to be rid of the Bourbons, but now that the Bourbons had gone, the inevitable reaction came. The masses found the expected millennium as far away as ever, and the jangle

between progressive North and stationary South succeeded to the brief honeymoon.

The same feelings, that led to the revival of Bourbonism in the country districts, gave a dangerous strength to the democratic Garibaldians in the towns. The prosaic, unsympathetic Piedmontese had no fascination for Southern minds; their sober, grey-coated soldiery awoke no interest in a people, who had welcomed the picturesque red-shirted volunteers. The King had lost much of his prestige by secluding himself during his stay at Naples, and Garibaldi was still "the poor man's king," who had promised the peasants an agrarian law, and was believed by the *lazzaroni* to be descended from St. Januarius, predestined to bring them "liberty and macaroni." Every ruffian, who wanted pillage or pension, put on a red shirt, and called himself a Garibaldian. The crowd, who honoured Garibaldi's name from devotion or interest, were roused to angry resentment by the studied depreciation of their hero by Farini and La Farina, by an inane attempt to suppress Garibaldi's Hymn, by the fancied slights to the volunteer officers. In the discredit of Piedmontese rule even the Murat faction began to revive.

Sicily had never been corrupted like the mainland, but the poverty, the half-barbarian crime appeared in even stronger type. In the great estates of the wheat districts there was the same oppression of the peasant, the same usury, though here the tyrant was not the landlord, who was invariably an absentee, but the middleman. The peasants themselves were too crushed down to give trouble; but the *mafia* outstripped the *camorra* in its crime and lawless daring.¹ At Palermo the same mixed rabble as at Naples conspired to prevent things from settling down,—Bourbon employees, who had lost office, the incapable and dishonest nominees of Crispi and Mordini, who feared losing it, the 2000 volunteers, whom Garibaldi had left behind, the thieves and assassins, who had fought for the revolution and been disappointed of their booty. The civil service was disorganised, the treasury was plundered, food was dear, work-

¹ Villari, *op. cit.*, 21-37; see above, Vol. I., p. 98.

men were on strike, there was great distress among the poor. Public opinion was still in the main constant to the Cavourians, and the invincible hatred of the Bourbons made the rise of a serious reactionary party impossible. But the autonomists were clamouring for a regional system, which almost slid into Home Rule, and round the Garibaldians gathered an unscrupulous, noisy mob of disappointed "martyrs," whose self-interested patriotism had not found the recognition that it claimed.¹

It is questionable whether for a country, where corruption and disaffection were so strong, a temporary dictatorship would not have been the better rule. It was Garibaldi's constant and cherished ideal; and though his own ludicrous essay at government was responsible for much of the confusion, the absolute rule of a competent, sympathetic administrator, untrammelled by the distant, ill-informed interference from Turin, might, even after the bad start made by Crispi and Bertani, have done much to heal and lift up and consolidate. The governments of Naples and Sicily were still half independent of Turin, with their own ministries, and Lieutenants enjoying viceregal powers. But it needed a system, which would allow one man to organise without fear of interference, whether from central government or parliament. Farini had advised that Ricasoli should temporarily have sole power in Sicily, and though Ricasoli refused to go, he recommended a military dictatorship, while others urged it as even more necessary at Naples. But Cavour would have none of it; he feared that it would depreciate the country in the eyes of England and Europe; "struggle," he said, "is a necessity of constitutional government, and when there is no struggle, there is no life or progress." The King refused it unconditionally as contrary to his constitutional oath.

But whether there were dictatorship or not, everything depended on the choice of the Lieutenants. It was not easy to find men for so many difficult posts. "The Italian cause," Cavour foretold, "will eat up many men." He had sent as Lieutenant of Sicily, Montezomolo, a respected Liberal noble

¹ Ciotti, *Palermo*, 16-18.

of Piedmont, who in his earlier days had belonged to Young Italy. He was a figure-head, and Cordova and La Farina went to take over the administration from Mordini. Cordova was an honest courageous Sicilian, the ablest of the revolutionary leaders of the island in 1848, perhaps the best man next to Ricasoli, who could be found for the post. But to throw the gauntlet down to the Garibaldians by sending La Farina was another of the unfortunate personal selections that Cavour made at this time. The civil service and police, composed of Crispi's and Mordini's nominees, conspired to make the new administration impossible, and the Turin government left it without sufficient military force to impose its will. On the last day of the year the inevitable crisis came; and strong as the Cavourians still were outside the capital, the two Councillors had to fly from Palermo, and Cavour thought it prudent to recall them.

The difficulties of government in Sicily were light compared with those at Naples. No South Italian was available for the post of Lieutenant, and Ricasoli refused it as he had done for Sicily. Finally Cavour selected Farini, partly because his record at Modena marked him for a strong man, partly because he could rely on him to guard the King against Garibaldi's influence. A more unfortunate choice could not have been made. It was a gratuitous irritant to the Garibaldians; it sent a bourgeois to rule a proud and powerful aristocracy. Farini was reluctant to go, ill, suffering from the disease that finally killed him, and the southern climate completed the wreck of his health. The difficulties of his position would have tried the strongest man, and the King's presence added to them. The dual authority and Victor Emmanuel's rash promises brought down on his Lieutenant's head the blame for mistakes and harshnesses, of which others were the cause.¹ But his own fatuity is responsible for the continuous failure of his administration. He proved as weak as he had been strong at Modena; and the cowardice of the mass of the people, which might have been the strength of a strong government, was fatal to a weak one. Farini himself became more or less the tool of

¹ Revel, *Da Ancona*, 98.

the place-hunters; his position strangely intoxicated him, and an affected hauteur smothered his chance of success in ridicule. Bourbonists and Garibaldians and Murattists conspired to damage him, and disappointed democrats wrote to Turin, that Naples was lost, unless Farini was recalled. Cavour realized the mistake he had made, though at times he seems to have hoped that Farini would blunder into success, and knew that "peoples are not regenerated in a week." By degrees dissension rose between them, and when Farini talked of retiring, Cavour caught at the excuse, and appointed his successor (January 3, 1861).

He sent in Farini's place the Prince of Carignano, with the young diplomatist Nigra as his chief adviser, hoping that a royal prince might win the impressionable Neapolitans. Carignano had a thorny task. In some districts the brigands seemed irrepressible; Naples was crowded with pretended Garibaldians, hungry for spoil, with camorristas struggling under the strong heel of Spaventa, the Minister of Police, with autonomists eager to discredit the Piedmontese government. It was perhaps to avoid the reproach of Piedmontism, perhaps from consciousness of their own inexperience, that Carignano and Nigra made Romano home minister; and the unscrupulous intriguer soon dominated the government, putting his own creatures into office, and encouraging the camorra, that Spaventa had half stamped out. But powerful as the camorra was, Naples was sound at core, and the outcry against the minister and his criminal following became so loud that he had to resign. After his departure the work of government was easier; Spaventa carried on the war with the camorra unmolested, and strangled with perhaps excessive severity an incipient plot of Bourbonist nobles; the national guard on the whole kept order in the capital, and mobilized national guards, sent from the North and Centre, supplied to some extent the lack of troops.

The immediate danger lay in the brigandage, which showed its head from time to time, finding an easy shelter in the great forests and mountains, where hardly a road ran. All through the winter it had overrun the hill country round Tagliacozzo in the Abruzzi, fed by Papalists across the fron-

tier, who made depots of arms in neighbouring monasteries, and busily recruited for the brigand bands at Rome,¹ indifferent if the men, whom they egged on, pillaged and massacred in the name of Pope and Bourbon. The savagery led to natural reprisals. Cialdini threatened to shoot every man taken with arms in his hands; Pinelli, the military historian, who was sent to hunt down the brigands, gave strong expression to the indignation, that every patriot felt at the Pope's unholy patronage of the banditti; his brother-general De Sonnaz, after driving back a large band into Papal territory, crossed the frontier and ransacked a store of arms in a border monastery. The fall of Civitella del Tronto brought the movement in the Abruzzi to an end, but as summer drew on, the plague broke out in more alarming proportions elsewhere. Francis was at Rome, busily organising the conspiracy, which took ex-convicts for its leaders, and made robbery and murder its weapons. He had committees in correspondence with him all through the South; the clergy, angry at the recent ecclesiastical reforms,² were eager to harass or upset the Italian government; disbanded soldiers enlisted with the banditti to escape the summons to join their colours. But wherever the authorities showed energy, the brigands disappeared. Though they invaded several towns and terrorized the inhabitants into acquiescence, they retired at the first approach of a few troops, and the national guards of the district completed their discomfiture. Had the government had more troops at its command, the movement would have made little headway; and sinister as the phenomenon was, it was of less serious moment than the apathy and ignorance and poverty, that made the regeneration of the South and its fusion with the North likely to be the task of many weary years.

The Neapolitan difficulty was only the most dangerous aspect of a problem, that touched every one of the annexed

¹ Bianco di Saint Jorioz, *op. cit.*, 30, 239-242, 249, 331; Ghiron, *op. cit.*, I. 373-376; Monnier, *Brigandage*, 111; BonCompagni, *Chiesa*, 71; Thouvenel, *Le secret*, II. 262; Ricasoli, *Lettere*, VI. 116.

² See below, p. 201.

states. The hegemony of Piedmont had been loyally accepted by the great mass of the nationalists. But the hegemony contained within itself hardly reconcilable theories of national growth. The nationalist movement in Piedmont had been a compromise between two very different schools. The old and narrower party, strong in the civil service and army, regarded Italy more or less as the artichoke of the historic proverb, to be won and governed and dominated by the Piedmontese; the idea of any metropolis but Turin was as repugnant to them as in 1848, and they reconciled themselves to the new great Italy by the hope that Piedmontese laws and Piedmontese ideas would be triumphant through the annexed provinces. The broader school, which the National Society had created, and which Cavour now led, knew that a little state with four millions of inhabitants could not claim everything in a kingdom of twenty-one millions, that Piedmont must more or less sink herself in Italy, that the laws and institutions of the other states must be treated with respect. To a certain extent the old school had its justification. It was, with few exceptions, the Piedmontese statesmen and the refugees trained in their school, who alone could organise a clean and capable administration. Charles Albert's Statute, as a collection of constitutional maxims, supplied a very fair foundation, on which to build up a code of law. But their views had their selfish and impossible side. The states, with their varying social conditions, their separate historic past, could not be forced into one mould. The codes of Piedmont were inferior in many respects to those of Lombardy or Tuscany or Parma or Naples. Its communal system could only be introduced with much heartburning and ill prospects of successful working into states like Tuscany or Lombardy, which boasted long traditions of vigorous municipal life. The Piedmontese bureaucracy, well trained and honest though it was, was unsympathetic and narrow and irritating, sometimes with an arrogance and pretentiousness, that overshadowed its real worth, and made it the butt of Lombard or Tuscan wit. A city in the extreme corner of Italy, with little historical or artistic association, could not be the permanent capital of

the peninsula; Milan and Florence, Naples and Palermo clung to their metropolitan honours and grudged to surrender them except to Rome.¹ There were angry cries that Piedmont was monopolizing government contracts, that hungry Piedmontese employees were thrusting themselves into fat posts, that trade and industry were flowing towards the seat of government, and leaving commercial stagnation behind in the less fortunate states.

It was facts and fears like these, that made men as diverse as Ricasoli and Crispi share a common opposition to the Piedmontese school, that made Pepoli declare in exaggerated phrase that the bureaucracy of Turin was one of Italy's greatest enemies. Rattazzi's premature application of modified Piedmontese laws into Lombardy was causing grave discontent there. Ricasoli had carried on an almost pedantic struggle to postpone their introduction into Tuscany and save a semi-independence of administration for his state.² He had obtained confirmation for the Tuscan law and the decrees of the Provisional Government; but Rattazzi's error had been repeated in Emilia and Umbria and the Marches, and was sowing the same crop of trouble there. It would have been wise to let much of the old legislation of each state live on untouched for the present, except where uniformity was absolutely needed, as in the army and electoral laws and customs' tariff. The country had been stupefied by a shower of new legislation, producing a formal unity that had no resemblance to the facts. Critics complained with justice that the sweeping changes had made a heap of ruins, which blocked any right building up of the new state. Now however the evil was done. The old laws had been roughly upset, and the best policy that remained was to pass some broad measure of local government, which would recognize a certain independence of administration, which would draw the boundary between concerns of central and local government in favour of the

¹ The population of Naples was 417,000, of Milan, 219,000, of Palermo, 186,000. The population of Turin advanced from 179,000 in 1858 to 204,000 in 1861.

² I am obliged to use this word, strictly inapplicable now, to avoid confusion with provinces in the technical sense.

latter. Cavour believed firmly in decentralization; already in July he had appointed a commission to draft a scheme of local government, and Farini, as Minister of the Interior, laid before it proposals, which perhaps Cavour himself had suggested. The essence of Farini's scheme was to form large local areas called "regions," intermediate between the province and the state. They were to be grouped round "the natural centres of Italian life," but their boundaries were not necessarily to correspond to those of the old states, lest they should encourage autonomist aspirations. They were to be administrative units only, and not even possess elective councils. So far indeed from their being made important units of local government, Farini proposed to base it more than ever on the provincial councils, which were to control main roads, rivers, public health, secondary and technical education, and the bigger charities.¹ In fact, the scheme left the conception of the regions very nebulous, and it was far from clear what powers Farini proposed to confer upon them.

So far the question had been mainly an academic one. The advocates of a strong and far-reaching state-action appealed for more centralization; the friends of *laissez-faire* upheld the regions, which would, they hoped, impede the activity and interference of the central government. The conquest of the South brought the question into practical political importance; and while it made the speculative decentralizers draw back, afraid of their own consequences, it created an eager popular demand for regional independence. The great disparity between North and South demanded that the latter should be treated with especial delicacy; to force on it a number of uncongenial laws was certain to provoke a reaction in favour of the old order, and it was the hope of minimizing the blunders of the government, that sometimes made warm friends of unity foremost in claiming local independence. In Sicily a committee, appointed by Garibaldi in the later days of the dictatorship, reported in favour of giving to the Lieutenant of each region viceregal powers, which would encroach seriously on the

¹ Farini's scheme in Cavour, *Lettere*, VI. 729; see Masserani, *Studi*, 460. Mazzini had advocated regions ten years before: *Opere*, VIII. 32.

functions of the central executive. On the mainland a "league of the interests of Naples" united federalists, republicans, Bourbonists in an endeavour to preserve the old institutions, and push the claims of Naples to be the capital. Few indeed here or elsewhere proposed any form of Home Rule; but a strong agitation grew up to develop Farini's proposals, to give each region its Lieutenant and Council, to exalt the region not only by transferring to it the more important powers of the provinces, but by making its finances and administration half independent of parliament and the central government.

It fell to Minghetti, as Minister of the Interior after Farini's appointment to Naples, to draft a new Bill. His proposals (November 1860) followed in the main the lines of his predecessor's scheme. They intended to reverse the French system by freeing both commune and province from any direct supervision by the officers of the government. The syndic was to be chosen by the communal council. The provincial councils were to be independent of the prefect, and keep practically the same extended powers as those proposed by Farini. The region took a more definite shape. It was to take over "powers usually reserved to the central authority"; regional councils, elected by the councils of the component provinces, would, in conjunction with the Governor, control higher education (including apparently the universities), national roads and larger public works, and have certain powers of legislation in respect of agriculture with the right to suggest new laws for the consideration of parliament. The Governor was almost a viceroy; he was to control the prefects, and represent the central government in many matters; and within the limits of his powers there was no appeal from his decisions.¹ But Minghetti followed Farini in not necessarily taking the old state boundaries; and he intended that the region should be experimental, perhaps have only a provisional existence long enough to allow a gentle transition from the old order to the new. The scheme was meant to

¹ Minghetti's speech of March 13, 1861; *Id.*, *Ai suoi elettori*, 7-9; Masserani, *op. cit.*, 461.

be a compromise, but it contented nobody. Its provisional character was obviously unsatisfactory. Men who had supported the regions from a hope that they would clip the powers of the bureaucracy began to fear that the new Bill would only substitute a number of petty oligarchies, inheriting the worst traditions of the old governments. The autonomists saw little value in proposals, which might divide Tuscany or merge Parma and Modena in Emilia. There was an uneasy feeling that despite Minghetti's safeguards regions might encroach on the traditional liberties of municipality and province. But the strongest opposition came from those, who feared that the region savoured too much of federalism, that it would be a dangerous stumbling-block to the consolidation of the kingdom. "Regionist" and "federalist" became synonymous terms of reproach. The rather shadowy powers of the regional councils could indeed hardly be a serious danger, but the councils themselves might easily become rallying points for autonomist agitation. And the semi-independence of the Governors, wise though it probably was, was thought to be full of peril at a time, when a strong central government seemed to many the one prime need. Even Ricasoli, despite his tenderness for Tuscan laws and institutions, thought that the regions contained the seeds of peril to the state. Cavour saw as early as December that Minghetti's scheme had no chance of acceptance, and was frightened by the outburst of autonomist feeling. He decided to abruptly retrace his steps, postpone the whole question of local government, and centralize. The administrative independence of Tuscany was taken away, despite Ricasoli's pleadings (February 14); a month later (March 20) Cavour limited that of Naples and Sicily, and carried out a long-projected design by dissolving the cabinet, and forming a new ministry of representatives of each of the old states. His policy now was to have one strong national government, in which Piedmont should have no larger share than was necessary, and silence charges of Torinese self-seeking by obtaining from parliament a resolution which recognized Rome as the future capital.¹

¹ Jacini, *Questione*, 17-18.

Meanwhile, beside the bottomless problem of Naples and the complicated settlement of the new kingdom, ran the unsatisfied aspirations for Venice and Rome, affecting the internal life of the nation at every step. For Venice, despite Garibaldi's determination to provoke an attack in the spring, it was generally recognized that Italy must wait. The unexpected resistance of Gaeta had put a strain on the military resources of the country. Garibaldi's disbanding of the Neapolitan troops and the fidelity of the remnant, that followed Francis, dispelled Cavour's hopes of doubling the Italian army by the incorporation of the Bourbon forces. The Neapolitan fleet had indeed been secured; but only some 3000 officers of the army and a very few of the rank-and-file took service under the national flag. About 4000 were all that were left of the Volunteers.¹ "It will take two years," said Cavour in November, "to organise the army, and we must have peace till then;" unless circumstances were too strong for him, he meant never to call in again the dangerous aid of France.² Much as a war with Austria might do to fuse North and South in a brotherhood of arms, he dared not risk it yet, and he pledged himself to prevent any irruption of irregular corps into Venetia. He hoped that the internal difficulties of Austria, the expense of keeping her army on a war footing, perhaps the growth of liberalism in the new Diet at Vienna would bring a peaceful solution. Another inspired pamphlet had been published by the inexhaustible La Guéronnière (December 14), advocating the sale of Venetia to Italy. The Emperor seems to have hoped that Austria would rid herself of the burdensome province, and buy Bosnia and Herzegovina with the price; but Austria would hear nothing of it, and Cavour had no liking for the project. Failing a peaceful solution, war must come some day, and he was already projecting an alliance with Prussia, and sending La Marmora to Berlin to greet the new King, and impress on the statesmen there that natural ties dictated friendship to Italy and Prussia. Despite

¹ See below, p. 216.

² Cavour, *op. cit.*, IV. 94; Chiala, *Politica segreta*, 155; Martin, *Prince Consort*, VI. 187; Salazaro, *Cenni*, 113.

official disavowals, he was encouraging the Hungarians to rise, and sending arms to Roumania; and when in May there seemed some prospect of an early Hungarian insurrection, he resolved in that event to throw prudence to the winds, and welcome French help, if the Emperor were dragged into a new war of liberation.¹

¹ Cavour, *op. cit.*, VI. 709; Chiala, *op. cit.*, 176-178; Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, V. 413; Guerzoni, *Bizio*, 300, 302; see Chiala, *Dina*, I. 358.

CHAPTER XXXIV

ITALY AND ROME

1860-61

ITALY AND ROME; anti-Catholic feeling; Cavour and the Temporal Power; the Catholic position; the Liberal clergy; THE "FREE CHURCH IN A FREE STATE"; negotiations with Rome; they break down; Napoleon III. intends to withdraw the French garrison. The elections; political parties; the government and the Volunteers; Garibaldi attacks Cavour. CAVOUR'S DEATH.

THIS however was a momentary fit of enthusiasm. Venice could wait, but every instinct of self-preservation urged the Italians to Rome. Papal territory now embraced the strip of coast between the Tuscan and Neapolitan shores, and inland for some twenty or thirty miles, including Viterbo, Tivoli, Velletri, and Frosinone. Even within this strip, which the Piedmontese troops had not entered, Viterbo proclaimed Victor Emmanuel's authority in the autumn, and Pepoli, as governor of Umbria, had occupied it, till the Emperor in spite of promises to England insisted on its remaining in Papal territory. Over this petty state the Pope still ruled, though it was recognized by everybody that his power could not survive for a week the withdrawal of the French garrison. It is true that the nationalists showed few signs of activity in Rome itself. But 5000 of their best men were in exile, the city was tight in the grip of the French and Papal garrisons, and even in spite of soldiers and police 10,000 adult males signed an address of adhesion to Cavour's policy.¹ In the surrounding towns the resent-

¹ Respecting the politics of the Romans, see Ghiron, *Annali*, I. 120-124; Further Correspondence 1860, VII. 88-89; D'Haussonville, *Cavour*, 439; Dicey, *Rome*, 24; Grün, *L'Italie*, 97; Thouvenel, *Le secret*, II. 41; Un Romano, *Sulle quistioni urgenti*, 7.

ment was strong at being abandoned to the Pope, and if the French troops withdrew for a moment, they pulled down his arms. More and more, month by month, the Italians fixed their eyes on Rome. "Without Rome Italy is nothing," said Ricasoli; "for Venice we must wait, the day will come; for Rome we cannot wait;" and D'Azeglio's appeal to give up Rome and fix the capital at Florence found no response. When Parliament met in the spring it passed an unanimous resolution that Rome must be the capital. The glory of the eternal city, what Balbo had called "the importunate memory of her past greatness" lay strong on the Italian imagination. The belief in her perennial mission made Ricasoli and Mazzini declare in almost identical language that on her possession depended the moral future of Italy. The shame of the foreign occupation chafed and angered the nation; when the Papalists claimed that the Temporal Power was necessary for the independence of the Papacy, the Italians retorted that the possession of Rome was necessary for the independence of Italy. The inhumanity, that sacrificed the Romans to serve the supposed interests of Catholicism, was felt as an insult by the whole nation, and Italy was eager to free them, as Umbria and the Marches had been freed.

The feeling turned to exasperation, when the Pope allowed the Bourbon conspirators to make their headquarters at Rome, and organise the brigand bands under Papal protection.¹ It was intolerable that Rome should be a city of refuge for the men, who were spreading crime and confusion in the South, and the Pope's unctuous patronage of iniquity was digging a gulf between the Papacy and Italy, which could never be filled up, while the Temporal Power remained, a cancer to corrupt the life-blood of the nation. Religious indifferentism was spreading fast, especially among the middle classes and artisans;² "if Italy has to choose between nationality and Catholicism," it was threatened, "she will

¹ See above, p. 190.

² Bobone, *Lettera*, 31; Balan, *Continuazione*, II. 447-480; Un Romano, *op. cit.*, 56; Perfetti, *Ricordi*, 61; Arthur, *Italy*, 159; Bianco di Saint Jorioz, *Brigantaggio*, 143; for the same in 1863 see Balan, *op. cit.*, II. 494-498; in 1866, Ricasoli, *Lettere*, IX. 124.

choose the former." The strain was acuter even than last year between the priesthood and the Liberal laity, and the complaints of libels on the church, of anti-Papal plays, of irreverence and sacrilege showed how Antonelli was shaking the faith of a Catholic nation. Freemasonry carried on a steady, silent propaganda for free thought.¹ Protestantism gained some ground, especially at Florence;² and though there was small likelihood that it would gain any large permanent hold on the country, there was a very serious prospect of schism on Reformed Catholic lines, that would equally shake the power of the Papacy in Italy.³ But Cavour knew that the question went much deeper than a quarrel between Italy and the Roman court; that the Papacy was bound to take account of Catholic feeling in France, and Spain, and Belgium as well as in Italy; that Italy could not dissociate herself from the European polity in a matter that touched every Catholic nation. He shared to the full the aspirations for Rome. He had refused to listen to the suggestion of a provisional change of capital;⁴ he had told the Emperor that he would make no terms with the Papacy, that surrendered the claims of Italy to Rome. "Rome," he had said in parliament, "must become the noble capital of regenerated Italy."⁵ He saw all the danger to the country, that came from a power in her midst, which rested on foreign bayonets; he saw all the practical gain of winning the city, whose unchallenged metropolitan rights would still the nascent rivalries of Turin and Florence and Naples. But Rome could not be won by force, while the French garrison was there. Cavour realized, as the more impatient nationalists did not, how powerful and how hostile was the opinion of Catholic Europe,

¹ Tivaroni, *L'Italia*, III. 216.

² Arthur, *op. cit.*, *passim*; Wylie, *Italy*, *passim*; Bobone, *op. cit.*, 31; *Necessità di una riforma religiosa*.

³ Pantaleoni, *Idea italiana*, 163; Passaglia, *Per la causa*, 46; Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, V. 246; VI. 142; Masserani, *Tenca*, 323; Cavour, *Lettere*, IV. 54; Siotto-Pintor, *L'Italia*, 114; see below, p. 228.

⁴ Castelli, *Carteggio*, I. 521; Id., *Ricordi*, 164; BonCompagni, *Chiesa*, 92; Alfieri, *L'Italia liberale*, 85; see below, p. 262.

⁵ Speech of Oct. 11, 1860; see Cavour, *op. cit.*, IV. 129; Artom e Blanc, *Cavour*, xxx; Monnier, *L'Italie*, 419; Pantaleoni, *op. cit.*, 48; *contra*, D'Haussonville, *op. cit.*, 439; Cantù, *Cronistoria*, III. 563.

that in France the Emperor could barely stand against it, that, if he lost his feet, the storm of Catholic hatred would be loosed on the new kingdom.

Recent events had exasperated the Papalists more than ever against both Piedmont and the Emperor. The invasion of Umbria, La Moricière's defeat, the alarm at Rome, Napoleon's double game, the desertion of the Catholic governments had spread consternation and fierce anger in the Catholic world. As each province was added to the kingdom, it had its anti-clerical laws, often more drastic than those of Piedmont. Provincial councils had been given a limited discretionary power to decide what parts of the catechism should be taught in the schools (October 1860). Pepoli, as governor of Umbria and Valerio in the Marches, acting of course under instructions from Turin, had suppressed the monasteries on lines that perhaps brought real hardship to the inmates, had legalized civil marriage (though the religious rite was still necessary), had appropriated the property of the Jesuits to found elementary schools, had taken from the bishops their ecclesiastical courts and rights of supervision over education and charities. Garibaldi had nationalized the property of the Jesuits and threatened that of Cathedral chapters in Naples and Sicily; and in February Mancini, Carignano's minister of worship, abolished the concordat of 1818, dissolved the Neapolitan monasteries (though on milder lines than Pepoli's), and took from the bishops their control of charities. Ricasoli had long been besieging the government for leave to nationalize church property in Tuscany, sell church lands, and invest the proceeds for the equalization of clerical incomes. Bishops, exiled for hostility to the government, were eating their souls in bitterness at Rome, while their properties were sequestered by the Italian authorities. Here and there sacrilege had been committed by the soldiery or the emancipated populace. The clericals asserted, though there is no evidence to prove it,¹ that immorality had grown in the freed provinces; and good feeble men, who preferred

¹ See e.g. O'Reilly, *Leo XIII.*, 221, where the Umbrian clergy speak of the "licentiousness of the theatre and the press," but can charge no immoral conduct. See below, p. 305.

the certainty of weakness to the possibility of corruption, lamented the evil works of liberty. The clerical outcry was loud. Now that the Papalist Volunteers had failed, their only hope lay in stirring Catholic opinion throughout Europe to a pitch, that would compel the governments to intervene. Beckx, the General of the Jesuits, protested in the European press. Montalembert voiced the anger of the French Catholics: "Piedmont dares everything, France allows it, Italy accepts it, Europe submits to it."

The fear of losing the last remnants of the Temporal Power touched them even more vitally than the anti-clerical legislation of the new kingdom. The recent history of Piedmont, they urged, belied her protestations of care for the Pope's spiritual authority. "Those, who are trying to destroy the Temporal Power," said the Pope, "have for their object the entire overthrow of our holy religion." There was a section indeed of less bigoted Cardinals, who saw that compromise was necessary; and a "Congregation," appointed to consider the theology of the question, had decided that the Pope might renounce his temporal dominion, if the interests of the church demanded the surrender.¹ But they were a handful among the worldly-minded men, who took their stand on "partisanship of old abuses, old rights, old principles, that recked little of the interests of religion or even of Papal government." It was a policy of suicide, that allied itself more or less to the fallen dynasties in Italy and France, in Spain and Portugal, that regarded "modern society" as the accursed thing, with which the church must always be at enmity, that was still hoping to win back Romagna, and trusting that revolution or reaction might break up the new kingdom. Had the Papacy been able to discern spirits, it would have recognized what was noble and religious in the national movement and helped to build up a god-fearing nation. But it preferred to plunge into a sad and profitless struggle, whose issues, save perhaps in far-off results, could be evil only. On the one hand was the young nation, rejoicing in its strength, proud of its achievements and its destiny; sometimes eager to throttle the enemy,

¹ Pantaleoni, *op. cit.*, 51, 100.

that lay between it and its attainment, glad, when it could not slay, to worry and exasperate; sometimes yearning for reconciliation with the power, whose influence reached to every Italian household, whose dim traditional glory cast its spell even on those who loathed it. On the other hand stood this power, with all its mighty strength for good or evil, with its mingled worldliness and timid goodness, forgetful of its mission, piteously, so piteously, blind to what was passing round it, clinging to its poor rag of earthly dominion, while it vented its screeds of impotent passion, and forgot bare morality in lust of revenge.

To the national claim of Italy the Papalists opposed the Catholic claim to the Temporal Power. The extremers of them found their arguments in theology; to them the Temporal Power was "a sacred thing, like aught else that is dedicated to God and the church;" all the church's organisation and possessions shared in the sanction that its divine origin gave, a sanction that therefore overrode any right derived from human law; the Temporal Power, if not actually a dogma, was near akin to one; and the same divine constitution, that forbade its surrender, forbade reform or religious toleration within the Pope's dominions.¹ But the wiser apologists saw that it was impossible for a church, which had shaped itself to political changes in every other country, to take its stand on *a priori* principles. Even the Jesuits acknowledged that the Temporal Power was not a dogma; it is not, said Passaglia, while still its champion, an ecclesiastical patrimony for the sole benefit of the church.² They defended it less on rights of possession or theological sanction than on arguments of practical utility. They repeated Bossuet's dictum that the Temporal Power was necessary that the Pope "may exercise his spiritual power throughout the universe in more liberty and security and peace." It was all-essential that the Pope's words and acts should be above suspicion of pressure from any government; that his election should be absolutely

¹ Mura, *Il Clero*, 101-102, 142; Id., *Questione romana*, 57, 86. See Liverani, *Il Papato*, 135.

² Passaglia, *Dialoghi*, 104-111; so Liverani, *op. cit.*, 150; and Cardinal Pecci (Leo XIII.) in O'Reilly, *op. cit.*, 200-201.

free; that there should be no danger that a hostile government at Rome might impede his free communication with the church. Ignoring how restricted even now was the Pope's independence, how much the Papacy was still the puppet of the Catholic Powers, they argued that a lay government at Rome must necessarily encroach on the Pope's spiritual liberty, that it would destroy his international position and involve him in the foreign entanglements of the Italian kingdom. Many of them recognized that to the populations, whom the Pope governed, the Temporal Power meant the denial of any free and progressive life; but with an inhumanity as great as that of the stranger, who would rather have Rome picturesque than healthy or moral, they held that an institution of Catholic right overrode the special interests of three millions, and the Romans were cynically bidden find their consolation in "contemplation and the arts, the cult of ruins and prayer."¹

The argument was a weighty one in Catholic eyes, but it was met from within the church itself. There had long been voices among the Catholic clergy, to plead for the reconciliation of the church and liberalism. Lamennais and Montalembert in France, Rosmini and Ventura and Gioberti in Italy had preached reform and recognition of modern progress, and their disciples were not a few both in the clergy and the laity.² The Jansenist school of Piedmont, the old Ambrogian independence of Milan still had their influence. The recent national movement had found its friends among the clergy everywhere. The rising in Sicily and Calabria and even at Naples had been largely a religious movement, led by priests who inherited the Southern tradition of opposition to Rome. Grief at the mad folly of the Roman court, a sense of its danger to the church, anxiety to heal the widening breach with the laity enlisted a large proportion of the clergy in the cause of compromise. How widespread the movement was, was hardly recognized as yet,

¹ See e.g. Dupanloup, *Souveraineté*, 38 *et seq.*, 75; O'Reilly, *op. cit.*, 202-205; Passaglia, *Dialoghi*, 10, 99; Mura, *Il Clero*, 96; Wiseman, *Pastoral Letter*, 24-30, who however seems to recognize the injustice of sacrificing the inhabitants.

² See above, Vol. I. p. 396; Vol. II. pp. 125, 129.

but even in Rome itself fifty of the clergy had signed the address to Cavour. To a large extent it was a movement of the lower clergy against the higher, a revolt of the half-starved parish priest against the wealthy and luxurious prelate, which sought the support of the Catholic laity against the despotism of bishop and Pope.¹ They attacked in unsparing language the folly of the excommunication, the cruelty that said to the Romans "it is a dogma or nearly one that you must be a miserable people," the unchristian fury of the bishops, that refused to make for peace and imperilled the unity of the church, that, while the whole nation was rejoicing, spent itself in selfish and sterile lamentation. The bishops, the reformers said, can only curse, they have lost the power to bless; and while the Italians are holding out their arms for reconciliation, the Papal court and its abettors spurn each overture for peace.² They attacked the apologists of the Temporal Power in their stronghold of dogma and tradition. Their leader was the Jesuit Passaglia, "an ultramontane theologian, most tender of the Pope's universal supremacy," who had helped to formulate the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, and whose erudition and devout adherence to the tradition of the church gave his writings special point in Catholic ears. Gradually, despite himself, driven into the reforming camp,³ he and his followers appealed to the Fathers and the Canonists to prove that the alleged necessity of the Temporal Power was opposed to the experience and doctrine of the earlier centuries of the church; that the Temporal Power had been violated again and again without hurt to the Pope's spiritual authority; that his oath not to surrender it had originated in a desire to guard against nepotism, and must yield to the safety of the church. They showed that it had been the church's custom to recognize *de facto* governments, that to excommunicate without gravest cause or include the multitude in spiritual

¹ *Petizione di novemila sacerdoti*; Passaglia, *Per la causa*, 30-32; Pantaleoni, *op. cit.*, 64-65.

² Passaglia, *op. cit.*, 30-46 *et alibi*; Liverani, *op. cit.*, 14, 156; Bobone, *op. cit.*, 15-21; Curci, *Memorie*, 250-251.

³ The *Dialoghi* represent his transitional period, when he was still defending the Temporal Power, but pleading for reform in the Papal States.

penalties had been condemned by the masters of Catholic tradition. The bishops, they complained, have raised an opinion to a dogma; they have closed their ears to reason, and betrayed the interests of the church by refusing the proffered freedom, which is worth more to it than all the Pope's temporal possessions. A good Pope, said Passaglia, will always be free, and the liberty of the Papacy is better served by the imitation of Christ than by the Temporal Power.

The bulk of their writings did not appear till a few months later, when the action of the Italian government had given them courage to speak. But they were already making their influence felt, and it was on their cooperation that Cavour mainly relied in his hopes to go to Rome with the consent of the Catholic world.¹ "The Roman question," he had told the Chamber in November, "cannot be solved by the sword; only moral forces can overcome moral obstacles." The sting would be taken out of the Catholic attack, if it could be shown that the abolition of the Temporal Power was compatible with a greater spiritual independence than any that the Papacy had known in modern times; and the earnest of Italy's intentions would be an offer of the widest liberties to the church. It seemed an extravagant hope that Rome could be weaned from her hostility, but Cavour threw himself into it with all the intensity of his nature. At first he viewed the religious question with political eyes; but gradually, as his great conception more and more possessed him, the religious reformer obscured the politician. To realize "a free church in a free state," "to sign a new peace of religion from the Capitol" with all its far-reaching issues for mankind, was a glorious aim, beside which the mere winning of Rome to Italy sank into the shade. He would reconcile the Pope to civilization; he would give the church fresh youth, when it had tasted the fruits of liberty; and the uprise of Italian nationality would not be barren of results to the world.² Nothing shows more the mental grasp of the great statesman, than that at a time of such tension

¹ Jacini, *Questione*, 25; see Pantaleoni, *op. cit.*, 42.

² Artom e Blanc, *op. cit.*, xxvii-xxxii; Cavour, *op. cit.*, IV. 144, 155; Castelli, *Ricordi*, 123; Tavullini, *Lanza*, I. 257-262.

and anxiety, with all the problems of the new kingdom thrust upon him, he boldly launched a scheme, which would revolutionize the relations of church and state. His daring conception was no less than an absolute reversal of the maxims which had guided the governments of Catholic Europe. It had been their policy from medieval times to bind the church with concordats and laws, which limited the Pope's authority, which made the clergy more or less dependant on the government, which gave the Catholic profession the dignity and emoluments of a state church, but made it pay dearly by the surrender of its liberty. A century ago the long struggle between church and state had culminated in the discomfiture of the former, when Joseph II. in Austria, Leopold in Tuscany, Tannucci at Naples had coerced the Papacy into concordats, which made the church a handmaid of the state. And though French experience in the present century had shown how hard it was for the state to curb a disciplined and hostile church, the safeguards of the concordats were not entirely illusory. All this Cavour proposed to sweep away, if the Papacy would surrender its Temporal Power. It was no new principle to him. He had always fearlessly applied his theories of liberty to the church;¹ and though more recently he seems to have thought that the church could only be gradually freed in a land, where Catholicism was the only creed and the habits of liberty were shallow-rooted, he now threw doubt to the winds. The church of course could not have privileges inconsistent with free government. The state would recognize civil marriage, there would be equality of law for laymen and clergy, the suppressed monasteries would not be restored, and the clergy would have no control over the state schools and universities. But, subject to the general law of the land, the church would be absolutely free in the enjoyment and control of its property, and the state would guarantee it a certain income. The Pope might exercise canonic discipline without let, provided he did not call in the aid of the civil arm, might hold synods, and correspond with the bishops. The clergy might preach and teach what they pleased in their own

¹ See above, Vol. I., p. 398.

schools and seminaries. The state would surrender its right to nominate bishops, who in future would be elected by the clergy of the diocese. The Pope would retain the nominal title of sovereign, with ample endowment for himself and his court. The Conclave would be absolutely free from governmental influence.¹

Cavour knew that his proposal would be unpopular at first; that, though a few voices had pleaded for it since Charles Albert's days, it was too sudden a reversal of policy to be easily accepted; that there would be strong prejudices against it in the universities, in parliament, in the civil service, among men who thought that a free church in a free state was "a church free to attack the free state." Especially in Piedmont and Naples and Sicily public opinion was likely to oppose any surrender of the positions, that had been won from Rome. But he was sanguine that he could convert the lay opposers. "In the next generation," he said, "the separation of church and state will be an accomplished fact, accepted by all parties;" and his own faith proved contagious. With great rapidity large sections of the laity, captured by the brilliancy of his scheme, silenced their doubts and came over to his platform. The Liberal clergy declared that it opened a new era to the church, and that the promised freedom was cheaply purchased by the loss of the Temporal Power. It is almost certain that Cavour's prestige and the merits of his scheme would have won parliament and people.

He had already embarked on his attempt to win the Papal court.² Communicating his plans to Minghetti alone in the cabinet, he entrusted Passaglia and a Roman doctor, Pantaleoni, with an unofficial mission to the more liberal Cardinals. Two of these, Santucci and D'Andrea, threw themselves warmly into the project, and others were friendly; but the majority of the Curia were still looking for help to Austria or Gaeta. At last (January 13) Santucci laid the

¹ Bianchi, *Diplomazia*, VIII. 412, 415-419, 428-433.

² Issia, *Negoziato*; Pantaleoni, *op. cit.*; Aguglia, *Questione romana*; Bianchi, *op. cit.*, VIII. 411-441; Cavour, *op. cit.*, IV. 149, 167, 171, 179, 206; Thouvenel, *op. cit.*, I. 393, 463; II. 2, 4, 7; D'Azeglio e Pantaleoni, *Carteggio*, 432-433.

scheme before Antonelli and the Pope. Pius apparently resigned himself to accept it, and Antonelli, after a last effort to persuade Austria to attack Piedmont, expressed himself in its favour. Cavour at once made direct overtures to him, and baited the proposals well. There is strong evidence that Antonelli was offered and did not refuse a mighty bribe.¹ The cardinals were to have the privileges of royal princes and seats in the Senate. Perhaps Cavour salved the Pope's conscience by offering him the suzerainty of all his former possessions, thus saving his oath to alienate no territory of the Holy See. At all events Antonelli agreed to Cavour's bases; nine cardinals had been won, perhaps frightened by the threats of schism; the Pope wavered from day to day, but at times at all events resigned himself to the unpalatable necessity. Gaeta had fallen, and Austrian help seemed remote. Antonelli was eager to be rid of the French garrison, perhaps had some dim feeling of Italian patriotism; and the Consistory might be won by the temptation of winning liberty for the church and the hope that the example of Italy would be followed by other states. The negotiations seem to have arrived at a very forward stage. But a hitch suddenly occurred, and Cavour had to experience again the "inexhaustible ruses of Roman diplomacy." It is impossible to say whether Antonelli was ever serious in his negotiations, and perhaps he had all through been playing a double game. At all events towards the end of February he suddenly broke them off. According to one version the secret oozed out prematurely, and he became convinced of the hopelessness of winning the Pope and Consistory; according to another and less probable account the Pope was the readier to accept, and sadly gave up the scheme of reconciliation, when Antonelli objected his Papal oath.² It is certain that early in March Antonelli was in

¹ Bianchi, *op. cit.*, VIII. 434; see Cavour, *op. cit.*, IV. 171, 173. Antonelli denied it *in toto*, but even the clericalist Balan (*op. cit.*, II. 325) apparently gives no credit to his disclaimer. Pantaleoni (*op. cit.*, 80) thought that Antonelli was only playing with the bribe; but if so, it was his obvious policy to publish the facts and discredit Cavour.

² Isaia, *op. cit.*, 29-34; Thouvenel, *op. cit.*, II. 7; Pantaleoni, *op. cit.* 86. Gramont knew of the negotiations as early as February 7: Thouvenel, *op. cit.*, I. 393.

treaty with the Spanish court for an intervention of the Catholic Powers; the Jesuits were working hard to prejudice the Pope against compromise; and though at Santucci's petition Cavour had hurried on matters and given his agents their credentials to negotiate formally, all hope of success had gone. Antonelli took the lead of the opposition, and the expulsion of Pantaleoni from Rome (March 21) closed one of the most curious chapters in modern history.

It is probably too early yet to dogmatize as to what would have been the result to Italy, if Cavour's scheme had been accepted. There can be little doubt that it would have been loyally observed by the government. The Papalists, indeed urged with some colour of reason that there was no guarantee that the Italians would maintain their promises, that even if the intentions of the government were genuine, its hands might at any time be forced by the extreme party. But the militant anti-clericals would have been powerless under a system, which would have reconciled Rome to Italy and brought the Catholic party into parliamentary life. Even the Law of Guarantees,¹ though administered by a parliament from which the Papalists have abstained, has been kept strictly in the letter, and if it has been broken in the spirit, it has been for sheer self-preservation from the church's unscrupulous hostility. Cavour's scheme promised advantages, which are absent from the Law of 1871. The latter was a one-sided contract, in which the state gave much, but had nothing in return. The former pledged the church to give the state its friendship, and in some directions both would have greatly gained. The power of the church would have vastly increased, as it won the neutrality or friendliness of the men, most of them the strongest of the country, whom the Pope was now driving into open hostility. And though the influence of the clergy among the peasants and the superstitious and uneducated populations of the South might have become more mischievous, it would have saved Italy much of the later friction between Vatican and Quirinal, it would have added to the stability of the state by making the strict Catholic population take

¹ See below, p. 380.

an effective part in politics. And even had the reactionary clerical party become strong in parliament, as doubtless it would have become, that would at all events have been better than the apathy and aloofness, which has allowed charlatanry to thrive. It is more doubtful whether either Cavour's scheme or the Law of Guarantees stands for the moral vitality of the nation, whether it was good that the state should alienate its right to force reforms upon the church. Cavour had a robust faith in the vitalising properties of freedom; but the religious as well as the civil interests of the country were probably best served, when the power of the bishops and the Roman court were reduced to a minimum. An endowed "free church" under discipline of Catholic strictness may mean that the laity and lower clergy may find themselves under a hard despotism of the episcopate, and that the church may be stereotyped in its worst abuses. Italy is suffering in soul and body from the moral distraction, which must come to a country where there is only one religious profession, and that one in deadly hostility to the state; and that this is her case, she probably owes in part to the Law of Guarantees.¹

Cavour's enthusiasm had obscured his estimate of success, and even Pantaleoni's expulsion did not destroy his faith that a solution would come soon. He could not believe that Rome would sacrifice her highest interests for temporal dominion or lust of revenge. A few days later he told parliament that Rome must be the capital of Italy, and publicly launched his policy of the "free church." The Chamber enthusiastically and almost unanimously passed a resolution in its favour (March 27), but Cavour at last saw that its realization was for the moment impossible, and he turned to another less perfect but more feasible solution. It seemed as if the Emperor had at last made up his mind to withdraw his troops from Rome. In spite of his official

¹ I have avoided the words "disestablishment of the church," because, though technically the same as Cavour's scheme, practically the absence of other religious bodies in Italy and the exceptional position of Rome makes the latter very different from disestablishment schemes in England.

displeasure at the invasion of Umbria, he had let it be understood that he was more angry with the Pope than with Piedmont.¹ Though he had insisted on Viterbo returning to the Pope, he had allowed the Italians to keep Orvieto. He would have rejoiced if the Pope had released him from his dilemma by flight.² Failing such happy accident, he probably thought it the lesser danger to break altogether with the clericals. He complained that Rome had become the refuge of his enemies, and his confidant Pietri branded it "a Catholic and Legitimist Coblenz." Prince Napoleon had coupled the evacuation of Rome and the Unity of Italy with the principles of 1789 as the goal of the Imperial policy; and though the Emperor's fears of free government were ever pulling him back, he had given some semblance of power to the French Chamber, and began to bid for Liberal support. He threatened the French bishops and suppressed the associations founded to collect money for the Pope. Pius was unteachable, and the Emperor, weary of the whole business, prescient of the greater troubles in store, irritated by the folly of the Papal court, was anxious to escape from Rome, if by any means he could do it without offending Catholic feeling overmuch or seeming to lower the flag of France to Italy. About the middle of April he let Cavour know that he would evacuate, on the condition that the Italian government would guarantee the Pope's present territory from attack. The Pope might maintain an army, but if after a few months' interval the Romans overthrew his government and annexed themselves to Italy by plebiscite, Victor Emmanuel might go to Rome; but it must be at the invitation of the inhabitants and not by conquest.³ It was a poor policy in the abstract to make the Romans masters of the fate of Rome. The Romans had a right to good government, but the Catholic argument had this much truth in it, that while both Italy and the Catholic world were supremely interested in the destiny of Rome,

¹ Cavour, *Lettere*, IV. 37; VI. 615. See Castelli, *Carteggio*, I. 339, 343.

² VielCastel, *Mémoires*, V. 94.

³ Cavour, *op. cit.*, IV. 212-216; VI. 701-704; *Affaires étrangères 1861*, 5; Thouvenel, *op. cit.*, II. 69, 97, 113; Ricasoli, *Lettere*, VII. 164-165, 238; Pantaleoni, *op. cit.*, 99; Bonfadini, *Arce*, 276.

that destiny could not depend on the vote of the 700,000 people, who made up the total of the Pope's subjects. It was known however, that, if the Romans rebelled, they would vote for annexation; and to the Emperor it was a convenient means of escaping responsibility by an appeal to the gospel of plebiscites. Cavour perhaps did not stop to consider how small were the chances of a successful rising at Rome; perhaps he hoped that some subterfuge might evade the clear meaning of the treaty, and saw that it was intended to give the Italians a pretext to go to Rome ere long. But at all events he recognized how unpopular any adhesion to the scheme would be; parliament and public opinion would be quick to condemn a pact, which seemed to make Italy the guardian of the Temporal Power, and the Garibaldians would make every effort to break through it. But it was better, he thought, to face the unpopularity, than forfeit the French alliance by rejecting the Emperor's proposals. The King and Minghetti, and, with much reluctance, Ricasoli agreed to support him, and Cavour undertook to sign the treaty, if the Emperor would officially recognize the kingdom, and use his influence to make the Pope renew the interrupted negotiations. Before May 10 it had been decided at Paris to evacuate at the end of June, and Cavour was confident that the Italians would have Rome in "two years at latest."¹

But again as a year before, the hopes of gaining Rome were dashed at the moment when attainment seemed certain. Cavour, beset by all the problems that fronted the young kingdom, was eager to have the support of parliament. "I always feel strongest when parliament is sitting," he said, and he hoped that its meeting would heal faction and help to settle the country. The Chamber opened (February 18) with the same enthusiasm and pride, that had marked the parliament of half-completed Unity a year ago. The ministerial majority was unbroken; the clericals were hardly represented; only some 80 Garibaldians, as the members of

¹ Cavour, *op. cit.*, IV. 231; VI. 708; Ghiron, *Annali*, II. 70; Castelli, *op. cit.*, I. 359.

the Extreme Left were now called, were returned in a Chamber of 443. Lombardy and Tuscany, Umbria and the Marches, partly no doubt owing to the use of the government's influence, sent an almost unbroken ministerial phalanx. The new Moderates, who formed it, had marched far from their political ancestry, the Right Centre of the Piedmontese Chamber. Gathered from many sources,—members of the Piedmontese Centre, converted republicans and Garibaldians, monarchical constitutionalists from the new provinces, they represented the men who had carried out Cavour's policy in the last two years, who had saved Central Italy, who had followed in the wake of the Garibaldians in Naples and Sicily and won the South for the monarchy. The timid hopes of the Moderates of the '50s had given place to a fervid belief in Italy; they were no less determined than the Garibaldians to go to Rome and Venice, but they were cautious men, who wanted to be sure of victory before they measured their strength with Austria, and hoped to win Rome without earning the ill-will of every Catholic Power. Their defect lay in their timidity; so long as they had Cavour to inspire them and lead them on, they would go far; but when his hand was removed, enthusiasm gave way to prudence, and great hopes to calculation of the cost, and masterful advance to feeble waiting upon time.

But theoretically at all events their policy was sounder than that of the Garibaldians. The Left afforded a shelter to politicians of every hue—democrats, federalists, Bourbonists,—whose one bond was opposition to the government. But the purely Garibaldian section, sent mainly from Naples, formed a tolerably compact body, strong in the prestige it had won in 1860, stronger in representing the popular impatience for Rome and Venice. Heedless of military and diplomatic difficulties, they refused to temporise or compromise. They believed it easy to repeat the happy accident of Garibaldi's Sicilian campaign, and wanted to send volunteers to prepare the way in Venetia and the Agro Romano. If the government declined to move, they claimed the right to act themselves, and repeat the dualism, which had nearly proved so fatal in the previous autumn. But dangerous as

they were in the country, as a parliamentary party they could be neglected. "They do us far less harm than the Right," said Cavour, "they stimulate us and prevent us from going to sleep." The only rock ahead for the government lay in the possible formation of a Centre opposition collecting round Rattazzi. There was still considerable strain between him and Cavour, for which both were probably to blame; and in the absence of effective party discipline, with so many deputies only too untrained and inexperienced, there was scope for his unscrupulous parliamentary adroitness, which held out one hand to the narrow Piedmontese school, the other to the Garibaldians. His close relations with the King gave him a vantage at the start. There was already a small Centre party, "the party of impotent pretensions and ruined reputations," which was anxious not to merge itself in the ministerialist ranks. There were the remnants of the old Left, who differed little in policy from the ministerialists, but retained the tradition of a purely partisan opposition. From these heterogeneous elements was gradually evolved a "Third Party," not strong numerically, and without any principle of cohesion, but individually powerful, and supported by the large section of public opinion, which, as it grew impatient at the delay in settling the country, clamoured less for new measures than new men.

But it was very difficult to shake Cavour's position. He had declared so frankly for the broader school of nationalists, for the aspirations for Rome, for placing the new provinces on an equality with Piedmont, that he had the great mass of Liberals behind him. And though, when the ministry was dissolved in March,¹ the King hoped for a moment to get rid of him, he found no encouragement, and the incident passed unsuspected by the country or by Cavour himself.² It was not easy however to make things march in the Chamber. Though the Piedmontese deputies naturally took the lead, the want of practical knowledge on the part of the new members made them waste their time in

¹ See above, p. 195.

² Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, V. 404; Mme. Rattazzi, *Rattazzi*, I. 562; Pantaleoni, *op. cit.*, 205; Cavour, *op. cit.*, IV. 197.

trifles and pedantries. It was their want of any sense of proportion that brought the question of the volunteers into a prominence altogether beyond its merits. The King had made rash promises to them at Naples, which Fanti and his brother generals had considered insulting to the army, inasmuch as they gave rank to a host of improvised and inexperienced officers. Cavour objected to the part of the King's scheme, which put the "Southern army" on a semi-independent footing, and the pressure of the ministry and the army-party together compelled the King to give way. Practically the whole of the volunteer rank-and-file took advantage of the offer, which sent them home with three or six months' pay; half of the 7000 officers came before a commission, which examined their claims to rank in the regular army, and they seem to have been fairly treated, till on April 11 an order of the government apparently put them on the retired list. The disappointed place-hunters, who had borne a desultory and inglorious part in the campaign, had long been venting their complaints; and the better volunteers smarted under the sordid depreciation of their achievements by the baser Moderates, under a disgraceful attempt to blacken Bertani's character, under D'Azeglio's intemperate and inaccurate polemics. Garibaldi had been at Caprera all the winter, brooding over his dismissal, disappointed that the volunteers had dissolved so easily. He was still loyal to the King, and for the moment had abandoned his designs on Rome and Venice.¹ But, save at rare moments, he nursed his unreasoning hatred of Cavour; he talked of shaking the dust of Italy off his feet and going to America to fight in the Federal army.² His one fixed idea was to have an "armed nation," which would sooner or later put a million men into the field to fight for Venice and Rome. If the government would not frankly undertake the task, he asked that they should at least allow him and his friends to prepare the road; to mobilize a certain number of national guards, to organise rifle-practice, to form "Committees of

¹ Mario, *Mazzini*, 420-421; *Mazzini, Opere*, XIII. lxxix.

² A few months later, according to Guerzoni, *Garibaldi*, II. 275, he was offered the command of it.

Provision" to collect money and arms. Cavour accepted or tolerated all these schemes more or less,¹ and the work of the National Society might have been repeated, but for the friction on the question of the volunteers. Early in April Garibaldi left Caprera, and after a foolish speech at Genoa, which showed small respect either for King or parliament, he made an unexpected appearance in the Chamber (April 18), fantastically dressed in his red shirt, "looking," in the words of a French spectator, "like a prophet or an old comedian." There was general anxiety as to his intentions, and Ricasoli, convinced that publicity was the wiser course, questioned him as to the notorious speech, at the same time inviting the government to explain the recent order respecting the volunteers. When Fanti in reply studiously depreciated them, Garibaldi's pent-up anger escaped, and he broke into a wild, passionate attack on the government, accusing Cavour of all but causing civil war, and protesting that he would never take the hand of one, who had made him, a denizen of Nice, a stranger in his own land. The indignation of the Chamber interrupted him, but though next day he recovered his self-control, there was no breath of compromise in his speech. His folly had stirred a bitterness as great on the other side, and a slanderous letter, which Cialdini published a few days later, only voiced the anger of army and public. But when Garibaldi challenged his assailant to a duel, the saner heads on both sides felt that the unhappy incident must be closed. Garibaldi had brought his reputation as low as after the Romagna episode, and a wise policy recommended generosity and oblivion. Cavour was now, as always, ready to be reconciled; Medici and Bixio calmed Garibaldi, who felt his mistakes, and the King intervened to bring the protagonists together. Cavour and Garibaldi met (April 24), and though the interview was cold, it was courteous and sincere, and was followed by a warmer reconciliation with Cialdini. Garibaldi retired quietly to Caprera, and wrote a cordial letter to Cavour, accepting the French alliance, and praying for the arming of the nation, that all might work together to complete the liberation of Italy.

¹ Guerzoni, *Bixio*, 290-292; *Id.*, *Garibaldi*, II. 246-249.

No one expected the terrible blow that was to fall. Cavour had been much shaken by the episode; "it has poisoned me," he said. The heavy work of the past two years had undermined his constitution; he had for some time suffered from insomnia and head trouble. At the end of May typhoid developed itself, and the blunders of his doctors doomed him. His last hours were occupied with Naples and its problems, his last testament to his friends was to "provide for the disinherited of the South." In the "sublime delirium" that followed, he protested that there might be no state of siege at Naples, and his last words were "Italy is made, all is safe" (June 6). His country was stunned by the awful and sudden blow. Strong men were crying in the streets and in parliament; and Turin was silent and mourning, as if the plague had passed over the city. In the prime of life (for he was only fifty-one years old, and was born one year after Gladstone), his guiding hand was taken away, when his country most needed it. It is impossible to calculate from how much trouble his firm wise leadership would have saved his country, had he remained at the helm another twenty years. When a nation sails in smooth waters, it may be well that no single man may have such preeminence as Cavour had. But in a time of crisis and organic change, if one great man has risen to control a nation's destinies, her welfare must only too much hang on the single life. At the moment of Italy's triumph, destiny dealt her a staggering blow.

Cavour went to his grave with his work half done. No fair criticism would charge to his account the backwash that came after him. He made Italy; the inception, the inspiration were not his; but his were the consummate statesmanship, the unbending activity, the resourceful daring, that accomplished the seemingly impossible. The stain of dishonourable means tarnishes his memory, but he never played a double game, except when it seemed an unavoidable necessity to his great goal. And if he sometimes sacrificed to his political ends the bigger ends of truthfulness and honest dealing, he helped to create a national environment, where shams thrived less and a robust virtue was possible. Des-

potism, whether in a state or village, is ever the most fruitful parent of dishonesty, and Cavour made truth and straightforwardness easier in Italy to all time. And nothing can obscure the tolerant, genial, humane spirit, which had no room for pride or pettiness, which hardly ever allowed personal rancour to guide it, which, through all its devotion to Italy, never lost sight of the bigger welfare of humanity. Cavour has often been compared to Bismarck ; but, however like their work, their methods had nothing in common, save in a common readiness to lie, when lying served their ends. But where Cavour's lies came singly, Bismarck's came in bundles. Cavour's mind was bigger, broader, juster, full of faith in humanity and freedom, of hate for tyranny and intolerance. It had none of Bismarck's scorn for others' rights, none of the cynicism, which in the name of lawless might built on the wreck of justice. Cavour brought Italy into being without a crime towards a sister nation ; and had he lived, he might have done much to save Europe from the evil, which Bismarck's contagious influence has wrought.

CHAPTER XXXV

RICASOLI

JUNE 1861—JANUARY 1862

RICASOLI PREMIER. NAPLES : Ponza di San Martino ; brigandage ; abolition of the Lieutenancies. Ricasoli and ROME ; the petition of the Liberal priests ; Napoleon III. and Rome in 1861.

THE immediate need of the country was to find a successor to its dead leader. It was not true, as D'Azeglio said, that Cavour's practical dictatorship had created a void round him, for the events of the last two years had thrown his lieutenants into positions of tremendous responsibility, and on the whole they had risen well to them. But none had Cavour's master-touch, and the dead statesman had held the threads of the whole movement so completely in his hands, his prestige and grasp of the situation had been so preeminent, that it made his successor's task one of severest difficulty. Public opinion pointed at once to Ricasoli as the man best fitted to fill his place. The King would have preferred the facile Rattazzi, but it was impossible for Rattazzi to take office, while his great opponent's ashes were hardly cold, and the love of a nation was weeping over his grave. Farini's failure at Naples, Minghetti's defeat on the regional proposals had placed both temporarily under a cloud, while Ricasoli's fame was bright with the fresh record of his triumphant statesmanship in Tuscany. His strength marked him as a man, who might control the discords; his name was a guarantee for a straightforwardness, which promised a refreshing contrast to Cavour's obliquer methods. His known repugnance to be dragged at the Emperor's heels, his keenness to win Rome recommended him to the large section of nationalists, who had been restive under what they thought

Cavour's exaggerated prudence. The anti-Piedmontese party in Tuscany and Lombardy were ready to follow the champion of provincial rights. Ricasoli indeed had many of the qualifications that were needed for a leader in a troublous time. His courage and firmness, his broadmindedness and stainless integrity pointed him out as a man made for crises. But hitherto he had been almost an absolute ruler, untrammelled by colleagues or intrigues of court or Chamber. Nobody recognized better than himself how little he was made for parliamentary life. He hated its compromises and half-measures; he was a poor debater; his brusque, monosyllabic manner contrasted unpleasantly with Cavour's genial good-humour. He was too proud to condescend to the small arts of managing a party, of disarming opposition by saying the smooth word or humouring personal vanities and ambitions. He hated to make use of a petty-minded man; he easily took dislikes, and did not conceal them. Confident in himself and in his own honesty, he tried to drive straight through obstacles, and scorned to stop and consider that intrigues were thickening and enemies increasing. And his uneasiness in his new position, together with his exceeding conscientiousness, led to a certain inconsistency of conduct. Sometimes he was ready to wreck his policy by an obstinacy, that savoured more of self-pride than heroism. Sometimes the sense of his responsibilities, perhaps a certain weariness of struggle, prompted him to a compliancy, which made Edmond About call him "a Tuscan painted to look like iron." His policy in its main lines followed Cavour's. He would have nothing of dictatorship or exceptional powers. If the government was to root itself in the respect of the country, it must work on normal and regular lines. "Better," he said at a later date, "have ten mistakes from the use of liberty than one from the interference of government." The country needed a year's quiet to consolidate itself, and order its administration and army and finance. Venice therefore must wait, opportunity and time would open the road to her. But in the march to Rome no doubt he hoped to quicken the pace, which he thought had been slowed by Cavour's deference to the

Emperor and anxiety to conciliate the Papacy. He had always shown a certain sympathy for the "Party of Action," and keenly as he hated disorder and illegality, he looked kindly on and hoped to win the men whom Cavour had often regarded as mere wreckers. The winning of Rome was the dearest part of his creed, and he was anxious to enlist every force that would rivet the hopes of Italy on her. He was a more constant Catholic than Cavour, sincerely troubled at the hurt that the folly of the Papal court was doing to the church, at the growth of irreligion that it was fostering. Tuscan though he was, he had been carried into enthusiastic belief in the "free church," and was prepared to offer Rome as good terms as Cavour had promised. If Rome was resolute to sacrifice the church to its blind hatred of the new kingdom, he prayed that Catholicism might be saved by a new schism, not of doctrine but discipline, that would purify the church of its abuses and reconcile it to Italian civilization and common sense.¹ Italy must have Rome for its capital; but he was as insistent as Cavour had been that it must be with the consent of France. His impetuosity of the previous autumn disappeared in the dry light of office; and though he protested that the future of Italy should not hang on the Emperor's lips, though he was resolute not to yield an inch of Italian soil to buy his favour, though he held himself above Cavour's finessing and perhaps used franker language to Napoleon, there was no material difference between his and Cavour's attitude towards France.

In his task of consolidating the country Ricasoli was met at the outset by the Neapolitan problem, which had troubled Cavour's later days. It was the evil destiny of the South, that when strong steady rule was needed above all things, it had no continuity of policy. The Prince of Carignano had resigned, weary of his thankless task; and Cavour just before his death had appointed to the Lieutenantancy Ponzà di San Martino, one of the shrewdest and most capable of Piedmontese administrators. Carignano's failure was set down to his hostility to the Bourbonists, and San Martino's policy was to win them by conciliation. He hoped that the

¹ Ricasoli, *Lettere*, VI. 17; Bonfadini, *Arese*, 289.

honest men of all parties, Bourbonists, Liberals, Garibaldians, would close up their ranks in front of the anarchy, that threatened the whole civilization of the South.¹ Naples, he believed, might be taught to govern itself, and with the fostering of trade and alleviation of the misery of the masses, the roots of discontent would be cut in two. It was an impossible task at the moment. The Bourbonists took his overtures as a sign of weakness and doubled their intrigues; and the animosity between them and the Liberals was too strong to permit of cooperation. There was no confidence in the government or its employees. San Martino was indeed to a certain extent successful in grappling with the corruption. The bread-dole was stopped at Naples; some dishonest officials were brought to justice; the taxes were better paid, and many of the disbanded soldiers responded to the order to re-enlist. Peruzzi developed a scheme of public works—roads, railways, reclamation,—which were more needed than any new laws. With time San Martino might have gone far to settle the country; but the folly of the Turin government snatched his chance away. The one pressing need was to stamp out brigandage, and this could only be done by a display of military force, for which the 5000 men under Giacomo Durando's command were quite insufficient. But the petition for more troops was promptly rejected by Fanti; and when after Ricasoli's accession San Martino repeated the demand, he had for only answer the supersession of Durando by Cialdini, with powers largely independent of himself. It was too sounding a rebuff, and San Martino in self-respect resigned (July 12).

Cialdini had none of San Martino's long administrative experience, but he had the qualities, that could fascinate an impressionable people. The "Garibaldi of the regular army," his soldierly figure, his daring, his keen insight had made him its idol; and his person and manners won him prestige and sympathy at Naples. Completely reversing San Martino's policy, he threw himself on the support of the Garibaldians. His object was to unite all the Liberal sections in order to crush the Bourbonists. He probably intended to

¹ Revel, *Da Ancona*, 183.

throw over the advanced wing, when the alliance had done its work;¹ but at all events for the moment he pursued the Garibaldians with caresses, and they were allowed to mobilize national guards, which might operate against the brigands and hope perhaps to grow into a new volunteer army. The distress at Naples was relieved by public works; and though Spaventa had resigned, the war against the *camorra* went on, and the office-hunters were checked by the publication of their names. Tenderness to the Bourbonists changed to severity. Carignano's leniency had encouraged them to hardly concealed conspiracy, and it is probable that a plot was maturing at Portici to seize Naples and proclaim the fallen dynasty. The new Lieutenant struck hard; a score of nobles were arrested and kept in prison, though there was no sufficient evidence to convict them; and the archbishop with many of his clergy was forced to flee the country.

Meanwhile Cialdini had been hunting down the brigandage, that had broken out again here and there throughout the South. Though it fought in Francis' name, and claimed Papal patronage, it was no more reputable than before; recalcitrant soldiers of the Bourbon army escaping from the enlistment order, peasants recruited by the priests at Rome, ex-criminals, *cafoni*,² adventurers of all nations repeated the same tale of plunder and arson and murder. Pinelli dispersed them in the Terra di Lavoro; in the Avellino district the national guards and the mobilized Garibaldian corps drove them back to the mountains; and Cialdini, occupying the passes into Puglia, cut their communications. The national guards cleared Calabria; Pinelli cut up another band in the Capitanata. When a band near Benevento massacred with unutterable atrocities a small detachment of infantry at Pontelandolfo (August 7), the soldiers, who found their comrades' dismembered bodies hung up in the streets, took a natural revenge by burning out the brigands' haunts. By the end of August Ricasoli boasted that true brigandage, apart from isolated outrages, was extinct. Suddenly it blazed up again under the leadership of José Borjés, a

¹ Nisco, *Cialdini*, 242-244, 247.

² The poorest class of agricultural labourers, especially in Calabria and the Basilicata.

Catalan, imported by the Bourbon leaders, who were always careful not to adventure their own lives. Borjés was an honest enthusiast for the legitimist cause, a generous brave man by the confession of his enemies, the only brigand-leader who showed any military or political capacity. He landed in Calabria with a few Spaniards, to find the inhabitants indifferent or hostile. He crept along the mountains, footsore and half starved, hard beset by the troops and national guards, sickened by the evil doings of the few brigands who gathered round him. Tracked like a wild beast from the Basilicata to the Abruzzi, he escaped from the seven bodies of troops upon his trail by desperate marches, that recalled Garibaldi's retreat in 1849. He had almost reached the frontier, when he was hunted down by the *bersaglieri* near Tagliacozzo, and shot (December 8).

The repression of the brigands had been attended by inevitable severity. It is impossible to reconcile the conflicting estimates¹ of the brigands that were shot fighting or in cold blood, but they ran at all events to several hundreds, possibly to two or three thousand; and sometimes the soldiers, maddened by the nameless atrocities of the banditti, had in spite of their officers got out of hand and made savage reprisals. The victims deserved small pity, for brigandage had been a criminal and anarchist movement, whose political mask was too transparent to deceive. It was better that they should be exterminated, that even a few innocent men here and there should be involved in their fate, than that every little town in the South should be liable to pillage and arson, that men and women should go in danger of outrages worthy of a Turkish soldiery. The troops, ill-backed, often thwarted by the civil authorities, deserved more sympathy than censure in their task of protecting life and property from gangs of miscreants. But the outcry against their reprisals was a welcome weapon to the enemies of the new kingdom. It was easy to contrast the numbers of the

¹ Compare Bianco di Saint Jorioz, *Brigantaggio*, 395-396, with Hansard's *Debates*, CLXX. 1461; Ulloa, *Presenti Condizioni*, 39; and Tivaroni, *L'Italia*, II. 372. See also Correspondence—South Italy; Hansard's *Debates*, CLXI. 709; CLXIV. 1863.

slain brigands with the handful that had fallen in the Bandiera expedition or when the Swiss sacked Perugia. The magistrates and officials attacked their military rivals, who had the courage to do what themselves had shrunk from. The government, whether necessarily or not, had stepped outside the law to cow the Bourbonists, and kept hundreds of suspects in prison, often when they had been acquitted by the courts. To a surface criticism, which ignored the true nature of brigandism and forgot that the great majority of the population had received the new rule gladly, it seemed as if Naples had exchanged one set of tyrants for another. Brigandage was distorted into evidence of the feelings of the majority, and D'Azeglio, indiscreet as ever, wrote that "the Neapolitans do not want us, and we have no right to stay there."¹ It was in vain that Ricasoli pointed out that brigandage was a hereditary scourge, that it was at best agrarian in its character, that the measures of repression, mild compared with those of Manhès in Joseph Bonaparte's time, were necessary to protect the great mass of peaceful inhabitants. The Bourbonists dinned the severities into the ears of Europe, and the Emperor, who had already allowed the Papal authorities to supply the brigands with arms, suddenly displayed an absurd and insincere tenderness for them. Even Ricasoli was moved, and blamed Cialdini for his refusal to bring the Bourbonist leaders to trial. Both men were too autocratic to agree, and the personal friction became acute. It was in vain that an almost unanimous consensus of opinion at Naples represented the danger of Cialdini's withdrawal at a time when brigandage was only suppressed for the moment and confidence in the central government was still so weak. At a moment of great danger Cialdini had arrested the reaction and won for himself affection and prestige, which were more likely to attach the Neapolitans to the government than a sheaf of new laws. But Cialdini, like San Martino before him, found his position made impossible by the constant meddling from Turin; he himself thought that the only road out of the

¹ The letter was published without his consent: D'Azeglio e Pantaleoni, *Carteggio*, 439. He regretted writing it: Castelli, *Carteggio*, I. 385.

friction between Turin and Naples was to abolish the Lieutenancy and bring the administration of the South under the direct orders of the central government. In the middle of October he sent in his resignation.

The abolition of the Lieutenancies had been hurried on by Ricasoli. He had always recognized the dangers of the regional scheme, and his tenderness for Tuscan autonomy had been more a sentimental jealousy for Florentine traditions and his own recent work there, than part of a thought-out scheme of national settlement. None the less his passage to the extreme centralizing camp marked a great and rapid change of opinion, which he did not attempt to conceal. Tenure of office had convinced him of the paramount need to make the whole administration dependant on one centre, to prevent the Lieutenancies from adopting policies counter to that of the government, to give a single direction to the march of the nation. His proposals for local government were a close adaptation of the French prefectures. The Lieutenancies of Naples and Sicily and the Government of Tuscany disappeared; and Italy was divided into fifty-nine provinces, each under a Prefect with extensive powers, but directly subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior. He found little support from his colleagues and strong opposition from Minghetti and Lanza. But he had the King behind him, and he coerced the cabinet into a reluctant consent (October 9).

More even than quiet in the South, more than any question of local government, the security of the country demanded a solution of the Roman question. There was little hope that the Italians would settle down to sober patient progress, while they were denied their capital, and the enemy in their midst sowed strife and passion. The shameless encouragement of brigandage at Rome, the readiness of the Pope and his government to throw honesty and morality to the winds, if only they could raise up trouble for the new kingdom, made the possession of Rome an importunate need. Had the French government compelled the Pope to observe the barest rules of political morality,

Italy might have been content to wait. But she could not sit patient, while she had within her borders an enemy, who knew no scruples, who patronized outrage and arson and murder, who was stirring the clergy to revolt throughout the kingdom, and striving to reduce it to anarchy.

Ricasoli was prepared to accept either of Cavour's two solutions—the "Free Church" in exchange for a surrender of the Temporal Power, or the Emperor's later proposals for the withdrawal of the French garrison and deferred possession by the Italians. But the first solution was made impossible by Rome's non-possumus. Ricasoli indeed made fresh overtures, almost repeating Cavour's proposals;¹ but dear as their success was to him, he seems to have had little faith in their chances, and the Papal court naturally looked askance at the man, who had threatened it with schism. His offers indeed drew out a remarkable demonstration from the nationalist clergy; 9000 or more (they were about one in nine of the secular clergy) sent a petition to the Pope, praying him to restore peace between the church and Italy.² But nothing could thaw the obduracy of Rome. The irreconcilables, who followed De Mérode, the militant Belgian prelate who was Minister of War and Antonelli's rival, still dreamt of recovering Umbria, and they had the Pope's ear. With unblushing perversity they distorted the controversy into a fight for morality and religion, and the priests were told that their oath of fidelity to the church prevented them from acknowledging the government. Passaglia had to fly from Rome; the priest, who confessed Cavour on his deathbed, was haled before the Inquisition; every act of sordid oppression was employed to frighten into submission the clergy who had signed the address.³

The possession of Rome with the Pope's consent proved

¹ Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VI. 93, 158-160; Bianchi, *Diplomazia*, VIII. 708.

² *Petizione di novemila sacerdoti*; 8176 seculars and 767 regulars signed, and apparently a considerable number more signed independent petitions; Curci, *Vaticano regio*, 253, puts the total number of signatories at 12,000.

³ *La curia romana, passim*; *Du père Passaglia*, 65; Bobone, *Lettera*, 11; Curci, *op. cit.*, 159-160, 254-255; Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VI. 30, 37, 78, 103, 211; Paya, *Cachots du Pape*, 49 et seq.; Ghiron, *Annali*, I. 150-153; see Balan, *Continuazione*, II. 386-387.

impossible, and Ricasoli turned to the more imperfect but more feasible task of persuading the French to withdraw, even if it were on terms that forbade an immediate march to Rome. If only the French garrison left, he would be content to wait a time, glad to have escaped from the baleful connection with France, and trusting that a spontaneous rising of the Romans would give Italy her capital ere long.¹ At the moment of Cavour's death the Emperor was pledged to leave, but either because he did not trust Ricasoli to respect Papal territory, or because Catholic pressure at home had grown too threatening, he began to raise quibbles as soon as the new premier took office. After Cavour's death he officially recognized Italy (June 15), but he wrote testily to Victor Emmanuel, that he should stay at Rome as long as the Pope's remaining territory was menaced with invasion. He was at heart anxious as ever to withdraw, but French opinion declared more and more stiffly for the Pope and against Italy. The clericals, undeterred by the threats of the government, were agitating every church organisation to prejudice her cause, many of the Liberals were hardly more friendly, the Empress was bitterly hostile, and Napoleon stood almost alone in wishing well to the new kingdom.² He dared not risk the storm by abandoning the Pope, unless he could sooth the French conscience by adding a new jewel to the Empire. There is little doubt that he hoped to drive a hard bargain with Italy, and persuade her to exchange Sardinia for Rome. But Ricasoli would not listen for a moment to the tempter, and Palmerston was prepared to fight rather than let the island fall into French hands.³ Baffled in this, the Emperor thought it necessary to temporize, till opinion at home blew more propitious, or some happy accident freed him from the chain he had bound round himself. Pius was not expected to live long,

¹ Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VII. 52; X. 196-197; see Bonfadini, *op. cit.*, 289.

² Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VI. 21, 37, 86, 122; VielCastel, *Mémoires*, V. 116, 132; Castelli, *op. cit.*, I. 354, 359. I do not know to what phase of the Emperor's policy to refer La Guéronnière's *La France, Rome, et l'Italie*; according to Thouvenel, *Le secret*, I. 433, it was not inspired by the Emperor.

³ Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VI. 10, 12, 27, 62; see *Affaires étrangères 1861*, 8-9; Bouillier, *Un roi*, 279.

and Napoleon hoped to escape from his dilemma by securing the election of a Pope, who would be more ready to compromise. In the meantime he had no intention to hurry matters. Delay suited his constitutional indecision; he was still more or less irritated with Italy, because she had accomplished her Unity in his despite; Ricasoli's language offended him; he dreaded the wave of Liberalism, that might pass across the Alps to France. Either from petulance or to humour the clericals, he showed his teeth. Using the handle that D'Azeglio's letter gave him, he professed to believe that the kingdom was in danger of disruption,¹ and allowed Goyon, the French commander at Rome, to insolently refuse the Italian overtures for combined action against the brigands.

Ricasoli grew more and more impatient. He did not expect the Pope's early death; he found it increasingly difficult to hold back the inhabitants of Papal territory from rising, especially at Viterbo; the difficulties of fusing North and South made it more imperative than ever to move the capital to Rome; and he knew that public opinion would soon demand some strong measure, which might mean rupture with the exasperating ally. But not many weeks passed before the Emperor began to veer again. He knew the danger of losing Italian sympathy; he suspected the Catholic societies of plotting against himself, and the Bishop of Poitiers had compared him to Pilate; the French Liberals were rapidly gaining strength and confidence, and he saw the need of throwing them a sop. Benedetti, a known friend of Italian unity, came as ambassador to Turin (August 25), and Lavalette was sent to Rome to spur Goyon to repress the brigands. Still however the Emperor would make no promises, and at the end of October he flatly declined to leave Rome during the Pope's lifetime. But there were men around him, who saw more clearly than he did the danger that lay in his feeble policy of waiting on chance. Prince Napoleon proposed that Italy should offer to respect Papal territory for the present, if the Pope would grant a constitution and promise to follow its foreign policy, and

¹ Bonfadini, *op. cit.*, 298; see Cantù, *Cronistoria*, III. 604.

that whether he accepted or refused, the French garrison should leave at once. Fresh instructions, indifferently obeyed, were sent to Goyon to prevent the brigands from crossing the frontier, and in the middle of January (1862) the Emperor seems to have decided to insist that the Pope should come to terms with Italy and allow the French to evacuate, on condition that Italy guaranteed his territory from invasion by irregular bands.¹ Ricasoli was puzzled whether to accept the French terms; sometimes, weary and hopeless, he was inclined to wait for the Pope's death, provided that Francis were expelled from Rome and the brigands' depots broken up. And his own power was shaken, and he was compelled in spite of himself to turn his mind to the intrigues, that were threatening to drive him from office.

¹ Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VI. 235, 264, 266, 275, 299; *Affaires étrangères* 1862, 34-35; De Cesare, *Scialoja*, 182-184.

CHAPTER XXXVI

ASPROMONTE

OCTOBER 1861—DECEMBER 1862

Ricasoli and Venice. The cabal ; and Garibaldi. Ricasoli and the democrats ; Ricasoli and Garibaldi ; Ricasoli resigns. RATTAZZI AND GARIBALDI ; Garibaldi in Lombardy ; Sarnico ; Garibaldi at Palermo ; "Rome or death" ; the government and Garibaldi ; ASPROMONTE. Napoleon III. and Rome in 1862. Rattazzi resigns.

It was an essential part of Ricasoli's policy that Rome should take precedence of Venice. He was willing indeed, despite some scruples as to national dignity, to buy Venetia, and he would gladly have seen the Powers persuade Austria to take Bosnia and Herzegovina in exchange. He knew that Italy was unprepared to fight her singlehanded, and only in the event of a serious Hungarian rebellion would he consent to fight before 1863. In that case he was willing to court an European war, and help France to the Rhine in exchange for her assistance in Venetia. Otherwise the struggle must be postponed. Not till the finances had improved and the Italian army was organised, till brigandage was put down and the Roman problem in train for settlement, should Italy think of war. "A perfectly quiet '62 and something big in '63" was his programme. The postponement of the Venetian question might also serve to win the moral support of England, which would balance the French influence and perhaps secure the recognition of the kingdom by Prussia and Russia. Palmerston had counselled a waiting policy, and Ricasoli was anxious not to alienate him by rejecting the sensible advice.¹

¹ Ricasoli, *Lettre*, VI. 8, 337, 339, 423 : VII. 26, 52. Palmerston wished to see the Temporal Power entirely destroyed ; Lord John Russell would have temporarily left the Leonine City to the Pope.

But there were strong forces making for an early war. Victor Emmanuel, no doubt from patriotic motives, had long cherished the idea of taking a large part in Italian politics outside the official working of his ministers. Cavour had kept him more or less in check, but he grew restive under Ricasoli's hand. He had set his heart on an attack on Venetia in 1862. It was partly that he wished to postpone the Roman question; he "did not want to go to Rome now or for some time yet"; and though in the autumn the strength of the cry for Rome impressed him, he still thought that Venice should have precedence. He secretly fomented an agitation for war, encouraged the Hungarian exiles, and negotiated privately with the Emperor for French help.¹ He made no attempt to conceal his intentions from his premier, and when he found Ricasoli resolutely opposed, prepared to cabal actively against him. He had little liking for the austere Puritan, who lived in a moral world so different from his own, and treated King and subject with the same cold unbending dignity. He found a ready agent in Rattazzi, to whom intrigue was as the breath of his nostrils. Rattazzi was no doubt disappointed at Ricasoli's accession to power, angry that the premiership should be in the hands of one, who openly avowed himself the admirer and disciple of Cavour; at the bottom of his heart he distrusted the forward programme, and would gladly have seen the possession of both Rome and Venice indefinitely postponed.² No doubt his policy had a true side to it; long peace and retrenchment were necessary to restore the finances and put the administration in order, and Rattazzi's narrow lawyer mind was incapable of appreciating the sentiment, which made Italy weigh all else as naught in the balance compared with Rome and Venice. It is impossible however to believe that Rattazzi was mainly moved by patriotic principles in his attack on Ricasoli. At one time perhaps he could have been won by a seat in the cabinet. Personal ambitions, sheer love of caballing, a courtier's deference to the King weighed more with this man

¹ Ghiron, *Primo re*, 185; Massari, *Vittorio Emanuele*, 386, 388; Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VI. 300, 304, 363; VII. 28. See however Ghiron, *Annali*, I. 126.

² Mme. Rattazzi, *Rattazzi*, I. 589.

"of little ideas and little intrigues," and urged him to strange ventures and a game, whose winning meant dishonour.

The Emperor made the third member of the cabal. His views as to Venice seem to have been shifting and irresolute. He too, like Ricasoli, would have been glad "to liquidate the Italian question in the East" by an exchange of Venetia for the two Balkan provinces. But if this were impossible, and Venice could only be won by war, he found it difficult to balance the gain and loss. The condition of French finances made him anxious to avoid war at present, and his uncertain relations with Prussia counselled an humouring of Austria; on the other hand a war in Venetia would divert Italian thought from Rome, and give him time to find a solution there. What reply he actually sent to the King is uncertain; it would seem on the whole that he discouraged war, though he did not absolutely refuse help.¹ But at all events he was ready to encourage the conspiracy against Ricasoli. He knew, no doubt, that Ricasoli in his unofficial days had never concealed his dislike; he must have felt that the premier's honourable nature consorted ill with "his own subterranean schemings. Perhaps he thought that Ricasoli in office meant that English influence was more powerful at Turin than his own; possibly he hoped that with Rattazzi in power he might get Italian countenance for an adventurous policy in the East."² Benedetti, the new ambassador at Turin, was allowed, probably encouraged, to intrigue for Ricasoli's fall, and on the Emperor's repeated invitation Rattazzi went to Paris in October. Promises were made, whose nature can only be conjectured; it is probable, that though the Emperor held out no hopes of an early advance to Rome or Venice, he promised to use his influence to obtain the recognition of the kingdom by Prussia and Russia and some settlement at Rome, which seems to have included the suppression of brigandage and the withdrawal of the French garrison.³ On Rattazzi's return

¹ Mme. Rattazzi, *Rattazzi*, I. 607-608; Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VI. 31, 39, 300, 333, 356; Thouvenel, *Le secret*, II. 211.

² Castelli, *Carteggio*, I. 413, 415; Cordova, *Discorsi*, I. 138.

³ Castelli, *op. cit.*, I. 401, 416-417, 424; Arrivabene, *Italy*, II. 404; Nicotera's speech of November 25, 1862; Taxile-Delord, *Second Empire*, III. 185.

the cabal went on with redoubled vigour. But the King, however regardless of the spirit of his constitutional oath, was careful to observe it in the letter. Rattazzi undertook to try to get Ricasoli defeated in parliament, and give the King the excuse to dismiss him. He knew that Ricasoli's position was too strong for himself to overthrow. But he had used and thrown aside Garibaldi at the end of 1859; and he might repeat the manœuvre, and win for the cabal the glamour of the ex-dictator's name. Since his unfortunate appearance in parliament in April, Garibaldi had led a secluded life at Caprera, sometimes with moods of confidence in the government and protesting that he would "never compromise Italy by provoking a war with France"; more often fretting for action in his isolation, surrounded by mischief-makers, who poured acid on his smarts and urged him to desperate courses. His own inclinations were to attack Rome before Venice, partly because he wished to complete his unfinished project of 1860, partly because Mazzini favoured the rival scheme. Mazzini knew the hopelessness of attacking Rome while the French were there, and his imagination saw Hungary and Bohemia at the point of revolution and Venice ready to fall an easy prey. The democrats were distracted by the rival policies, distracted too by a split between the semi-republican section, which claimed the right to push a forward programme independently of the government, and the frankly monarchical party, which was reluctant to break with parliament. A conference of the two sections at Genoa (December 15) laid the foundations for their fusion into a "Liberation Society"; and Garibaldi, accepting its presidency, apparently resigned his designs on Rome and gave his sanction to an agitation for an attack on Venetia.

The conference, which was likely to meet in greater strength in March, alarmed the Moderates, and they clamoured for its suppression. It had its dangers, for to a certain extent it was a rival of parliament. But Ricasoli saw the mischief of driving the agitation beneath the surface; he knew the worth of its impulsive patriotism; however suspicious of their ulterior designs, he refused to

interfere with the democratic meetings, so long as they kept within the law, and sanctioned the rifle-practice clubs, which were chiefly promoted by the democrats. He saw that the plan of Minghetti and the Moderates to stamp out the extremists was as impossible as it was ungenerous. The extremists thrived on injustice; Mazzini in exile, Garibaldi neglected in his hermitage would always be a flag of agitation, and he believed that nothing would do more to take the sting out of the democratic attack than the repeal of Mazzini's outlawry. He had no hope of winning Mazzini; sincerely as he respected him, he knew him to be too inflexible and unteachable; but he foresaw that Mazzini without the halo of martyrdom would be a spent force, and he was ready on conditions to sign the decree of amnesty.

He hoped for more positive advantage if he could conciliate Garibaldi. Garibaldi's natural inclination was to follow the King; the danger lay in the influences that surrounded him at Caprera and the possibility that his unbalanced impressionable will might hurry him into some foolish and irretrievable action. If Ricasoli could occupy him and divert his mind from its prejudices and suspicions, he might save him from ruining himself and keep his reputation bright for the day of struggle. The need for such action became imperative, when he learnt from his agents that Rattazzi was intriguing at Caprera. He knew enough of what was going on round him to fear the worst mischief from the unscrupulous caballer. Rattazzi appears to have made a secret visit to Garibaldi, and whatever were the exact promises given, he left behind him the belief, that if he came into power, he would sooner or later, attack Venetia, and help Garibaldi to lead an expedition to some point in Eastern Europe, whence he could harass Austria in the rear.¹ Ricasoli knew that Garibaldi's hopes once raised, he would be impatient for action; that if the government refused to move, he would plunge into a foolhardy raid into Venetia or Dalmatia, which would set Europe ablaze, and

¹ See Appendix F; and Chambers, *Garibaldi*, 179; Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VII. 13, 28; D'Haussonville, *Cavour*, 429.

drag Italy into a life-or-death struggle, for which she was quite unprepared. The only remedy was to win his confidence in the ultimate intentions of the government, to persuade him to wait till it gave the signal, and busy him meanwhile with the rifle-practice clubs. But his overtures failed to dislodge Rattazzi's influence, and Garibaldi was eagerly awaiting the moment, when a change of ministry would give the forward movement its chance.

The cabal had caught the unwary Garibaldi in its meshes; it only remained to shake Ricasoli's position in the Chamber. As soon as parliament met in November, it was clear that trouble was brewing for the ministry. The cabinet, substantially the same as Cavour's last, was not a strong one; both in it and in the party there were deep divisions of opinion, and Minghetti had resigned in September, mainly because of his opposition to the new policy of centralization. The Right, unable to rise above its exclusiveness and conservatism, was irritated and frightened by Ricasoli's tolerance of a labour movement in Tuscany and Emilia and his increasing friendliness to the democratic Committees. The Piedmontese section of the ministerialists approached Rattazzi, and Rattazzi was openly fomenting every element of opposition. There was plenty of matter for an attack—the new policy of centralization, the administrative chaos, the unsettlement in the South, the recall of Cialdini, the inconclusiveness of the negotiations respecting Rome. It was probably hinted that, if Ricasoli left office, the Emperor would be more ready to meet Italian demands. The storm broke on the question of the government's tolerance of the Committees of Provision. The Chamber abstained from a hostile vote, but the debate showed plainly that Ricasoli had lost his majority. He was powerless to stand against the disreputable intrigue. For a time he disdained to verify the reports that reached him of the plots maturing round him. In his scorn of finesse and management he made no effort to conciliate the leaders of the majority, and all the prayers of his friends were powerless to move him. He was too aloof, too impatient of pettiness to be a parliamentary leader, and his

incapacity to control the Chamber gave a certain excuse to the cabal. The King snatched at the opportunity to get rid of the unobsequious minister, who stood in the way of his own chaotic schemes. As early as December Ricasoli had told him bluffly, that he could not stand against "intrigues of palace and street," that the King must frankly choose between him and Rattazzi. But he dreaded the dangers into which Rattazzi and the King would plunge the country; he wanted "to save the crown from the consequences of its own follies," and so long as parliament was with him, he refused to resign except at a formal request from the throne. But towards the end of February he realized that he had lost the support of the Chamber, and he determined to retire. The King eagerly accepted his resignation (March 1), and with wanton injustice taunted him with being false to Cavour's policy and pandering to the Extreme Left. Rattazzi had his reward, and without reference to the feelings of the majority, was entrusted with the formation of the new cabinet. The pettiness and folly of the Moderates, the unscrupulousness of the King and Rattazzi, Ricasoli's own honourable but unpractical obstinacy had brought the country into new and perilous waters.

The danger lay in this, that Rattazzi and the King had called up the revolutionary spirit, that Cavour and Ricasoli had laid with so much trouble, and put Italy at the mercy of Garibaldi's reckless impulses. Rattazzi had a confident trust in his own finesse, and believed that he could always at need call the Revolution to heel. But his small intrigues were powerless to ride the whirlwind, where Cavour's masterful spirit had been at home. How explosive was the situation, which he and the King had created, was seen at once. Garibaldi had already landed at Genoa (February 25), when Ricasoli resigned, and as soon as he heard of Rattazzi's appointment, hurried to Turin, and returned enthusiastic with the hopes that Victor Emmanuel and the new premier had given him. The promises of the winter were no doubt repeated and reinforced. What they were must still be more or less matter of conjecture.¹ There can be no doubt

¹ See Appendix F.

that Rattazzi talked in general terms of arming the nation and completing the unity of Italy; but the wary politician probably committed himself to no definite plan beyond the mobilization of a few national guards, and Garibaldi owed it to his own imaginative mind, if he interpreted Rattazzi's vague allusions to imply an early struggle for Venice and perhaps for Rome. There can however be equally little doubt that Rattazzi, acting probably at the instigation of the King, encouraged Garibaldi with promises of arms and money to some knight-errant adventure in the East. But in this strange tragi-comic conspiracy, whose phases varied with the humours of two undisciplined minds, the expedition had no settled destination. Sometimes it was Dalmatia, to help an expected Hungarian rising; sometimes it was Greece, where King Otho's subjects had revolted, and where perhaps Victor Emmanuel hoped to see his son Amadeus on the throne. But through the changing projects there probably always ran the idea, dear alike to the King and Garibaldi, of draining the strength of Austria by encouraging her eastern provinces to revolt. The moment seemed opportune, for there was ferment in Roumania and Montenegro and Dalmatia, and the constitutional struggle in Hungary might at any time lapse into revolution.

Meanwhile Garibaldi seemed master of the government. He was made president of the rifle-clubs, as Ricasoli had proposed before his fall; his son Menotti was given a regiment of mobilized *carabinieri*,¹ ostensibly to attack the brigands; the volunteers (there were barely 3000 left) were incorporated into the regular army, and though Garibaldi was irritated by the measure, it was still more disliked by the military party, and was doubtless meant to please him. At Turin he was caressed by all, the cynosure of the capital; his prestige was still very great, and with the favour of the government at his back, his popularity carried all before it. At the state's expense he was sent with designed parade to Lombardy on the ostensible mission of organising the rifle-clubs. His progress through the Lombard cities was almost a royal one; officials and priests and nobles vied in doing

¹ Mounted police on a semi-military footing.

him honour, and the populace made ovation to "the poor man's king." Everywhere the crowds shouted for Rome and Venice, and Garibaldi was lavish of promises that to Rome and Venice they should go, and sang the praises of the "sacred carbine." Sated with flattery, taking the melodrama of patriotism for enduring resolve, he fancied himself in all but name dictator, able to force the government, willing or unwilling, into war, and perhaps not disliking to show his independence of it by taking up the cry ~~for~~ Rome.

Rattazzi had gained his end in so far as he had won the reflected glory of Garibaldi's popularity. It secured for him the tolerance of parliament, and the adhesion of the democrats, whose strength after the Lombard demonstrations he and all Italy exaggerated. Perhaps too he hoped to play off Garibaldi against the Emperor's exigences, and allow himself to claim, that popular pressure and the danger of revolution made it the interest of both governments to satisfy the national aspirations for Rome. But the Lombard progress had been a little too successful. There was the same danger as in 1860 that the King's prestige would be eclipsed, and it was high time for the crown to score a point in the game. The King was sent to Naples (April 28), where the French fleet and Prince Napoleon came to salute him, and he found an enthusiastic reception, in which Garibaldi seemed for the moment forgotten.¹

Meanwhile Garibaldi had gone to Trescorre, in the middle of the valleys that lead to the Tyrol, on the pretext of taking the baths. His real purpose was to organise an expedition, and though the government made painful professions of ignorance, Garibaldi and his friends did not attempt to conceal that an expedition was preparing. What was its objective? It is impossible to believe that Garibaldi went to the borders of the Tyrol to prepare operations in Dalmatia or Greece. The most probable hypothesis is that Garibaldi was encouraged by his Lombard reception to take a bolder line of his own; that his friends suggested suspicions

¹ The Canons held an expiatory service in the Cathedral after the King's visit, but kept his alms: *Lettere ad A. Panizzi*, 457

of Rattazzi's motives in wishing to send him on a far-off adventure; that he believed that if he made a raid into Venetia or the Tyrol, the country and the government were bound to follow him. He knew that everybody was trying to manage him, and he hated to be managed. His victories of 1860, due to a conjuncture of circumstances not likely to be repeated, were a fatal instance, which vitiated his reasonings. And though Rattazzi seems to have discouraged the new venture, and the King's remonstrances turned him for the moment back to his original plans, it is probable that he found some backing from Depretis, who was now in the cabinet, and, on whatever understanding, got a renewal of the promise of arms and money.¹ Suddenly the government showed its teeth. The official theory was that the police on the track of a common robbery found for the first time proofs of the intended raid on the Tyrol. The plea deceived nobody; it was no knowledge of new facts, but a change of policy, that decided the ministry to open its official eyes. It may be that Rattazzi learnt at length that Garibaldi had escaped beyond the reach of his finesse, and that it needed stronger measures to hold him in; perhaps Garibaldi had broken his compact, and King and minister wished to punish him; possibly diplomatic remonstrances frightened them; possibly they realized that their schemings had brought them to the brink of a war with Austria and started back in alarm. Whatever the motive, the government took strong action (May 15). Arresting about 100 of the volunteers near Sarnico, it sent them to Brescia, where the Garibaldians tried to force the prison, and in the scuffle that followed the troops fired and a civilian was killed. The incident roused the democrats to passion; demonstrations threatened the government at Milan and Genoa, at Naples and Palermo; Garibaldi called the soldiers assassins and demanded the release of his men. Then quickly cooling, he gave up the expedition, had interviews with Rattazzi and Depretis, and retired into the country, forbidding all recruitings for the volunteers, and sending a disingenuous defence of his action to the Chamber. After another secret

¹ See Appendix F.

interview with the King and Premier, he returned to Caprera, and the country took his withdrawal with a coolness, that showed what little depth there was in the enthusiasm.

Suddenly Italy was startled by the news that he had landed at Palermo. Why he went, is shrouded in even thicker mystery than the burlesque of Trescorre. It is impossible to believe his own explanation, that he went to Sicily in the hope of preventing an imminent separatist outbreak. There had been secret communications with the King, and it is probable that Victor Emmanuel had again promised means for a Greek expedition, and perhaps had used vague phrases about Rome, which Garibaldi had interpreted into a more definite sense than they were meant to bear.¹ He doubtless intended to make Sicily, as in 1860, the starting-point of an expedition, possibly still wavering as to its destination, more probably intending to sail to Greece, or, it may be, to take the King's promised help and use it for an attack on Rome, trusting that success would cover his disloyalty.

He found an enthusiastic welcome at Palermo. Sicily was in an inflammable condition; the Garibaldians were strong in the towns, and an ostensibly republican rising at Castellammare on New Year's Day, repressed only after much bloodshed, showed how strong the anarchical and autonomist elements still were. Pallavicino, who was Prefect at Palermo, wrote to the ministry that Sicily must be governed either by the Party of Action or by *carabinieri*. "If Brescia is repeated at Palermo," he warned them, "Sicily will cease to be Italian." It was in surroundings so dangerous for his ungovernable temperament that Garibaldi found himself. At first he held himself in hand, though keeping the expedition always in view; but after a few days he broke out in a furious attack on the Emperor (July 15). "Napoleon must leave Rome, and if necessary there must be another Vespers," he told the Palermitans; and Pallavicino, who was present, made no protest. A few days later Garibaldi was addressing the crowd at Marsala, when a voice from the audience shouted "Rome or Death," and Garibaldi replied "Yes, Rome or

¹ See Appendix F.

Death it shall be," and led the people to swear it on the altar of the Cathedral. Whether he had been reining himself in till now, or, as was his wont, had suddenly come to one of his impetuous resolutions, he hesitated no longer. A sort of religious crusade was proclaimed; Garibaldi exalted "the pure gospel of Christ" as the antithesis of the Papacy, and he, the reviler of Pope and clergy, praised priests and friars and bowed to a miraculous image.¹

The news of Garibaldi's intentions threw the country into intense excitement. It seemed as if 1860 might be repeated, and Rome be won, as Naples was won then. Viterbo decided to rise, and while some of the nationalists at Rome telegraphed to Rattazzi for instructions, others corresponded with Garibaldi and prepared for action.² It was the universal belief that the government was behind him, and none held the opinion more fixedly than himself. Its ambiguous policy had brought it along a path that seemed to have no issue. Whether or not it had had any previous understanding with Garibaldi, it seemed either from fear or good-will to look on his preparations with a half-friendly eye. Perhaps Rattazzi again hoped to use Garibaldi to force the Emperor's hand. Instead of vetoing the Roman plans of revolt, he only instructed them to avoid collision with the French, and was apparently projecting an occupation of Velletri and Frosinone.³ Pallavicino had been left without instructions beyond a vague order to discourage the volunteer recruitings. And Garibaldi's confident statements that the King was behind him seemed to find their confirmation in the action of the authorities. Pallavicino drank to his health with the prayer that Victor Emmanuel would soon be crowned on the Capitol; and soldiers of all ranks deserted without let to join Garibaldi's force. But again as in May, the government suddenly took fright. Perhaps their connivance had been in deference to the King against their own better judgment; perhaps Rattazzi feared a repetition of the dualism of 1860; more probably

¹ Chambers, *op. cit.*, 202-203, 211; Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VII. 83. See below, p. 337.

² Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VII. 94-95; Frigyesi, *L'Italia*, 220.

³ Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VII. 94.

Napoleon's attitude alarmed them. Pallavicino was superseded; the government tried to prevent volunteers from coming to the island; and a royal proclamation (August 3) branded the expedition as "an appeal to rebellion and civil war." Civil war indeed seemed imminent, and Garibaldi's staunchest friends drew back in horror at the prospect. Not one of his old generals followed him; Fabrizi and Medici and democratic deputies tried hard to dissuade him from the mad enterprise. But he had again taken the bit in his mouth; and as often, when puzzled by circumstances or conflicting advice, he took refuge in unreasoning obstinacy. Confident of the King's approval, confident that the French would not actually oppose him, encouraged by the arrival of volunteers and the desertions from the regular troops, he refused to stop and consider. Even now the authorities hesitated to declare against him. Rattazzi was probably still hoping to win him to hear reason. It was not till August 17 that the government decided to break with him, proclaiming him a rebel, and sending Cialdini to Sicily to put it under a state of siege.

On the following day Garibaldi arrived at Catania, a conflict with the troops having been again and again avoided only by the extreme anxiety on both sides to have no civil war. He had only 4000 men, the majority boys and vagabonds. Had the frigates that blockaded the port kept a strict watch, it would have been impossible for him to cross, but their intentional blindness, whose motives it is hardly possible to conjecture,¹ allowed him to seize two steam-packets, and run the blockade by night with 2000 of his men (August 24). Landing on the Calabrian coast close to where he disembarked in 1860, he found little response from the people; Reggio was occupied by a strong force, and he was obliged to retire with his starving, footsore men to the wild heights of Aspromonte. Over 3000 troops were on his track with orders from Cialdini to attack at once and force him to surrender. He had to pause in his weary marches for stragglers and food to come in, and gave the troops their chance to catch him (August 28). There was

¹ See Appendix F.

no defence, for Garibaldi tried to prevent his men from firing on Italian troops, and the best of them did not spend a shot.¹ The fighting lasted ten minutes, a score were wounded on each side, and Garibaldi, with an Italian bullet in his heel, surrendered at discretion. It was a conclusion worthy of the whole pitiful business, but if it was more akin to burlesque than tragedy, Garibaldi's resolve to have no civil strife at any cost made its issues less mischievous than they might well have been.

At all events Aspromonte brought the Roman question again importunately to the front. The government had shown itself strong enough to hold the revolutionary party in check, and men like Fanti, who hitherto would have preferred that Rome should be forgotten for the present, saw that a waiting policy was very difficult now. But he and all other responsible men knew that it was a madman's freak to try to go to Rome without the Emperor's consent. Had Napoleon felt strong enough, he would have let Victor Emmanuel be crowned on the Capitol under a variant of the old Vicariat scheme; even as it was, he wrote an open letter in May pointing to the withdrawal of the French garrison, on condition that Italy recognized existing Papal territory, and that the Pope entered into some sort of federation with the kingdom.² This still saved France's guarantee for the Pope; but Rome was stiff as ever against reconciliation. A great assembly of bishops, almost all non-Italian, who had gathered there for the canonization of certain Japanese martyrs (June 9), spoke of no surrender, and, led by Wiseman and Dupanloup, declared for the retention of the Temporal Power. Antonelli refused to listen to Napoleon's pleas, unless the lost provinces were restored. Then came the Garibaldian raid, and in spite of angry official threats, the Emperor was apparently still unshaken in his intention to withdraw, even though it might be postponed, was still willing that the Italians should go to Rome, if the Pope fled or the

¹ Gjerzoni, *Garibaldi*, II. 323-324; Chambers, *op. cit.*, 243; Vecchi, *Garibaldi*, 349. The official description of a desperate struggle is a pure fiction.

² Bianchi, *Matteucci*, 381-383; *Moniteur* of May 20; Thouvenel, *op. cit.*, II. 282, 303, 328; Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 437.

Romans called them in.¹ The French position was indeed more intolerable than ever after Aspromonte. The raid emphasised the danger of conflict between French and Italians; Garibaldi's defeat by the Italian government took away much of the excuse for the occupation; it was impossible to claim that the presence of the French encouraged Rome to conciliation. But the strength of the French Catholics was driving the Emperor to a temporary retreat. Thouvenel was dismissed (October 15), and his successor, Drouyn de Lhuys, implicitly refused to evacuate.

The change of minister was only a new evolution in the Emperor's art of balancing. It meant that he was beating time, not that he had reversed his policy.² But Rattazzi's inability to obtain any concession from him was a fresh blow to the tottering ministry at Turin. All the Premier's dexterous trimming had failed to secure him a stable majority. The Right had always been suspicious, and though they gave him votes of confidence, it was only from their greater dislike of the Garibaldians. Peruzzi, who led the anti-Piedmontese faction, had attacked him for trying to "enlarge Piedmont rather than make Italy," and Peruzzi's plea that the capital should be moved from Turin produced an outcry among the Piedmontese deputies, that split the Right and added to the parliamentary confusion.³ The Garibaldians were enraged by Sarnico and Aspromonte, and Rattazzi had been obliged to weaken his weak cabinet to admit politicians of straw from their ranks. When Parliament met again in November, the storm burst from every quarter. Garibaldi's wound was felt to be a national disgrace; it was believed, with partial truth, that the government had egged him on and then deserted him; and if a later judgment must ascribe the main blame of the miserable catastrophe to Garibaldi's own folly, it is easy to understand the wrath and bitterness of half Italy, when it was known that he lay

¹ Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VII. 94, 114, 119. For the attempt of the English government to get the Pope to Malta, see Correspondence—Rome (1863), 2; Pasolini, *Memoirs*, 249.

² Taxile-Delord, *op. cit.*, III. 187; Thouvenel, *op. cit.*, II. 439.

³ See below, p. 251.

stricken by an Italian bullet. And the pity and enthusiasm, which found an echo in England and Germany and Sweden,¹ in Italy let loose a spirit, which threatened to endanger the monarchy and plunge Sicily at least into civil strife. The purposeless vindictiveness of the government intensified the bitterness. Cialdini hunted down the volunteers in Sicily, and shot seven soldiers who had deserted to them. The ministry, instead of amnestying Garibaldi at once, worried him with petty cruelties, and waited till the swelling cry for pardon forced their hands. They dared not bring him to justice, lest "a piece of paper might drop out of his red shirt" and compromise themselves. It was not till October that the belated pardon was granted; and when parliament met again, Left and Right joined in attacking the discredited cabinet. On December 1 Rattazzi resigned.

¹ A penny subscription for him in England produced over £1000. Palmerston sent him an invalid's bed: Vecchi, *op. cit.*, 358.

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE SEPTEMBER CONVENTION

DECEMBER 1862—SEPTEMBER 1864

Advance or retrenchment? THE MINGHETTI MINISTRY; the *consorteria*; parliament; the Southern Railways scandal. The King's intrigues with Mazzini and Garibaldi. Minghetti tries to win Venetia. Minghetti, France, and Rome; THE SEPTEMBER CONVENTION; the Turin riots.

TROUBLES were coming thickly on the young kingdom. Aspromonte brought home to it how deadly was the sore that the Papacy and France had made at Rome, how cruel the dilemma between risking a terrible conflict with France and leaving a smouldering agitation, that any wind might fan to revolution. Cavour, had he lived, might have solved the difficulty; but Ricasoli's maladroit honesty and Rattazzi's poor finesse alike had failed, and it seemed only too probable that their successors would surrender to either Napoleon or Garibaldi. And Italy had difficulties enough besides; the impossibility of reducing the army, while Venetia remained in foreign hands, the consequent financial pressure ever drawing tighter, the unsettlement in the South, the jealousy between Piedmont and the new provinces, the corruption which had crept in from the civil services of the old governments and traditions of public life, that had little of the wholesomeness of Piedmont. So bad was the outlook in domestic politics, that it is a speculative question whether it would not have been best for Italy to have resigned Rome and Venice for a space, and concentrated herself on domestic and social reform. A policy of retrenchment and quiet organisation would have arrested her on the slippery path, that threatened to lead to bankruptcy, would have recon-

ciled the classes that were being alienated by heavy taxation, would have allowed some of the pressing problems of the church, the land, the railways, local government, to be worked out calmly. But the question is one of academic interest. Sentiment is ever more potent than calculation, and in face of the existing excitement a policy, that threw national expansion into the background, was impossible. When on Rattazzi's fall Pasolini, and after him San Martino tried to form an "administrative" and non-party cabinet, their efforts shipwrecked at once. A waiting policy being impossible, the only alternative was to solve the questions of Rome and Venice quickly. But every month brought fresh proof how cruel was the loss that Italy had had in Cavour's death. Ricasoli and Rattazzi had had at least some vision of their country's needs, some sense of what national dignity required. After them the government passed into the trivial hands of men without courage or capacity, men of the small ideal and tortuous compromise, whose want of principle and energy allowed the country to drift into ever deeper waters abroad and at home.

The nominal head of the new ministry was Farini. Had Farini been in his vigour, he might have made a fairly capable premier. But the mental decay, which had followed the strain of the annexations, was fast developing into insanity, and in the following March the progress of the disease drove him into private life. The real leaders of the ministry were Minghetti, who had the Ministry of Finance and after Farini's retirement took the Premiership as well, and Peruzzi. Minghetti had been in the '50s one of the ultra-moderates of Romagna, anxious to conciliate the Pope, and obtain at best Home Rule for the Legations. But he had been in close touch with Cavour and the Piedmontese leaders, and in 1859 was carried away with so many of his school by the tide of opinion that made for Unity. He was perhaps the best parliamentary speaker of the time in Italy, though his speeches smelt of the lamp and had more polish than persuasiveness. He had been a careful and original student of economics, with fresh ideas that had a ring of socialism. But he was quicker to grasp ideas than test

them; a colourless, ineffective man, who had won the respectful contempt of the country, and whose want of backbone and entire inability to take a strong line made him a dangerous leader. Financial mismanagement, administrative chaos, national humiliation make the record of this mediocre man with his moderately good intentions, his moderately high principles, his moderate capacity, his absolute feebleness in execution. His colleague and rival, Peruzzi, who had followed a similar evolution in Tuscany, had lately come into notoriety as the inventor of the phrase that Italy could not be governed from Turin; he was a small-minded sectarian, who hated Piedmont at least as strongly as he loved Italy. Under him and Spaventa the Ministry of the Interior became the centre of a secret police, whose methods smacked more of the old despotisms than of free government. Repression or secret subsidising of the press, the employment of secret agents of unclean associations, the compilation of a "Dictionary of Suspects"¹ showed how hard it was for men, who had grown up under a despotism, to govern in the spirit of free institutions. The Foreign Ministry, after a brief tenure of office by Pasolini, was held by Visconti-Venosta, a young Lombard noble, who had been a disciple of Mazzini, but who, since he came over to the Right, had become a diplomatist in every fibre, cautious, moderate, timid. Within their small range of ideas the ministry had excellent intentions, but they had little programme save one of negotiations, little thought for the morrow, no brave attempt to grapple with the problems that were urgent for solution. Their policy was to beat time, and in Italy's present condition beating time meant disaster. The finances went from bad to worse. Their social legislation began and ended with parliamentary commissions. Their ecclesiastical policy developed the petty worrying of the clergy, which had begun under Rattazzi.² Sicily and Naples were kept under a military rule, culminating in the notorious Pica Law,³ which

¹ Zini, *Storia*, II. 1117, 1119, 1138; Garnier, *Royaume*, 46-47; Hansard's *Debates*, CLXX. 1436-1437; Cantù, *Cronistoria*, III. 591.

² See below, p. 274.

³ See below, p. 306.

however necessary in itself, could not take the place of the social legislation, which was the only lasting remedy.

But perhaps the strongest condemnation of the Minghetti cabinet is the encouragement it gave to the outcry against Piedmont. The regionists avenged themselves for the defeat of their schemes by a factious attack on all things Piedmontese, and repaid the intolerance of capacity with the intolerance of mediocrity. Peruzzi's foolish speech in the preceding summer brought to a head the long threatening split in the Right, and parliament was paralyzed by the miserable struggle between "Piedmontism" and "the Cabal" (*Consorteria*). A less partisan and wiser government would have tried to sober down the passion of faction that was seizing on Chamber and country. But Minghetti, still more Peruzzi and Spaventa, could not forget their past; the few Piedmontese in the cabinet occupied subordinate positions, and the ministry threw itself on the side of the *Consorteria*, subsidising the press, it is said, to advocate the transfer of the capital to Florence, carrying an equalization of the land-tax, which, however equitable in principle, bore hardly on the "old provinces" and fed the heart-burnings there.¹ In the apathy and slough of public opinion, which followed the disillusionings of the past year, it was easy for faction to absorb politics. Too many of the deputies had learnt in exile or a lifetime of opposition traditions that unfitted them for parliamentary life, and made criticism seem more important than legislation. In the absence of strong personalities, or of organised parties that might have supplied their place, parliament was as weak as the ministry. The old Cavourian majority was disintegrating, and the Chamber was broken up into little groups, based more on personal or local affinities than principles, too small and too badly led to take a wise line, making it impossible for the government to rely on a stable majority, and encouraging it to keep in office more by parliamentary dexterity than by a strong lead.

The scandals respecting the Southern railways threw a

¹ Alfieri, *L'Italia liberale*, 62, 69; Mme. Rattazzi, *Rattazzi*, I. 657; Galeotti, *Prima legislatura*, 144-150; La Farina, *Epistolario*, II. 530.

sinister light on the suspiciousness and party passion which ruled the Chamber. One of the most obvious duties of the new kingdom had been to encourage railways, especially in the South. "Railways," said Ricasoli, "will do more to suppress brigandage than ten brigades of soldiers." The Chamber had granted a concession of the Southern railways to Bastogi, a Leghorn banker and Cavour's Finance Minister in 1861. In the spring of 1864 ugly rumours spread that there had been corruption at work, and at the instigation of the Left a Committee was appointed to inquire into the scandal. Though the report implicated Bastogi and one other deputy, it cleared the air. The leaders had never been tainted; all the statesmen of the Revolution, who had no private wealth, died poor. And though the unsullied purity of the subalpine parliament had gone, the sensitiveness of the Chamber to clear its name and the findings of the Committee disproved the charges of general corruption. The persistency of the rumours, which the Committee did nothing to lay, pointed rather to the reckless partisanship, which was succeeding to the patriotism of three years ago.

The inevitable effect of the incompetence of government and parliament was to encourage the revolutionary party. Mazzini's policy now as before was to aim at Venice before Rome; he thought of the struggle for Venetia not merely as a step to the completion of Italian Unity, but as part of an European policy, which would break up the Austrian Empire into its component nationalities, and by freeing the Slavs of Galicia, help the insurgent Poles. Thus Italy would hallow her own completed nationality by contributing to the settlement of Eastern Europe.¹ His hope was to force the government to strike for Venetia; except for a moment after Aspromonte, he was willing, as in 1859, to suspend his republican propaganda, and accept the monarchy, if the country chose it. He recognized that without the army it was impossible to drive the Austrians from the Quadrilateral. But he had convinced himself that the government would never initiate, and his plan was to organise insurrection from Trent

¹ Mazzini, *Opere*, XIII. cliz, 71-73.

to the Friuli, enrol volunteers in free Italy to help it, and create an irresistible set of opinion, that would drive the government into war. He found a strange claimant for alliance in the King, who was more than ever chafing at constitutional restraints, and was busily developing a secret unofficial policy, which was often in direct variance with that of his ministers, and created intolerable hitches in the regular working of his government. On this occasion it may perhaps be pardoned to him, for he represented the country more truly than did the feeble Minghetti cabinet. He was provoked by their timidity, and eager to win Venetia and deal perhaps a deathblow to hated Austria, glad too as in 1861 if, by bringing Venice to the front, he could make the country forget Rome for a time.¹ He had never shared Cavour's and the Moderates' intolerance to Mazzini, and in May 1863 he began to approach him through a private agent; and Mazzini, discouraged by the ill-success of his preparations in Venetia, willingly promised cooperation on condition that French help should not be asked for. After a tedious huckstering of policies, they seem to have agreed that Mazzini should foment the insurrection, that this should make the pretext for the government's intervention, and that the King should supply arms for the insurgents. A simultaneous rising in Hungary and Galicia was to place the Austrians between two fires, and the King was sanguine enough to think that England would send her fleet to the Adriatic or surrender Malta as an earnest of her good-will.² But at this point he seems to have realized the difficulties. He knew that he could not defeat Austria single-handed, especially when the Schleswig-Holstein question had seemed to reconcile Prussia to her. Though apparently he had won over some of his ministers,³ the majority of the cabinet, whether ignorant or not of the King's complicity, had

¹ Diamilla-Müller, *Politica segreta, passim*. The revelations may now be safely accepted as genuine. See Mazzini, *Opere*, XIV. lxiii, 134-138; Tavallini, *Lanza*, I. 359; Mario, *Mazzini*, 428. Some of the correspondence was first published in 1872 as *Corrispondenza inedita di G. Mazzini con xxx*.

² Diamilla-Müller, *op. cit.*, 64. For another attempt to get Malta, see Ib. 165, but *contra*, Guerzoni, *Garibaldi*, II. 373.

³ Tavallini, *Lanza*, *loc. cit.*

announced their intention to put down any irregular movement (January 1864). They were trying to get Napoleon's support for a counter-scheme of their own, and Pasolini brought back orders from Paris, where the King's intrigues were well-known,¹ that vetoed any attack on Venetia. Mazzini urged the King to dismiss his ministers, call Ricasoli to office, and appeal to the country, confident that a war majority would be returned. Such a policy, high-handed though it was, might have saved Italy from much dishonour; but the King shrank from it, and Mazzini, long irritated by his indecision, broke off the negotiations (May).

Victor Emmanuel had probably for some months past been transferring his hopes to Garibaldi. The ground-idea of the plans of two years before reappeared, and it seemed natural that, if a revolution broke out in Galicia under Italian auspices, Garibaldi should be sent to lead it. Peruzzi at all events gave his adhesion to the plan, and there were doubtless those in the secret, who looked on the scheme as a convenient means of getting Garibaldi out of the country.² He on his part had for a year past cherished some such project, as much to help the Poles as to worry Austria. The King, forgetful of the hostility between Slavs and Magyars, was in communication with the Hungarian exiles, and Garibaldi was helping Mazzini to prepare for simultaneous revolt in Venetia. He was on a visit to England³ when Victor Emmanuel's proposals reached him; with a little hesitation he accepted them, and soon after his return went to Ischia, whence he was to sail for Roumania in a vessel provided by the King. So far the secret had been well kept, but rumours of the expedition began to leak out, and

¹ Bonfadini, *Arce*, 317, 436.

² Diamilla-Müller, *op. cit.*, 93-94.

³ The main reason for the visit seems to have been simply a desire to please the many English friends, who had invited him. Hitherto Palmerston had opposed it from fear that it might offend the Emperor and lead to a Radical agitation in England, but he now gave his consent on condition that Garibaldi was in the hands of hosts, such as the Duke of Sutherland, who would be responsible for his behaviour. Soon after Garibaldi's arrival, Palmerston got anxious again, and by a discreditable manoeuvre Garibaldi was almost forced into the Duke of Sutherland's yacht and taken back to Caprera: Guerzoni, *Garibaldi*, II. 340, 347, 370-378; Diamilla-Müller, *op. cit.*, 154-168.

Garibaldi's best friends tried to dissuade him. The scheme seemed so rash, so suspiciously like an attempt to lure him to peril and perhaps death, at all events to prevent him from leading the imminent rising in Venetia. Bertani and a few deputies of the Left published an anonymous protest (July 10), which gave the project to the world, and branded it a piece of royal scheming worked for royal ends.¹ The King was frightened by the sudden publicity, which compromised him before foreign governments and his own ministers. Bad news came from Roumania, where Prince Couza, hitherto an accomplice in the plot, declared against it. The King hastily broke off the negotiations; and Garibaldi, indignant at what seemed the treachery of his friends, went home to Caprera.

While the King and his fellow-conspirators were plotting to break up the Austrian Empire and reconstruct Eastern Europe in a revolutionary war, his ministers were trying to gain Venetia by diplomacy. They hated the irregular popular forces, that Cavour would have taken in hand and guided, and they knew that Italy was not in a position to fight Austria alone. The European situation seemed to give them a chance of winning Venetia in their own way. The Russian government had goaded the Poles into revolt (January 1863), and though Bismarck hastened to show his sympathy for its methods, it had scandalised the decent opinion of Europe. England and France were keenly sympathetic for the Poles, and a great European war seemed probable, in which the freer Western Powers would be ranged against Russia and Prussia, while Austria might be drawn into either alliance. It would be difficult for Italy to preserve her neutrality in such a contingency, and there seemed to be a hope of winning Venetia, whichever side Austria declared for. If she declared for Russia, Venetia might be had by means of the French alliance, though King and revolutionists were forswearing it; if she joined the Western Powers, she might be persuaded in the interests of the coalition to sell the

¹ Mario, *Bertani*, II. 305; Mazzini, *Opere*, XIV. cxix; Diamilla-Müller, *op. cit.*, 173.

province, or exchange it for territory in the East. A Macchiavellian estimate might have deprecated assistance to the Poles, who if triumphant would add their weight to the Catholic coalition that backed Rome against Italy; and there was a strong and growing opposition to any policy that meant alliance with France. But honour at all events, if not interest, counselled help to the side that made for freedom; and Arese was sent to Paris (March 1863) to suggest an alliance of the three Powers. He found the Emperor anxious to form a combination with England and Austria, and preferring, even if he could win the latter only, to go to war at once. He was eager to redeem his promise of 1858 by obtaining Venetia and perhaps the Trentino for Italy; and possibly the incurable schemer still dreamt, that, if Italy had Venetia, the South might be carved into a separate state under French protection.¹ But he would not break with Austria, and harked back to his old project of an exchange for Bosnia. Lord John Russell was as anxious as Napoleon for the exchange, and willing that Austria should take Roumania or even Poland, but though Palmerston was ready to conclude an alliance with France and risk a war, the peace tendencies of the cabinet were too strong for him.² Even then, had the Emperor retained aught of his old vigour, an alliance of France, Italy, and Austria, involving the surrender of Venetia, might have been possible.³ But he was "like a man standing in the dark for fear of knocking his head against a post." In his dilemma he tried to bring together a Congress, always his favourite refuge in international perplexities; and the Powers were invited to Paris (November 1, 1863) to settle the new Europe which had superseded that of 1815. But an emphatic refusal came from every government except the Italian; and at this juncture the death of the King of Denmark (November 15) brought the Schleswig-Holstein question to a head. England was indignant at the action of Prussia and Austria, and anxious to secure the French

¹ Pasolini, *Memoirs*, 280.

² *Ib.*, 277, 290-292; Bonfadini, *op. cit.*, 310-317, 432; Bonghi, *L'Alleanza*, 80.

³ Castelli, *Carteggio*, I. 481, 483, 486-487.

alliance for her efforts to save Denmark. An understanding seemed not impossible, for the Liberal agitation in France was driving the Emperor to look for schemes, that might distract attention from home affairs by a forward policy abroad; and as the momentary alliance between the two German Powers made an advance towards the Rhine impossible, he thought of demanding the cession of Venetia at the point of the sword, and he seems to have expected English support.¹ But his more generous plans, now as so often, remained suspended. Minghetti lost hope of winning Venetia by the Emperor's help and turned his thoughts to Rome.

The earlier policy of the ministry had been to let the Roman question sleep.² Catholic Europe was more hostile than ever after Aspromonte, and however ready the governments of France and Austria might be to subordinate the interests of the church to political considerations, they could not disregard the Catholic sentiment, that impelled them to protect the Pope. The whole question was so thorny and complicated, that even Ricasoli was willing now to let it rest till the Pope's death. One more feeble overture was made for reconciliation on the lines of the Free Church proposals. Failing their acceptance, there were influences in the Moderate party, that would even after Aspromonte have welcomed a renunciation or indefinite postponement of the claims to Rome,³ or bartered a temporary guarantee of the Pope's remaining territory for its commercial union with Italy and better government for the Romans, till a change of Catholic feeling made the Temporal Power crumble of itself.⁴ Perhaps indeed, now as two years before, the wiser policy was to wait till passion cooled, and the force of events gave Italy what she wanted. But however wise in the abstract, public opinion made such a policy impossible; and till Rome was won, the Temporal Power meant unrest and

¹ Pasolini, *op. cit.*, 300; Castelli, *op. cit.*, I. 492-493, 508.

² Pasolini, *op. cit.*, 252; Bonfadini, *op. cit.*, 320; see Visconti-Venosta's note of July 9, 1863.

³ Pasolini, *op. cit.*, 249; BonCompagni, *Chiesa*, 106, 117.

⁴ Jacini, *Questione*, 69-87.

brigandage and reaction at home, ever-recurring friction with France abroad. Italy could not afford to alienate France; if she wanted Venice in the near future, she must at least keep her friendly neutrality, and for this as well as for domestic quiet, the government was obliged in its own despite to start again on the prickly and wearisome negotiations.

The Emperor on his part was, as always, anxious to escape from Rome. He felt all the danger of European complication that the occupation brought; in view of a possible war on the Rhine he dared not entirely alienate Italy; he had no personal tenderness for the Pope or his Temporal Power, and was increasingly irritated by the scandal of Papal abuses and the effrontery with which the Papal court took French help and scouted French advice. The electoral successes of the French Liberals made him feel that he must do something to conciliate them; and Rouher had taken office at the end of 1863 on condition that the French left Rome shortly.¹ At the same time he was more afraid than ever to break with the clericals, who were still in spite of their irritation supporting the government. There was a clerical majority in his cabinet; the Empress was passionately hostile to Italy; French opinion generally was unfriendly, and even among the Liberals, much as they might desire the downfall of the Temporal Power, Italy had few real friends. But Louis Napoleon had linked his destiny to hers; according to the measure he meted to her, the fates would mete to him again. Had he been strong, had he thrown himself on the Liberals and defied the clericals to do their worst, he would perhaps have made his position impregnable at home, and an Italian alliance would have retrieved his waning prestige in Europe. But "he had no genius and feared liberty"; his indecision grew on him with failing health and aging years; the grand schemes of European polity, which had thrown their lustre over his first ten years of power, were going, devoured by consuming fear. He dared not frankly take sides with Liberalism; more and more, with many a hesitation that seemed to show him conscious of his fatal error, he was surrendering to the clericals,

¹ Castelli, *op. cit.*, I. 489.

who, more careful of the Papacy than of their own country, were pushing him down the slope that ended at Sedan.

But the surrender was not yet complete, and as usual he sought refuge in a compromise. He proposed to withdraw his troops on condition that Italy guaranteed existing Papal territory, and renounced temporarily at least the claims to Rome. In principle it was the same as Cavour's last and least happy project,¹ and the negotiations professed to be in continuance of those, which were dropped at his death. In the summer of 1864 the Convention began to take definite shape; in its final form as it appeared in September, Italy guaranteed Papal territory from any attack from without; in return the French undertook to withdraw their troops within two years.² So far the Convention followed the lines of Cavour's scheme, though with alterations all for the worse. But the negotiations turned chiefly on the security, real or ostensible, which Italy was to give for its observance of the treaty; and at Pepoli's unhappy suggestion,³ a Protocol, probably intended to be kept secret as long as possible, bound the Italian government to move the capital from Turin. Whether Naples or Florence were selected, the transference was intended to be evidence to Catholic Europe, that Italy had chosen her metropolis, and renounced her claims to Rome. But both treaty and Protocol were intentionally dishonest; and there was an understanding between the two governments, that the object of the compact was to throw dust in the eyes of the Catholics. "We must find a solution," said the Emperor to Pepoli, "which will allow me to make people think that you have given up Rome, while you can let it be thought that you have not given it up."⁴

¹ See above, pp. 212, 229.

² There was apparently a clause in an earlier draft, which bound France to assist Italy, if Austria attacked her: Ricasoli, *Lettere*, VII. 240.

³ Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 292; Minghetti, *Ai suoi elettori*, 53; but see Tavalini, *op. cit.*, I. 309.

⁴ Veroli, *Pepoli*, in *Riv. Eur.*, XXIX. 1204; see *Ib.*, XXXI. 103, 110-111; Pasolini, *op. cit.*, 256; Minghetti, *op. cit.*, 53. Drouyn de Lhuys probably accepted this interpretation: Veroli, *op. cit.*, XXXI. 104; Bianchi, *Matteucci*, 404; Massari, *Vittorio Emmanuele*, 415; Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 21; in spite of his later despatches and Harcourt, *Drouyn de Lhuys*, 159. So also Rouher: Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 14; and see *Ib.*, II. 41.

The gist of the Convention was in its silences. The contingency of a rising of the Romans was purposely omitted, and when at a later date it was found impossible to leave it out, it was agreed, that should the Romans make the Pope's government impossible or "exceptional cases" arise, both France and Italy should resume their liberty of action.¹ There can be no doubt that at the time when the Convention was made, the Emperor understood as clearly as did the Italian government, that a serious Roman rising would be followed by an Italian occupation of the city. The phrase was adopted that the Convention "put the Papal sovereignty in the condition of any other sovereignty," that is, made its existence conditional on its subjects' good will or inability to rebel. Cavour's phrase that the Italians would go to Rome by "moral means" was found conveniently useful. In Cavour's time, when there was still hope that the force of opinion would compel Rome to an early compromise, still a possibility that the Romans would make the Pope's government impossible and that the Italians might have to intervene to save the city from anarchy, the phrase, though doubtfully sincere even then, had its meaning. Now it meant too little or too much. When Cavour and Ricasoli had failed, the chances of bringing the Papacy now or for years to come to ways of reasonableness or conciliation were too remote to enter into the calculations of any but an utopian statesman. And however right the Italians may have been in their assumption that the Romans desired absorption in the kingdom,² the disorganisation of the Liberals there, and the right to maintain an army, which was specifically secured to the Pope under the Convention, made a spontaneous or unassisted rising of the Romans impossible or foredoomed to failure. This was generally, though not always, recognized, and it was intended to strengthen the Roman Liberals by subterranean methods, or manœuvre some poor pretence of revolution, which would give the

¹ Drouyn de Lhuys' note of October 30, 1864; La Marmora's note of November 7, 1864; Minghetti, *op. cit.*, 59; Lanza's speech of September 20, 1880, quoted in Cadorna, *Liberazione*, 51.

² See below, p. 338.

Italians a pretext to intervene.¹ “‘Moral methods,’” said an Italian critic, “mean that after promising not to win Rome by force, we do all we can to win it by propagandism.” Propagandism was as opposed to the spirit of the Convention as was force, but even a propagandism backed by the countenance of the government was not enough. Force and force alone could give Rome to Italy; and though the later gloss offered a technical loophole, yet the plain letter of the treaty, if it meant anything at all, pledged Italian honour never to resort to force. But the intentional equivocations were as useful to the Italian government, as they were to the Emperor. While the French ministers could claim that the Convention made Italy the defender of the Temporal Power, the Italian statesmen protested that Rome remained the goal of Italian ambition, that the new capital was only a “halting place” (*tappa*) in the direction of the Capitol.² Mazzini indignantly protested against an interpretation, which was equivalent to saying, “If the French leave Rome, we shall find opportunities to evade our promises”; and had the Convention been honest, the Chamber would have expunged from its records the vote that acclaimed Rome for capital. But Italy to her cost chose the easy road of dishonour, and refused to listen, when D’Azeglio warned the Senate that the evil example of equivocation in high quarters must bring its curse.

And if the Convention is indefensible in its moral aspect, it has scarcely more to commend it on the score of expediency. The change of capital was a blunder, whose full mischief was only realized in the months that succeeded. It was either an unworthy concession to French dictation, or an expression of an equally unworthy jealousy of Piedmont. The military reasons, which were alleged for it, were a mere pretext.³ If

¹ Castelli, *Ricordi*, 166; Harcourt, *op. cit.*, 187.

² So Minghetti: *op. cit.*, 58-59; Castelli, *Carteggio*, II. 88, 172, 318, 371; Id., *Ricordi*, 166. So Lanza: Tavallini, *op. cit.*, I. 325; Ricasoli: *Lettere*, VII. 248-249; the King: Cordova, *Discorsi*, I. 155; the Minghetti cabinet: Nigra’s note of September 15; La Marmora: his note of November 7; the Parliamentary Commission: Ghiron, *Annali*, II. 91, 94, 98. See also Bonfadini, *Roma nel 1867*, 50-51.

³ Veroli, *op. cit.*, XXIX. 1205; Della Rocca, *Autobiografia*, II. 148.

Rome were to be the ultimate capital, to change the seat of government provisionally meant useless friction and expense and unsettlement. It was a hazardous experiment to anger Turin, to exchange its tested soberness and loyalty for the unknown at Florence. Cavour had condemned the change;¹ Minghetti himself had said less than two years before, that "a nation cannot move its capital twice." But the leaders of the *Consorteria* saw their chance of destroying the predominance of Piedmont at a blow, and were not ashamed to pander to the miserable local jealousies, which cried for the humiliation of the province that had freed Italy. And if the Protocol was wholly mischievous, not much more can be said for the Convention itself, though even now thirty-five years afterwards the historian must share some of the difficulties of contemporary Italy in measuring the gain and loss. No doubt the gain was great in getting the French out of Rome, though diplomatists of higher calibre than Nigra and Visconti-Venosta would have seen the danger that lay in the two years' delay, the inconsistency of permitting the Pope to keep up a mercenary force, the possibility that France would repudiate the secret understanding and take her stand on the plain words of the treaty. To some extent indeed, apart from the Protocol, it satisfied national dignity; it lessened for the moment the friction with France; it might perhaps frighten the Papacy into abating some of its hostility. But these advantages were won at too high a price. It put Italy in the utterly false position of being guardian of her most malignant and unscrupulous enemy. Sooner or later it was bound to bring the government into conflict with the more generous and impatient spirits in the country; it was impossible to guard effectually against raiders the long frontier, which ran over mountains and malarious flats, and it was hardly an exaggeration, when Mazzini declared that it decreed "Aspromonte in permanence." Nor would the great majority of the nation tolerate a renunciation, whether nominal or real, of the claims on Rome. "The Emperor has brought confusion to our

¹ See above, p. 200.

house," lamented Ricasoli; and the only defence of the Convention is that it was the best policy possible under circumstances, which made a forcible seizure of Rome mean war with France. But rather than stain Italian faith, rather than throw new matter of discord between government and people, it were better to have waited, to have accepted Rome's hostility and dared her do her worst, to have drawn reasonable Catholicism to the side of Italy by encouraging the Liberal priests and granting the church its liberty. Had Italy done this, she would, without compromising her own honour, have worried France into surrender, or at worst have trusted to the chapter of accidents, which the waning strength of the Empire and the prospects of conflict between France and Germany promised to bring speedily.

The Convention was signed on September 15. At one stage the negotiations had been nearly broken off owing to the King's opposition, and it had only been by a threat of resignation that Victor Emmanuel, more prescient than his ministers, was brought to give way. Even they, though far from realizing the impending storm, were conscious of trouble in store, and had tried to guard against it by the inclusion of Piedmontese in the cabinet. But La Marmora and Lanza and Sella held aloof from the discredited and foundering ministry. By September 18 both Convention and Protocol were known. In many parts of Italy they were hailed with delight by the silly faction, which cared more to humiliate Turin than protect national honour. And many, who had no sympathy with the *Consorteria*, were deluded for the moment by the quibble, that made it appear a stage to the winning of Rome. But the more far-seeing or less sophisticated democrats protested angrily, and at Turin the feeling was bitter and indignant. The Torinese had long shed their old provincialism; they were good enough nationalists to be ready to sacrifice their own city to have the capital at Rome. But when Piedmont had fought and bled and paid to free Italy, a transference of the capital to Florence or Naples, seemed, as it partly was, ingratitude and insult; and the secrecy, in which the matter had been wrapped, made the deliberate blow smart more.

All classes united in angry protest against their abandonment. Demonstrations to the cry of "Rome or Turin" began and grew, as the ministerial organs threatened repression, and the news of the popularity of the Convention in the other provinces came in to exasperate. On September 21 the crowd was suddenly attacked by the *carabinieri* and left over fifty men and women killed and wounded. After this the city was ripe for anything. The rumour grew that a secret article of the Convention had ceded Piedmont to France;¹ the demoralized cabinet made no attempt to quiet feeling by a frank statement of facts, and the leaders of the *Consorteria* had only their own folly to blame, if report swelled their hatred of Turin to nefarious designs on the lives and liberties of its citizens. Even now, however, had the patrol of the streets been left to the national guards, further bloodshed might have been avoided. There was probably no deliberate intention on the part of the authorities to provoke it. But the carelessness of the Ministry of the Interior and the friction between it and the police prevented any careful preparations to ward off disorder.² The people were irritated by an useless parade of troops; and on the evening of the 22nd a more deadly conflict took place between soldiers and people. Twenty-five corpses, over one hundred wounded lay in the streets of sober loyal Turin.

¹ See below, p. 267.

² Ghiron, *op. cit.*, II. 145-162; Castelli, *Ricordi*, 168-175, 180; Pasolini, *op. cit.*, 319.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE SYLLABUS

• SEPTEMBER 1864—JUNE 1865

THE LA MARMORA MINISTRY; Parliament and the Convention; agitation in Piedmont; the "Permanent." Lanza and Sella. The new Chamber. Ultramontanism; THE SYLLABUS; Italy and the Syllabus; the Dissolution of Monasteries and Church Lands bills; the vacant sees; the Vegezzi mission.

THE Minghetti cabinet might have survived the Convention; it was impossible after the Turin massacres. It resigned, leaving to its successor the evil inheritance of strife and disorganisation that its feeble policy had brought. After Rattazzi's refusal to form a ministry, which would have to execute the Convention, the King turned to La Marmora as the fittest premier for the crisis. His Piedmontese birth and sympathies were likely to lay some of the wrath and suspicion of Turin; his honourable part in the wars of 1855 and 1859, his long and intimate connection with Cavour made it impossible for the nationalists of the other provinces to cavil at his patriotism. He was an honest, brave, cautious man, with a considerable contempt for democracy, but always sensible and moderate and capable of rising above military habits and modes; a man who preferred to get round obstacles rather than go through them, who kept many of the best traditions of the Piedmontese school of statesmen, its tenacity and love of justice and the shrewdness that made them born diplomatists. Like so many Piedmontese, he had learnt Italian as a foreign language in mature life, but he had expanded his ideal in the wake of Cavour, and loyally accepted the work of 1860. He sympathised rather coldly with the aspirations for Rome; he disliked the Convention

not so much because of its principle or the transference of the capital, as because his loyal nature shrank from its equivocations and he knew the impossibility of preventing raids across the frontier. Quite clear-sighted as to the troubles in prospect, he accepted office in the hope of filling up the breach between Piedmont and Italy; and he thought that it was better to accept the Convention with all its imperfections on its head than risk a rupture with France by repudiating a treaty already signed. Minghetti had intended that the parliamentary sanction should be nominal, at all events for the Convention;¹ La Marmora determined to bring both Convention and Protocol before the Chamber, but made his tenure of office conditional on their acceptance; and the Chamber, fearing that his resignation would unloose the waters, reconciled itself to the ungracious task. There was a general understanding, except with part of the Left, to accept the broader and less honourable interpretation. And even with the Protocol the *Consorteria* showed a half-ashamed satisfaction. The sections of the Left and the Piedmontese, who opposed both Protocol and Convention, could only muster seventy votes (November 19).

Outside the Chamber the feeling against the Convention was strong and angry among almost all sections of the Democrats. "There is only one possible Convention with Bonaparte," broke out Garibaldi, "to rid our country of his presence." "The plebiscites, the government, parliament, the country," said Mazzini, "have decreed that Italy must be one and Rome its capital; the Convention cancels this solemn decree." In Piedmont the transference of the seat of government made it a matter of close and present wrong. In vain the ministry tried to bribe the city into acquiescence by a large dole for public works. Turin, the loyal city, did not even spare the King. The crowd hissed his guests as they went to a state ball (January 30); and some of the deputies sent an anonymous letter, taunting him with having to ring his palace with troops that the court might dance in safety. Angry and ill-at-ease, he stole away from the city, till a reaction set in, and an obsequious deputation

¹ Minghetti, *Ai suoi elettori*, 54-55; Zini, *Storia*, II. 1195.

brought him back to make a half-hearted reconciliation. But the agitation was still working below the surface, and turned again to passion, when Mazzini announced (March 13, 1865) that the Convention had another secret Protocol, providing that if Italy obtained Rome or Venice without the consent of France, she should cede to her all Piedmont up to the Sesia. The ministers, past and present, categorically denied the fact, and it is almost certain that Mazzini had, as on other occasions, allowed himself to be hoaxed. No doubt French intrigue had been at work in Western Piedmont, and possibly the question of cession had been mooted; but in the absence of evidence it is difficult to believe that even the Minghetti cabinet seriously contemplated so black a treason to the nation.¹ But at all events the report found easy credence at Turin. Cavour's denials, when the cession of Nice was pending, and Minghetti's similar falsehoods respecting the Convention had discredited the word of an Italian minister; and not even La Marmora's high name for honesty could bring back confidence. All classes joined in an agitation, which would rather see the republic than France at Turin; and a considerable number of the Piedmontese deputies, long estranged from the remainder of the Right, vented their anger in a policy of "permanent" opposition, that had its inspiration in the bitterness, that the folly of the *Consorteria* and the blunder of the Protocol had evoked.

The formation of the "Permanent" party completed the demoralization of the Chamber. The new Italian codes, the laws on local government and public health and police, whose hurried enactment preceded the removal of the capital to Florence, were almost lost sight of in the faction fights which absorbed the energies of parliament. The outlook was very serious, for it was impossible to secure a stable majority, and the futile party struggles were discrediting parliament and perhaps endangering the constitution. Rica-

¹ Mazzini, *Opere*, XIV. 101; Tivaroni, *L'Italia*, II. 452, from Carpi, *Il risorgimento italiano*; Diamilla-Müller, *Politica segreta*, 188-193; Tavallini, *Lanza*, II. 324; Ricasoli, *Lettere*, IX. 329; D'Ideville, *Journal*, II. 222. There is the negative evidence that no mention of any treaty was found in the Tuileries documents in 1870.

solì and his friends made an unsuccessful attempt to wean the Left from barren opposition and fuse it with the more advanced Moderates, who were parted from it by a hair's breadth on all essential points. But his efforts failed, and the tendency to form unreal, factious groups went on. The cabinet, though its leading members were all Piedmontese, had stood neutral between the Permanent and the *Consorteria*, and did something to calm down the bitterness; but it was itself paralyzed by the struggle between Lanza and Sella. Lanza was a typical Piedmontese; the son of a smith, with little culture, but the manners of an old-fashioned noble, he was a prosaic methodical man, with a passion for work, rigorously almost obtrusively honest, a pedant generally on stilts moral and oratorical, obstinate, inflexible, angular, who seldom gave up a good idea for a better one. In the Agricultural Association of 1846 and the early Piedmontese parliaments he had been a democrat, with a strong suspicion of all things aristocratic, and a warm friend of the extreme war policy. After 1850 he moved gradually to the Right Centre, and had been one of Cavour's truest admirers and followers. A sincere Catholic, he was an unwavering believer in the Free Church. But he was too independent to be strictly ranked with any party, and sometimes independence slid into perversity, and politicians complained that he was "a disintegrating element" in every cabinet that he sat in. Sella, like Lanza, came from a lower-middle-class family of Piedmont; like Lanza, he was honest, unyielding, outspoken; like Lanza, though at a later date, he had entered parliament as a member of the Left and abandoned it for the Right. But Sella belonged to a different type of mind. A geologist by profession, he carried scientific habits of thought into his politics. He was a clear thinker and speaker, with a strongly positive bent, who hated phrases and absolute principles, a cautious, hard Finance Minister, who thought more of the needs of the Treasury than of the social effects of his legislation. In economics he belonged to the Liberal school, with a fixed belief in economic "laws" and freedom of contract, whose sole specifics for the working-classes were thrift

and combination. But though his financial creed made him rank with the Right, in religious questions he leant to the Left. He believed in the Free Church so far as it meant the non-interference of the state in those ecclesiastical matters in which its own interests were untouched; but he thought that the state should reserve powers to check clerical hostility, and if it gave more liberty to the church, should at least start it with no privileges.

Two men of diverging temperament and common strength of will were bound to come into conflict, though they were always in a way loyal to each other, and often ready to sink their personal feelings. Sella wished to stem the deficit by a grist-tax,¹ and Lanza feared that an excise, which tasted of the times of the old despotisms, would bring the discontent to a head. He had urged a conciliatory policy towards the church, and tried to minimise the interference of the state. La Marmora was no believer in a Free Church, and Lanza found himself opposed by the majority of the cabinet, while his uncompromising support of the officers, who had been using stern measures against the deserters in Sicily,² made him the target of an angry attack from the Democrats. Unpopular in the country, out of sympathy with his colleagues, he resigned in August (1865).

He deserted the ministry at a critical time, and it was not without reason that his colleagues complained that he had "sacrificed the interests of the country to his theatrical conveniences." His resignation made the position of the government intolerable, and it decided to dissolve the impotent and discredited Chamber, in the hope that the country would return a stable majority. The event proved that the electors were as much at fault in their political instincts as the Chamber had been. All the interests that the Revolution had injured, all the local ambitions that parliament had been too busy to attend to, above all the unpopularity of the new taxes and the fear of worse combined to take their revenge; and the polls resulted everywhere, except in Piedmont, in the rejection of most of the old deputies. The *Consorteria* came out much weakened, and the Left, which

¹ See below, p. 315.

² See below, p. 325.

stood with a democratic anti-clerical programme,¹ gained equally with the Liberal opposition, which centred round the Permanent and was tending to form itself into a Left Centre party, giving a rather uncertain allegiance to Rattazzi. The three parties were evenly balanced, making it more difficult than ever to secure a ministerial majority, and Ricasoli's renewed efforts to fuse the Left with the best men of the Right and Centre shipwrecked again. Chaos reigned more supreme even than in the old Chamber. The transference of the capital, instead of helping towards a settlement, had only added to the confusion. The rank-and-file of the *Consorteria* were bitterly and provokingly hostile to everything Piedmontese. Lanza was nursing his grievances; Rattazzi was more or less unfriendly to the ministry and waiting his chance to succeed them. The "old guard" of Piedmont, that till now had been the backbone of steady government, was becoming a mere guerilla band with a policy of mischief. In its personal composition the new Chamber was inferior to the old, and the majority of the deputies came to Florence with hardly any political programme beyond that of harassing the government. Sella's "splendid itch for unpopularity" focussed their hostility; his new budget, proposing grist and window taxes, drew down a storm of criticism, and when parliament was a month old, the government was defeated on a bye-question (December 19). The hostile vote came from a coalition of the Left and Left Centre; but the majority of the Left Centre were separated from Crispi and Mordini by prejudices almost as strong as those that parted them from the Right. Both parties too were pledged to reduce the taxes, and they knew how difficult, if not impossible, it would be to fulfil in office the promises of opposition. There was no alternative but for La Marmora to take office again; and, making Sella his scapegoat, he consented to form a new cabinet, partly to carry out the schemes by which he was hoping to win Venetia, partly because the whole situation was so full of danger, the belief in parliament so shaken, that he thought

¹ Mario, *Bertani*, II. 307-308; Salazaro, *Cenni*, 114-116; Un Italien, *Crispi*, 61-63.

that under any other leader there was real danger of a breakdown of the constitution.¹

Meanwhile the ever-present Roman question obtruded itself into every issue of home and foreign policy. The September Convention, though it had settled for a time the question of the Temporal Power, only indirectly affected the relations of church and state. It had been a bolt from the blue to the clericals, who in their first consternation regarded it as the mark of their abandonment by France.² But though it made Rome at times more conciliatory on minor questions, she hardened her heart more resolutely than ever on the bigger issues. Though Antonelli was still strong enough to secure De Mérode's fall (October 1865), his loyalty was suspected,³ and his power shaken, and the Papacy was at the mercy of men, whose fanaticism was more dangerous than his obliquity. Inside the church their policy was ecclesiastical centralization; while the bishops were strictly subordinated to Rome, the lower clergy were placed under bondage to the bishops. "Religion in Christian society," said an episcopal pamphleteer, "is personified in the hierarchy, and they are the pillars of society itself."⁴ The priest, who showed independence, was a marked man, to be if possible deprived of his benefice; and they knew that there were few who could stand before the coalition of spiritual and material terrorism. In France Gallicanism was making a last hopeless fight at Lyons; in Italy the Liberal priests were nearly crushed. Through 1863 they had held their own; in Lombardy, especially at Milan, they had been strong enough to defy the capitular vicar; and throughout Italy the men, who had signed Passaglia's memorial, were keeping up a fitful struggle, in which, had they been supported by government or people, they might have triumphed. But Rome had safeguarded herself against a religious revolt by smothering the spirit of religion; and when the Minghetti

¹ La Marmora, *Un po' più di luce*, 63; Massari, *La Marmora*, 329.

² D'Ideville, *op. cit.*, II. 214-217; Falloux, *Discours*, II. 254.

³ Balan, *Continuazione*, II. 440-444. For De Mérode's fall see *Ib.*, II. 688.

⁴ Ghilardi, *Legge Vacca*, II. 55; see Manning, *Vatican Council*, 128.

cabinet, careless of its best weapon, withdrew the protection hitherto given by the government, the Liberal priests began to surrender in despair, and by the end of 1864 gave few signs of life.¹ Everywhere, save in Germany and Belgium, where the Old Catholic movement was dawning, Ultramontanism was triumphantly welding together the mighty forces that Rome possessed in every Catholic country.

United by a forced conformity within, the church threw down the gauntlet to progress. The Encyclical *Quanta cura* and the Syllabus, or summary of false opinions, that accompanied it² (December 8, 1864) mark the divorce, that the Ultramontanes had made between the Papacy and civilized government. It is an error, says the Syllabus, that "the Pope can or ought to be reconciled to or compromise with progress or liberalism or modern civilization." The Syllabus is in part an attack on modern thought and criticism; in part a condemnation of the Catholic Reformers, which left no place within the church for those who disbelieved in the Temporal Power, or held to the Free Church, or claimed independent thought in matters of church discipline. But it was perhaps more than all these a root-and-branch onslaught on the principles of free government. It condemned religious toleration in Catholic countries, secular schools, civil marriage and divorce. Legal security for liberty of conscience and worship, said the Encyclical, is "liberty of perdition." The Syllabus implicitly claimed for the Church the right to use temporal punishments, and demanded that the clergy should share in controlling the schools and choosing the teachers, that the ecclesiastical courts should be restored, that the state should surrender its right to nominate bishops. In its full medievalism it asserted the independence of the ecclesiastical power, the divine origin of the church's laws, and their supremacy over any lay legislation.

Whatever may be the precise doctrinal value of the

¹ Balan, *op. cit.*, II. 366-376, 413-416, 480, 489; Serra Gropelli, *Cinque piaghe*, 61; Siotto-Pintor, *L'Italia*, 230, 239-240; O'Reilly, *Leo XIII.*, 183, 258.

² The Syllabus is said to be much on the lines of the Bull *In eandem Domini*, three centuries old.

Encyclical and Syllabus,¹ they were rightly taken by the common sense of Europe as a condemnation of liberal government, and a threat that the church would use its strength to combat it. It was the language of men who had cut themselves adrift from reason, and put their trust in the powers of fear and superstition; and those loyal Catholics, who had touch with the world about them, could only put out half-ashamed apologies for its blind and senseless fury. Civilized government was bound to protest against doctrines that struck at its roots. The French government did not conceal its anger, and so strong was the feeling in the country, that Dupanloup had to explain away the most reactionary theses of the Syllabus. In Italy it fanned to flame the smouldering feeling, which wrecked every attempt of the government to conciliate Rome by concession. The resentment, that all Italian patriots felt, had often passed into a virulent hostility, that inspired Garibaldi's passionate invectives, and made a democratic paper declare that the "ultimate end of the Italian revolution was the destruction of the church." There had been iconoclasm in several cities, and little or no attempt to bring the offenders to justice; the Modenese had cheered for Renan; a petard had exploded, while an unpopular bishop was preaching at Milan. The bitterer symptoms of anti-clericalism were the work of a few, but the wrath at the Papalist attack and the polemics of the Liberal clergy found an echo through Italy, and a deputy had proposed in the Chamber that every priest should be compelled to take an oath of allegiance. The new Civil Code had settled the vexed marriage question

¹ Two points arise in the interpretation of the Syllabus: (1) The Syllabus asserts that certain propositions are false; the contradictory propositions are therefore necessarily true; the contrary propositions are not necessarily true, but some articles of the Syllabus either imply them or are meaningless. For the attempt to change the Syllabus into affirmative propositions, see below, p. 364. (2) Were the condemnations of the Syllabus made by the Pope *ex cathedra* and therefore dogma binding on the church? The Pope and Manning at all events held that they were (Manning, *op. cit.*, 180; Id., *Centenary*, 38, see also *Civiltà Cattolica*, quoted in Arthur, *The Pope*, I. 229-236). The less ultramontane clergy held the contrary; e.g. Newman in *Letter to Duke of Norfolk*, 78-82. See other authorities quoted in Gladstone, *Vatican Decrees*.

by making the civil ceremony obligatory, the religious rite optional. A considerable and insistent section of the public had rejoiced in the resolution of the Chamber (thrown out by the Senate) to make seminarists liable to military service; and they called for the dissolution of the monasteries, which in their eyes were so many strongholds of the proud and threatening enemy. The Minghetti cabinet had to a certain extent played to this feeling; its policy, as in other matters, had been to let things drift or use feeble force. Had it encouraged the Liberal clergy, treating episcopal provocation with contemptuous tolerance, and appealing to the great section of Catholics, to whom country and church were dear alike, it would have built a power inside the church, that might have brought Rome to her knees. But the government left Passaglia and his followers to carry on a brave but hopeless struggle, and alienated the more timid of them by its threats of anti-clerical legislation, by waging with half the episcopate a strife, which had little dignity or sense of strength. And while it frightened the timid Catholics, it did practically nothing to find a solution for the great pending questions of church and state,—the dissolution of the remaining monasteries, the sale of church lands, the reduction in the number of dioceses.

The La Marmora ministry continued the same policy of irritation, again attacking the seminaries, allowing the Prefects to interfere in questions of ritual, reviving the ancient powers of the state to punish clericals, who abused their office and refused absolution to political excommunicates.¹ But the constructive inertia of the Minghetti cabinet was at an end; even those who approved strong action against the bishops, knew that more radical remedies were needed. They were parted however into two sharply marked currents of thought. The men who had never accepted Cavour's ecclesiastical policy, or had only been drawn to it by his prestige, believed that to give new liberty to the church was a policy full of danger, that though the Temporal Power in its old fulness might be a dream of fanatics,

¹ Balan, *op. cit.*, II. 648-649, 653, 689, 692; Cantù, *Cronistoria*, III. 723, 725.

yet millions of Italians were trained to obey those fanatics. They wanted to effect a working arrangement, which would not disturb the main principles, that had hitherto ruled the relations of state and church, to remove the chief sources of friction, especially in the matter of the vacant sees, but give the bishops no new vantage-ground. Such a policy seemed no solution to those who continued the Cavourian tradition. Though the Syllabus had condemned the Free Church, its partisans went on their way undismayed. They knew indeed that it was hopeless now to ask Rome to voluntarily surrender the Temporal Power, they knew that there was small chance of winning her even to friendly neutrality. But they meant to appeal from Rome to Catholic Europe, from the unreason there to the wiser and more Christian elements in the church. If the Pope banned the Free Church, they would carry it out in his despite; and they thought that a system, which Montalembert and Wiseman had recently extolled for France and England, must satisfy reasonable Catholics for Italy. For the present their policy was to clear out of the road some of the barriers, that stood between the church and modern society. When this had been done, even the old school, they thought, would see that the church might be left to itself without peril to the state.¹

Thus at present the two schools had to some extent common ground. Both wished to dissolve the remaining monasteries and sell church lands. The Piedmontese law of 1855 had left untouched nearly half the religious houses in the old provinces.² The legislation of 1860-61 had affected Umbria, the Marches, and Naples, but even here there was a certain number of exempted houses, and in Sicily, Tuscany, Emilia, and Lombardy there had been no dissolution. In the whole country there remained nearly 2400 houses with 47,000 members, of whom at least 13,000 were Mendicants, and with an income estimated at seventeen million lire, half of which belonged to Sicily. There was a

¹ BonCompagni, *Chiesa*, 172-181, 344; Ricasoli, *Lettere*, VII. 146, 261-263; Castelli, *Carteggio*, II. 54.

² See above, pp. 4-5.

clear need for legislation. It was impossible to preserve the monasteries permanently in a part of the kingdom, when they had been dissolved in the rest. Apart from the more doubtful question of the teaching orders and a few houses dear to learning or national tradition, there was no sufficient reason for the existence of institutions, which exempted so many from the plain duties of citizenship. Economic reasons urged that the vast properties in mortmain should be brought into circulation. While the income of monasteries, bishoprics, and chapters amounted to nearly fifty million lire, it was intolerable that the state and communes should still be called on to contribute several millions to ecclesiastical purposes, and that the priests in thousands of parishes should have barely sufficient for the simplest needs of life. And perhaps above all there was the sense that the monasteries were so many centres of hostility to the new order, a standing army with which the Pope waged his campaign against Italy. But however general was the consensus on the principle of dissolution, the parting-lines reappeared on the details. While the extremer anti-clericals wished to suppress all monastic houses without exception, there was a strong feeling that the teaching orders, which educated 100,000 children and were respected and valued in hundreds of Catholic homes, should be spared. While all Liberals were agreed that church lands should be sold, there were wide differences as to the destination of the proceeds. There was indeed a general understanding that part should go to replace the state and communal subventions; that the state, as representing the laity, should claim such portion of the endowments as had been devoted to the secular purposes of charity and education. But there was no agreement as to what the *quotum* should be, whether the needs of the exchequer or the claims of the church should rank first. Again, while the erastian school would have placed the revenues of benefices under a department of the state, the Cavourians, prominent among them Ricasoli, would either have handed them over to the clergy to regulate as they liked, or placed them under provincial and communal boards representative both of laity and clergy but without any interference from

the government.¹ A Bill dealing with the matter more or less on Cavourian precedents had been introduced by the Minghetti cabinet early in 1864; but the La Marmora ministry brusquely reversed its policy, drawing a Bill on extreme erastian lines, which boldly owned that the country's financial needs took precedence of all else, and proposed to lay hands on the bigger share to fill the insatiable maw of the exchequer.² All church and monastic property was to be put under the control of the Minister of Worship, thus making the clergy as completely a state-paid body as under the Civil Constitution of 1791. The bill swept within its dissolution clauses every monastic house without exception; but the existing monks and nuns were permitted to live in cloisters reserved for them, and were granted pensions for life. The influence of the reformers was seen in the provisions, which cut down the revenues of bishoprics and cathedral preferments, and raised the stipends of the parish clergy. The bill brought on itself the condemnation of all but the extremest anti-clericals. It was naturally attacked by the Moderate Liberals, who regarded church property as sacred to the church, however much its distribution might be changed; the church reformers could not consent that parochial benefices should be managed by a state department; the Free Church party, whether reformers or not, could not accept proposals, which would drive the whole church into fierce hostility. To alienate the Liberal clergy, to make compromise with Rome more remote than ever, to lose all hope of winning a name for moderation in Catholic Europe, seemed madness, while the young Kingdom was still so vulnerable. The Church Reformers drew a counter-project, which would have spared the houses devoted to education or charity, placed the proceeds of the church lands in the hands of parish and diocesan boards elected by all male Catholics over thirty years of age, and devoted five-sixths of episcopal revenues to raising the stipends of the poorer clergy.

It was impossible to find a compromise between the

¹ Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VII. 146, 261; BonCompagni, *op. cit.*, 344.

² Vacca's speech of November 12, 1864. This and the earlier Bill are known respectively as Vacca's and Pisanelli's.

rival schemes, and the majority of the Chamber seemed (April 1865) inclined even to outstep the ministerial Bill in its bitter anti-clericalism. The government, despairing of passing any measure, turned to the alternative of a working compromise with Rome, which should begin by settling the question of the vacant sees. • Even before 1859 it had been necessary to expel several bishops for their hostility to the state. After the annexation of the Papal provinces and the South, seven more had been banished for real or supposed sedition, and a more considerable number, who had left their sees rather than acknowledge the new rule, had not been allowed to return; at this date there were forty bishops in exile, almost all belonging to Neapolitan sees. In other cases bishops had been translated or had died, and no successor had been appointed; in yet other instances bishops-designate had been selected by the Pope, but had not received the *exequatur* of the government. Nearly one half of the Italian sees (108 out of 229) were without a resident bishop, and sincere Catholics like Ricasoli were perhaps even more anxious than the Pope to see the scandal ended. But the question involved issues that touched the whole controversy between church and state. All political parties were more or less anxious to see the number of dioceses reduced; to cut down the episcopal revenues, which reached to triple those of France and Spain combined.¹ But besides Rome's reluctance to make concessions on these points, there were the further difficulties of the *exequatur* and oath of allegiance. The ancient law of Piedmont, as that of other countries, provided that no act of the Papacy could be recognized within the kingdom without the royal *exequatur*,² and that among other things an *exequatur* was required before a bishop could take possession of his temporalities. It was a necessary act of self-defence for the state, and the Papacy was willing to give it a qualified recognition in Northern Italy.³ But in the ex-Papal provinces and Naples any

¹ In France and its colonies there was one bishop to 400,000 inhabitants, in Spain one to 275,000, in Italy one to 90,000.

² *Exequatur* for acts of the Holy See, *placet* for those of diocesans.

³ Balan, *op. cit.*, II. 669.

acknowledgment of the *exequatur* seemed to imply a recognition of the King's sovereignty there, and this Rome would not tolerate. She cavilled with equal persistency over the oath of allegiance, which pledged every new bishop to "loyally observe the laws of the state." The oath had little value, for the French bishops had taken oaths at every change of government in France since 1814; but precedents were against the Papalists, for a similar oath had been taken without difficulty in all the old states except Tuscany and Modena, and Pius VII. had expressly enjoined it in that part of the Papal States, which came under the rule of the Italian Republic in 1801. But those were days when ultramontanism was unborn, and milder counsels ruled at Rome.

The Minghetti cabinet had let the question of the sees drift, and made feeling at Rome still angrier by allowing the empty bishops' residences to be appropriated for schools and law-courts. La Marmora felt that inaction was impossible, and when in March 1865 the Pope made overtures for an arrangement, he seized on the opportunity to negotiate, and sent Vegezzi, who had been Minister of Finance in 1860, to treat. His instructions were to recognize the majority of Papal nominations, and consent to the return of the absentee bishops, excepting only such as were so unpopular, as to make disturbances probable should they come back. All the new appointments however were to be subject to the oath of allegiance and *exequatur*, conditions that were exacted in almost every Catholic country. At first Rome showed some inclination to compromise; the more far-sighted prelates saw the danger of a protracted struggle with Italy; the Pope was eager to fill up the widowed sees, and even spoke of calling an Italian garrison to Rome, when the French "left."¹ But the stalwarts of ultramontanism, hoping that the chapter of accidents might still prevent the French from going, reversed the brief mood of friendliness, and opposed anything that implied a recognition of the Kingdom. Lanza would have disarmed them by waiving both oath and *exequatur*, but the majority of the cabinet refused to go beyond a promise that the oath should be taken

¹ Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VII. 293, 364.

to imply no explicit approval of the changes of 1860, and their stiffness gave Antonelli an opportunity to break off the negotiations.¹ Their failure was hailed with a general sense of relief. Anything that tended towards the Free Church was unpopular with large sections both of Moderates and Democrats. They had feared that Vegezzi might compromise the claims to the capital, and they were fixedly opposed to making any concession to the Pope. Even Liberal priests dared to join in the protests, and the angry feeling of the country showed that Rome was provoking a spirit as fierce and unconciliatory as her own.

¹ Ghiron, *Annali*, II. 176-179, 183-194; Balan, *op. cit.*, II. 669-670; Massari, *op. cit.*, 312; Castelli, *Carteggio*, II. 56.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE WINNING OF VENETIA

1865—OCTOBER 1866

The Austrians in Venetia; the risings; Mazzini and the Permanent; Italy and Venetia; THE PRUSSIAN ALLIANCE; La Marmora and Bismarck; the treaty signed; efforts for peace; war declared. Plans of campaign; CUSTOZZA; inaction of the army; Napoleon proposes armistice; the Volunteers; Lissa; *uti possidetis*; armistice signed; peace signed.

For a time the Roman question went into the background and Venetia came to the front. Had the Austrians given it Home Rule after Villafranca, they might possibly have won the Venetians to a grudging acquiescence. As it was, they had tried to stamp out Italian life, filling the civil service with Germans, publishing the laws in German. The Venetians defied them with a passive rebellion, that refused to elect deputies to the Imperial Reichstag and boldly sent addresses of devotion to Victor Emmanuel. There were insurrectionary Committees in every town, and with a spirit worthy of the heroes of Young Italy a tiny band kept revolt simmering in the mountains through the summer and autumn of 1864. When the rising ended in inevitable collapse, Mazzini saw in the agitation in Piedmont a new opportunity to help the Venetians. Partly from traditions, that dated back to 1848, partly from a wish, shared with so many others, to postpone the Roman question with its infinite complications, perhaps for a moment because they nursed a hope that a movement in Venetia would delay the transference of the capital, Piedmontese opinion was instant for the winning of Venetia. In the early months of 1865 communication ran busily between Mazzini and certain members of the Permanent. Mazzini promised to sink his

republicanism during the war; his correspondents undertook to stir public opinion, and warmly entered into his plans to collect volunteers to march to the support of the Venetian insurgents, who were expected to rise in April.¹ But Mazzini was more careful than ten years before not to precipitate unready revolutions; and when he found that there was no sufficient material for a rising, he postponed it to the spring of 1866.

The anxiety to force the Venetian question was not confined to Mazzini or his fellow-conspirators of the "Permanent." "Venice," wrote a Piedmontese Moderate, "is the serious aim, the national question, the question of independence; Rome is the distraction, the question of passion and vanity, the goal of the revolutionary spirit." Even among those, who cared most for Rome, there were some, who thought with Lanza that the road to Rome lay through Verona. And many a troubled patriot felt that a war would brace the nation and arrest the incipient decay, and looked impatiently for the hour, when the expulsion of the Austrians might make economy possible, and allow the country to settle down in earnest to the work of organisation.² So strong was the sense of this, that even in the government itself Lanza seems to have abandoned his earlier policy of repressing Mazzini's preparations, and given some countenance to the Venetian Committees.³

His fall put an end to the coquettings of the government with the revolution. La Marmora regarded connivance with anything in the nature of raids as disloyal. And all Italian statesmen were agreed that at all events an insurrection was a subsidiary matter, that the essential was to secure an anti-Austrian alliance abroad. Mazzini and his friends always assumed, that if Italy put out her real strength, she was more than a match for Austria, especially if a Hungarian or Slav rising in her rear took her between two fires as in 1848. He estimated that Italy could put into the field 270,000 regulars, 130,000 mobilized

¹ Diarmilla-Müller, *Politica segreta*, 213, 234-236, 241.

² *Ib.*, 212; Jacini, *Due anni*, 100, 104; *Id.*, *Questione*, 59, 65.

³ Tavallini, *Lanza*, I. 383.

national guards, and at least 30,000 volunteers, against a maximum of 170,000 that Austria could spare for the defence of Venetia. Subsequent events showed how sanguine were his calculations, and more level-headed statesmen knew how great the strength of Austria still was, how superior her military organisation to that of the young Italian army, and feared that Italy might dash herself again in vain against the Quadrilateral. And though in impulsive moments in the full tide of Austria's discomfiture after 1859, Cavour and Ricasoli might think the Hungarian alliance sufficient, they and every prudent man knew, that if Italy wished for victory, she must have an allied army to fight beside her own.

There was little hope and less desire to draw the Emperor into another war, and for some years past Italian statesmen had seen how the drift of events might bring them another ally, less powerful perhaps but less exacting. Sooner or later Prussia must fight Austria for the hegemony of Germany. The self-effacement of Frederick William IV.'s rule had humiliated Prussian sentiment, and the appointment of his brother William as Regent in 1858 had marked the advent of a braver policy. The feeling that there was no room for two great Powers in the German Federation had prevented Prussia from coming to the rescue of Austria in the following year, and made her defy the strong national sentiment that prompted the defence of a German power in distress. As early as 1856 Prussian statesmen were beginning to see that Piedmont was their natural ally;¹ and the sense that a strong Italy was likely to be independent of France went hand in hand with a real sympathy for Italian aspirations to prompt the resolution of the Berlin Chamber in 1861, that it was "not in the interest of Prussia to oppose the consolidation of Italy." In the same year Schleinitz had assured La Marmora that Prussia would do nothing to hinder a solution of the Venetian question.² Twenty months later Bismarck was

¹ Cavour, *Lettere*, II. 211; Id., *Nuove lettere*, 337. So Cavour in 1858; Massari, *Cavour*, 270.

² Cavour, *Lettere*, VI. 671-673, 686; La Marmora, *Un po' più di luce*, 17. Mazzini advocated a Prusso-Italian alliance in the same year: *Opere*, XI. 262. In 1866 he protested against it: *Ib.*, XIV. 183.

Prime Minister, and before the end of 1862 he was sounding the Minghetti ministry as to what would be the attitude of Italy, if Prussia attacked Austria. "Some day," Cavour had said to the Prussian minister in 1859, "Prussia will thank Piedmont for her example," and Bismarck had taken the lesson to heart. The cardinal point of his policy was the conviction, that Prussia and Austria could not coexist in the German Federation. He was determined that "blood and iron" should sooner or later make Austria cease to be a German power, and transfer her political centre to Pesth. But he knew that he stood alone, that king and country were strongly set against war with another German people. The smaller German states knew that his policy threatened their independence; the Liberals held back from the arch-enemy, who had made a farce of parliamentary government and helped to crush the Poles. The Berlin court was as anti-Italian as the English, and the theory was not yet dead that the Quadrilateral was necessary to German security, or at least that it must be held, while the French held Rome. Bismarck saw that he must wait; and the Schleswig-Holstein crisis, with its false seeming of friendship with Austria, gave his unscrupulous dexterity its chance to demonstrate the difficulties of a Prusso-Austrian alliance, to alienate the smaller states from Austria, and irritate her to a point that must soon make peace impossible. Even in the middle of the episode he told the Italian minister that he was only using Austria to serve his own ends, and that Italy was Prussia's natural friend.¹

Italian popular feeling was only one whit less strong against a Prussian alliance than against one with France, but the contingency had been always kept in sight by the Italian Foreign Office. Pasolini had told Bismarck in 1862 that "Italy would always side with the enemies of Austria"; and La Marmora on his appointment to office at once turned his thoughts to Berlin, and threw out hints that were better understood by Bismarck than by his own countrymen.²

¹ Bonghi, *L'Alleanza*, 85.

² Pasolini, *Memoirs*, 238; La Marmora, *op. cit.*, 36-37; Jacini, *Due anni*, 46.

But he knew that a formal alliance was still in the distance, that, if Bismarck fell in his struggle with the Liberals, the prospects of conflict between Prussia and Austria would be indefinitely postponed. He hoped that Austria might be frightened by the fear of a hostile coalition into selling Venetia or exchanging it for Bosnia; and he was prepared to enter an alliance with Austria and France, if it explicitly provided for the cession of Venetia. His prudence was wise, for Bismarck had to wait again. Prussian opinion had compelled him to patch up the rents in the Austrian alliance, and the Convention of Gastein (August 1865) marked ostensibly the renunciation of his schemes. But he was at the same time picking up the dropped threads of the negotiations for a commercial treaty with Italy, and trying to pledge her to help in the case of an eventual rupture with Vienna.¹ La Marmora was cautious as ever; for a moment he suspected an understanding between France and Austria; Italy, he knew, was to Bismarck only a pawn in the game, and he held that Prussia's double policy released Italy from obligations, if, as still seemed possible, Venetia and the Trentino might be won without a war. But with the new year (1866) any doubt as to the necessity of the Prussian alliance was clearing away. Austria had refused to sell Venetia; fears as to French hostility disappeared, when it was known that Bismarck had visited the Emperor at Biarritz (October 1865), and reassured himself as to the attitude of France.² La Marmora brought the commercial treaty to a successful conclusion (March), and introduced the St. Gotthard Railway Bill "to link Italy with Germany." Early in March General Govone was sent to Berlin at Bismarck's request, with powers to negotiate an offensive and defensive alliance, if Prussia proved to be in earnest. But La Marmora knew that wariness was necessary as ever. He was still uneasy as to the Emperor's intentions, and it was not till the end of the month, that he assured himself that though Napoleon

¹ La Marmora, *op. cit.*, 41, 47; Jacini, *op. cit.*, 136, 140; Bonghi, *op. cit.*, 243, 252. Lanza apparently knew nothing of the negotiations: Castelli, *Carteggio*, II. 70.

² See below, p. 288.

would give no help to Italy if she took the offensive, his sympathies were with her.¹ After the Bucharest revolution in February, La Marmora again hoped that Austria's fears would make her ready to cede Venetia, and he allowed negotiations for its exchange with the Danubian Principalities, though he felt the ignominy of the bargain, and the opposition of the Powers soon made the project a hopeless one. He was still preoccupied by suspicions of Prussian sincerity. Bismarck no doubt genuinely desired the Italian alliance, not only to gain her help in the event of war, but to compromise his own government. But the peace influences at Berlin were very strong; and an inkling of the Italian overtures to Austria made him in his turn doubt La Marmora's loyalty. Again it seemed possible that he might be forced to surrender to the peace party; and, having used the Italian alliance to frighten Austria into concessions, repudiate it and leave Italy face to face with her enemy, friendless save for the uncertain and embarrassing patronage of France. He did his best to trap Italy into an one-sided agreement, which would have given her all the danger and no certainty of advantage. But the wary Italian diplomatists were on their guard, and at the end of March Bismarck, finding that his snare was set in vain, won his King's consent to a secret treaty, which bound the two allies to war with Austria. Her refusal to reform the Federal Constitution was to be the pretext, and both parties pledged themselves to use all their military resources, and make no peace or armistice except by mutual consent and on such terms as would give Venetia to Italy, and to Prussia a territory equivalent in population to Venetia and Lombardy; should Prussia not declare war within three months, the treaty would expire. La Marmora, after an ineffectual attempt to get the Trentino formally included in Italy's prospective reward, signed the treaty on April 8.

The two statesmen had now one object in common, to make war inevitable. It was far from being so yet. The peace party in Prussia was hardly weakened. England

¹ La Marmora, *op. cit.*, 80, 127-128; Jacini, *op. cit.*, 165-166; Benedetti, *Mission*, 78; Ricasoli, *Lettere*, VIII. 11; Bonfadini, *Arese*, 338.

was using all her influence to patch up a reconciliation, and in the middle of April Bismarck, unable to resist the manifold pressure, consented to disarm, if Austria would do so at once. The situation was saved by an accident. The careless report of an English attaché led the Viennese government into a mistaken belief that the Italians were concentrating troops towards the Po. It replied to the imaginary danger by putting the army in Venetia on a war footing (April 26), thus giving La Marmora the excuse that he was waiting for to mobilize, and enabling Bismarck to break away from his engagement. But La Marmora found himself faced by a new difficulty. Bismarck, probably yielding to court influences, and relying on a forced interpretation of the treaty, informed the government of Florence, that Prussia was not bound to help, if Austria attacked Venetia before the allies declared war; and La Marmora feared not without cause that Austria would bribe Prussia into quiescence and launch all her strength on Italy.¹ The dishonourable repudiation was followed by an offer from Vienna, that must have sorely tempted his loyalty (May 6). The Austrian government, realizing at last how serious the position was, and rushing, as its wont was, from over-confidence to panic, offered to cede Venetia in exchange for a simple promise of neutrality, which would allow her to throw all her forces on Prussia, and compensate herself in Silesia. Italy might have gained at a stroke most of what she wanted, and La Marmora's colleagues would probably have accepted the gilded offer; but in his eyes national honour was more precious than any territory, and he refused to listen for a moment to the voice of the tempter.² He had his reward, for Prussia, alarmed by rumours of the Austrian proposals, now promised to stand by Italy.

La Marmora had hardly found himself safe from Prussian treachery, when he was in danger of check in another quarter. Napoleon had welcomed the signs of hostility between the

¹ La Marmora, *op. cit.*, 192-198, 305, 310; see Benedetti, *op. cit.*, 114. King William flatly denied the existence of any treaty with Italy: *Halt, Papiers sauvés*, 170.

² La Marmora, *op. cit.*, 208, 224-225; *Id.*, *Segreti*, 144-146; Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VIII. 13.

two great German Powers. He hoped to find in it his chance of gaining the two fixed objects of his later foreign policy, to advance the French border to the lower Rhine, and fulfil his promise to Italy that he would free her to the Adriatic. Some such success was more than ever needful to repair his broken prestige, shaken at home by the growth of the Liberal opposition, abroad by the imminent collapse in Mexico. His wiser policy no doubt would have been to make a frank alliance with Austria, to win at least the neutrality of Italy by insisting on the cession of Venetia, and crush, perhaps for a generation, the threatening growth of Prussia. But he had no longer the physical or moral capacity for great resolutions; French public opinion declared strongly against war; and, in common with most observers, he believed that Austria would be defeated by Italy but would certainly crush the Prussians. The natural sequel would be that Italy would gain Venetia, and Austria take Silesia; both German Powers would come out of the struggle exhausted and mutually exasperated; and as the price of his neutrality he would win the consent of Prussia to his Rhinewards march.¹ Bismarck, who in his own words was "much less a German than a Prussian," had been so influenced with the danger of a Franco-Austrian combination, that he was ready to pay the stipulated price. The details of what took place at the interview of Biarritz can only be surmised; but there can be no doubt that Bismarck agreed to "certain adjustments" between the Moselle and the Rhine. But he soon convinced himself of the difficulty of persuading King or people to surrender "a single clover-field" of the Fatherland, and tried to induce the Emperor to exchange his claims on the Rhine for Belgium.² Napoleon had little taste for the new proposals, and already felt misgivings as to the wisdom of his policy. He seems to have begun to fear the possibility of a Prussian victory, and, had Austria

¹ Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VIII. 12-13; La Marmora, *Un po' più di luce*, 117; Sorel, *Guerre franco-allemande*, I. 11-12; Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 34.

² Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VIII. 11, 15; La Marmora, *op. cit.*, 242, 275-276; Maupas, *Mémoires*, II. 186; Benedetti, *op. cit.*, 157, 165; Rothan, 1865, 50-53; Fyffe, *Modern Europe*, III. 385; Sorel, *op. cit.*, I. 15; Correspondence—War, 5.

then been willing to cede Venetia, he would probably have helped her to win Silesia. Prussia was so hateful to the French, that a war with her might have been popular, and even a corps of observation on the Rhine would have paralyzed her. But the Austrian government at this date made it a question of honour not to give up Venetia. The Emperor flew to his panacea for every difficulty, and whether in the hope of enlisting European support for his schemes and avoiding the arbitrement of war, or more probably to gain time and put off the need for decision, he revived the idea of a Congress (May 1). The proposals, that he intended to lay before it, would have given Venetia to Italy, part of Silesia to Austria, while Prussia would have Schleswig-Holstein and some of the minor states, and the Palatinate and Rhenish Provinces would pass under the protectorate of France as a step to ultimate annexation.¹ The Congress was still-born. Prussia and Italy refused to disarm beforehand; it was clear that Bismarck intended to go there only "to light the powder"; and Austria on her part resolutely declined to accede to any basis that involved the cession of Venetia. After some weeks of vain negotiation the Emperor gave up the Congress (June 5), and anxious to save some fragment of his policy, influenced probably by a generous belief that the consolidation of Prussia was in the interests of European peace, he seems to have thought of joining his arms to hers, if she would buy his help by the cession of the Moselle provinces. Whether or not the new scheme had taken shape, Austria took fright, and by one of those brusque changes in her policy, that were so frequent at this time, she purchased the neutrality of the Emperor, and she hoped perhaps that of Italy too, by a secret undertaking to surrender Venetia whatever the issue of the war (June 12).²

The failure of the Congress made war almost inevitable. But though King William was slowly reconciling himself to it, the peace influences in Prussia were not extinguished,

¹ Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 123-124; Correspondence—Conference, 3.

² Bonfadini, *op. cit.*, 353; Rothan, *op. cit.*, 169-171; Taxis-Delord, *Second Empire*, IV. 249; La Marmora, *op. cit.*, 258; Bismarck's circular of July 20, 1870.

and Bismarck found it difficult to invent a plausible *casus belli*. He asked Italy to take the initiative and attack Venetia; perhaps he was intriguing with the Party of Action to make a raid, that would irritate Austria into taking the offensive.¹ But La Marmora, wary as ever, feared that Prussia might draw back at the last moment, and, despite the Emperor's emphatic declaration of sympathy, he refused to risk Italy in what might be a single-handed conflict. His fears were perhaps at the moment not unfounded; but the encouragement of the smaller German States was enticing Austria to become the aggressor as she had been in 1859. On June 14 the Federal Diet pronounced for hostilities in her support; two days later the Prussians entered Saxony and Hanover, and on June 20 Italy declared war.

The declaration of war was welcomed with relief and thankfulness by the whole country. The enthusiasm was very real to free the Venetians and bring unity nearer completion. The democratic societies had kept feeling warm among the masses; to the patriots of Piedmont it was an article of faith, dearer than ever since their recent troubles; the King was impatient for action, and the sense of coming conflict woke the country to something of the old spirit of 1860. Parties vanished; La Marmora resigned the premiership for the field of war, and Ricasoli took his place with a coalition cabinet (June 20). The government was empowered to raise taxes by royal decree, the financial difficulty was tided over by making the paper currency inconvertible, and on Crispi's motion a drastic "law of suspects" was passed to repress conspiracy at home. Mazzini urged the republicans to cooperate, and Garibaldi, once again friendly to the government, was called from Caprera to take the command of the volunteers. La Marmora had, perhaps for diplomatic reasons, delayed enrolling them to the last moment, and in his undying distrust of them had prepared equipment for 14,000 only; but 30,000 at least presented themselves in a week, and the number would

¹ La Marmora, *op. cit.*, 259, 269, 272, 278.

have risen higher still, had the government been able to arm them. The Prussian alliance indeed was far from popular; the memory was fresh of her frank unfriendliness, and even now her policy had been so equivocal, that critics might well think her more the friend of Austria than of Italy. Radicals hated Bismarck for his scorn of parliamentary government, and despised the nation that had surrendered to him. La Marmora was almost alone in his belief in the Prussian army.

Still, if alliance there must be, it were better with Prussia than with France. And Italy went into the war in full confidence of success. Her army was numerically much stronger than any forces Austria could bring against her. She could put into the field 220,000 men, besides the volunteers and reserves, against the 100,000, which, apart from the garrisons, made up the Austrian strength in Venetia and the Tyrol. The public knew nothing of the mismanagement and perhaps corruption which crippled the army's organisation, or of the jealousies and incompetence of the generals, which paralyzed its strategy. Fanti was dead; and La Marmora and Cialdini, representatives more or less of different schools, were rivals. Both however were sensible and patriotic enough to see the evils of a divided command, and each had pressed the other to claim the commandership-in-chief. It would appear that the King's anxiety to be in evidence and the political advantages of magnifying him overbore the military argument, that pleaded for unity of direction.¹ The King took the command on the Mincio with La Marmora as chief of the staff, and Cialdini had a semi-independent command of the army of the Po.

There were two possible plans of operations. The Italians could throw their whole strength from the West against the Quadrilateral, and bring the Austrians to a pitched fight on the old battle-ground between the Mincio and the Adige; or they could advance from the Lower Po, force the Austrians to an action near Padua to save their communications, then in the event of victory leave sufficient strength to attack

¹ Chiala, *Cenni*, I. 263-268; La Marmora, *Schiarimenti*, II; Cialdini, *Risposta*, 6-7; Della Rocca, *Autobiografia*, II. 244 n.

the Quadrilateral from the East, and advance with the main army to the Danube, whence they might encourage insurrection in Hungary or join hands with the advancing Prussians in Bohemia. While La Marmora favoured the more cautious strategy, Cialdini advocated the forward scheme, and it was strongly backed by Usedom, the Prussian minister at Florence, nominally on his own initiative, more probably at the suggestion of Bismarck, who had long been laying the groundwork for a Hungarian rising.¹ Ricasoli, who was picking up the connections with the Hungarian and Slav conspirators that La Marmora had dropped, would have accepted the plan, and the King welcomed the prospect of fulfilling his dreams of two years before. But his generals vetoed the forward strategy. La Marmora distrusted and disliked irregular movements; he refused to "dirty his hands" by accepting Kossuth's offer of a Hungarian rising, and sent the volunteers to guard the Italian left in the Tyrol. Probably he never really examined Usedom's scheme, and rejected it because it was suggested by Prussia.² He was wise no doubt in his suspicions of Hungarian promises, for Kossuth's power was on the wane, and Deak was unwilling to break with the monarchy. And though La Marmora's generalship went to the extreme of caution, there were serious risks in a forward movement, while the Quadrilateral was intact and a Prussian defeat might allow the Austrians to throw all their strength into Italy. His intention to secure the fall of the fortresses and then advance by the Tyrol was sound if not brilliant strategy. Unfortunately the divided command spoilt it. A compromise was made between his own and Cialdini's plans without the merits of either, and the result was an ill-combined scheme to attack the Quadrilateral on both sides.

Hostilities commenced on the morning of June 23. So far as there was any concerted plan of operations, La Marmora was to cross the Mincio in force and draw the

¹ La Marmora, *Un po' più di luce*, 316, 331, 348; Id., *Schiarimenti*, 7-8; Cialdini, *Risposta*, 14, 16, 23; Tavallini, *op. cit.*, II. 345; Chiala, *op. cit.*, I. 442; Bonghi, *op. cit.*, 276-278; Guerzoni, *Garibaldi*, II. 419; Usedom's letter in *Norddeutsche Zeitung* of February 11, 1874, quoted in Ghiron, *Annali*, II. 241-242.

² La Marmora, *Schiarimenti*, 7; Id., *Un po' più di luce*, 343.

Austrians westward, in order to give Cialdini his chance to cross the Po near Ferrara. But La Marmora advanced before Cialdini was ready, and apparently was uncertain whether to make a simple demonstration or an advance in force. Finding no signs of the enemy, he concluded that the Austrians were concentrating behind the Adige, and decided to thrust himself between Verona and Mantua by occupying the historic heights between Valeggio and Sommacampagna. The movement began early on the morning of the 24th, and had it been successful, it would have placed the Italians in a very strong position. But on the preceding afternoon and night 90,000 Austrians had left Verona and forestalled the Italians on the heights. The able Austrian commander, the Archduke Albert, saw his opportunity in their blundering strategy, and hoped to crush the divided armies in turn. Still La Marmora had a great superiority in numbers, a greater superiority in artillery, and with fair generalship the odds were on his side. But no odds could make up for the amazing series of errors. One of his three corps was left in idleness in front of Mantua. The patrol service was neglected, the warnings of an Austrian advance unheeded, and on the morning of the 24th seven columns were advancing by seven different routes with no expectation of meeting the enemy. Two divisions of Durando's corps on the left were caught in turn in the winding roads between Valeggio and Oliosi, and after barely holding their ground through the morning were beaten back in disorder. Round Custozza Brignone's division, after making a fine resistance, had to retreat before midday. Two divisions from Della Rocca's corps on the right recaptured the heights and for an hour or two made ground; but the troops were exhausted by the heat and want of food, the artillery ran short of ammunition, and for some inexplicable reason La Marmora refused to allow another of Della Rocca's divisions, which could have well been spared, to march to their support. Custozza was evacuated at evening, and Della Rocca, who had allowed his remaining divisions, 24,000 strong, to be kept in check at Villafranca by a few thousand cavalry, could do no more

than protect the retreat. During the night the whole Italian force recrossed the Mincio, and had the enemy pursued to the bridges, a terrible disaster might have followed.

Custoza was no crushing defeat. Less than 90,000 Italians had been in action, and only Durando's division had been seriously disordered. The Austrian losses had been much heavier than the Italian, and the position on the Mincio was as good as at the commencement of the campaign, while the army of the Po had not moved from its positions. But what strategically was of small importance, was a terrible blow to the morale of the army. La Marmora's incompetence, Della Rocca's misjudged inaction, the light-heartedness with which the army had been sent on a leisurely parade in face of the enemy had shaken all faith in the generals. They in their turn had little confidence in their men, for though most of the army had fought well, some regiments had made a poor show. A sort of panic seized the generals. La Marmora telegraphed to Cialdini and Garibaldi in terms of utmost discouragement, and though next day he recovered from his dejection and prayed Cialdini to maintain his positions, Cialdini persisted in believing that La Marmora must continue his retreat, and drew back in the direction of Modena.¹ In fact, on the 26th La Marmora retired behind the Oglio, much harassed by the enemy's cavalry; and Garibaldi, who had just crossed the frontier at Caffaro, was ordered to fall back to protect Brescia. It was clear at all events that the divided command must cease. La Marmora did his best to atone for the blunder of Custoza by at once proposing that Cialdini should take the command-in-chief. The King promised Ricasoli not to interfere in the operations, and the two generals undertook to work in harmony. On the 29th it was arranged between them that Borgoforte should be attacked as a feint, while Cialdini crossed the Lower Po, and that as soon as La Marmora's forces had effected a junction with his, he should take the general command. The prospects of the Italians were still good. The army had regained

¹ La Marmora, *Schiarimenti*, 22-25; Cialdini, *op. cit.*, 10-13. The evidence is well collected by Tivaroni, *L'Italia*, III. 31-32.

much of its confidence; its superiority of numbers promised ultimate victory, and the fleet might be expected to drive the enemy out of the Adriatic. There is reason to think that even before Sadowa the Austrians had decided to evacuate Venetia.¹

Suddenly at the moment when the Italians were ready to resume the offensive, Napoleon telegraphed (night of July 4) that Austria had offered to cede Venetia to himself, to be retroceded to Italy, and that he proposed an armistice on this base. While the Italians had missed the victory that seemed so certain, the Prussians had falsified the forecasts, and dealt the enemy a blow, that laid her at the conqueror's mercy. The battle of Sadowa (July 3) confounded Napoleon's plans. He had done his best to help Austria by suggesting to the Italians that the Venetian campaign should not be conducted with too much energy.² Prussia's triumph threatened his designs on the Lower Rhine, and raised the phantom of a Prusso-Austrian alliance against himself. For the moment he thought of attacking Prussia, but found that he had not enough *chassepots*.³ He was again actively intriguing for the Moselle country, and Bismarck was still so possessed by the dread of a French attack that he was willing to offer either the Palatinate or Belgium, if France would help his own plans of aggrandisement in Germany.⁴ But the Emperor, true to his policy of balancing, was anxious above all to preserve Austria from collapse. To impose his mediation on the belligerents would save Austria's position in Germany, allow him to fulfil his promise to Italy, and retrieve something of his own prestige.

The Emperor's telegram was followed three days later by a threat, that if the armistice were refused, he would

¹ Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 140.

² La Marmora, *Un po' più di luce*, 310.

³ Rothan, 1866, 190, 219-232; Harcourt, *Drouyn de Lhuys*, 259-264; Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 141; Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VIII. 124; Beust, *Memoirs*, I. 320; Sorel, *op. cit.*, I. 19-23; Taxile-Delord, *op. cit.*, IV. 473.

⁴ Correspondence—War, 3-6, 70-71; Franco-German War No. 1, 2; Benedetti, *op. cit.*, 177, 185-197; Beust, *op. cit.*, I. 318. According to Benedetti in *op. cit.* and Correspondence, &c., 9, the draft treaty published in the *Times* of July 25, 1870, should be dated at July 1866 not 1867, as represented by Bismarck, and this seems to be the probable fact.

hand back Venice to Austria and perhaps make an alliance with her. It brought the Italians in face of a terrible dilemma. To risk a rupture with France was too great a hazard. Even if the threat of war were bluff, there was the danger that Prussia might be bought over, and Italy left alone to face Austria with Napoleon's sympathies against her. On the other hand to make peace, while the army was intact but with the stain of defeat upon it, to lose for the young nation its military prestige, to take Venetia as a dole of the patronizing foreigner, was a humiliation, which touched to the quick the self-respect of King and ministers and people. At first however the course of the government was clear. Honour and expediency alike forbade them to conclude any armistice without the consent of Prussia; and for a few days it seemed as if Prussia were anxious to continue the war. The Italians replied to the Emperor that they could conclude no armistice without Prussian consent, and even with that, made acceptance conditional on the immediate handing over of the Venetian fortresses and French support for their claims on the Trentino. In the meantime, in case Prussia eventually accepted the Emperor's proposals, Italy must make prompt use of the interval to recover her prestige in the field, to make Venetia hers by right of conquest and not by the Emperor's grace, to occupy the Trentino and Istria, that her claim to them might be strong in the day of negotiation.¹ The inaction after Custozza had caused grave discontent at home, and roused suspicions at Berlin that the Emperor's hint to slacken operations was making Italy play the traitor to her ally. The suspicion was unfounded, but it is difficult to explain the almost complete inaction of the Italian generals during the first ten days of July. Ricasoli urged a forward movement with all his vigour; but it was July 14 before the generals adopted most of Cialdini's original plan, and decided to leave part of the army to watch the Quadrilateral and help the volunteers in the Trentino, while Cialdini, who had already crossed the Po on the 8th, was to push on with the main force through Venetia, and send a detachment to occupy

¹ Ricasoli, *Lettere*, VIII. 50, 52, 68, 328; La Marmora, *Schiarimenti*, 36.

Istria. Between the 9th and 13th a large proportion of the Austrian troops were recalled from the Quadrilateral to defend Vienna. On the 14th and 15th Cialdini occupied Padua and Vicenza, while Medici was pushing on by forced marches up the Val Sugana to join hands with Garibaldi. On the 10th two of La Marmora's corps left their positions on the Oglio, and were hurrying to join Cialdini's army. He was soon making forced marches eastward with 150,000 men, and on the 25th he was ready to cross the frontier into Carniola.

Meanwhile Garibaldi's 38,000 volunteers had been making slow progress in the Tyrol against less than half their number of Austrians and Tyrolese under Kuhn. Brave as most of them were, they had no physical stamina for mountain warfare, and the little discipline they had at the best easily passed into demoralization. The officers had been chosen more on political than military grounds, and "men, who had made their proof in prison or parliament, led brigades with marvellous incapacity." Garibaldi himself had lost something of his old skill and vigour, and it was slowly that he could fight his way up the Chiese valley, and turning to the right at Storo, advance by the Val di Ledro towards Riva. Even when he had joined hands with his right wing after a keenly fought and not very decisive battle at Bezzecca, Kuhn could still have made a stubborn resistance, before the volunteers reached Trent. It was Medici's brilliant advance from the East that compelled the Austrians to evacuate the Southern Tyrol.

The small successes of the volunteers did little to replace the lost laurels of Custoza, and a great naval defeat brought new humiliation. The Italians had expected a prompt and easy victory by sea. But despite all the money that had been lavished on it, the fleet was quite unready; Persano had little capacity and less energy, and though he was probably no coward, his nerves were shattered by debauchery, and he perhaps had no liking for the war. The fleet lay idly at Ancona, declining battle with a weaker Austrian squadron, till peremptory orders drove Persano to take the sea and attack the Dalmatian island of Lissa with its impor-

tant naval station. He had partly succeeded in his object, when the Austrian fleet appeared (July 20). The Italians had a slight superiority in strength, which was more than balanced by the better tactics of the enemy, and in the fight that followed, they lost two of their ten ironclads. The Austrians could not drive them from their position, but the loss of the two ships and the suspicious behaviour of Persano made Lissa rank with Custoza, and forced Italy to drink the dregs of shame.

The real truth about Lissa was only known three days later, when the first false reports of victory changed to exaggeration of the defeat. But Italy's opportunity had already passed, when the news came that Prussia was about to sign preliminaries of peace at Nikolsburg (July 26). Bismarck had again played a disloyal part, and was negotiating for peace in defiance of his ally.¹ Prussia had nothing to gain by continuing the war; Bismarck still feared Napoleon's intentions, and either to buy his alliance or play with him till Russian support was secured, was offering him an offensive alliance that would give him Belgium.² The Emperor had no wish to have Belgium, he was still hoping to gain Luxemburg or the Palatinate, and was determined to prevent Prussia from absorbing South Germany. But he believed that his end would be best gained by peace; he was determined that Italy should give way, and knew that she could not help it. He insisted on the immediate acceptance of the armistice, backed away from his promise that Verona and Mantua should be handed over at once, and absolutely declined any engagement as to the Tyrol.³ All that was possible now was to keep a tight hold of the Trentino, and make the terms of retrocession less galling to the national honour. Ricasoli consented to accept the armistice on a basis of *uti possidetis*, and with the stipulation that Venetia should come to Italy without dishonouring conditions, and after a plebiscite which would enable Italy

¹ Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VIII. 334.

² Benedetti, *op. cit.*, 191-198; *Papiers secrets*, VI. 23-24; Sorel, *op. cit.*, I. 25-28; Rothan, *op. cit.*, 258, 338-341.

³ Diamilla-Müller, *op. cit.*, 282-284; Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VIII. 86; Halt, *op. cit.*, 173. Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 142 must be wrong.

to claim that she took the new province by the will of the people and not as a gift from France. The Emperor nominally endorsed the terms, but soon backed from his promise to support the *uti possidetis*, and Bismarck declined to make the claim to the Tyrol a *casus belli*.¹ Austria knew that she could safely refuse the Tyrol, and threatened to renew operations, unless the Italians evacuated it. Ricasoli would have dared very much rather than surrender Trent, or bow his neck to the Emperor's dictation. "The honour of Italy," he said, "is more precious than Venetia," but as reports came in of the critical position of the army, he gave way inch by inch, till his high claims ended in pitiable surrender. There was, indeed, no hope of a successful campaign. Austria had taken advantage of the armistice with Prussia to pour down troops, and already she had 250,000 men between the Isonzo and Trieste, and 60,000 in the Northern Tyrol. Italy had to choose between the dishonouring peace and a terrible war with almost certain defeat. A truce had been made a fortnight before, and on the eve of its expiration (August 11) the Italians were still obstinate. At the last moment Ricasoli made a belated surrender, and La Marmora, availing himself of the strange dualism, which divided the conduct of the negotiations between Florence and the army, had already determined to authorize the signing of the armistice on his own responsibility.² All that was really possible now was to obtain Venetia on more honourable terms. The Emperor, perhaps from sheer petulancy, seemed to wish to humiliate Italy as much as possible, and was even trying to rouse a cry in Venetia for a French protectorate. Ricasoli higgled over the details of retrocession and the plebiscite with a temper as obstinate as he had shown in 1859. The friction delayed the signing of the peace till October, and laid up fresh store of bitterness between Italy and France.

¹ Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VIII. 86-87, 162, 206; Diamilla-Müller, *op. cit.*, 286; La Marmora, *Segreti*, 148; Id., *Un po' più di luce*, 113; Bonghi, *op. cit.*, 266.

² Compare Cordova, *Discorsi*, I. 174, and Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VIII. 97-98, 162, 338, with Massari, *La Marmora*, 365-370. See Bonfadini, *op. cit.*, 347-350.

CHAPTER XL

THE COUNTRY AND THE CHAMBER

Italy ; its poverty ; its resources ; the government and trade ; the peasants. Educational progress ; morality ; character and culture ; social freedom. The electorate ; PARLIAMENT ; parties ; political purity. FINANCE : growth of expenditure ; efforts to reduce it ; growth of debt ; the taxes ; Finance Ministers. The Civil Service. Local Government. Social reform.

THE Kingdom of Italy now ranked with the Great Powers, though hardly as yet acknowledged to be one. Though in size it stood only eighth among European countries, in population it was fifth. Exclusive of the 700,000 still under Papal rule, it had a population probably in excess of twenty-five millions ;¹ despite the Apennines and the Maremma, the density was 221 to the square mile, or nearly as great as in the British Isles, considerably higher than in France or Germany.

The most salient statistical fact of Italy was its poverty. Its resources had indeed grown since 1840 ; then its foreign trade was probably under 900 million lire, now it exceeded a milliard and a half.² But despite the growth of trade there was a general dead-level of poverty. Though the whole taxation in 1865 only reached 635 million lire (£25,400,000), and the burdens—imperial and local—per head were less than 38 lire,³ they were enough to weigh the country to the ground. The whole taxable income of the country, real

¹ The population of the kingdom, excluding Venetia, at the census of 1861 was 21,777,334 ; that of Venetia at the census of 1857 was 2,454,526 ; in 1871 the population, including Venetia and Rome, was 26,801,000. Estimated population in 1898, 31,479,000.

² Maestri, *L'Italia*, 267–268. In 1886–90 it averaged over 2½ milliards, and since has remained almost stationary.

³ Bonghi, *Finanze*, 210–217. In 1897, 60 lire.

and personal, amounted to the poor total of two and a quarter milliards. The income-tax returns showed that only 1,313,000 persons (or about one in four of heads of families), had an income exceeding 250 lire;¹ and Sella calculated in 1868 that there were only 33,000 individuals or corporations with an income of over 10,000 lire (£400). How low was the standard of living may be seen from the salaries of officials. A Secretary of State had £800, the highest-paid judge £600, the Permanent Secretary of a Department £320; the average income of a parish priest was less than £32, of a schoolmaster under £16.

It is possible that Italy has not the natural resources to make her a rich country. She has practically no coal, her mineral wealth is small, her geographical position not very favourable to commerce. But on the other hand she has some of the richest land in the world; the accumulated labour of centuries has enormously increased its productiveness, and the Po valley is the classical land of irrigation. Her long and indented coast-line gives her special facilities of communication, and in certain industries she has the inherited artistic skill handed down through the generations. A great deal of her poverty was and is remediable. The trade of the country had been strangled by protection, by internal customs-barriers, by want of railways, by want of wise commercial legislation. Over two million hectares, much of it land of immense natural fertility, has still to be reclaimed from marsh and maremma.² Sicilian agriculture is even now in the medieval stage.

Much however had been already done by the new national government since 1859. The internal customs-lines had disappeared. The Piedmontese tariff, perhaps the most liberal of the Continent, covered the peninsula, and though it had destroyed some of the small protected industries, it had given a great stimulus to trade. The country was being rapidly covered with a network of railways, and between 1860 and 1868 the length of lines in working had

¹ Maestri, *op. cit.*, 255.

² Bodio, *Movimento Economico*, 47. 300,000 hectares were reclaimed between 1860 and 1890.

more than doubled, and now stood at 5524 kilometres.¹ The trunk lines were made, that to Brindisi being opened in 1865; the tunnelling of Mont Cenis was approaching completion, that of the St. Gotthard was projected. The lines of telegraph had doubled between 1860 and 1867. Large sums had been spent on harbours, irrigation, the reclamation of waste lands. The eight chief cities had spent 150 million lire on public works since 1860. Some progress had been made in technical education, though small in proportion to the need. The results were considerable. Trade had shared in the general quickening of the country. The capital of joint-stock companies jumped from 1,351,000,000 lire in 1860 to 2,576,000,000 in 1864, the main increase being in railways. There was a great development of banks, though they were still few. The Commercial Treaty of 1863 with France was leading to a rapid expansion of commercial relations, and more than one-third of the whole trade was with her.

But industrial life was still weak. Ricasoli complained bitterly of the commercial dependance on the French, that ships and machinery, coin and uniform, all had to be bought from them. There was no inventiveness, there were no manufactures of any importance except silk-spinning, and the chief exports were raw or unfinished articles,—silk thread, olive oil, fruit, corn, unrefined sulphur. But Italy is primarily an agricultural country. Only five and a half millions lived in towns of over 6000 population; Naples was the only city whose population exceeded 250,000, and only nine had more than 100,000. At this time more than twice as many persons were engaged in agriculture as in manufactures and trade. And agriculture, hit hard by the vine and silk-worm diseases, was crushed to the ground by the heavy taxes. In Lombardy the burdens on the land had increased, it is probable, since the days of Austrian rule, and two-thirds, if not more, of the income from the land went in taxes and interest on mortgages.² Many a small proprietor had seen

¹ Maestri, *op. cit.*, 117; in 1896, 15,447 kilometres and 3055 of steam tramways.

² L'Autriche dans le royaume Lombardo-Vénitien; Consiglio Provinciale di Bergamo, *Rettifica*; Parliamentary Papers 1891, Commercial No. 9, 56; Cantù, *Cronistoria*, III. 703.

his property sold to satisfy the tax-collector. In the South the suffering was even greater; for though the rise of prices consequent on the introduction of railways had helped the farmer, the increase of taxation went far to balance the benefit, and the labourers suffered from the double change. The poor had nothing to fall back on. There was a trifling number of Benefit Societies;¹ except in part of the Centre, there was a general dearth of Savings Banks, and Co-operative Banks were only in their infancy. Food, indeed, was cheap at first, thanks to the free trade in corn; but after 1866 the depreciated currency sent prices up, and even this boon vanished. That there was a certain improvement in the general condition of the people was acknowledged even by the enemies of the new kingdom, and among the artisans the gain was probably considerable.² But even at the best, it was unproportioned to their extravagant hopes, and there was a terribly black side to the picture. It is true that only one in 74 of the population had relief from the charities,³ which formed the only substitute for a poor-law beyond the free medical relief given by the communes; and probably there was nothing like the destitution of contemporary Ireland. But in 1867 there were deaths from starvation not only in the South, but even in fertile Lombardy. "The peasant of the richest land in free Italy," lamented Villari, "is still compelled by poverty to catch frogs."⁴

The poverty of the land went hand in hand with its ignorance. "The real Quadrilateral, that has stopped us," said Villari after the war, "is our seventeen million illiterates and five million dilettanti." The old governments had left a terrible mass of arrears, which it needed more than one generation to make up. Over three-quarters of the

¹ In 1862, 443; in 1872, 1417; in 1885, 4898; in 1895, 6725, with 994,000 members.

² Canth, *op. cit.*, III. 835, 863-864; Guiccioli, *Sella*, I. 188; Foreign Office Papers 1891 No. 211, 19-21.

³ Maestri, *op. cit.*, 157-158; in Venice more than one in four were said to be paupers: Villari, *Lettere meridionali*, 17. In 1880 the income of charitable estates was 96,000,000 lire, of which the hospitals had one-third.

⁴ In 1748 Hume wrote from Cremona: "Alas poor Italy. 'The poor inhabitant Starves, in the midst of nature's plenty curst.' The taxes are here exorbitant beyond all bounds": Burton's *Hume*, I. 266.

population in 1861 were illiterates, and in Naples and Sicily the proportion exceeded 90 per cent. Even in Piedmont and Lombardy one-third of the men and more than half the women could neither read nor write.¹ The new kingdom was doing much to grapple with the evil. Rattazzi's law of 1859 had organised the education of the country. It compelled the communes to provide elementary teaching, and made the state and local bodies jointly responsible for secondary and higher education. Attendance at an elementary school was free and compulsory;² and though the operation of the enforcing clauses was still suspended in parts of the country, there had been great activity in providing schools. The old governments spent about 8,000,000 lire annually in education; in 1868 the state and local bodies together expended five times as much. Turin, which in 1849 gave 50,000 lire to its schools, spent 280,000 in 1859, and ten years later nearly 700,000. Naples spent 50,000 in 1861, 820,000 in 1871. Few communes anywhere now were without a school. The figures of attendance are conflicting, but there appear to have been at this time about 1,500,000 children at elementary day schools and another 200,000 at evening and Sunday schools, and though these represented only one-third of those of school age, it was as high a proportion as in Great Britain at the time.³ But there were still great deficiencies. One-sixth at least of the pupils attended the inferior clerical schools.⁴ In parts of the South not much more than one per cent. of the population went to any school. Parliament spared no

¹ Maestri, *op. cit.*, 136; Ricasoli, *Lettere*, IX. 159; Morpurgo, *Saggi*, 390. Three-quarters of children of school age attended in Lombardy in 1862. In 1890 the percentage of illiterates in Piedmont and Lombardy had been reduced to 18, but in Sicily it was still over 60.

² See especially sections 319, 326.

³ Maestri, *op. cit.*, 139-140; Hippeau, *L'instruction*; Bodio, *op. cit.*, 16-17; Masserani, *Tenca*, 348-353; Galeotti, *Prima legislatura*, 170, 436; *Riv. stor. del risorg.*, I. 907. In 1887 2,307,000 children attended school, but still only 7.5 per cent. of population, as against 14.5 in France and 16 in England and Wales at the same date. In 1895 the proportion was 8.31 per cent.

⁴ Maestri, *op. cit.*, 140; Hippeau, *op. cit.*, 347; Villari, *op. cit.*, 106. Religious teaching was obligatory in the state schools, except where special exemption was claimed.

time for educational reform, and though it appointed a Commission in 1863, no result had come of it. A succession of twenty-four Education Ministers in the twenty years after 1848 made it impossible to bring their Department up to the level of its work.

The poverty and ignorance of the people bore their natural crop of crime. The *camorra* at Naples, the *mafia* in part of Sicily, the gangs of murderers in Romagna remained to prove how impossible it was to extinguish at once the criminal traditions, that had such hold in certain districts. Out of every hundred offences that came before the courts, fourteen were murders. It is possible that the freer life of the new Kingdom, even if it did not increase vice, brought it to the surface, and the indictment of the clericals had thus much truth. The popular religion had always been at best a matter more of sentimentalism than morality. The alienation of the people from the clergy, the discredit into which the Papacy had brought religion, no doubt meant a certain loosening of moral ties. But the immorality and crime were not nearly so serious as both Liberals and clericals represented them. It is difficult to compare criminal statistics, but the quantity of crime was apparently rather small, especially among the peasants.¹ Italy is a very sober country, and despite the national evil of the Foundling Hospitals, illegitimate births were fewer in ratio to population than in any European country except Holland.² The disease lay rather in the low level of character and thought among the cultivated classes. There was activity enough in certain directions,—in commercial development, in education, in journalism. But there was little strength or originality. Educated Italy seemed to have passed suddenly from youth to middle age, to have become

¹ According to Villari, *op. cit.*, 135, criminal offences per thousand of population were 2.4 among the peasants, 2.8 among the liberal professions, and 3.6 among proprietors; but this must be an under-estimate. In 1879-89 offences against person and property were just under 5 per thousand. Homicide is 20 times higher in proportion than in Great Britain, $3\frac{1}{2}$ times higher than in Austria, theft is considerably less than in France, England, and Germany, less than half that of the latter country.

² Maestri, *op. cit.*, 107.

serious, sceptical, pessimist. Italian thought, which expressed itself greatly under despotism, was struck with sterility as soon as it was free to expand. Utopias had vanished in the grim realities of the hard upward battling, and men, who under coercion would have been idealists and poets, were members of parliament, civil servants, merchants. The struggle for life in the poverty-stricken land was too intense to allow much room for poetry or art. Italy, divided between superstition and indifference, had lost her soul for a time. There was a certain amount of metaphysical thought; Villari in history, Sacchi and Lombroso in science won themselves European names; but Sacchi lived in Papal Rome, and except for Carducci's there was no poetry of worth.

It was this lack of character, which made the political life of the country so unreal, the results of liberty so disappointing. There was indeed a solid gain in political and social freedom. Life in the new kingdom was larger, happier, brighter. Literature and the press were nearly, though not perfectly free. The old police tyranny had gone, save for small backslidings of Spaventa and Menabrea, some scandalous treatment of political prisoners in the South, and the temporary coercion of the Law of Suspects.¹ Rattazzi's laws of 1859 retained a few vexatious restrictions on personal liberty, obliging every artisan to keep a libretto of character, which put him at the mercy of his employers' testimonials, and allowing no printer or lithographer to open business without a permit; the Civil Code of 1865 put young men up to twenty-five years under strictest subjection to paternal discipline.² But on the whole personal freedom was assured, except in the brigand-ridden provinces, where the Pica Law gave power to confine suspects to their own neighbourhoods. There was liberty of association, though the right was not always scrupulously observed by the government; and Liberals boasted with over-hasty assurance that no privileges or class injustice remained to be remedied. The franchise was in the main that of the

¹ Hansard's Debates, CLXX. 1437-1438; Garnier, *Royaume*, 84-93; Cantù, *op. cit.*, III. 695, 702.

² *Cronaca politica*, III. 411, 425; Civil Code, arts. 63, 221.

Piedmontese Electoral Law of 1848, which gave a vote to all except illiterates who paid 40 lire in direct taxation, and to tradesmen and manufacturers possessing property of a certain value. It was indeed less wide, as the reduced qualification of the poorer provinces had disappeared; nor does there appear to have been any agitation for its extension. Only one in 44 of the population had a vote, and in the worse-educated districts, such as the Marches and Umbria, the proportion went down to one in 75. Before the union of Venetia, the total electorate hardly reached 500,000.¹

The effective electorate was much smaller. Traditions of the old order, poverty, ignorance, the influence of the clergy made the political education of the people a matter of slow and painful progress. Their spirit was often more consonant to a despotism than to constitutional government; and the duties of citizenship—the national guard, service on juries, the franchise itself—were sometimes regarded more as a burden than a privilege. The electoral divisions had been formed *ad hoc*, and represented no administrative or historic areas; even the elementary distinction between urban and rural constituencies had been purposely neglected.² The divisions had no solidarity, and the number, who went to the polls, fell even below what their weak interest in politics would have sent. The great bulk of the devotee Catholics abstained, for though the Sacred Penitentiary decided in 1866 that it was lawful for Catholics to vote, the formula of “no electors no elected” had the mass of Papalist feeling behind it. Over two-thirds of the electorate systematically kept away from the ballot-boxes, and the Chamber was elected by less than 150,000 voters. The civil servants and all the tribe that answered to the beck of the government composed a large proportion of these, and ministers did not scruple to use their power. Even Ricasoli in 1867 regarded it as one of the first duties of a Prefect to work the elections, and so rigorous a Puritan as Lanza thought that

¹ In 1874 Italy had 2.2 voters per 100 of population, while France had 12.7 and Germany 10. The suffrage was extended in 1882. It now stands at 2,120,000 electors, or 6.7 per 100.

² Serra-Gropelli, *Cinque piaghe*, 32-36.

it was folly for the government to forego its influence, provided there were no corruption. The electors showed little comprehension of national needs; the absence of defined party programmes hid the real issues, and made it easy for elections to be lost or won on petty local questions or mere love of change.

It was inevitable that parliament should not rise above the low level of the electorate. The want of party organisation left the choice of candidates to little local cliques. In the unfortunate absence of any payment of members it was often difficult to find any one to stand, and the bulk of the deputies were either rich men, who had few sympathies for the masses, or poor men who became place-hunters or were forced by their narrow purses to neglect their work. "The politicians," said a Liberal journalist, "are the worst element in Italian life." La Marmora was a pessimist, but he spoke truth, when he set down the misfortunes of the country to "the mania for popularity, the mania for trickery, the mania for finding fault." The Chamber lightly unmade each successive cabinet, heedless of the hurt done by the constant changes of ministry. Important measures were pigeonholed, because precedence had to be given to petty local bills. The interminable essays, that passed for speeches in the Chamber, showed how deficient was the grip of the country's business possessed by ministers or deputies. Ministerial crises had greater attraction than constructive legislation; and in the almost entire absence of party discipline individual self-assertion was almighty, and personal humours and small conceits shortened the arm of parliament, and kept the country's wounds unhealed. Minghetti was wiser than Sella, when he desiderated the formation of two strong parties as in the English House of Commons.

But the wish was perhaps an impossible one. The real dividing line was between nationalists and clericals, and the latter were unrepresented in the Chamber. Had they been, it would have been well for all parties. The lines of opinion, that divided the different Liberal sections, were weak and shifting, and it is not easy to disentangle the threads that arranged the different party groupings. To a certain extent

the deputies from each of the old states acted together not only in local but imperial politics. There were well-marked Tuscan and Neapolitan and Lombard groups. The tendency was of course most strongly developed in the case of the Piedmontese. The Permanent, led by San Martino, formed a bond for men of widely different political views, whose only common aim was to defend Piedmont from the attacks of the *Consorteria* and retaliate with extreme animus on any government that favoured their rivals. The less partisan Piedmontese, some of them like Lanza and Sella and La Marmora, among the ablest and most reliable men in the Chamber, though unwilling to share in a factious opposition, sympathized largely with its dislike of the *Consorteria*. These local divisions obscured the more real party lines, though they did not obliterate them. The Right were no longer the clericalists of the subalpine parliament. They were now the ministerialist party, the party that claimed for itself the Cavourian tradition, that with its various sections more or less made up the supporters of every ministry, except in part Rattazzi's, down to 1876. The pure Right after 1864 belonged mainly to the *Consorteria*; they were constitutionalists, to a certain extent anti-clericals, but conservative in their social policy, half-hearted in their aspirations for Rome, a doctrinaire faction, with a partisanship as narrow and less excusable than that of the Permanent. Men of statesmanlike outlook, like Lanza or Ricasoli or La Marmora, though their principles were on the whole nearest theirs, could not ally themselves strictly to the incapable, intolerant groups, that followed Minghetti or Menabrea. Lanza, though he sympathized with much of their financial policy down to the Tobacco Scandal,¹ was more critic than friend; Ricasoli's broader social views and more genuine aspirations for Rome often carried him towards the Left, and he was always dreaming of a fusion of the honest men of the Right Centre and Left, who would follow a consistent and advanced Liberal policy. The Left Centre, though lineally descended from its namesake of the Piedmontese parliament, had fallen from its high estate, consisting in

¹ See below, p. 359.

the main of Rattazzi's personal following, and sharing in his discredit, till after 1867 it began to realize its weakness and made approaches to the more moderate Left. The Left had little more of common policy than the Permanent, and made a cave, in which anti-ministerialists of every colour took refuge. Its financial policy was inconsistent and impossible; it voiced the discontent at the heavy taxation, and opposed all new taxes, on whatever class they fell, but it had nothing to suggest in their place, and its desire for economy, though big in profession, vanished when it came to a practical point in the budget. But however inconsistent and ill thought-out, it had on the whole a Radical policy; it was impatient to go to Rome, it chafed under the French alliance, it had a crude programme of social reform. Gradually it parted into two more or less distinct groups. Crispi, despite his violence and crookedness, had won himself a position in parliament, and had abruptly broken from Mazzini in 1864 with the formula "the monarchy unites us, the republic would divide us." Round him were grouped some of the old leaders of the Party of Action, like Mordini, who had learnt responsibility and political instinct since 1861. They had, it is true, abandoned little of the factious opposition, which had driven Sella from their ranks and was now alienating Bixio; but they were ambitious to take office, anxious to form a coalition with Rattazzi's group and the Permanent, that would drive the Right from power. Beyond them under Bertani's leadership ranged the small group of irreconcilables of the Extreme Left, with an honester and more defined policy, scorning the diplomacy of Crispi and Rattazzi, though working on the whole with them, enthusiasts for social reform, and after 1867 more or less involved in the republican movement. They and the moderate men of the Right Centre are the only parliamentary groups that command respect.

But the Chamber had its good features. If it had few of the active virtues, it had more of the passive than legislatures of greater note. Most of the deputies came with good intentions, which were spoilt by their childish ineffectiveness and want of experience. When the Chamber could be made

to feel that the situation was serious, it could show much self-restraint. Its purity was high. Intriguing women and financiers never played the part that they did in France under the Second Empire. The scandal of the Southern Railways proved its sensitiveness rather than any prevalence of corruption; and though the Lobbia incident¹ probably showed that in 1868 corruption had got a footing, even then the number of deputies, who used their parliamentary position for personal ends, was very small. The Commission on the Southern Railways recommended that any deputy, who became director of a business subsidised by the state, or of any other undertaking that might conflict with the public interest, should vacate his seat. And though the Chamber watered down the proposal, it passed a resolution three years later that any deputy connected with a subsidised business must resign his seat, though he might apply for re-election.² No statesman came out of office richer than he went in; some died in poverty; "in Italy," boasted a deputy, "power has enriched no one;" and wanting in force and courage and bigmindedness as most of the statesmen were, their hands, with the possible exception of Bastogi's, were absolutely clean.

But the passive virtues were not enough to meet the tremendous task that fronted them. Parliament had to carry through a political and social revolution; it had to make up the arrears of generations and content an impatient and unassisting people. It had to unify the law, to remodel the civil service, to reform local government, to create a powerful army and fleet, to cover the land with railways and schools, to face the hundred problems of Church and State, of social reform, of the special difficulties of the South. And pitiless despot over every social question ruled the importunate problem of finance.³ It was sometimes said that the unity of Italy was more than anything a matter of money, and to a certain extent this was true. The young

¹ See below, pp. 359-60.

² Ghiron, *Annali*, II. 24-26; III. 4-6.

³ For the following figures see Sachs, *L'Italie*; Pasini, *Finanze*; Bonghi, *Finanze*; Id., *Pasini*; Maestri, *op. cit.*, 338-346; Galeotti, *op. cit.*; Minghetti, *At suoi elettori*, 15-35.

kingdom was ever struggling in the toils, that seemed dragging it down to bankruptcy. Heavy taxation was pulling back commercial development, and crushing the people, whose burdens were an easy taunt for the enemies of Italy at home and abroad to fling at her. In the early days of the kingdom few foresaw the danger. The suppression of six governments and four courts, the expected commercial expansion would make finance, it was hoped, an easy matter. The provisional governments of 1859 and 1860 had abolished taxes and contracted loans with a light heart, thinking that the young giant could bear uncomplainingly a few more burdens on his strong shoulders. In 1861 Pasini, the financial expert, estimated that the normal budget of the state would be hardly more than half a milliard of lire.¹

It did not take long to discover how cruelly fallacious these hopes were. Till Venice was won, the expenditure on army and navy was bound to be heavy, and until the economists forced a reduction in 1865, it never fell below 300 millions.² The country was clamouring for public works to develop its resources, — harbours, reclamation, roads. Railways were needed above all, and to encourage capital, it was found necessary to make considerable subsidies towards their construction, and some had been built entirely by the state. Public works and railways together absorbed between 1861 and 1867 over 100 millions a year. There was a heavy deficit on the working of the post and telegraphs, and it was not till 1865 that they began to pay their way. Already in 1861 the interest on the debt was 143 millions, and it was clear that the national expenditure would start with a total of 900 millions a year. "We are beggars," said Rattazzi, "in the pomp of an *hidalgo*."

Every Finance Minister after 1862 set himself bravely to reduce the expenditure. It was a weary task, for the whole financial system of the state was disorganised, and parliament cared more for economy in the abstract than in the concrete. But in spite of all obstacles the expenditure was brought down with astonishing success. Comparing the budgets of 1861 and 1867, 20 millions were saved on the

¹ Bonghi, *Pasini*, 851.

² Always understand *lire*, unless otherwise mentioned.

cost of the civil service, nearly as many more on the relief of the poor and allied expenditure, and much more important than either, drastic reductions in the military and naval budgets reduced them from 390 millions in 1862 to 191 millions in 1867.¹ On those portions of the budget, in which economy was possible, the saving between 1861 and 1867 reached 251 millions, or more than one-third. But every effort at economy was sterilized by the terrible mounting of the national debt. When Bastogi funded the debts of the various Italian states in 1861, the total indebtedness reached two and a quarter milliards, of which more than half was taken over from Piedmont. The debt was a light one, for it came to only 106 lire per head, while that of Great Britain at the same date was 694, of France 252, of Austria 161. But each successive budget showed the same appalling deficit; and in the eight years from 1860 to 1867 the accumulated deficits reached a total variously estimated at figures between three and a half and nearly four milliards. In eight years the country had spent the income of fourteen. Much of this was fairly regarded as extraordinary expenditure incidental to the consolidation of the new kingdom, and not likely to recur; and as such, it was argued, it might be legitimately liquidated by the alienation of national estate. Prudence was silent in the primary need of reaching equilibrium, and the property of the nation was sold with reckless haste. But the demesne lands, including the monastic lands which had been nationalized in 1855, only brought in 250 millions; in 1864 the state railways were leased for 95 years for 200 more; the sale of church lands under the Act of 1867 had not yet come into operation. The alienations did little to fill the abyss, and the Exchequer was driven back on loan upon loan. Fresh debt was issued to the value of 700 millions in 1861, a milliard in 1863, 670 millions in 1865. And as the price of issue sank from 80 to 70, from 70 to 66, barely 1600 millions came into the state coffers to represent the 2400 millions of fresh debt. The 5 per cent. interest on the debt advanced from 143 millions in 1861 to 225 millions in 1864, and 367 millions

¹ 372 millions in 1896.

in 1867,¹ nearly eating up all the saving that had been made in other items. The temptation to repudiate must have been great, and it says much for the honesty and wisdom of Italian statesmen, that not once did they palter with the seduction.

It was soon clear that instead of the half milliard, which had been the sum of the revenues of the old governments, Italy must be prepared to spend at least 400 millions more.² Cavour had foreseen the cost, and insisted that Italy "must pay and pay." He had made Piedmont pay in the '50s, but he had developed the resources of the country to an extent, that made the new burdens comparatively light. It was hoped that the statesmen of the new kingdom would follow in his footsteps. But none of them, as Ricasoli complained, "had the genius to create future wealth"; and indeed no financial skill could have developed the Centre and the stagnant South, as Cavour had developed Piedmont. New taxes had to be raised from the old resources. They were not indeed heavy, as compared with those of other countries; indirect and direct together (exclusive of local taxes) they reached barely 24 lire per head, while the French paid 47 and the Austrians 39. But they were heavy in comparison with the wealth of the country. The income-tax fell on all but the very poor; the land-tax reached nearly one-quarter, in some districts one-half, of the annual value of the land. And though the country often responded with a fine self-denial, the bitter cry of the taxpayer rang in the ears of every statesman. Each Finance Minister in turn found himself compelled to impose new taxes. Bastogi, who was in charge of the Exchequer from March 1861 to March 1862, proposed to raise the necessary new supplies by re-assessing the land-tax, by taxing income from personalty, which had hitherto almost escaped, and by putting an excise on drinks. But it was impossible during his brief year of office to give effect to his schemes. Sella in 1862 could do no more, and he repeated Bastogi's programme, except that for an excise on drinks he proposed to substi-

¹ In 1896 the interest was 687 millions, of which 123 millions were in annuities.

² In 1896, 1624 millions.

tute a grist-tax. Minghetti, who followed him after Rattazzi's fall, hoped to balance receipts and expenses by small new taxes, small readjustments, small economies. But in practice the only appreciable reduction he effected was in public works, and though he trebled the income-tax, the deficit remained almost as heavy as before. He had confidently expected to balance income and expenditure in four years. But equilibrium was a vanishing phantom; and when Sella returned to the Finance Ministry in September 1864, he found the country no nearer a solution of the problem.

For a time he carried out Minghetti's programme, though with more thoroughness. 63 millions were saved on the army, and the expenditure on public works was cut down to one-half. But Sella realized acutely the danger of a hand-to-mouth policy, and a year's experience in office strengthened his conviction of the need of some drastic remedy. New loans not only mortgaged the future of the country, but could only be raised at a disastrous price. Equilibrium must be reached by fresh taxes. But it was impossible to increase the land-tax without reassessment, and that would be a matter of years; the income-tax was already so unpopular, that it was difficult to collect it; an increase in the price of tobacco and salt had only diminished the consumption and brought in no more revenue; and commercial treaties prevented any increase of the customs, even if the country surrendered its free-trade policy. It is not so apparent why the excise was not extended to drinks and articles of luxury; perhaps it would have produced too little. Sella concluded that the only possible new tax of sufficient magnitude was a grist-tax, which would impose a small excise on all corn that passed through the mill.¹ Without being large enough to appreciably raise the price of bread, he calculated that it would bring in 100 millions, and this with 25 millions from a tax on doors and windows would bring the budget within measurable distance of equilibrium. Sella

¹ Guiccioli, *Sella*, I. III-III. According to Mr. Stillman's *Union of Italy*, the abolition of the grist-tax in 1882 did not produce any difference in the price of bread.

was prepared to face the unpopularity of his proposal; the business of a Finance Minister, he held, was to produce a satisfactory budget, and he was always apt to underrate political considerations or the remoter economic results of his policy. Perhaps he was right; the first need of the country was to pay its way, and the fear of bankruptcy and its paralyzing effects on trade were, he urged, the worst tax upon the poor. But the outcry was fierce; the nationalists had always denounced the grist-tax, as one of the crying evils of the old rule. In the terrible poverty of the masses anything that threatened to raise the price of bread was likely to lead to dangerous disaffection. Sella found it impossible to carry his proposals, and resigned at the end of 1865.

Scialoja, who succeeded him, was an economist of repute, in sharp contrast to Sella's practical, rather narrow, mind. In place of the grist-tax he suggested an excise on wines, boldly faced the reassessment of the land-tax, and proposed to extend the income-tax to rents. Such a programme, like Sella's, would have nearly produced equilibrium, but like his it shipwrecked in a Chamber that refused to face facts. In 1866 Italian finance seemed to have reached its lowest point. The war brought an inconvertible paper currency, and the price of government stock fell to 51 by the end of 1867. Italy was like a wounded horse, desperately struggling to get on its feet. In 1867 the monastic properties began to be swallowed; in 1868 the grist-tax was at length imposed by a reluctant Chamber, and the Tobacco Monopoly was leased. But light was beginning slowly to appear. In 1869 the deficits began to fall appreciably, and in 1875 Minghetti at last produced a budget, whose income balanced its expenditure.¹

Less urgent than the question of finance, but going to the roots of government, was the reform of the civil service. The Piedmontese had inevitably absorbed the bulk of the more important posts; they were trained in a careful school, honest, industrious; but they were slow to adapt themselves

¹ The deficits began again in 1885. The grist-tax was abolished in 1882; the forced paper currency in 1883.

to new circumstances, bound to their routine, unpopular both from their good and bad qualities. It would have been well, however, if all the civil service had been permeated with their steadiness and trustworthiness. Large numbers of employees had been inevitably taken over from the fallen governments, and continued their traditions. A crowd of place-hunters had swum into office in 1860, and infected the service with their idleness and dishonesty.¹ The degradation of the service was completed by a system, which allowed no entry by examination, no classification of different grades, which promoted from the copyist to the highest official by seniority or favouritism,² which paid writers above the market rate, but offered no salaries to attract first-rate men. It was "the triumph of incapacity." The whole machine of government creaked; the bureaucracy, so spoke Ricasoli from his knowledge, was vicious through and through. The revenue suffered, because the customs-officers and income-tax collectors avoided their work; laws were badly drafted, because there were no experts in the government offices to draw them, and they fell into the unskilful hands of parliamentary committees. Sometimes there was worse than incapacity; state documents of highest importance were lost or abstracted, and jobbery and embezzlement were not unknown.³ But the most threatening danger was lest the bureaucracy might rivet itself on the nation, and become "as fatal to liberty as an aristocratic caste." The people, it was said with some exaggeration, had abdicated its power into their hands; and illegalities, like those of the Southern prisons, were tamely acquiesced in. The Prefects were so many political agents of the government, and their irresponsibility (for they could not be sued for abuse of power, except by royal permit) and their enormous influence made them a standing danger to the working of free institutions.

The classification of the service, the introduction of

¹ See above, pp. 147, 170.

² Serra-Gropelli, *Cinque piaghe*, 94-110; Villari, *op. cit.*, 240; Galeotti, *op. cit.*, 365; Ricasoli, *Lettere*, VII. 137, 139.

³ Garnier, *op. cit.*, 50-51; La Marmora, *Segreti*, 98-100; Mario, *Nicotera*, 82.

competition, the reduction of its numbers would have done much to change it, and a strong ministry would have forced the reforms through parliament. But the more radical remedy lay in decentralization. Local government was in a more or less provisional and chaotic state. The Revolution found municipal government vigorous universally, and provincial government almost everywhere in possession of roads, secondary education, and charities. The provincial systems of at least Tuscany and Lombardy were in advance of that of Piedmont. When it became necessary to have a common model for the different states, a wise caution would have introduced a scheme, which had the good points of all. Rattazzi's hurried legislation in 1859 prevented any careful working out of such a scheme. His law placed communes of every size from the largest city to the smallest village in much the same condition.¹ The powers of the communal council and its executive committee were substantial; they covered the control of communal property, communal roads, elementary education, the national guard, electoral registration, certain duties towards the parish church and its priest. But the Syndic, who presided at the council's meetings, was a nominee of the government, and the Prefect and the Provincial Councils had wide powers of supervision. The latter were a mere skeleton, with few and vague duties beyond their power of controlling and assisting the communes and certain rights over charities. Rattazzi's law had no friends, and the opposition to the short-lived regional schemes gave additional impetus to the cry for increasing the powers and independence of the provinces. Minghetti's proposals² would not only have widely extended their functions, but freed them from any supervision by the Prefects. Ricasoli's bill of 1861 promised them the power but not the independence, proposing to hand over provincial roads, secondary schools, and asylums; but offering no release from the control of Prefect or Syndic. Two years later Peruzzi's bill harked back to the freer principles of Minghetti's proposals, widening the suffrage, ousting

¹ The text of the law in *Cronaca politica*, III. 261 *et seq.*

² See above, pp. 193-4.

the Prefect and Syndic from the chair of the councils, and adding the control of rivers, woods, and archives to the powers given to Provincial Councils in Ricasoli's bill.

But each measure shipwrecked in its turn, and it was left to Lanza to carry a measure in the hurried legislation, that preceded the transference of the capital in 1865. Lanza's law like Ricasoli's bill combined large functions and limited independence. The provinces were given powers over provincial roads and bridges, dykes and lighthouses, secondary and technical education, and lunatic asylums, with certain minor duties in respect of elementary schools and public health. The communes, in addition to the powers conferred under Rattazzi's law, were compelled to pay for the medical attendance of the poor (a principle deeply rooted in Italian municipal tradition), for the smaller ports and lighthouses, for registration of births and deaths, and the local police. But while the new law extended the functions of local bodies, it stereotyped their dependance on the syndic and the prefect. In France the Prefect was the agent of the government in all its working within the province, and the system could at all events claim economy and simplicity. In Italy his task was less to carry out the duties of the central government than to control the local councils. It was a costly and vexatious system, born of political fear, and maintained for political motives. And Lanza's legislation, however much in advance of Rattazzi's, left much unsettled. A country, whose civic traditions were so deeply rooted, chafed at the restrictions on municipal freedom. On the other hand fears of municipal extravagance, a doctrinaire tenderness for minorities, evidence of local corruption in the South supplied arguments for keeping the councils under tutelage. It is curious that parliament did not reconcile the conflicting theories by insisting on the obvious distinction between urban and rural communes. The 8300 communes of Italy ranged through every gradation of size from the small communes of the North and Umbria and the Marches to the agglomeration of villages, that made the commune in Romagna and Tuscany and the South, and to the cities small and great.

That Milan or Naples should have the same power as a tiny alpine village was an absurdity, that points to the lack of constructive statesmanship in the Italian parliament.

Finances, civil service reform, local government, these with the relations of church and state were the pressing domestic problems of the decade. It is small wonder if no time was left for social reform. Only a voice here and there was heard to plead for the agricultural labourers, who on the large Lombard and Sicilian farms were little better than serfs, or for the miserable sulphur-workers of Sicily, where by some strange fatality the liberal mining legislation of the kingdom, which separated the ownership of the minerals from that of the soil, did not apply.¹ Even Crispi's and Bertani's programmes offered nothing to relieve the misery of the poor, except so far as they would have changed the incidence of taxation. It is probable, indeed, that in the towns little could be done, except in sanitary reform.² In a country, which was practically untouched by modern industrial conditions, legislation for the artisan was hardly needed, and even Sella's proposal to legalize trades-unions had not the urgency, which it would have had in a manufacturing country.³ But legislation was sorely needed for the peasant. The first and most obvious remedy for his poverty was indeed one of taxation. But the heavy taxes had not reduced the *mezzaiuoli* of Tuscany to the abject indigence of the peasant of the South. The sale of the ecclesiastical and demesne lands offered a great opportunity to increase and fortify the small proprietors, as the French had done at the beginning of the century. The chance was largely lost through the pitiable carelessness of parliament. It seems indeed that in Naples much was done to carry out the still half-neglected law of 1806, and sell demesne lands in small parcels.⁴ But an attempt to break up the ecclesi-

¹ Villari, *op. cit.*, 21-25; Bianchini, *Condizioni*, 9, 28.

² The death-rate has fallen from 30.06 in 1862-66 to 26.52 in 1888-1890, and 25.03 in 1893-1896.

³ The Penal Code of 1859 reproduced the provisions of the Piedmontese law respecting strikes (see above, Vol. I., p. 105), but applied them to lock-outs also. At this time the only organized trades-union was the printers'.—Foreign Office Papers 1891 No. 211, 30-31.

⁴ Bodio, *op. cit.*, 48.

astical properties of Sicily broke down, when the leases were offered in the open market and bought up by the well-to-do.¹ The rich crown-lands of the Val di Chiana were sold by private contract. The clause in Rattazzi's Church Lands Act of 1867, providing that the monastic lands should be sold in small parcels and with deferred payments (though in this case too by auction), is the only serious instance in the decade of parliament's care for the peasant. It is perhaps this negligence, which more than anything else makes the rural classes of Italy so often the easy prey of the reactionary and the clerical.

¹ Ghiron, *Annali*, III. 62; Ricasoli, *Lettere*, VIII. 289; but see Bianchi, *Condizioni*, 48.

CHAPTER XLI

THE FREE CHURCH BILL

SEPTEMBER 1866—APRIL 1867

After Custoza. Sicily ; Palermo revolt. Ricasoli's home policy. DISSOLUTION OF THE MONASTERIES ; attitude of Rome ; Ricasoli and the church ; Tonello mission ; THE FREE CHURCH BILL ; it is defeated. The elections ; Ricasoli resigns.

VENICE was won, but the price was a heavy one. The war had been one of disaster by land and sea, unredeemed by the small successes of the volunteers. Superiority in numbers had gone for nothing, when crippled by bad organisation and incompetent leading. Austria had yielded, because Prussia not because Italy had conquered her. The Trentino and Istria had been missed ; Venetia had come as a present from the foreigner, and Napoleon's bounty was even more offensive in 1866 than in 1859. Italy, betrayed by an unscrupulous ally, discredited by her failure in the field, her tottering finances, her beaten diplomacy, was isolated and friendless. She woke from a dream of glory to a disillusioning, that destroyed her faith in men and institutions. No country could breathe easily under the weight of a Custoza or a Lissa. Success would have done much to heal ; failure, had it been the sequel of a glorious struggle, might have knit the nation together ; but the ignominy of deserved collapse, the maddening sense of national dishonour bore its crop of recrimination, and the rot went on its devastating way with doubled power. Indignation with the leaders, anger at the incapable officialism, whose carelessness had done so much to cause defeat, awoke a feverish discontent ; and though Venetia was rejoicing in its deliverance, through all the rest of Italy there was a brooding sense of something rotten in the state, that might easily bring disruption and

mischievous. Nobody indeed thought for a moment of restoring the fallen dynasties. But civil war was often on men's lips; the prestige of the government was shaken almost beyond recovery; the volunteers had again become an independent power, and during the negotiations for peace there had been a real danger that they would attack the Austrians on their own account. Mazzini was fishing in the troubled waters, and his re-election time after time at Messina, as often annulled by the intolerant folly of parliament,¹ the 40,000 signatures to the petition praying for his amnesty, were symptoms of the political discontent. And though it was a superficial diagnosis, there were many who thought with him that "it was the monarchy that corrupted." The King was no longer the nation's figurehead and idol; Turin was still venting on his head its wrath at the Convention; and the scandal of his gross life, his debts, his unwise meddling in party struggles, his diminishing regard for constitutional proprieties made him the target of increasing criticism. But at present the expression of discontent was not so much republican, as vaguely socialist or anarchist. The people forgot how much had been done, how tremendous had been the obstacles. There was wide, sometimes angry, repining among the working classes that Unity had not brought the expected millennium, that taxation had grown, that the commercial progress had not fulfilled the exaggerated hopes, that the deep social wounds of the South were still unhealed, that the government was in the hands of a bureaucracy, that often imitated the petty tyranny and corruption of the old system. And beside the discontent, that found a parliamentary outlet, there were old elements of disorder, that had been silent in the enthusiasm of the national struggle, but now began to cry aloud, and needed a generation of wise and firm government to extinguish them.

The discontent was greatest where the misery was greatest. Six years could do little to cleanse and regenerate the South. On the mainland indeed and in Eastern Sicily there was no fear of serious disorder. La Marmora's strong rule at Naples (1861-64) had gone far to crush both

¹ Wilkes' case is an obvious parallel.

brigandage and *camorra*. The tardy cooperation of the French, the bravery of the troops in this inglorious frontier warfare, the wise severity of the Pica Law, though they could not eradicate brigandage, prevented it from being again a serious peril; and a raid on the camorristi (September 1862) had allowed Naples to breathe in security. But in part of Sicily the symptoms of disorder, social and political, had only grown more threatening. Separation indeed was hardly heard of except as a Bourbonist cry; but the strong desire for some form of Home Rule remained. The government had centralized even more than the Bourbons had done, and while the lawyers and civil servants of Palermo were suffering from the removal of law-courts and government offices, centralization had brought no compensating advantages. The constant changes of Prefect prevented the government from introducing the strong steady rule that was needed most of all. "Schools and roads" were still the radical remedy for the island; but their operation must be slow, and in the meantime Sicily needed a firm government, that would cow rebellion, whether clericalist or anarchist, rally the middle classes and the peasants to itself, and give time for a more civilized and order-loving generation to grow up and take root. But this was just what was lacking. Crime was fearfully prevalent; a responsible witness stated that there were fifteen hundred murders in the island in two years; men were stabbed in Palermo in full daylight; in parts of the island travellers had to go in caravans for safety, and at Girgenti the people, finding the government powerless to protect, had turned on the brigands with lynch law. In one district the landlords had not dared to collect rent; in others the peasants themselves paid black-mail to the banditti. In the neighbourhood of Palermo the *mafia* was still waiting for the chance it had lost in 1860 to loot the palaces of the capital. Taxes had grown here as everywhere, though the island had special financial privileges; while railways had been feverishly pushed forward on the mainland, the two short sections from Palermo to Termini and from Messina to Catania were all that had been completed

here.¹ The conscription had added fuel to the discontent; Sicily had lost its old immunity from military service, and the opposition to the levies had been so desperate, that in a very few cases the soldiers retaliated. Angry protests against their reprisals had been made from time to time in parliament, and at the end of 1863 Garibaldi and a score of other deputies had resigned, when the government professed itself impenitent. But the criticism took no account of the difficulties that faced the authorities. There had been in Palermo alone four thousand refractories or deserters in the first three years of Unity. Three score of *carabinieri* in their search for deserters had been shot from behind hedges, and again and again the troops, when fired at, had forborne to retaliate. And the government found no support from any Sicilian party. The Liberals were afraid to come forward. The autonomists and Garibaldians had for six years kept up an active and unscrupulous attack; and the people, taught to hate the new rule, naturally began to turn to the partisans of the old. The more reputable Garibaldians repented too late of their mischief; and the discontent they had fomented fell into the hands of priests and Bourbonists, who took their cue from Rome, and perhaps hoped for a general rising in the South, of which a Sicilian outbreak would be part.² The cry for the dissolution of the monasteries incensed not only the monks, but the devotees who followed them and the swarms of idle poor who lived on their alms. The clericals organised the revolt of crime and poverty. The government was blind and helpless, and the discredit of the war brought the crisis to a head. On September 16 bands of insurgents invaded and seized Palermo. The masses of the capital had no sympathy with them, but they were afraid to risk themselves,³ and the troops could barely hold the castle and government buildings till reinforcements came up four

¹ Ciotti, *Palermo*; Ghiron, *Annali*, II. 355-356; III. 56-75; Ricasoli, *Lettere*, VIII. 289, 291, 319-322; IX. 5, 37; Tavallini, *Lanza*, II. 324-331; Govone's speech in the Chamber, December 5, 1863.

² Ciotti, *op. cit.*, 16-23; Ghiron, *op. cit.*, II. 352-353; Tavallini, *op. cit.*, II. 326, 329-331; Castelli, *Carteggio*, II. 155, 163; Balan, *Continuazione*, II. 718-720; Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VIII. 289; Un patriota italiano, *Condizioni*, 32-33.

³ Ciotti, *op. cit.*, 40, 49.

days later. In the interval sheer anarchy had reigned ; the insurgents gave their chief efforts to an unsuccessful attempt to open the prisons, and to the cry of "the republic and religion" palaces were looted and soldiers burnt alive in an orgy of savagery. But behind the criminal gangs stood those who had urged them on ; and though there is much that is dark in the history of the revolt, there can be little doubt that in the main it was the work of the same clerical-anarchist alliance, which had scourged the Neapolitan provinces five years before.

The outbreak brought home the danger of the whole situation. Ricasoli saw that the hardest task before him was to stay the dead-rot, to purge and invigorate the civil service, to develop industry and education, to restore equilibrium in the finances without fresh taxation. He had talked of a "more than democratic programme," and tried more than once to persuade Crispi to enter the cabinet. Coercion, which had held revel under the Law of Suspects, must be abandoned, except where brigandage had broken out again. "It is better," he said, "to spend the money of the state on public works than on repression and prisons ;" he showed an almost doctrinaire anxiety to raise the state of siege at Palermo, and appointed the young Liberal noble, Di Rudinì as Prefect, to inaugurate a milder rule.

Rome was, now as always, his chief concern. In the summer, a few days after Custozza, parliament had at last dissolved the monasteries. The Act excepted only a few houses, especially known for their educational or charitable work, but it gave small pensions to the existing inmates,¹ and permitted nuns to live on in their cloisters, compensating them for any dowry they had brought into them. The monastic lands and all other ecclesiastical real property except parish benefices passed to the state and were to be sold ; but five per cent. of the capitalized value, which was estimated at 1700 million lire, less the cost of administration, was to be paid annually to an ecclesiastical fund, which was further augmented by a quotum levied on bishoprics and richer benefices. The fund was first to pay the pensions of the

¹ 360 to 600 lire for monks, 250 for begging friars.

monks and nuns, and relieve the state and communes¹ of any remaining ecclesiastical charges. The income of any property, which had gone in the past to the relief of the poor or education, was to be handed over to the communes interested, and applied to like purposes. The whole of the residue of the fund was to go to increasing the incomes of the poorer clergy. In its treatment of the monasteries the Act stood midway between Vacca's bill and the law of 1855. It did not make the large exceptions of the earlier law, but it spared a few of the more famous houses. It did not make the needs of the treasury paramount, as Vacca's bill had done; but in other respects, it broke completely from the Cavourian tradition, giving the administration of the ecclesiastical fund to a board appointed by the government and parliament, and omitting all provision for the reform of the church.

The dissolution of the monasteries, comparatively lenient though it was, naturally did not increase the good-will of Rome, especially when the ringleaders of the anti-national clergy were struck at under the Law of Suspects. There was still, it is true, a small party among the prelates, who wanted reconciliation, who would have accepted Ricasoli's Free Church scheme now, as they would have accepted Cavour's in 1861.² Some of the bishops were weary of exile, and longing to return to their sees. Antonelli, little as he cared for spiritual things, was sufficient statesman to see that Rome could not always refuse compromise, and with the impending departure of the French he had abandoned his non-possumus attitude. But with these exceptions, the Roman court was resolute as ever to harden its heart against Italy.³ The Pope veered between the two parties, more often leaning to the latter. He could not forget the spiritual welfare of his Italian flock, he was very anxious to fill the vacant sees, he had a certain strange yearning for Victor Emmanuel's friendship, and never quite lost his pride in Italy.⁴ But he

¹ Except communes in Sicily, where an old law remained in force. The fund appears to have been so unable to meet the charges on it, that by 1879 it was in debt to the Treasury to the amount of 61 million lire.

² Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, IX. 239, 309. See Balan, *op. cit.*, II. 740.

³ Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, IX. 54, 153; Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 165.

⁴ Balan, *op. cit.*, II. 723; Gregorovius, *Diarii romani*, 312; Cantù, *Cronistoria*, III. 731.

would do nothing, that seemed to recognize Italian sovereignty over the lost provinces; Italy and the Revolution were still synonymous to him, and in the testiness of age he cursed her, because she had conformed her ecclesiastical laws to those of the civilized world. He feared that if the church loosed one stone of her constitution, she would open the floodgates to revolution and immorality.¹

Ricasoli was profoundly saddened by the widening gulf between Italy and the Papacy. "Let us have religious peace and avoid schism," he cried. But while he agreed with the Conservatives that "the great question was not to defeat the clergy and enrich the state with their spoils, but reconcile the church to modern society," he saw that safety lay only in reform. "We must purify the church," he said, "and bring it back to its origins; its security lies in putting itself at the head of modern civilization, not in fighting it."² He still, despite disillusionings, seems to have had some hope that Pius would speak "the one unworldly word that would save everything." And bitterly as he resented the spirit that ruled at Rome, he recognized that there had been intolerance on the other side, that the scandal of the vacant sees could have been avoided, that the secularization of the monastic and episcopal buildings had been executed with unnecessary harshness.³ His impatience to have Rome had cooled since the days when every delay had galled him. Everything was postponed to his absorbing anxiety to conciliate the church and create no stumbling-block to the religious life of the country. "Italy can wait for Rome, till the ripening of the fates brings her assured triumph, she can prosper even with the capital at Florence," he said; but again, as in his ecclesiastical legislation he could not be content, as the Conservatives were, with the *status quo*. There must be no more foreign intervention, Rome must cease to be a centre of intrigues against the kingdom, Europe must recognize that she was Italian terri-

¹ Balan, *op. cit.*, II. 722; Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, IX. 74, 107, 216, 275.

² BonCompagni, *Chiesa*, 333; Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, IX. 7, 199; X. 39-40.

³ He saved San Marco from being used as a government office, and protected the House of Loreto from secularization.

tory and not "a feud of the Catholic world." Granted this, he would accept compromise on one of two lines. Either, as had been proposed from time to time since 1860,¹ the Pope might have the Leonine City (the part of Rome adjacent to St. Peter's and the Vatican) with a strip of territory to the coast; or Rome might be the Italian "capital of honour," where the kings would be crowned by the Pope, while Florence remained the seat of government.²

But he was ready to give up these and every political aspiration, if he could win the good-will of Rome. The moment was a critical one. The French were on the point of leaving; the Convention bound them to evacuate by December 11, and three days later the last troops sailed from Civita Vecchia. All Europe was waiting in suspense to see what the Romans would do. Some of the Moderates were organising a legal movement, which, they hoped, would compel the Pope to call in the Italian government to arbitrate between himself and his subjects. The plan won the King's support, and had its friends in the cabinet; but Ricasoli seems to have feared that if any strong agitation occurred at this moment, the Pope would probably fly, France would intervene again, and the chance of reconciliation be lost for a generation. Had his object been merely to gain Rome, he might perhaps at this time have safely defied France, and, assuming that the Romans were in earnest, have gone to Rome in 1866. But he confined his aspirations to the freeing of the border provinces, and, rather than weaken the chances of peace, he used his influence to restrain the Roman Liberals from action in the city.³ He was prepared to forget all Rome's wrongs to Italy, and hold out the olive-branch. Keeping in reserve the Free Church scheme, which offered Rome what she possessed in no European country, he made it his policy

¹ Un Romano, *Sulle questioni urgenti*, 52-54; Liverani, *Il papato*, 248 n.; Pasolini, *Memoirs*, 259.

² Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VIII. 305-306; IX. 11-12, 76, 83, 98.

³ Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 165-166, 171, 175, 182-193, 201, 264; Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VIII. 248, 305; IX. 102; Frigyesi, *L'Italia*, 108, 293; Bianchi, *Mentana*, 81; Nicotera's speech of November 25, 1867. The whole matter is very obscure. See below, p. 339.

to carry out the suppression of the monasteries as leniently as possible and fill the vacant sees. He permitted the absent bishops to return (October–November), and the friendliness, with which his action was met by the more reasonable clerics, encouraged him to negotiate for the settlement of other burning questions spiritual and political.

The Pope had sent a message through Lord Clarendon that he was desirous to reopen the Vegezzi negotiations, and early in December Ricasoli sent an agent to Rome, abasing himself to write a flattering letter of introduction to Antonelli. The main business of Tonello's mission was to effect a compromise on the nominations to the still vacant sees. Ricasoli offered to waive the oath of allegiance, to surrender the *placet* for purely spiritual acts, to make the *exequatur* for the temporalities as much a formula as possible. But he refused, pending the introduction of the Free Church, to give up the principle of the *exequatur*, and insisted that the state, as representing the laity, must have a voice in the appointment of bishops. Antonelli conceded the latter point, but either he was playing a double game, or the forces against conciliation were too strong, and he still declined any concession, that implied a recognition of Victor Emmanuel's sovereignty over the lost provinces. Ricasoli, despairing of an agreement on principles, fell back on a temporary arrangement for the vacant sees. Even then the negotiations limped, for Rome vetoed all nominees of the government, who were known opponents of the Temporal Power, and proposed men, who were notoriously unpopular or hostile to the government. It was only after protracted treating that fourteen names were agreed upon. And when Tonello approached the political matter of his mission—common action for the suppression of brigands, a customs-union, postal arrangements—again the irreconcilables overbore Antonelli, and the Pope met Ricasoli's olive-branch with the suggestion that the Italian government was inspired by the devil.¹

Ricasoli made a last effort for peace. He brought up his reserves, and introduced the Free Church Bill, baiting his offer with the proposal to put the sale of the monastic

¹ Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, IX. 126–127, 175.

and church lands into the hands of the bishops (January 1867). The bill embodied Cavour's principles. It proposed to free the Catholic church from all the control which concordats had given to the state, to surrender the state's right to nominate the bishops, to give up the *exequatur* and *placet*. On the other hand the disestablished church would cease to be the religion of the state, it would lose the subsidies that had been paid by the treasury or the communes, it would be in the eyes of the law no more than an ordinary corporation, free in the management of its property and internal discipline, and governed by its own canon law, which would be a matter of contract binding on members of the church and might be enforced in the temporal courts, so far as it did not conflict with the law of the land.¹ The second part of the bill concerned the sale of the estates of the suppressed monasteries, and included with them all church lands whatever. The Act of the previous year, passed amid the excitement of the war, had only settled the principle of the question. There were three possible ways of carrying through the sale of the lands: it might be done by the state, as was contemplated by Vacca's bill, and intended though not decided by the recent Act; or as the church reformers had often asked, it might be entrusted to parochial and diocesan boards, on which the laity would have a preponderating voice; or, forgetting the claims of state and laity, it might be given over to the bishops. In his absorbing desire to conciliate them, Ricasoli abandoned his old position, and adopted the latter course. If the bishops consented, the operation was to be placed in their hands; they were to complete the sale within ten years, and pay over, partly to the state, partly to the communes, a capital sum of six hundred million lire, or about one-third of the total, as roughly representing the share of the church's income, which had been devoted to the civil purposes of charity and education. Subject to the rights of the parochial clergy and the pension-claims of the dispossessed monks and nuns, the bishops were given absolute control of the residue.

¹ The analogies with the Irish Church Act are many, and it would seem as if the latter were partly drafted from the Italian bill.

If they refused to undertake the task, the state was to effect the sale and pay them an annual income of fifty million lire.¹ To expedite the payment of the state's share, the government contracted with a Belgian bank to receive the six hundred millions in four years, the bank to collect it from the bishops in instalments spreading over ten years, and take one-tenth for its commission.

The bill met with a chorus of condemnation. Ricasoli was so convinced of its necessity and justice, that he had hardly stopped to consider its chances of acceptance. The bishops, though with some division of opinion,² rejected the offer. Not all the substance of advantage that it promised could make them surrender the shadow of prestige that it took away. That the Catholic church should lose its prerogatives, that it should be placed on the same footing not only with other religious denominations but with any joint-stock company, that the civil courts should be interpreters of Canon Law, seemed an intolerable humiliation. The liberty of the church, they retorted, was a mockery, when the state refused to recognize monastic vows, when it forbade the church to hold landed property, and took from it a large share of its wealth with the ill-disguised object of relieving its own depleted exchequer. But the fiercest opposition came from the Liberals and Democrats. The return of the bishops had been answered by threatening demonstrations against the more unpopular of them. The Tonello mission had been watched with many misgivings; it seemed to smack too much of a concordat, and the feeling was general that the government was ready not only to surrender the prerogative of the crown and the dignity of parliament, but make concessions that would imperil the supremacy of the state. The Free Church Bill seemed to confirm their suspicions, and freethinkers who longed to abase the church, nationalists who resented its hostility, the large section that inherited the traditions of state control and had never accepted Cavour's theories, joined hands in attacking what

¹ The text of the bill in Frigyesi, *op. cit.*, 597-602; see the Report of the Ministry on it in *Ib.* 581-592.

² Frigyesi, *op. cit.*, 564; Balan, *op. cit.*, II. 736.

seemed a surrender of precious rights, a legacy of untold danger to a future generation. Even many of those, who held an abstract belief in the freedom of the church, refused to accept a scheme, which partially neglected the interests of the lower clergy and laity, and threatened to stereotype the absolutism of the bishops and Rome. "Let us reform the church first and then we will talk of freeing it," said Giacomo Durando; while the Syllabus was fresh in men's minds, it seemed treachery to progress to give fresh liberties to the men who had heaped their anathemas on it. The surrender of the state's right to nominate bishops meant that the episcopate would be handed over to the most obscurantist and irreconcilable section of the church. Men, whose canonical oath bound them "to defend the dominion and prerogatives of the Pope, and pursue and combat heretics and schismatics," would have small mercy for Liberal clergy or church reformers. And though the bill specially protected the rights of the lower clergy, its recognition of Canon Law seemed on the surface to give the bishops, as of old, the support of the civil arm. The more intolerant anti-clericals, like Garibaldi, denounced concession to the "fatal sect of priests," and claimed that ecclesiastical property was a national estate, to be appropriated to the needs of the state or the relief of the poor. There were hints that if the government surrendered to the church the cause of freedom, it gave an excuse to revolution. "The church disarmed," said a pamphlet of the time, "is not the church dead: we must cut off its head at Rome."¹

It was soon evident that the bill had no chance of passing. Even had the prejudice against it been weaker, the premier's want of tact would have wrecked its prospects. He had neglected to submit it to the cabinet; and his colleagues, who had only tolerated the negotiations with Rome, were still more lukewarm for the Free Church. As the agitation spread in the country, Ricasoli lost his balance. With an inconsistency to his own principles, that admits of no defence, he strained the law (February 2) to proclaim

¹ Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, IX. 351-532; Frigyesi, *op. cit.*, 129, 149; Balan, *op. cit.*, II. 739.

public meetings in Venetia, where the opposition was most outspoken. It was easy for the Left to attack him as a reactionary, a section of the ministerialists deserted him, and a vote of censure was carried by 136 votes to 104 (February 11). Ricasoli had to choose between resignation and dissolution; he decided to appeal to the country, and it was indeed clear that government was well-nigh impossible with a Chamber, whose tendency to groups killed all hope of a steady majority. Ricasoli's manifesto to the electorate was a sensible exposition of Liberal policy,—the Free Church but with safeguards for the lower clergy, retrenchment and railways, no venturesome policy and no reaction. But he spoilt it by an intemperate and impolitic attack on the old Chamber; he was irritated and demoralized, and spared no governmental influence to secure a majority. But the country was too deeply roused to obey ministerial pressure. The credit of the government suffered from the heavy taxes and the scandals of the King's private life; the Belgian bank contract roused the old suspicions of speculation and corruption; and a new ministerial combination, intended to appease the opposition, was "only a plaster on a wooden leg." The elections (March 10) were fought with unusual passion. The democrats dragged Garibaldi into an electoral campaign in Venetia, where his crude invective against "the clericals and their accomplices" stirred the meetings to enthusiasm, but left no result at the polls. Venetia sent up a phalanx of Moderates, but the strength of parties remained much as before. The new Chamber was as hostile as the old to Ricasoli's policy; and there was a widespread feeling that he had blundered too badly, that his overthrow was the only alternative to a long and dangerous crisis "with bankruptcy at the door and revolution on the flank." So far the King had loyally backed him, but either Rattazzi's influence or a sense that Ricasoli was impossible won him to the opposition, and when the premier wished to bring back Sella to the Finance Ministry, the King made an excuse of the unpopularity of the champion of the grist-tax, and forced Ricasoli to resign (April 4).¹

¹ Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, IX. 367-369; Mme. Rattazzi, *Rattazzi*, II. 162; Un Italien, *Crispi*, 401.

CHAPTER XLII

MENTANA

APRIL—DECEMBER 1867

Rattazzi's third ministry ; the cry for Rome ; GARIBALDI AND RATTAZZI ; the Roman Committees ; the Terni raid ; Rattazzi's policy ; French policy ; Rattazzi and the Party of Action ; Garibaldi in September ; his arrest ; the raids ; Rattazzi changes front ; FRANCE DECIDES ON INTERVENTION ; Rattazzi resigns ; Garibaldi escapes from Caprera ; the Roman rising ; the French land at Civita Vecchia ; Menabrea cabinet ; the Italian troops cross the frontier ; Garibaldi's campaign, MENTANA ; Rouher's *jamais*.

THE King with more grasp of the situation than the groups, which so lightly made and unmade ministries, tried to form a coalition cabinet of Menabrea from the Extreme Right, and Rattazzi. But Menabrea refused to take office, the progressive Right was paralyzed by the feud between Lanza and Sella, and Rattazzi came into power (April 11) with a Centre ministry. He had hoped to form a working alliance with the Left, perhaps also with the Permanent, but either because Rattazzi and Crispi could not trust each other, or because Crispi foresaw the friction between the government and Garibaldi, or because he asked terms that Rattazzi could not grant, the negotiations fell through, and Rattazzi, with only his own following to fall back upon, had to fill up his cabinet with second-rate men.¹ His parliamentary position was as insecure as in 1862 ; he found indeed a certain strength in the unwillingness of all parties to provoke another crisis ; but neither Right nor Left were disposed to do more than tolerate him. The supposed court origin of the ministry, the general distrust in the premier's honesty, his wife's

¹ Mme. Rattazzi, *Rattazzi*, II. 166 ; Castelli, *Carteggio*, II. 225 ; Tavallini, *Lanza*, II. 353 ; Un Italien, *Crispi*, 404.

literary indiscretions, all added to his enemies. Rattazzi sought safety in his old policy of dexterous balancing; he bid for Ricasoli's support, he held out new hopes of office to the Left, and made promises to Crispi, whose exact nature is conjectural, but which enabled the leader of the Left "to hold him by the throat."¹ But not even Crispi's influence could make the Left work heartily with the "man of Aspromonte"; the extreme wing, which followed Bertani, was frankly unfriendly; sorenesses of old date made the alliance of the Right impossible. Rattazzi's tenure of office was dependant on his power to play off one opposing party against another.

The ministry could give no lead, at a moment when a strong government was more than ever called for. Rattazzi's accession to power encouraged the same hopes that it had done five years before. His policy was slave to the name for facile yielding he had got himself, and the impatient nationalists, now that Venice was won, looked to his weakness or connivance to let them go to Rome. The enthusiasts for Rome were, like all enthusiasts, a minority; but they were a powerful minority, they had the less emphatic feeling of the majority behind them, and in a time of excitement they became irresistible. Politicians in a hurry to complete the unity of the nation, anti-clericals, to whom the Papacy was heir of Torquemada and Loyola, the secular enemy of progress, alike defied the Convention and took their stand on the oft-repeated vote of parliament, which acclaimed Rome the capital of Italy. The tide set strongly for them now; the weakness of the Papacy, the Emperor's hated and insulting veto, impatience to change the policy of the Convention and the Free Church Bill for open war with the Temporal Power, made an attempt to win Rome inevitable ere long.

The enthusiasts naturally looked to Garibaldi to lead them. After the war he had retired to Caprera, convinced that the saner policy was to wait for Rome.² He had been

¹ Mme. Rattazzi, *op. cit.*, II. 167, 171; Frigyesi, *L'Italia*, 256; Cordova, *Discorsi*, I. 212; Mario, *Garibaldi*, 723.

² Ricasoli, *Lettere*, VIII. 144, 166; Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 197.

drawn from his retreat in February to influence the elections against the Free Church Bill, and his intemperance had done much to undo Ricasoli's labours for conciliation with the church. He preached a vague natural religion, himself its high-priest, and baptized children "in the name of God and Jesus the Liberal."¹ It says much for the spell he had cast on the average Italian, that he did not smother his reputation in ridicule. His theology was half a defiance to the Papacy, and his addresses to the Venetians made it clear that he was thinking less of the Free Church Bill than of Rome. If legal means failed to win Rome, Italians, he insisted, must go there by force. But confident that France would not interfere, encouraged to believe that Prussia would help,² he thought that there would be no need for bloodshed. "We are strong enough," he said, "not to use violence."

The reference to legal means, so alien to Garibaldi's thought, pointed to the influence of Crispi and his friends, who were trying to bring about an understanding between Rattazzi and Garibaldi. In the tangle of intrigue that followed it is difficult to conjecture what were the premier's real motives and policy. Though his views on the Roman question had probably advanced since he came to Florence, he would still perhaps have been glad to let it sleep, and use the respite to save the country from bankruptcy. He had fought Ricasoli's concessions to the church, but he dared not risk a breach with France, and he promised to observe the Convention in letter and spirit, trusting perhaps that time would weary Europe of the Papal question and allow Italy to pursue her way without let.³ But short of leading the country into great and present danger, Rattazzi subordinated every consideration to the needs of his parliamentary position. He could not keep in office without the support of the Left, and the Left could be won only by promises of open or secret support to the forward policy. Rattazzi had channels of communication with the Roman

¹ Frigyesi, *op. cit.*, 166; Guerzoni, *Garibaldi*, II. 469-471.

² Frigyesi, *op. cit.*, 462, 508; Benedetti, *Mission*, 246; Castell, *op. cit.*, II. 264; Rothan, *France en 1867*, II. 119.

³ Mme. Rattazzi, *op. cit.*, II. 161-162, 221, 224, 231.

Liberals; Crispi was led to believe that Rattazzi and Garibaldi would combine on a common plan; everybody looked for hidden meanings in Rattazzi's words, and his declaration in parliament that he would do nothing to prejudice the future of Italy, was taken as encouragement to the Romans to rise.¹ He knew no doubt that without thrice as many soldiers as he could dispose of, he could not prevent raiders from crossing the long Papal frontier, and perhaps it was the knowledge of this that strengthened his inclination to temporize. Trusting as ever in his own finesse, perhaps hoping that Garibaldi's schemes would come to nothing, he meant to keep the Party of Action in hand, to be used or brought to heel or thrown over, as occasion required. The Luxemburg question made war seem imminent between France and Prussia, and the chapter of accidents might allow Italy an easy march to Rome.

There was one solution, which all parties except the Extreme Right and Mazzini would have welcomed as the best. A rising of the Romans in sufficient strength to overthrow the Papal government was the one legal solution left possible by the Convention,² and despite the clerical reaction in France, despite the threats of the French government, it seemed hardly possible that the Emperor would refuse to acknowledge a plebiscite, which declared Rome annexed to Italy.³ Many patriots seriously hoped that the Romans would find salvation for themselves. It is difficult to form a sober estimate of what proportion of them had nationalist sympathies. A large number had interests too closely bound up with the Papal court; the peasants had been taught that the Italian government was the enemy of all things sacred; and perhaps there were many, who "preferred coin and the Pope to paper-money and Italy." But the provincial towns were sturdily Italian; the democratic spirit of 1849 was still alive in Rome, and the bulk of the Roman poor, especially in the Trastevere, hated the Papacy and its mercenaries. But with a powerful force of French and Papal troops to crush a rising, with 10,000, it is said, of their best patriots

¹ Frigyesi, *op. cit.*, 210; Mario, *Garibaldi*, 723.

² See above, p. 260.

³ See Rothan, *op. cit.*, II. 170.

in exile, it is not strange that conspiracy languished. And any hope of successful movement was extinguished by the quarrels that divided the Roman Liberals. The National Committee danced to the wires pulled at Turin or Florence, and drew a subsidy from the Italian government; some of its leaders had had mysterious relations with Antonelli, which leave it in doubt which side was insincere.¹ The rival Committee of Action, descended from the Committee formed by Mazzini after the fall of the Republic, had been kept by his influence from fusion with any non-republican organisation. "If Rome is to be annexed to the kingdom, like the rest," he wrote, "I would rather the Pope stayed at Rome another three years." But it had been recently reorganised on less exclusive lines, and was apparently prepared to sink its republicanism, and cooperate with any organisation less pledged to the Moderates than was the National Committee. The departure of the French spurred both committees to activity. But while the policy of the National Committee was to leave Rome for the present to its fate and free the border provinces, the Committee of Action was preparing revolution in the city itself, and intended to appeal to Europe with their freedom self-won and a plebiscite for union. Soon after Rattazzi's appointment it had federated on this programme every section of Roman nationalists except the National Committee, and Garibaldi readily accepted the lead of the new movement.² He was less sanguine than his friends as to the prospects of a rising at Rome, and intended to send bands of volunteers to raid the border and distract the Papal forces. But he had hardly taken in hand the enlistment of volunteers, when the immature movement was precipitated. A message came from Rome that the nationalists were ready to rise, and Garibaldi lightly gave his assent to a raid near Terni. As a matter of fact no preparations had been made either at Terni or Rome, and the few hundred raiders, who responded to Garibaldi's message, were easily surrounded and captured

¹ Frigyesi, *op. cit.*, 219; Balan, *op. cit.*, II. 440-444, 490; Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, VII. 214; Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 185, 246, 256, 264; C. Bianchi, *Mentana*, 84.

² Cavallotti, *Insurrezione*, 70.

by Italian troops, before they crossed the frontier (June 18). The real history of the escapade is still hid in mystery, and its fiasco produced a rich crop of suspicion. The National Committee and the government were freely charged with conspiracy to wreck the credit of the Garibaldians; but there is no real evidence to implicate either, and the least improbable hypothesis is that it was the work of a few hot-headed nationalists, who wished to throw a gage of defiance to the Catholic pilgrims, whom the centenary of St. Peter's death had drawn to Rome.¹

Nothing now could hold Garibaldi back; lashing himself into unreasoning passion and probably exaggerating the popular impatience, he thought that he could carry the country with him. He defied the government as "the Pope's *sbirro*," and proclaimed his resolve to go to Rome and "dislodge that nest of vipers." He sent arms to the frontier to test Rattazzi's intentions, at moments he seemed inclined to bid for the republicans.² Early in August volunteers were being enlisted in all the provinces contiguous to the border, and Garibaldi, travelling through Southern Tuscany, made no concealment of his intentions. "We will go to Rome," he said, "in spite of priests and Buonaparte;³ the Convention must be torn up on the Capitol." He had at all events succeeded in rousing the country. St. Peter's centenary (June 3 to July 1) had been made the occasion of a great Papalist demonstration, and the Pope's querulous invective stirred bitter resentment in Italy. An indiscretion of the French general Dumont, proving, as the Italians had long suspected, that the Pope's Legion of Antibes was composed in part of French soldiers of the line under the disguise of volunteers,⁴ produced intense exasperation against the Emperor's underhand evasion of the Convention. Public meet-

¹ Frigyesi, *op. cit.*, 181, 276-291; Cavallotti, *op. cit.*, 80-84; Bianchi, *op. cit.*, 81.

² Guerzoni, *op. cit.*, II. 481; Mazzini, *Opere*, XV. xlix; *contra*, Cavallotti, *op. cit.*, 215.

³ So the Democrats preferred to spell.

⁴ Notes and speeches quoted in Frigyesi, *op. cit.*, 89, 443, 454, 576, 644, 646, 649; Taxile-Delord, *Second Empire*, IV. 495; Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 254, 256.

ings in the large cities demanded the occupation of Rome, and called for secularization of the church's property. Even many of the Moderates gave their sympathy to a movement that promised a rising in Rome. Soldiers and officers and civil servants gave homage to Garibaldi, and every one believed that through Crispi he had an understanding with Rattazzi, and that at the last resort the government would not oppose him. Garibaldi talked wildly of a million volunteers, and evidently expected that the army would fight by their side. Had he rushed in now, with the French perplexed, the Papalists unprepared, it is possible that he might have proclaimed Victor Emmanuel on the Capitol.

But this presupposed at least the connivance of the government, and at this moment Rattazzi made it clear that he would oppose a forward movement with all his power. He had found that his middle and ambiguous course was no longer possible, that he must frankly take sides for or against Garibaldi. His dilemma was a terrible one. If he threw in his lot with Garibaldi, Rome was in his grasp, and the glory of giving Italy her capital was for him. But the risk was tremendous; it meant rupture with France, perhaps a terrible war ending in a French occupation of Piedmont; it meant the deepening of the financial slough, and almost certain bankruptcy. If on the other hand he suppressed the volunteers by force, another Aspromonte, civil war, a republican movement that might tumble the throne were the only too probable sequel. Perhaps in the long run the bolder choice were the wiser. France had broken the Convention, when she sent her soldiers to join the Legion of Antibes; and even if Italy was not absolved from its observance, even if she could not bind the Emperor to the original equivocation of the treaty, Rattazzi had already broken it in the spirit, and it were better for Italian honour if he frankly denounced it in the letter, and took the risk. But Rattazzi was no man to hew the straight short course; he loved to circumvent danger, to take the long tortuous road, which would bring him to his goal without risking over much. He clung to office, and in the absence of clear principles the claims of his political position bulked over largely in his

calculations. Rattazzi's patriotism was never of the purest, but indeed the most unselfish of statesmen would have gone far to avoid another parliamentary crisis. Garibaldi's heedless courting of revolution threatened to make the financial difficulty more appalling than ever, and to aught less than the boldest faith it might well seem less momentous at the moment to win Rome, than to relieve the country from the burdens under which it staggered. Rattazzi had carried a Church Lands Act (July 28) with the undisguised object of helping the exchequer, though it claimed for the state a rather smaller quatum than Ricasoli's bill had done. The state was to effect the sale of the lands, and issue temporary bonds to the amount of its own share. It was essential that there should be nothing approaching a crisis, till the financial operations were concluded, or the Treasury might find itself depleted.¹

But it was week by week more difficult to avoid a rupture with France. Had the Emperor still had the strength to make his own policy, there would have been no fear of a French veto; Italy alone among his dreams had come true, and he was tender to the one creation, that reminded him of days, when he had planned to reconstruct the map of Europe. But he no longer guided his country's course; he had no secret workings now to countermine his government's evil diplomacy. The Catholics were all powerful at court, and the government dared not alienate them.² France was sullenly brooding over Sadowa and the Mexican fiasco, and she was ready to strike at random, if she saw a hope of regaining her lost prestige. The French hated Italy as the enemy of the Pope and the ally of Prussia; the small investors in Italian bonds smarted under their depreciation, and caught up the easy taunts against her bad government and disordered finances. France felt bitterly that the country, for which she had fought and bled, had deserted her; she forgot that if she had given Lombardy, she had taken Savoy and Nice, that Italy had shed her sons' blood year by year for the first Napoleon, that an insulting patronage cancels the fairest of material bounties. Mixed feelings, religious, political, financial, made her reso-

¹ Frigyesi, *op. cit.*, 418, 488.

² Rothan, *op. cit.*, II. 103.

lute, that if it lay with her to prevent it, the Italians should never go to Rome. Already before Ricasoli's fall Moustier, the Foreign Minister, had threatened a new intervention, if an attack from within or without drove the Pope to flight; and even Rouher, the more liberal Premier, opposed as he was to intervention, feared that if a rising took place, French public opinion would make it impossible to stand aloof.¹ Moustier's note showed that the French government repudiated the secret understanding of the Convention, and now it confessed its own duplicity in the matter of the Legion of Antibes. The irritation in Italy was intense, and for the moment perhaps Rattazzi was tempted to denounce the Convention.² But his almost constant policy at this period was to give France no pretext for intervention, though he would go as far as he could without breaking the letter of the treaty. Again and again he promised to guard the frontier as carefully as the resources of the government permitted, and he even went so far as to concert precautions with the Papal authorities. But his promise to use force if necessary was hardly consistent with his orders to the authorities at the frontier to do everything to avoid bloodshed,³ and he refused to prevent the enlistment and training of the volunteers. His action may have been partly due to an unwillingness to yield to French pressure; but it was very easy to retort at Paris that his leniency was a breach of the spirit of the Convention, that though the Convention was silent as to a spontaneous rising in Rome, the conspiracy was hatched in Italy and with the connivance of the government. The probability is that so long as France seemed embarrassed by the Luxemburg question, Rattazzi was willing that the Party of Action should make a throw for Rome, provided that the government were uninvolved in direct responsibility; but when the clouds cleared away on the Rhine, and 40,000 troops were mobilized at Toulon ready to sail to Civita Vecchia, Rattazzi shrank back from the danger.⁴

¹ Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, IX. 102; Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 202.

² Mme. Rattazzi, *op. cit.*, II. 171; Frigyesi, *op. cit.*, 458.

³ Frigyesi, *op. cit.*, 506, 639.

⁴ Mme. Rattazzi, *op. cit.*, II. 199.

But he dared not yet openly oppose the Party of Action, though he was nettled by Garibaldi's defiance, and threatened to arrest him if he crossed the frontier.¹ He was hampered by his earlier connivance, he hoped through their common friends of the Left to persuade Garibaldi to desist. Crispi and his followers were ready to cooperate, for they had small confidence in Garibaldi's wisdom, and realized, as he did not, the terrible dangers that threatened, if the government, in avoiding a rupture with France, were forced into a conflict with the Party of Action. Even some of the extremer members of the Party urged him to postpone the movement.² Grudgingly he consented to wait another month, to give time for the objectors to "find out what was Rattazzi's game,"³ but declared for invasion as soon as the weather cooled. The Peace Congress was about to be held at Geneva, and his parliamentary friends, hoping that in his absence the enthusiasm of the volunteers would cool, persuaded him to attend it. His wild indictment of the Papacy dropped like a bombshell on the Congress' deliberations, and probably ill satisfied with his reception there, he returned to Florence (August 17), apparently as impatient for action as before. It was daily more apparent that the Romans, still paralyzed by their dissensions, were not prepared to initiate the movement, and that the only hope of encouraging them to insurrection was to raid the borders. From his narrow standpoint his decision not to wait for the Romans was sound, but it lost the one vantage-ground in the political situation. Again Crispi and his friends urged him to wait; but, boasting that he had 100,000 Italians behind him, he refused to delay beyond the end of September. A war with France, he told the politicians, would regenerate the country; he "was weary of living

¹ Cavallotti, *op. cit.*, 178.

² Frigyesi, *op. cit.*, 471, 643; Guerzoni, *op. cit.*, II. 482; Cavallotti, *op. cit.*, 199; Mario, *Bertani*, II. 337; *Un Italien, Crispi*, 409; Mazzini, *Opere*, XV. lxxv.

³ Mario, *Garibaldi*, 723. This seems a more probable explanation than that given by Cavallotti, *op. cit.*, 231-232, that he was waiting for reports from Rome.

among shams and would prefer to die fighting.”¹ He gave orders for the bands to collect on the frontier, and on September 23 he started himself to join them.

The raid had been hurried on in consequence of the declared hostility of the government. After Garibaldi's return from Geneva, Rattazzi had had fresh negotiations with the Left, and apparently had promised connivance or help, on condition that Garibaldi retired temporarily to Caprera.² Garibaldi suspected a trap; but it is more probable that Rattazzi, again placed in the hard alternative between rupture with France and the danger of civil war, caught desperately at some stratagem, perhaps a rising at Rome with the support of the government, which he hoped would avoid both. But when Garibaldi only pushed on preparations the more determinedly, and Rattazzi knew that the troops at Toulon were ready to sail, and the King probably pressed for a decided policy, he suddenly abandoned his attempts at compromise, and issued a threatening proclamation (September 21), but, unable even now to break away from his intrigues, tried to paralyze the volunteers by sowing dissension among them. It was clear that if the raid was to be made, it must be at once, and with much misgiving the Garibaldian leaders decided to act. It was too late. Garibaldi was arrested on his way to the frontier at Sinalunga in Southern Tuscany (September 24), and taken to the fortress at Alessandria, but not before he had left behind a fiery appeal to the Romans to rise and to the Italians to help them. Large numbers of the volunteers were arrested, and the government basely trapped some Roman exiles and handed them over to the Papal authorities. Three days later Garibaldi was taken to Caprera; he went, according to his own statement, “without any conditions,” according to Rattazzi, under a promise not to leave the island. Crispi, who conducted the negotiations, perhaps

¹ Cavallotti, *op. cit.*, 255, 258; Mazzini, *Opere*, *loc. cit.*; see Garibaldi, *Memorie*, 426.

² Mazzini, *Opere*, XV. lxvi; Cavallotti, *op. cit.*, 257-261; Mma. Rattazzi, *op. cit.*, II. 174; see C. Bianchi, *op. cit.*, 104; and *Documenti relativi*, No. 28.

left each in the belief that his terms had been accepted by the other.¹

Garibaldi's illegal arrest ran like a shock through the country. It was clear that there was an immense amount of feeling behind him, which angrily resented the government's undignified vacillations. Only a military occupation saved Genoa from bloodshed, and at Florence Rattazzi narrowly escaped with his life. The very soldiers at Alessandria cried under Garibaldi's prison windows "To Rome"; and had he put himself at their head, it is conceivable that a military revolution would have changed the future history of Italy, and perhaps much else besides. The deputies of the Left still wished to temporise, hoping that if the raid were deferred till the Romans rose, the government would throw in its lot with them. But the hotter heads, led by young Menotti Garibaldi, refused to wait. In the first week of October the Sabine country and the province of Viterbo were full of bands, and Menotti Garibaldi was at Passo Corese, the nearest point of the frontier to Rome, 23 miles distant from the city. The few hundreds of ragged, half-starved, rain-soaked volunteers, who bore privation without a murmur and fought bravely with their rusty rifles, marched aimlessly to and fro under their incompetent leaders, finding poor sympathy from the priest-led peasants.

The Left no longer attempted to restrain the movement, and Rattazzi did not dare to oppose. Even sober Conservatives thought that it was necessary to go to Rome to preserve order, and save Italian volunteers from being defeated by Papal mercenaries.² There were ominous warnings of a republican movement, and though probably the danger of civil war was exaggerated, Rattazzi, with the warning of Aspromonte before him, felt that any risk were preferable to the possibility of its repetition. In his own words he "had to choose between disloyalty to engagements and stifling national sentiment"; and he chose the former. Even the

¹ Guerzoni, *op. cit.*, II. 494-495; Cavallotti, *op. cit.*, 295-299, 302; Mme. Rattazzi, *op. cit.*, II. 175; Mario, *Garibaldi*, 725; Vecchi, *Garibaldi*, 389-390; Un Italien, *Crispi*, 410.

² Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 261, 267, 275.

King, hitherto very anxious to be loyal to the Convention, thought that his "person and dynasty were at stake,"¹ and was acute enough to see that if the nation's sense of dignity were still humbled to France, the prestige of the monarchy might sink beyond recovery. Rattazzi's policy at this juncture, so far as it is possible to disentangle it, seems to have been to keep Garibaldi at Caprera and check the raids, but at the same time to encourage a rising at Rome under the auspices of the Moderates, and thus give the government a pretext to go there to preserve order and take a plebiscite of the Romans. After this Rattazzi never wavered; and though he still quibbled and equivocated to France, he rose for once to something of nobleness. "There are moments," he said, "when a nation does not think of danger but of its right."² He allowed volunteers to be publicly enlisted, though he tried through Crispi to discourage them; the national guards gave them their arms, the troops often helped them to cross the frontier, and they could retire and re-form on Italian territory, when chased by the Papal troops.³ Rattazzi sent pressing messages to the National Committee to rise at any cost; he sent them funds and promised arms; it was perhaps at his instigation that 12,000 Romans petitioned for Italian intervention in the interests of order.⁴ To preserve the fiction of a spontaneous Roman movement, he promoted the formation of a "Roman Legion," nominally formed of exiles, whose vagaries discredited the whole movement, and did more than anything else to spoil the chances of a successful rising at Rome.⁵

Rattazzi still hoped to avoid a collision with France. The French government might have small respect for the

¹ Rothan, *op. cit.*, II. 139; Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 333.

² Cavallotti, *op. cit.*, 360-361; Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 272; Mme. Rattazzi, *op. cit.*, II. 199; Bianchi, *op. cit.*, 81; Gadda in *Nuova Antologia*, Feb. 16, 1898, 577-580.

³ *Documenti relativi*, Nos. 4, 12, 19, 33, 38, 49, 50; Cavallotti, *op. cit.*, *passim*; Mazzini, *Opere*, XV. liv; Balan, *Continuazione*, II. 792; Vecchi, *op. cit.*, 391; Gadda, *op. cit.*, 582.

⁴ Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, X. 8; Guerzoni, *op. cit.*, II. 515; Adamoli, *Da San Martino*, 346; Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 276; Diamilla-Müller, *Politica segreta*, 324; Rothan, *op. cit.*, II. 152, 181.

⁵ *Documenti relativi*, Nos. 1, 41, 42, 51; Cavallotti, *op. cit.*, 381-398; Ricasoli, *loc. cit.*; Bianchi, *op. cit.*, 135.

wishes of the Romans; but if a rising at the door of the Vatican seemed to endanger the Papacy, France, he hoped, would recognize the plea for Italian interference to save the Pope from danger and secure the freedom of his spiritual authority. He was probably, in spite of subsequent denials, willing if necessary to have a mixed occupation; but at this moment he was determined to resist at any cost one of French troops only. War at all events, even if it meant bankruptcy, might rehabilitate the monarchy and draw the nation together.¹ He was sounding Prussia as to the chances of her support,² and he seems to have sent Prim to Spain to stir a military revolution, which would keep the Spanish ultramontanes engaged at home.³ He had good ground however for hoping that France would not stand in the way. The Emperor was still friendly, painfully anxious to avoid the trap of another expedition to Rome, ready to welcome Italian intervention, if the Pope could be persuaded to ask for it. If French troops went to Rome, it might mean war with Italy, possibly with Prussia, at all events a repetition of the diplomatic embarrassments which had harassed him since 1856.⁴ The Liberals in his cabinet emphasized the perils of intervention, and Rouher, though he now favoured it, urged that it should be made jointly by the two Powers.⁵ When Rattazzi sent Nigra, the Italian minister at Paris, to Biarritz to say that the danger of a republican rising at Rome might force his government to intervene (October 4), the Emperor promised that he would take no step without consulting Italy. If Rattazzi is to be believed, he gave his consent to an Italian occupation.⁶

But when the raiders seemed to hold their own, and the panic grew at Rome, the Catholic demand for intervention became clamorous; the Pope, though he regarded the

¹ Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 272, 277; Mme. Rattazzi, *op. cit.*, II. 262; Nigra's Despatch of October 17; *contra*, Bianchi, *Matteucci*, 406.

² Mme. Rattazzi, *op. cit.*, II. 178; Benedetti, *Mission*, 247; Rothan, *op. cit.*, II. 119, 138.

³ Vecchi, *op. cit.*, 387.

⁴ Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 257, 271; Rothan, *op. cit.*, II. 125-126, 188.

⁵ Rothan, *op. cit.*, II. 316; *Papiers de la famille impériale*, II. 235-236

⁶ Rattazzi's speech of December 19; see Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, X. 8.

Emperor as a traitor, wrote to remind him of the help he had promised, if danger threatened; Rattazzi's rumoured efforts to obtain Prussian support irritated him; and he sent a threatening message to Florence (October 11), that if the government could not guard the frontier, he might be compelled to act. Victor Emmanuel sent back a spirited reply that if France violated the Convention and sent troops to Rome, Italy would at once occupy part of the Papal States. His strong stand seems to have shaken the Emperor's resolution, and it was not till his cabinet put strong pressure on him, that Napoleon decided to intervene, and sent a more peremptory message that, unless Rattazzi put down the volunteers sternly and at once, France would compel Italy to respect the Convention.¹ It was ostensibly an ultimatum. Rattazzi and the majority of his colleagues refused to be coerced, and whether the Romans rose or not, urged an occupation of Rome at any cost.² They found themselves blocked by the King's veto. Victor Emmanuel's policy at this juncture is not the least mystery of the time. He had always been lukewarm for Rome; his adventurous programme of three years before had borne Dead Sea fruit; disappointment and sickness had made him cautious, and now at the Council meeting (October 19) he declared against intervention.³ And yet on this very day he telegraphed to the Emperor that if the French landed at Civita Vecchia, he would at once cross the frontier. It even seems that an order to pass it was sent to the troops, and as rapidly countermanded.⁴ But whatever may be the undisclosed secrets of the crisis, there can be little doubt that it was the King's opposition that compelled Rattazzi, hopeless and weary of his task, to resign.

Had Rattazzi carried the day, the Italians would probably have gone to Rome without more than an angry protest from France. Though his cabinet had decided to

¹ Halt, *Papiers sauvés*, 174-175; Rothan, *op. cit.*, II. 146-150; Nigra's despatches and telegrams of October 17 to 19.

² Mme. Rattazzi, *op. cit.*, II. 257.

³ Mme. Rattazzi, *op. cit.*, II. 180, 199, 257; Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 287, 333; Cavallotti, *op. cit.*, 373; Rothan, *op. cit.*, II. 152.

⁴ Halt, *op. cit.*, 176; Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 285.

intervene, the Emperor was still hesitating, tortured with doubt, hoping that the Italian government would suppress the volunteers, casting about for any compromise that would give him a chance of backing out from the expedition.¹ A few days later Italy's chance had gone, and new events had forced the Emperor's hand. On October 22 Garibaldi, inopportune as ever, appeared at Florence. While nine ships of war blockaded him at Caprera, he had made a wonderful escape in a little boat. When he arrived at Florence, the country was without a responsible government, for Rattazzi's cabinet was only carrying on the administration pending the appointment of their successors, and Cialdini, who, as a person acceptable to the Left, had been commissioned to form a cabinet, was still looking about for colleagues. Cialdini was determined to fight, if the French landed at Civita Vecchia; but he still hoped that an arrangement was possible, and he tried through Crispi to persuade Garibaldi to keep in the background. But when Garibaldi refused, he dared not arrest him, and with Rattazzi's inexplicable connivance Garibaldi left for the frontier. Perhaps the ex-premier hoped that "he might find a French bullet"; if another and more suspicious version be true, he had allowed him to be promised the support of the government.² Next day (October 23) Garibaldi crossed the frontier at Passo Corese.

On the evening before the long looked-for rising broke out at Rome. The Romans had shaken themselves out of their lethargy, and slowly and patiently the conspirators with their lives in their hands had matured their schemes. They had over a thousand young men eager to fight, and an indefinite number of sympathisers, who would have thrown in their lot at the first success. Among the poorer classes at all events the current set strongly for the nation-

¹ Rothan, *op. cit.*, II. 164-165, 175; Veroli, *Pepoli*, in *Riv. Eur.*, XXXI. 247; Jules Favre, *Rome*, 197; Prince Napoleon, *Les alliances*, 490.

² Busetto, *Bixio*, 227-228; Mme. Rattazzi; *op. cit.*, II. 184; Melena, *Garibaldi*, 208; Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 295. See also Guerzoni, *Garibaldi*, II. 514, and the curious and improbable story in Rothan, *op. cit.*, II. 213. It was apparently at this date that Garibaldi asked Bismarck for money and arms, and was not refused at once: Benedetti, *op. cit.*, 246.

alists, and an insurrection, which could hold its own for a day, would probably have found as general support as the Republic of 1849 had had. So far as numbers went, there was a fair chance of success. The Papalist garrison was small and half-hearted; and the conspirators had accomplices, who betrayed every plan of the government. All that was wanted was arms. But a series of miscarriages wrecked every attempt to smuggle them in, and the few that were collected were discovered by the police. On the evening of October 22 the barracks of the hated and brutal Zouaves were blown up, though few lives were lost. Eight hundred insurgents, with a few revolvers and bombs, captured one of the gates and advanced on the Capitol, but before night they were easily driven back and the gate retaken. And though the temper of the people was up, and on the 25th there was a last fierce struggle in the Trastevere, it was an effort of despair, and the chance of a Roman rising had passed.

Garibaldi's escape and the Roman rising made French intervention almost inevitable. Despite their easy victory on the 22nd, the Papalists were panic-stricken. They doubted whether they could make an effective opposition to Garibaldi, they knew that, if Italian troops advanced, resistance meant only useless bloodshed. The cry of the French Catholics for intervention grew more threatening than ever. The Emperor was torn with indecision; three times in twenty-four hours, it is said, the orders to the fleet at Toulon were changed. It was not till the 26th that he yielded to the pressure, and 22,000 men sailed from Toulon for Civita Vecchia. Would Italy assert her independence of him and advance her troops? Cialdini had abandoned his attempts to form a cabinet, and Menabrea had taken office on the 27th with a ministry taken from the extremest section of the Right. It was "a salvage cabinet" to rescue what it could in Italy's terrible crisis. Garibaldi's presence at the front had doubled the determination of the Party of Action, and the landing of the French troops made a collision almost inevitable. If Garibaldi were beaten by the French, the government must either protect his retreat with the inevitable sequel of a war

with France, or leave him to his fate and face the risk of a revolution. Its difficulties were increased by the impossibility of mobilizing an effective force. The strength of the army had been so reduced, that it was with difficulty that 12,000 men could be collected on the frontier. The natural tendencies of the cabinet were Conservative, and Menabrea at once issued a proclamation against the volunteers, declaring that Italy must abide by her engagements, and avoid a "fratricidal war" with France. But he could not brook the affront to Italian dignity, and on the day on which he took office, he telegraphed to Paris that if the French landed, the Italian troops would cross the frontier, as a protest against France's infraction of the Convention, though they would be careful to avoid collision with the Emperor's troops.¹ Had he hesitated, the temper of the country would have forced his hand. The landing of the French expedition had stirred an angry spirit of defiance, and the proclamation against the volunteers seemed to make the government the Emperor's accomplice. At Milan and Florence and Turin there were threatening movements of a half-republican colour. The Moderates themselves retorted on the cabinet that a war with France was less fratricidal than a conflict with the volunteers. The government had willingly or unwillingly to go with the tide, and on October 30, the day on which the French reached Rome, the Italian troops crossed the frontier North and South.

The sequel depended on Garibaldi's fate. When he arrived on the frontier at Terni (October 22), he found everything in confusion. The volunteers were discouraged and demoralized by the blunders of their commanders. A few volunteers under the brothers Cairoli, who made a brave attempt to carry arms into Rome, were attacked on the Monti Parioli, two miles outside the city, and hardly made their way back. And though the Papal towns were as nationalist in sympathy as the villages were Papalist, they had no power to help. Hastily collecting 7000 men at Passo Corese, Garibaldi advanced to attack the old feudal castle of Monte Rotondo, an important position

¹ *Halt, op. cit.*, 185.

thirteen miles from Rome, commanding the railway and the roads along the Tiber. The castle had only 300 in its garrison, but it taxed all the resources of the volunteers. Garibaldi's hand had lost its cunning; in the place of his old lieutenants, three of them now generals in the army, he had young Menotti and others of equal incapacity. Most of his men were sound, but his force had its complement of cowards, of republicans who thought more of politics than fighting, of adventurers bent on pillage.¹ Though the better of the volunteers dashed themselves against the strong walls of the castle (October 25-26), it took nineteen hours' fighting to capture it. The loss of Monte Rotondo spread consternation again at Rome. It was not yet known whether the French would sail, and the Papalists hastily evacuated the country up to the walls of the city, allowing the volunteers to occupy Viterbo and Velletri. Garibaldi moved on towards Rome, his advance delayed by the heavy rains and the exhaustion of his men, and on the 29th he was almost under the walls. For a moment, deceived by a false report that another rising was imminent in the city, he planned an attack on the strong outpost of Monte Mario. But as the hope of a rising ebbed, he saw that his position was untenable. Even if he could have entered the city east of the Tiber it would have been a mousetrap, and his only strategy was to return to Monte Rotondo and call up the remainder of the volunteers.² But necessary as the retreat may have been, it caused a grave and mutinous spirit among his men. Impatience at not attacking Rome, hopelessness of the issue, fears after the King's proclamation that they might find themselves between two fires, perhaps republican intrigues made insubordination run riot through the undisciplined force, and in two days 2000 had deserted.³

¹ Cavallotti, *op. cit.*, 598, 600; Garibaldi, *Memorie*, 438-439; *Riv. stor. del risorg.*, I. 139.

² Garibaldi, *op. cit.*, 440-443; Guerzoni, *op. cit.*, II. 525-527. This is more probable than the explanation given in Mazzini, *Opere*, XV. lxxviii, that the retreat was due to Menabrea's proclamation.

³ Guerzoni, *op. cit.*, II. 527-529; Tivaroni, *L'Italia*, III. 100; Adamoli, *op. cit.*, 345, 371-372; Mario, *Mazzini*, 445; Cavallotti, *op. cit.*, 614. Garibaldi charged Mazzini with spreading sedition, but the charge appears as reckless as many others of Garibaldi's statements.

The position at Monte Rotondo was untenable. The French had arrived, and though Garibaldi in his unreasoning optimism was confident that they would not attack, their presence at Rome at all events left the Papalists free to take the field, and Monte Rotondo could easily be captured with artillery. The Italian government had stopped reinforcements and provisions at the frontier, and it was impossible to check desertions, when a few miles of road took the faint-hearted into safety across the border. Garibaldi decided to march to Tivoli, where he would find reinforcements, and with his back to the Apennines could wait his time or organise guerilla fighting. It was a dangerous march, for it exposed his flank to the advancing enemy; but had his careful precautions to cover it been executed, or had he marched promptly, he would have reached Tivoli in safety. But his officers failed to carry out their instructions, and an ill-timed deference to his son delayed the march by some hours. The nationalists at Rome sent him full details of the French plan of attack, but he refused to believe them, and marched into a trap at the little village of Mentana.¹ Surprised in a bad position and out-generalled, the 5000 volunteers made a poor defence against an equal number of Papalists, till Garibaldi rallied them to a fine bayonet charge, and they were pressing the enemy hard, when the French in the second line came up.² The volunteers fought well, but they were now outnumbered by two to one, and the deadly fire of the *chassepots* mowed them down. By 4.0 P.M. the battle was lost, and though the French did not dare to enter Mentana that day, the bulk of the volunteers were in retreat to the frontier.

Garibaldi had blundered as politician and as general, and his foolhardiness wrought an unrelieved disaster. Mentana was a great moral blow to Italy. It had no glory, for the volunteers showed little of the spirit that won Calatafimi and the Volturmo, and the campaign had been a series of military mistakes. It raised the prestige of the Papacy; it

¹ The ancient Nomentum, the birthplace of Crescentius, and the spot where in 800 Leo III. met Charlemagne.

² Ribeyra, *Seconde expédition*, 127.

humiliated Italy; it left behind the seed of civil dissension and foreign complication. But the prevailing feeling at the moment was one of passionate wrath with France. The country writhed in its impotence to avenge French insults; riots and cries for war with France at Milan, demonstrations against the priests at Verona and Padua, talk of boycotting French goods were symptoms of the fever that convulsed the country. "The *chassepots* have done marvels," the French general reported; and the tactless phrase started the suspicion that one object of the expedition had been to test the new French weapon. The government, knowing that with its slender forces a war with France courted disaster, thought that its only policy was to avoid collision and give the French no pretext for remaining. It refused to receive the unanimous plebiscites for annexation which had been voted at Viterbo and Velletri, and whose acceptance France threatened to make a *casus belli*. The Italian troops hastily evacuated Papal territory; and the government arrested Garibaldi and sent him to Caprera. But it asked that France should keep her pledges and withdraw her troops. The Emperor would have gladly consented; the French Liberals cheered for Garibaldi in his hearing, and Jules Favre told the Chamber that the army had picked up pieces of the Encyclical for wadding to its *chassepots*. But Mentana had raised the hopes of the Catholics, and the clericals clamoured for France to recover Bologna and Ancona for the Pope. The Emperor hoped to rid himself of responsibility by calling a Conference of the Powers to arbitrate between Rome and Italy. But, except Spain, nobody courted the ungrateful task; it was felt that "France wanted Europe to endorse her own mistakes"; Prussia rejoiced in the entanglement, as a pledge of security to herself; Italy, though she dared not reject the principle of the Conference, did her best to make it impossible. While the negotiations were dragging along, the French Chamber debated the recent expedition. Thiers' bitter hatred of Italy found a ready response, and Rouher, fearing that the Chamber might censure the government for not going far enough to glut the passion to humiliate Italy,

smothered his real convictions,¹ and declared that "France would never allow Italy to seize Rome." Rouher won a vote of confidence for the government, but he helped to dig a gulf between France and Italy, which France was bitterly to rue. Menabrea saw that Rouher's blunder had turned the controversy in favour of Italy, and demanded the formal disavowal of his speech. The French apologized for hard words that Rouher had used against the King, and explained away his denial of Italian claims. But the Emperor dared not offend the Catholics by withdrawing his protection of the Pope, and though his troops left Rome before the end of the year, they only retired to Civita Vecchia.

¹ Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 330.

CHAPTER XLIII

TO ROME

DECEMBER 1867—1871

Menabrea ; the farming of the tobacco monopoly ; Menabrea resigns ; Lanza ministry. Republican movement. The Papacy after Mentana ; Italy and Rome ; THE ŒCUMENICAL COUNCIL. PROJECTS OF ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE AND AUSTRIA ; Italy and France ; negotiations in 1868-69 ; negotiations in July-August, 1870. Italy and the Convention ; Lanza decides to occupy Rome ; occupation of Papal States ; THE CAPTURE OF ROME. Lanza and the Papacy ; transference of the capital ; THE LAW OF GUARANTEES. Conclusion.

ROUHER's defiance could not be forgiven. Amid all the depression and shame there was no thought of surrendering the claims to Rome ; and a motion in the Chamber which, though reaffirming them, condemned Mentana and seemed an insufficient assertion of national rights, was defeated by a majority of two (December 22, 1867). The division implied a vote of no confidence, and Menabrea resigned. But the hostile majority had been made up from sections of all parties ; and anxious as the Crispi wing of the Left was to take office, it found itself deserted by the Party of Action on the Extreme Left, disgusted by Crispi's tricks and ambiguities in the autumn. They warned him that, unless he abandoned "the butcher of Aspromonte," and sided frankly with them, they would attack him ;¹ and their defection paralyzed the Rattazzi-Crispi coalition. The Moderate Right were torn by the feud between the Permanent and the *Consorteria*. There was in fine no alternative to Menabrea, and he took office again with a reformed cabinet (January 5, 1868). But though the new ministry had shed its more reactionary members, it was still the most Conservative that

¹ Diamilla-Müller, *Politica segreta*, 330-334.

the kingdom had seen. Menabrea was a Savoyard, who had been an ardent patriot and Liberal in 1848, who had spoken of "the ennoblement of labour" and preached "a liberalism that respected wealth but compelled it to be generous"; but in the '50s he had gravitated to the Extreme Right, and though he had accepted Unity, and refused to abandon Italy when his native province was ceded, his instincts in home policy now were Conservative, almost reactionary. Round him gathered the remnants of the old Right, eager for reconciliation with the Papacy, anxious, if it could be avoided, not to go to Rome, suspicious more or less of free institutions, and dreading the democratic spirit to which the maladroit leading of the Left had given a crude and dangerous aspect. With them was a section of the *Consorteria*, whose dislike of Liberalism was only less than its venom against Piedmont,¹ and the half-converted partisans of the fallen dynasties, who though they had surrendered any hope of restoration, retained much of the spirit of the old rule. Mentana indeed had produced a general reaction against liberty. The Moderate press clamoured for a suspension of the constitution. Repression and coercion, police inquisition, prosecutions of the press marked the abandonment of the Liberal policy, to which, in spite of small occasional aberrations, the new kingdom had been faithful. The executive was largely directed by generals; judges were changed, papers were sequestered, democratic societies were broken up. An evangelical pastor at Leghorn was prosecuted for speaking against the Papacy; and the society of the Liberal clergy at Naples was not allowed to meet. A cabinet with such a policy could only look to be tolerated by the Chamber. It had few real friends. Both sections of the Left and their allies in the Centre were bitterly opposed. The Permanent had voted against Menabrea in December, and despite Minghetti's efforts to win it for the government, refused to support a ministry whose Roman policy was so weak. Men like Lanza, Sella, La Marmora, whose sympathies were largely with the Permanent, were more hostile than friendly; and all who followed the Cavourian tradition,

¹ Castelli, *Carteggio*, II. 346, 377.

angrily resented the decline from their dead leader's high faith in liberty. But though the great majority were agreed in their suspicion of the government, nobody saw what to put in its place. Parliament had learnt wisdom from the succession of crises, and preferred to tolerate Menabrea, rather than provoke another change of ministry or plunge into the unknown of an election. An appeal to the country might bring the Left and Centre into power; and men, who cared for the credit of the government, might well prefer Menabrea's mild dragooning to the trickery of Crispi or Rattazzi.¹ It was this feeling, that allowed the ministry to weather for a time the storm that burst on the question of the Tobacco Monopoly.

The sale of tobacco had long been a government monopoly in all or most parts of Italy, and the system, which was practically equivalent to an excise, had been maintained by the new kingdom. Cambray-Digny, Menabrea's minister of finance, saw a chance of filling the depleted exchequer for a moment by farming the monopoly in exchange for an advance of 180,000,000 lire. Lanza exposed the economic unsoundness of the scheme, and pointed out that there was no sound middle course between abandoning the monopoly and retaining complete governmental management. But attention concentrated less on the economic objections, than on the suspicion that corrupt influences had been at work, and that the state had been cajoled into a bad bargain. The shares of the bank, which had the promise of the lease, rose at once nearly 70 per cent.;² there were grave suspicions that King and ministers were interested,³ and that bribery had been freely at work in the Chamber. The bill passed in spite of Lanza's and Sella's unanswerable criticism and the strong opposition of Permanent and Left (August 8, 1868). But the rumours of corruption grew, and in the following June Crispi and Lobbia, a deputy of the Left, charged certain members of the Right with having a corrupt interest in the lease. Ten days later Lobbia was

¹ Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 380, 412, 424.

² Lanza's speech of August 6, 1868.

³ Mme. Rattazzi, *Rattazzi*, II. 282-283, 293.

stabbed in a Florentine alley and slightly wounded (June 15, 1869). The incident seemed to confirm the suspicions, and Lobbia became the hero of the opposition. The government retaliated by charging Lobbia and others with fraudulent simulation of the crime; but though they were convicted by a lower court, the sentence was reversed on appeal, and a parliamentary commission of inquiry to a certain extent supported Lobbia's charges. In the absence of definite proof, the historian is bound to share the suspicions of the time, that Lobbia was the victim of the 'men he had exposed.

The scandal was the last blow to the ministry. Menabrea, sensible of his weakness, had been trying to win the Permanent since the spring of 1868. And though the mutual jealousies of Piedmontese and non-Piedmontese were patent or latent in every political question, its sympathies were at bottom with the Right. San Martino would have no compromise with the corrupt and factious ministry, but he found himself deserted by the bulk of his followers, and a "ministry of reconciliation" after the King's own heart had been formed (May 1869). But no coalition could save Menabrea's majority after the Lobbia incident. The various sections of the opposition combined to propose Lanza for the Presidency of the Chamber, and the ministerial candidate was defeated by forty votes (November 1869). This made Lanza's claims to office irresistible; he was the only man, who could hope to win enough following from the moderate wings of both Right and Left to command a majority. But the King kicked strongly and persistently against the pricks. He tried to retain some of the retiring ministers in office at court, and when at last he sullenly gave way, a new and greater dissension arose. Lanza insisted that the government should practice, in Sella's phrase, "economy to the bone," and this meant a large reduction in the army and navy budget. The King stoutly fought against it; he tried every ministerial alternative to Lanza, he threatened to abdicate, perhaps to suspend the constitution.¹ But it was clear that the

¹ Guiccioli, *Sella*, I. 216; Tavallini, *Lanza*, I. 448.

Chamber would have no minister but Lanza, and after nearly a month of crisis he took office with Sella and Visconti-Venosta as his principal colleagues (December 14).

Lanza thus came into office pledged above all things to economy. "We watch our expenses," he told parliament, "through a miser's spectacles." He was "convinced that a country, which comes to bankruptcy in time of peace, cannot recover for many generations," and he hoped to economise 23,000,000 lire on the army and navy. He had public opinion with him; since Custoza and Lissa the country had lost its pride in the army, and not all the heroism, which the soldiers had shown in the cholera epidemic of 1867, had restored their popularity. In vain Cialdini and Bixio urged the danger of leaving the country undefended, while Europe was heaving with premonitions of war; in vain the King tried to keep the army strong for a more adventurous policy. "You are afraid of dying of hunger," said Cialdini, "I fear being strangled." But the majority shared the ministers' paramount dread of bankruptcy, and though Sella only succeeded in carrying a petty economy of 15,000,000, it brought Italy a little nearer equilibrium.

Outside parliament Lanza had to face the discontent that had been growing step by step with the ever more crying incapacity of government and parliament. Below the political movement lay the struggle for bread; and the gloom deepened, as the hopes of 1860 went out, and taxes grew, and the price of bread rose with the paper currency, and the expected good times seemed to fade away. "They promised us that Victor Emmanuel would make us all rich, and we are poor as ever," said a working woman in the South. There the cholera created a revolutionary feeling of despair, and in several towns the people massacred the men, who, they thought, had poisoned their food. In South and North alike the half-starved labourers, the disappointed artisans, each in their way began to look for help outside parliament. The same phenomena, which had produced brigandage in Romagna in 1850-52 and in the South since the annexation, led to anarchist movements here and there among the

miserable agricultural labourers. There were risings against the grist-tax in Romagna, perhaps fomented by the clericals,¹ even before it came into force at the beginning of 1869. Even in quiet Piedmont there was a silent combination of the peasants to refuse to pay it. There was probably little or no connection between the anarchist riots and the republican propagandism, that found its strength among the artisans.² The working men's societies were beginning to feel their strength, and reconnecting the links with Mazzini, which they had never entirely broken. Mazzini had returned to pure republicanism; he was suffering from acute nervous disorder, with a monomaniac belief that revolution was always imminent, and proclaiming that in the throne lay the roots of Italy's ills. It was a surface analysis, but the discontent, which in 1866 had hesitated to break with the King, was now to a considerable extent frankly republican. Garibaldi gave a hesitating adhesion, and his influence swayed the Southern Freemasons, of whom he was Grand Orient.³ Republicanism had a footing in the rank-and-file of the army, especially among the non-commissioned officers; some deputies of the Left encouraged it secretly, and Nicotera, and perhaps the Extreme Left as a body, joined Mazzini's "Republican Alliance" in 1869.⁴ Juries acquitted republican papers; the press lampooned King and princes; ex-volunteers were secretly drilling. In 1868 and 1869 Mazzini was impatient for a rising, and in the spring of 1870 there were petty outbreaks in various centres, especially in Emilia, whose seriousness lay in the evidence of complicity among the garrisons. In May a band of 300 Garibaldians proclaimed the republic at Maida in Calabria, and the young Garibaldis seemed disposed to join it, but like the outbreaks in the North, it rapidly collapsed. Mazzini was still undismayed, and after a futile effort to stir the Genoese to revolt, he turned his thoughts to Sicily, where he intended to use against his own countrymen the

¹ Ghiron, *Annali*, III. 168.

² Mazzini, *Opere*, XV. 77.

³ Mazzini, *Opere*, XVI. xxxiv, clxxii, cxci, 381, 392-394; Diamilla-Müller, *op. cit.*, 391; Frigyesi, *L'Italia*, 271-273; Cantù, *Cronistoria*, III. 600.

⁴ Mazzini, *Opere*, XVI. xiii, clxi, clxiv; Mario, *Nicotera*, 89.

arms which Bismarck had promised him.¹ It marks the last stage of his decline from patriot to conspirator; and it was well for him, that while making his way to Palermo in disguise, the government arrested him and imprisoned him at Gaeta (August 1870).

Probably the movement was at no time so serious as the country feared, and after the small outbreaks in the spring there was no more evidence of sedition in the army. At this time at all events the social troubles and their sequel were less urgent than the relations of church and state, of Italy and the Papacy. It was one of the many evil results of Mentana, that it half discouraged the Italians in their aspirations for Rome. Victory had restored to the Pope much of his prestige; his government had crushed rebellion in the city, and it claimed, though falsely, that its troops had beaten Garibaldi at Mentana before the French came up. In truth however the Temporal Power was in worse case than ever. Austria under its Protestant premier Beust had become openly hostile, had torn up the Concordat and sanctioned mixed marriages. Though Bismarck was humouring the Papacy, it was only to win the Catholics of South Germany and play the diplomatic game of the moment. The Pope's own little army was hopelessly demoralized; and though France was at his feet, he knew that at any moment the wind might change at Paris. He confessed that he had only Providence to protect him, provoking Clarendon's retort that Providence had indeed worked miracles in the past ten years, but all in favour of Italy.

But despondency had settled on the land. The statesmen of Right and Left alike, much as they might press for a return to the Convention, dared not break with France; Lanza, La Marmora, Menabrea, Rattazzi were at one in giving up all hope of going soon to Rome.² The devotee nationalists held more and more aloof from public life. The Menabrea cabinet, though the Chamber forced it to make ecclesiastics liable to conscription (May 1869), allowed the

¹ See below, p. 369.

² Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 320; Tavallini, *op. cit.*, I. 398; II. 350-351.

new bishops, some of them men whose bigotry and cruelty the pages of Farini and Gennarelli had made infamous, to crush the Liberal clergy and flaunt their luxury in the face of the poverty-stricken people. Still the despondency was only temporary. All knew that it was only the hand of France, that stayed the Temporal Power from its fall; that even if Florence remained the seat of government, even if the Leonine City were left to the Pope in absolute sovereignty, Rome must be added to Italy, so soon as France of free will or necessity withdrew her veto. It was a question perhaps of life or death. Sooner or later, as Sella said, the Temporal Power must destroy Italy or Italy destroy the Temporal Power. Italy could never, except under constraint, tolerate in her midst a medieval government, an unbending enemy of her free institutions, a busy sower of sedition. The Liberal Churchmen still preached, though with feeble voice, that "the fall of the Temporal Power would be the exaltation of the Church"; that the Papacy must surrender its temporal dominion, or face a new schism, which might tear Italy from her.

But Rome kept true to her policy of defiance. She was gathering herself together for one great essay of strength in the Œcumenical Council of the bishops of the Catholic church. The Council, the first Œcumenical that had met since that of Trent, had been projected as early as 1864 with the original object of deliberating on the position of the church. But several years before it met, it was clear that the Ultramontanes would seize the opportunity to proclaim the dogma of the Infallibility of the Pope. Infallibility was an ancient doctrine, which had slumbered at times, when forces within or without the church were too strong for its acceptance, but had reappeared whenever the Pope's power was in the ascendant. At all events there was nothing novel in it, and its final promulgation as a dogma might have excited little notice but for that which was bound up with it. But it was part of the same policy, that had dictated the Syllabus, and the governments and the Liberal Catholics feared that it would be followed by the conversion of the condemnations of the Syllabus into affirmative and dogmatic

propositions.¹ The principles of free government would become anathema to every Catholic, and the new dogma would hurl defiance at the governments, at the foes and lukewarm friends of the Temporal Power, by asserting the authority of the Pope in all its medieval plenitude. "The reconciliation of the Papacy with modern civilization," said a book of the time which was approved by the Curia, "is a damnable heresy"; and it maintained that the Pope had the right to depose kings, that he was supreme over temporal sovereigns, and that therefore clerical privileges existed by a higher right than by the grace of the state. Sentiments like these probably represented the views of an extreme section only, but the fear that Papal Infallibility would make every Catholic a potential rebel, and that principles incompatible with modern civilization would become binding on all Catholics, troubled the laity and the governments of all Catholic Europe. It was in vain that the wiser apologists of the new dogma declared that the Pope's infallibility would extend to matters of faith and morals only; it was obviously impossible to define their limits, and it was seen how easily the Pope's binding pronouncements might cross the line that parted things spiritual and civil.² "It has become evident at last," said Dupanloup, "that every Catholic, whose actions are ruled by the faith he professes, is a born enemy of the state, since he finds himself bound in conscience to contribute, so far as in him lies, to the subjection of all nations and kings to the Roman Pontiff."³ Especially when in the spring of 1870 the authoritative *Schema De Ecclesiâ* claimed the supremacy of the Papacy in all things pertinent to the discipline and government of the church,⁴ the civil powers dreaded the tremendous weapon

¹ *Civiltà Cattolica* of February 6, 1869; Cecconi, *Concile*, III. 208, 211. See above, p. 273 n.

² The Faculty of Theology at Munich told Hohenlohe that among the partisans of Infallibility there were about twenty theories as to the significance of *ex cathedrâ*. Manning laid down that the Pope alone could define when he spoke *ex cathedrâ*: *Vatican Council*, 800.

³ Friedrich, *Documenti ad illustrandum concilium vaticanum*, II. 388, quoted in Arthur, *The Pope*, II. 265; Cecconi, *op. cit.*, IV. 450-455.

⁴ Pomponio Leto, *Vatican Council*, 84-89.

of offence that Rome was forging. In France the Gallican laity and the Liberal Catholics of Montalembert's school protested against the new "absolutism" of Rome; there were threats of schism among the Eastern Catholics; in Germany Döllinger and his followers attacked the ultramontane "struggle against the general conscience and sentiment of right"; in Italy the remaining Liberal priests and the laity of every school watched with anxiety this latest move of the defenders of the Temporal Power. The governments shared the uneasiness of the laity. Prussia protested; Beust threatened that if the Council confirmed the Syllabus, he would forbid its publication; Bavaria asked the Powers to take collective action to curb the Council. The French government encouraged the bishops to oppose the new dogma; and the Emperor would probably have threatened to withdraw his troops, if the Council proclaimed Infallibility; but only one minister supported him, and Paris confined itself to disregarded protests.¹ So threatening however was the outlook, as the dissatisfaction of the governments showed itself, and it became certain that there would be strong opposition to the new dogma within the Council itself, that its promoters wished to avoid putting it to the vote of the Council, and have it proclaimed *ex cathedra*.² The 150 bishops of the opposition, led by Dupanloup and Darboy and Strossmayer, stood high in learning and in the importance of their sees; they represented Paris and Milan and Turin and a great slice of Catholic Germany; but they were powerless before the crowd of titular and minor bishops, the untiring and unscrupulous manœuvres of the Curia, and their own exceeding reluctance to break with the Pope. Still it was not till July 1870, seven months after the Council first met, that the Ultramontanes triumphed, and the Pope's Infallibility was proclaimed at Rome on the day after that on which war was declared between France and Germany (July 20).³ The

¹ Ollivier, *L'église*, I. 30-34; II. 125-128, 213; Arthur, *The Pope*, II. 192-194; Jules Favre, *Rome*, 26-28.

² Balan, *Continuazione*, II. 935; Cecconi, *op. cit.*, III. 212.

³ 451 bishops voted for, 88 (including only 4 Italians, except titulars) against, 62 *juxta modum*.

TO ROME

• Ecumenical Council must be counted among the causes that destroyed the Temporal Power. It made every government in Europe suspicious of ultramontanism, and henceforth no zeal for Catholicism would prompt them to defend the Pope. It might seem to the French statesmen or to Bismarck a political necessity of the moment to protect him, but they did so to serve their own game. It needed only a great European cataclysm to leave the Papacy stranded and friendless. Such a cataclysm was approaching.

It was obvious after 1866 that war between France and Prussia was almost inevitable. France was sore and smarting with Sadowa and the failure of her diplomacy. The treaties between Prussia and the South German states were made public in the spring of 1867, and seemed a gage of defiance that France was ready to pick up. The Emperor was probably opposed to war, he wanted to be on good terms with Prussia, and hoped to soothe the irritation of France by the old device of rounding off her frontiers. But the Luxemburg question brought the countries within an ace of war (March 1867), and though the danger passed away, it was only for the moment. Mentana did something to restore French prestige, and "the *chassepot* bullets ricocheted into Germany." But France could not lightly look forward to a great war without allies. Her natural friends were Austria and Italy; Austria, because she wanted revenge, Italy because of her deference to France, both because they looked to a war to regain the prestige they had lost in 1866. Already in 1867 there appear to have been negotiations at Vienna • and Florence, but Beust refused to bind Austria, except in the event of Russia siding with Prussia and threatening Austria's position in the East.¹ The negotiations were resumed in the summer of 1868 by a private correspondence between the Emperor, Beust, and Victor Emmanuel, and the King, keeping his government for a time in ignorance of them, warmly supported the plans for a triple alliance. Rattazzi, still his private adviser, urged that Italy

¹ Beust, *Memoirs*, II. 172-173; Taxile-Delord, *Second Empire*, V. 205-207. See Diamilla-Müller, *op. cit.*, 321.

must choose between taking a part in the coming struggle or risking being eaten up by the victor. The King was eager to wipe off the stain of Custoza and repay the debt of Solferino; soldier more than politician, he thought that no September Convention, no Mentana could cancel what was due for the French blood shed on the Lombard plains. He would, had he had the power, have flown to the help of France for pure chivalry.

But there were few in Italy, who shared his good-will to her. Public opinion would probably have welcomed an alliance with Austria, for after the cession of Venetia there was nothing, except the minor questions of the Tyrol and Istria, to cause friction with her; and it was recognized on both sides that Austria and Italy were now natural allies, with a common liberalism, a common struggle with ultramontanism. But any alliance with France was certain to be intensely unpopular. Italy chafed under the taunt that she was "a prefecture of France." "The chassepots of Mentana," said Pepoli, "have dealt a mortal blow to the alliance of the two countries;" Rouher's "never" had thrown Italy into the arms of France's enemies, and the cheers with which the Crown Prince of Prussia was welcomed at Florence in 1868 showed which way opinion leaned. Economists preached against any war with its almost inevitable sequel of bankruptcy, but if war there must be, Italians would range themselves more readily with the maker of German unity than with the hated protectress of the Temporal Power. The only friends of France were in the court and military party and among the extremer Conservatives. Menabrea and some of his colleagues, when the King laid his plans before them,¹ would gladly have followed him into a Franco-Austrian alliance; but they knew how isolated they were, and that the only chance of winning public opinion to it was to drive a hard bargain with both countries. They made it a *sine qua non* of alliance that France should return to the September Convention and evacuate Civita Vecchia. They asked that the

¹ About August or September 1868; Guiccioli, *op. cit.*, I. 242, is wrong in saying it was not till June 1869.

three powers should combine on a common candidate for the Papacy after Pius' death, that Austria should cede part of the Tyrol, and that Italy should be allowed to form a naval station in Tunis. Beust was willing to grant all the Italian demands; he warmly urged that Italy should be allowed to occupy Papal territory, and was willing to rectify the frontier in the Tyrol, perhaps also in the Eastern Alps.¹

But the negotiations shipwrecked on the stubborn refusal of France to desert the Pope. The Emperor was still clear-sighted; "the occupation of Mexico and Rome," he said, "are the two bullets that France carries in her heel." But he was drifting more helplessly than ever, his prestige gone, age and disease gaining on him. The "Clerical Empire was made," and Rouher's speech had left the French government the servant of the Pope. Bismarck helped it to fall into the trap, and rejoiced that the folly of France left an open sore in Italy, that made alliance impossible.² Mazzini, who had totally obscured the patriot in the partisan, asked him for arms and money to attack Rome and create fresh trouble between France and Italy; and Bismarck parleyed with him, though he was too wary to pledge himself before the very eve of war.³ His intrigues reached their mark, and strengthened the determination of the French not to evacuate; they were willing that Italy should rectify its frontiers, apparently that it should take back part of Nice; but they obstinately refused to leave Civita Vecchia or allow Italy to go to Rome.⁴

But the same France, which was so clerical as to throw away its alliances for love of the Papacy, was so Liberal that the sham constitutionalism of the Empire was no longer pos-

¹ Prince Napoleon, *Les alliances*, 492-493; Massari, *Vittorio Emmanuele*, 502, 514; Guiccioli, *op. cit.*, I. 242-243; Mme. Rattazzi, *op. cit.*, II. 163, 211-214; Chiala, *Dal 1858*, 35, quoting from Crispi's speech of October 8, 1890; Beust, *Memoirs*, II. 175, which however I do not believe; Castelli, *op. cit.*, II. 491; Bonfadini, *Arese*, 440-441.

² Benedetti, *Mission*, 238-239, 261; Ricasoli, *Lettere*, IX. 216; X. 109.

³ Diamilla-Müller, *op. cit.*, 339-352; Mazzini, *Opere*, XVI. xlii; Tavallini, *op. cit.*, I. 512-513. Crispi had relations with Bismarck in 1870: Un Italien, *Crispi*, 397.

Documenti—Roma, 71, 78; Veroli, *Pepoli*, in *Riv. Eur.* XXXI. 253; Prince Napoleon, *op. cit.*, 494.

sible. The elections of 1869 gave a heavy gain to the opposition, and Émile Ollivier persuaded Napoleon that he could only save his throne by surrendering to the Liberals. Ollivier came into power at the beginning of 1870, and the new constitution was ratified in May by a plebiscite of 8,000,000 votes. The programme of the "Liberal Empire" was "liberty at home, peace abroad"; it was too late, Ollivier thought, to stop the growth of Prussia, and Europe breathed again and felt secure. Suddenly a brief half-year later the question of the Spanish succession made war imminent, and the threads of negotiation, which had never been quite dropped,¹ were hastily picked up. Hostilities were decided on by the French government on July 14; and already four days before France asked Austria and Italy for their alliance, and Beust and Victor Emmanuel eagerly welcomed the appeal.² The King believed in the easy triumph of the French armies, and apart from his chivalrous desire to help France, he probably looked to the alliance to bring the Italians to Rome, or extend his frontiers in Nice or the Tyrol. But, as he had doubtless foreseen, when he struggled to keep Menabrea in office, a cabinet pledged to economy would be very reluctant to take the country into war. Lanza's sympathies were with France, Sella's were with Germany, but both alike were opposed to any alliance; and Sella, in urging a reduction of the army, had probably been influenced in part by a desire to make it impossible. A French victory, he thought, meant the triumph of the Syllabus, the defeat of the national principle, a new lease of indefinite length for the Temporal Power.³ But a section of the cabinet supported the King. Visconti-Venosta felt that the royal action had to a certain extent tied the hands of the ministers; and the two parties compromised in accepting the French proposals on condition that the claims of Italy in respect of Rome were satisfied.⁴ What claims they meant appear not to have been precisely defined, and perhaps

¹ Lebrun, *Souvenirs*, 70-78; Prince Napoleon, *op. cit.*, 495; Beust, *op. cit.*, II. 176.

² Nigra in *Nuova Antologia*, March 1, 1895, 14; Guiccioli, *op. cit.*, I. 252-253; see *Le Temps* of January 12, 1873.

³ Guiccioli, *op. cit.*, I. 216, 260-263; Tavallini, *op. cit.*, I. 511.

⁴ Prince Napoleon, *op. cit.*, 496; Sorel, *Guerre franco-allemande*, I. 239.

at this moment France might have purchased the alliance by a promise to return to the September Convention. But Ollivier did not dare to offend his Catholic countrymen on the eve of war. In vain Beust urged that it was better that the Italian government should go to Rome than the Garibaldians. It was not till the 23rd, that Ollivier promised to return to the Convention and evacuate at once. But he still refused to waive the veto that warned off the Italians from Rome, and the delay had allowed the peace section of Lanza's cabinet to assert themselves and refuse the alliance at any lower price.¹

They had been helped by the manifestations of anti-French feeling in the country. There had been demonstrations against the alliance at Florence and Milan and Turin; the Left had tried, though unsuccessfully, to pledge the government against it, and Cialdini's appeal for war in the Chamber a few days later found little support. In Austria the Hungarian and German populations had declared strongly for neutrality, Francis Joseph shrank from the possibility of a third disastrous war, and Russia threatened to intervene if Austria moved. But neither Beust nor Victor Emmanuel gave up the game. The diplomatic history of the period between July 23 and August 3 is still imperfectly known. On Beust's initiative negotiations went on briskly for an alliance of armed neutrality between Austria and Italy in the interests of France. Beust, it appears, refused to give any definite pledge as to commencing hostilities, but there was probably an understanding that the two countries should be prepared to enter the field on September 15, by which time they confidently expected that the French armies would have entered Southern Germany and be able to effect a junction with them. So eager was Beust, that he again offered to allow Italy to extend her frontier in the Tyrol and on the Isonzo, and to use his influence with France to let her occupy Rome. In spite of Sella's opposition, the Italian government adhered to the alliance, on condition that France assented to the occupation. The King appears

¹ Castelli, *Carteggio*, II, 188-190; Id., *Ricordi*, 184; Chiala, *op. cit.*, 38, 46-47; Prince Napoleon, *op. cit.*, 497; Guiccioli, *op. cit.*, I, 270; Rothan, *L'Allemagne et l'Italie*, II, 68, 71; Andreas Memor in *Revue de France*, April 1, 1878.

to have gone farther, and promised the Emperor that if he would compel the Pope to accept a *modus vivendi* with Italy, he would make his cabinet consent to war or dismiss them. But when his agent saw the Emperor at Metz on August 3, Napoleon had come to share the obstinacy of his ministers, and refused any concession. "Better the Prussians at Paris than the Piedmontese at Rome," the Empress was reported to have said. Probably both shared the expectation of speedy victory.¹

Swiftly the disillusioning came. Three days later Macmahon was crushed at Wörth. On the 7th the French government, at last awake to the stern reality, implored Italy to send 60,000 men across the Mont Cenis. The war party in the Italian cabinet made one more effort; it seemed a base thing to desert France in her sore distress, and even Lanza's prudence bowed for the moment to his chivalry. Though there were not 60,000 men to send, it is possible that the cabinet would have declared for war, but for a message from Nigra (August 8) that the republicans were stirring and the empire tottering to its fall.² The friends of the alliance dwarfed their proposals to an attempt to win England and Austria to an armed mediation to preserve the territorial integrity of France. But Austria was now as unwilling to fight as England was, and the only issue of the Italian overtures was the feeble and meaningless project of a League of Neutrals. On August 18 the defeat of Gravelotte proved how desperate the French cause was. Now that the safety of France and his own throne were at stake, the Emperor was ready to sacrifice the Temporal Power; and despite the opposition of the clericals and probably of his own government, he sent Prince Napoleon to Florence (August 20) to tell the Italians they might do what they liked at Rome, provided they would send their army to his

¹ Guiccioli, *op. cit.*, I. 277, 281-284; Nigra, *op. cit.*, 15-18; Bonfadini, *op. cit.*, 361; Prince Napoleon, *op. cit.*, 498; Rothan, *op. cit.*, 77-78; Sorel, *op. cit.*, I. 246; Chiala, *op. cit.*, 49; Andreas Memor, *op. cit.*, which I doubt; *Le Temps* of January 16, 1873; *Franco-Prussian War* No. 3, 22-23; Beust, *op. cit.*, II. 176.

² Castagnola, *Da Firenze*, 5-7; Guiccioli, *op. cit.*, I. 287.

help.¹ But even the King saw now that the French were beaten, and that for Italy to interpose would only draw disaster on her own head without averting the doom of France. "Mentana cries for vengeance," Rattazzi is said to have told the Prince, and the chain of consequences that linked Mentana to Sedan was forged.

In the impending wreck Italy saw the chance of snatching the crown of her Unity. A few weeks ago it seemed indefinitely remote. Visconti-Venosta had formally promised to observe the Convention (August 4); the King had given the Emperor a like pledge; and even on August 16 the ministry still protested its fidelity. The Italians were feeble and equivocating to the last chapter of the miserable entanglement. The temptation to get the French out of Italy was too strong for thoughts of honour or of the future. Some of the ministers thought it mean to out-manceuvre France in the hour of her prostration, others like Sella intended to break the Convention as soon as the Empire had fallen.² But the government had given an impossible pledge. The last French soldiers left Civita Vecchia on August 19; next day the Left moved a resolution in the Chamber to denounce the Convention; and though they were beaten, the demonstrations that followed proved that the country was vigorously stirring. The Left threatened to resign in a body and rouse the country, and it was only Sella's promise to leave the cabinet unless it decided to go to Rome, that suspended their determination.³ The ministry was fast coming over to their views. Visconti-Venosta indeed and Lanza hoped to avoid any use of force, and they were wooing the same barren hope of a native Roman rising, that had seduced Ricasoli and Rattazzi.⁴ But Lanza was as resolute as Sella that Rome

¹ Prince Napoleon, *op. cit.*, 500; Castagnola, *op. cit.*, 10, 20, 24; Nigra, *op. cit.*, 22; Rothan, *op. cit.*, II. 100, is certainly wrong.

² Guiccioli, *op. cit.*, I. 271; Castelli, *Ricordi*, 184.

³ Guiccioli, *op. cit.*, I. 298; Mazzini, *Opere*, XVI. cciv-ccv; Mme. Rattazzi, *op. cit.*, II. 347-349. I find nothing to support Mme. Rattazzi's statement that they threatened at this date to proclaim the republic.

⁴ Castelli, *Ricordi*, 187-188; Id., *Carteggio*, II. 475-478; Tavallini, *op. cit.*, II. 375, 377, 379; Guiccioli, *op. cit.*, I. 298-299.

should be won.¹ In the debate on the 20th he threw over Visconti-Venosta's cautious disclaimers, and told the Left, that though he differed from them as to the means and occasion, he was equally determined to go there. But he was resolved, that, failing a responsible rising in Rome itself, the Revolution should have no part in the occupation. He wanted to give confidence to the Catholic world, to appear as the Pope's protector, and make him feel that he could still live "free and secure" in the Vatican. He blockaded Garibaldi at Caprera, arrested Mazzini, and took careful precautions to prevent any raid across the frontier and apparently discountenance any rising in the Roman provinces.²

Already he had begun to mobilize the few troops that the government could collect on the frontier (August 15), and asked the Chamber for a credit of 40,000,000 lire. On the 22nd the ministry decided to occupy, as soon as the Republic was proclaimed at Paris. Some thin sophistry was found to override the obligations of the Convention; instead of boldly announcing that France's long infringement of it had released Italy from its observance, the government invented the pretexts that it had been a personal bargain with the Emperor and not with France, that one of the "extraordinary cases," referred to in the commentaries on the treaty, had arisen.³ It was poor strategy, and it would even have been better, if Italy had unblushingly repudiated the Convention, as Russia at this time repudiated the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris. It was still undecided whether Rome should be capital.⁴ Lanza wanted to move warily and slowly. Even the clear-headed men, who knew that their ambitions were right, had a superstitious fear of laying violent hands on the Papacy. Lanza no doubt hoped that with caution and patience it might come to terms. There was a peace party among the Cardinals, and the fear of a popular rising, in

¹ Cadorna, *Liberazione*, 57.

² Id., 30-31, 40-43, 50; Tavallini, *op. cit.*, II. 4-5. See Beauffort, *Invasion*, 53.

³ Cadorna, *op. cit.*, 32, 51; Castagnola, *op. cit.*, 14; Tavallini, *op. cit.*, II. 27; *Documenti—questione romana*, 12. See above, p. 260.

⁴ Castagnola, *op. cit.*, 22; Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, X. 118-121.

which the pent-up hatred of priests and Jesuits might find a sanguinary vent, made them inclined to welcome the Italian troops as deliverers.¹ Lanza knew too that the Jesuits were working on the Pope's fears to make him fly from Rome, and he wanted to help Antonelli's efforts to retain him. Besides, he was waiting for public opinion to declare itself more strongly, and give him a mandate that he could not disobey. While he was still holding back, the news of Sedan reached Florence (September 3). The Left again threatened to resign, and perhaps hinted at a republican movement, unless the ministry decided at once to go to Rome. But the cabinet was still divided and hesitating,² and it was not till the news arrived two days later that the Republic was proclaimed at Paris, that they determined to occupy without further delay, and sent San Martino to reassure the Pope, and if possible obtain a peaceful entry for the Italian troops. Even now Visconti-Venosta seems to have hoped to avoid an occupation of the city, and his circular of the 7th informed the Powers that the government would only occupy certain points of Papal territory, and leave the Romans to decide on their own fate. Apparently both he and Lanza intended to submit the position of the Papacy to a congress of the Catholic Powers.³

But Visconti-Venosta's equivocations were probably on his own initiative, and his colleagues' resolve to occupy the city at all costs was strengthened by the attitude of Europe. Jules Favre in the name of the French Republic, though he refused to denounce the Convention, regarded it as obsolete.⁴ Bismarck found that his patronage of the Temporal Power was unnecessary or dangerous, and gave his qualified approval to the Italian plans. England raised no objection; Austria, reassured by the government's scheme of

¹ Tavallini, *op. cit.*, II. 392-398; Guiccioli, *op. cit.*, I. 296; Correspondence—Rome (1870), 26.

² The evidence as to what took place in the cabinet on September 3 to 5 is very conflicting. See Castagnola, *op. cit.*, 30-35; Guiccioli, *op. cit.*, I. 301; Correspondence—Rome (1870), 12-13; Cadorna, *op. cit.*, 344-346; Mme. Rattazzi, *op. cit.*, II. 351-352; Castelli, *Ricordi*, 187-188; Id., *Carteggio*, II. 484.

³ Correspondence—Rome (1870), 12; Castelli, *Carteggio*, II. 479.

⁴ Jules Favre, *op. cit.*, 7; Cadorna, *op. cit.*, 349, 357; Balan, *Continuazione*, II. 1022.

guarantees, readily consented. The temper of the country was getting too hot to allow of further delay, and on the 10th, before the result of San Martino's mission was known, the cabinet decided that the troops should cross the frontier next day. With great difficulty 50,000 men had been mobilized, and the force was in quite unnecessary strength to overcome the small and demoralized Papal army. But Lanza no doubt hoped that its overwhelming superiority would discourage resistance and avoid bloodshed. For the same reason, instead of advancing from the point of the frontier nearest Rome, Cadorna's columns took the longer and more difficult route by Orte and Civita Castellana, in the hope that the delay might give the Papalists time to reflect and despair of resistance. Viterbo and Civita Castellana were occupied almost without a shot on the 12th; Civita Vecchia surrendered to Bixio without firing a gun on the 16th; but it was not till the 17th that Cadorna reached the walls of Rome. Lanza's strategy availed nothing; San Martino had left with Antonelli's refusal to come to any terms and the Pope's confident prophecy that the Italians would never enter Rome. At times Pius seems to have hoped for some divine interposition; at other moments he made the unworthy excuse that he could not control his troops. When face to face with the advancing Italians, he determined to resist as long as possible but treat as soon as the walls were breached.¹ At last on September 20 Cadorna made his attack. There was a hopeless disparity in the two forces, and after a few hours' cannonade the Italians entered by a breach near Porta Pia, rapturously acclaimed by the liberated people. It was forty years since Mazzini had pointed to Rome, ten years since Cavour had asked parliament to proclaim it the capital of Italy. Rome had been won, but not as they would have wished; it was not through the great rising of a people, or because Europe and the Papacy had bowed of free will to the principle of nationality. The accidents of European politics had brought the Italians

¹ Balan, *op. cit.*, II. 1012, 1016-1017; Correspondence—Rome (1870), 34, 37; Rothan, *op. cit.*, II. 84; Diamilla-Müller, *op. cit.*, 413; *Roma, settembre-ottobre 1870*, quoted in *Riv. stor. del risorg.*, I. 593.

there; the Temporal Power had fallen, because the French War Office was corrupt, and its generals incapable. Italy had got her natural metropolis, but no great "religious peace" had been "signed from the Capitol."¹ But in spite of all, the possession of Rome has made the path of Italy easier, it has meant an acknowledgment, however grudging, of the national principle, it has helped to raise the Papacy and might much more, if the Vatican knew the things that belong to its peace. In its ultimate results the occupation of Rome may prove of bigger moment than the great war, which was then absorbing the attention of the world.

Lanza's chief preoccupation was still to win the Papacy to peace. He rigorously suppressed the few and trivial disorders that attended the first days of the occupation.² He carefully abstained from entering the Leonine City, till the Pope begged him to send troops to guarantee his safety (September 21); and he would have withdrawn them again but for Antonelli's petition that they might stay.³ He insisted that the formula of plebiscite for union should contain an addendum in favour of the Pope's spiritual authority. He paid over at Antonelli's request the first monthly subsidy of 50,000 scudi, which the government had promised.⁴ The whole cabinet shared his desire to prove to Europe that, Rome once occupied, there should be no more violence, that the Pope's spiritual authority was as safe as under his own flag. A bolder policy had been wiser. Had the Pope been frightened out of Rome, Italy could have gone henceforth on her way free from the incubus of his presence; and after the first shock the religious as well as the political life of the nation would have greatly gained. Europe at the moment was powerless to interfere, and would have acquiesced in the accomplished fact. The Papacy, driven into new sur-

¹ See above, p. 206.

² Cadorna, *op. cit.*, 199, 248-254; Balan, *op. cit.*, II. 1019-1025, 1042-1045; Correspondence—Rome (1870), 37, 50, 62; Castagnola, *op. cit.*, 65; there is no evidence to support Beaufort, *op. cit.*, 362. For the decrease of crime after the occupation, see Gladstone in *Quarterly Review*, January 1875.

³ Cadorna, *op. cit.*, 218, 263; Beaufort, *op. cit.*, 382; Pantaleoni, *Idea italiana*, 104-105.

⁴ Cadorna, *op. cit.*, 269; Guiccioli, *op. cit.*, I. 319-320.

roundings, might have shaken itself free from the traditions of Rome, and gained new life in the new environment.

But Italy chose moderation, and has paid the penalty. It was soon clear that no overtures of conciliation would win the Vatican. At first there seemed some hope. Pius was inclined to accept the inevitable, and see the finger of God in the destruction of the Temporal Power;¹ despite all the influence of the Jesuits he decided to stay at Rome. Antonelli strongly backed his resolution; and though the English and probably other governments offered him a temporary refuge, their invitations were cold and forced.² But friction with the Italians was inevitable. With doubtful wisdom the government took possession of the Pope's palace of the Quirinal; and Antonelli's cynically false versions of its action³ kindled Catholic indignation to white heat. In obedience to Catholic clamour the Pope refused to receive again the government's subsidy, and launched the Greater Excommunication on all, who had taken any part in the downfall of the Temporal Power (November 1). Facts meanwhile had driven the government from the larger concessions it had intended. The plebiscite (October 2) showed 133,000 votes for annexation and 1500 against on a register of 167,000; and though probably many of the Papalists were afraid to go to the poll or thought it useless to vote,⁴ the figures proved how overwhelmingly Roman feeling was for annexation. The proposed immunity of the Leonine City, which the government would gladly have granted as the price of the Pope's friendliness, had broken down with the occupation of September 21 and Antonelli's sensible refusal to create what would have been a city of refuge for criminals and revolutionaries.⁵ A scheme to make Rome

¹ Correspondence—Rome (1870), 41; Diamilla-Müller, *op. cit.*, 414; Tavallini, *op. cit.*, II. 414; *Roma settembre*, &c. (letter of September 30).

² Cadorna, *op. cit.*, 269-270; *Roma settembre*, &c., *passim*; Correspondence—Rome (1870), 4, 61; Rothan, *op. cit.*, II. 120-121.

³ Cadorna, *op. cit.*, 450-451, 543.

⁴ Correspondence—Rome (1870), 39; Curci, *Vaticano regio*, 200-201. In the city itself the figures were 40,000 for annexation, 46 against. The government carefully avoided any pressure: Cadorna, *op. cit.*, 232, 274, 544.

⁵ Guiccioli, *op. cit.*, I. 304; Ricasoli, *op. cit.*, X. 127; Castagnola, *op. cit.*, 27, 58; *Roma settembre*, &c. (letter of September 25).

the honorary capital, as Ricasoli had proposed to do four years before, was fading before the consensus of disapproval. The ministry decided to move the seat of government to Rome; and though Lanza, chiefly to make a last loophole for reconciliation, secured the postponement of the transference to the following summer, parliament refused to delay it longer.

It now remained to pass the Law of Guarantees, which was to settle the relations of church and state, and give the Pope his promised spiritual liberty. It was only three years since parliament had thrown out Ricasoli's Free Church bill; now its principles were universally accepted. But the old dividing lines reappeared among its partisans. While some saw only the political aim—to clear Italy in the eyes of Catholic Europe, to wean the Pope from his hostility, to permit at least a truce between church and state—Ricasoli and his party were concerned beyond all this, that the new order should be rich in spiritual results. "Religion in Italy," they lamented, was "a formalism or a superfluity;" the Liberal Catholic movement had borne little fruit, and proved that there was no stuff for reform in the Italian priesthood; salvation could come from the laity only, and they looked to the new legislation to place the sovereignty of the church in "the communion of the faithful."¹ In doctrine they were conservatives, seeking only to reject the innovations of the Syllabus and Infallibility. Their aim was a moral one, to regenerate the priesthood, to heal the divorce between patriotism and the church, to give new life to Catholicism, and shake the people from its spiritual torpor. But it was difficult to reconcile the aims of the reformers and the politicians. Anything in the direction of church reform only made the reconciliation of the Papacy more remote. Nothing would be more unwelcome to the powers that ruled the Catholic church, than to give statutory rights to the lower clergy and laity, or bring the internal disputes of the church before the civil courts. The whole recent policy of the Catholic church had been towards auto-

¹ Ricasoli, *Lettere*, X. 217-218; Balan, *op. cit.*, II. 1038-1041; Serra-GroPELLI, *Cinque piaghe*, 59-61, 78.

cracy, and the Papacy could not accept a policy which emancipated the lower clergy from the despotism of the bishops, nay more, which gave the real controlling power to the laity, and reduced Papacy and hierarchy to the conditions of the church's early days. The politicians cared little for Ricasoli's religious hopes, and refused to complete the Pope's alienation in order to win some far-off spiritual results. Indeed between the hostility of the church and the indifference of the country, Ricasoli's bigger policy would probably have had small chance of successful working. But the Free Church scheme in its narrower aspect, as a solution of the controversy between Italy and the Papacy, had won the great mass of Liberals. Those who most dreaded the power of the emancipated church, who feared that it would bring the religious life of the nation lower still, were yet disposed to accept it as the only means of satisfying Catholic opinion, of making it possible for King and Pope to live in peace side by side at Rome, of relieving the international strain that followed the occupation of the city. But though they accepted the principle, their fears peeped through on each detail of the scheme, as it came up for discussion in parliament. Sella and a large following among the deputies wished to give the church no more than a limited liberty, to retain for the state its powers of defence against clerical hostility. The common law of the land could not, they urged, reach acts that belong to a sphere outside its ken; no repressive measures could disarm the impalpable hostility of pulpit and confessional, and the state could only safeguard itself by its old preventive precautions. Had it not been indeed for ministerial pressure, the bill would probably have shipwrecked in the Chamber.

In fact when the details were reached, it was recognized by all schools that it was impossible to carry the principles of the Free Church to their logical conclusion. The Law of Guarantees confirmed the Pope in the rights and prerogatives of sovereignty, declared his person to be inviolable, and punished attacks on it as attacks on the King. He was guaranteed free use of the Vatican and Lateran palaces and a large annual dotation. These palaces and the seat of any

Conclave or General Council were declared free from all jurisdiction of the state. The Pope had special postal and telegraphic facilities given him, that his correspondence might be free with the Catholic world. So far the course of parliament was clear. The difficulties arose on the second part of the law, which defined the new liberties of the church in Italy. The Pope was guaranteed full freedom in the exercise of his spiritual ministry and in his correspondence with the bishops. The state surrendered its right to nominate bishops, surrendered the oath of allegiance, the *exequatur* and the *placet*, except provisionally so far as these latter related to the property of the church, and even this was given up in Rome and its neighbourhood. The Law repealed the ancient right to appeal to the civil courts against an ecclesiastic abusing his office so far as it related to purely spiritual matters or matters of ecclesiastical discipline, unless such abuse were contrary to the law of the land or injurious to public order or private rights. But the sequel has shown how wise were the provisions of Sella and his party. Force of circumstances has made some of these concessions more nominal than real. The *exequatur* and *placet* for the possession of the temporalities of a see or parochial benefice still remain; for the redistribution of clerical incomes, with the accomplishment of which they were to lapse, has never been made; and as interpreted by the courts, they have kept for the state very great powers of control over the clergy. Any ecclesiastic, not performing his office according to the requirements of canon law or abusing it for electoral purposes, is liable to be deprived of his stipend, and it has been claimed that this power can be used to protect nationalist clergy deprived of their cures by a bishop. Under the Penal Code a priest can be punished for inciting to disobedience to the laws or for refusing the rites of religion, if such refusal is calculated to produce public disturbances. The seminaries, except in Rome and its neighbourhood, are subject to state inspection and control in various matters. Nor can the church make any redistribution of clerical incomes without the consent of the state. The Law of Guarantees was made with many misgivings but in perfect

good faith; and had the Vatican sought peace, it would have been observed in the spirit as well as in the letter. But its subsequent history has shown that, where state and church are at bitter feud, Cavour's principle cannot delimit the doubtful borderland between the civil and the ecclesiastical.

The Law passed through parliament on March 21, 1871; two months later the Pope refused to recognize or accept it. On July 2 the King took up his residence at Rome; on November 27 he opened parliament in the new capital. The great drama had come to its end. Italian Unity was completed by the capture of Rome; with the Law of Guarantees the first act of the struggle with the Papacy was finished. That struggle still runs its course, and works its daily mischief; what may be its ultimate issues, we can only dimly forecast. If the Papacy still tries to drag down Italy in a common ruin, it may succeed in part and for a time. One can only pray that some day humanity may seem of greater moment than the ends of sect and party. Italy can afford to wait. Cassandras have prophesied her dissolution for thirty-five years, and she stands and will stand when they are forgotten. Her Unity has indeed not yet fulfilled all the exaggerated expectation of good. But it freed twenty-five millions from the stunting shadow of the *sbirro* and the spy, from ecclesiastical tyranny with the state's strong arm behind it, from governments that dared not progress. It has made life longer; it has given Italy railways, better laws, industrial development; it has made room for the marvellous growth of cooperation and popular banks and friendly societies, which perhaps in another generation will have gone far to lift the curse of poverty. It has given Italians the proud sense that they are members of a great state and count for something in the politics of the world. Italy is no longer the land of sentimentalism and decay; she has become practical, progressive, more or less earnest. But she still bears the marks of the days of misrule. She still has terrible enemies to fight—her grinding poverty, the unreality of her political life, the spiritual vulture that gnaws at her vitals. If a foreigner may trust his judgment, she lacks religion, lacks the Puritanism of her

great Ricasoli, lacks the constraining sense of duty that Mazzini preached. She needs more care for her disinherited, the courage that is not afraid of liberty, a higher stamp of statesmanship. She needs to forget the generous impatience, which in its revolt against the more apparent evils jeopardises the bigger interests and perhaps makes a monstrous alliance with the abiding enemy. She needs to keep clear of the temptations of a Great Power, to renounce charlatanry and adventure and militarism, to forswear showy ambitions that only drain her strength. But Italy has youth, she has calmness and docility and devotion, she has humane ideals, a comparatively generous foreign policy. If her political virtues are less than those of some other nations, she is free from some of their vices. She perhaps has neither the population nor the wealth to play a great part in the European polity. But she stands in it on the whole for a sane and liberal policy at a time when sanity and liberalism are at a discount. When she has set her own house in order, her calmness, her moderation, her comparative care for the world's good may give her a great and helpful influence. But she needs another Cavour, wise and honest and loving liberty, to sweep away the little men, whose fears and follies hold her back. Soon may he come to let her march again.

APPENDICES

A

CHARLES ALBERT AND THE CARBONARI

(Vol. I. p. 32.)

DID Charles Albert explicitly encourage the revolution of 1821? Of first-hand evidence we have Santa Rosa's and Charles Albert's statements, which give each other the lie. Santa Rosa (*Révolution*, 71, published in 1821) says that the Prince consented to join the movement. Charles Albert in a MS. written in 1822 (Manno, *Informazioni*, 436) says that he absolutely declined. See also his similar statement in Vayra, *Carlo Alberto*, 259. I prefer to believe Santa Rosa, because (a) Santa Rosa had a name for scrupulous honesty, which Charles Albert had not; (b) Charles Albert had a strong motive for denying his complicity, as on that depended his restoration to favour; (c) the other persons present at the interview never contradicted Santa Rosa's printed statement; (d) Charles Albert himself in 1848 said that he gave a qualified promise to "place himself at the head of the Piedmontese army to help the Lombard rising" (Leopardi, *Narrazioni*, 253). Cantù (*Cronistoria*, II. 180) says that there is documentary evidence of Charles Albert's adhesion on the evening of March 6, but, so far as I know, he has never replied to Manno's challenge to produce it. Among second-hand but contemporary evidence Un officier Piémontais, said to be the younger De Maistre (*Simple Récit*, 39), confirms Charles Albert's denial. Cesare Balbo, the son of Prospero (*Sommario*, 449), "knew" that Charles Albert was sincerely Liberal and passionate for independence, but (Ricotti, *Balbo*, 377) "firmly believed that before the outbreak the Prince broke frankly from the revolutionists." (This probably refers to his later betrayal of the plot.) Collegno, who was very intimate with the Prince, says that he expressed his desire for independence (Bianchi, *Diplomazia*, II. 109). Giffenga thought him loyal (Manno, *op. cit.*, 661). Thaon de Revel had strong suspicions,

and thought that he as good as disclosed revolutionary intentions (*Mémoires*, xlv). Metternich at first believed in his complicity • (Vayra, *op. cit.*, 135, 141), but afterwards thought there was no sufficient proof (*Mémoires*, III. 526-527); so also Wellington (*Despatches*, New Series, I. 456). There were undoubtedly communications between Charles Albert and the Lombard conspirators; messengers came to Confalonieri with "very strange words" from the Prince, though they may have been forged or misdelivered (Casati, *Confalonieri*, I. 107-112; Pallavicino, *Memorie*, I. 22-23). For Charles Albert's popularity in Central and Southern Italy as early as 1816 see Del Cerro in *Gazzetta Litteraria* of Oct. 27, 1894. For the statement that Charles Albert betrayed the details of the plot to Bellegarde after the collapse of the Revolution, see Lezat de Pons, *Études*, 147; but Predari (*Primi Vagiti*, 417) denies it on the strength of documents seen by him at Milan, and Mario (*Mazzini*, 36) shows the improbability of the whole story.

B

THE "THEORY OF THE DAGGER"

(Vol. I. p. 136; Vol. II. p. 27.)

IN a letter dated May 25, 1856, Manin attacked "the theory of the dagger" as "the great enemy of Italy." He implicated no one by name, but the reference was intended and taken to apply to Mazzini (see *Manin e Pallavicino*, 519). The charge has slender foundation. Mazzini held that political assassination is wrong, unless in very exceptional cases. He "abominated any theory of the dagger" (*Mazzini, Opere*, III. 41; X. 51). He refused indeed to condemn the honest assassinator as morally guilty; the same code of ethics, which glorifies Judith and Harmodius and Brutus, would in the future honour Orsini and Agésilao Milano; and he would throw no stone at the man who killed a traitor (*Ib.*, IX. 136). But assassination, he held, is often a crime and almost always a blunder (*Ib.*, IX. 137-138). It is, he says, "a crime, if attempted with the idea of avenging or punishing; a crime, when there are other roads to freedom open; culpable and mistaken, when directed against a man, whose tyranny does not descend into the grave with him" (*Ib.*, X. 54). Thus while Triumvir at Rome he energetically suppressed the political assassinations at Ancona (see above, Vol. I. p. 331); and when Cavour charged him with plotting against Victor Emmanuel's

life, he indignantly replied that the King's "life is protected, first by the Statute, next by the uselessness of the crime" (Ib., X. 48). Assassination, therefore, was only legitimate, when it was the only means of attacking a tyranny, and when at the same time it was likely to overthrow the tyranny. When assassination approximated to insurrection and became an "arm of irregular warfare," as in the cases of Marinovich and Rossi (see above, Vol. I. pp. 221, 281), he justified it (Ib., IX. 132). The statutes of Young Italy never advised assassination (Ib., III. 41-42; see also Gaiani, *Roman Exile*, 115). This was one of its most distinctive differences from Carbonarism. In 1858 Mazzini challenged Cavour to find any of its writings advising otherwise (Ib., X. 48), and at an earlier date he declared that, except perhaps in a few obscure lodges of Romagna, the Society had never condemned a member to death (Ib., III. 42).

On one occasion, however, in his early days Mazzini encouraged assassination. A Corsican, named Gallenga (see above, Vol. I. p. 136), came to Mazzini in 1833 to tell him that he intended to assassinate Charles Albert in revenge for a brother, who had perished in the revolution of 1821. Mazzini tried to dissuade him, but not succeeding and convinced that Gallenga was one of those "whom Providence sends from time to time to teach despots that their life may depend on the will of a single man," gave him a dagger, and money. Gallenga, on arriving at Turin, found himself watched by the police, and left. In later life he became special correspondent of the *Times* (Ib., III. 340-345). Pinelli probably refers to this incident, when he says (*Storia*, III. 55-56), without giving any evidence, that Mazzini hired a man to assassinate the King.

In 1832 or 1833 three Italians, supposed to be spies of the Duke of Modena, were assassinated at Rodez in the Department of Aveyron. At the secret trial, which followed, an alleged decree of Young Italy, with Mazzini's signature, was produced, ordering their assassination; but the decree was written in bad Italian (the text in *Westminster Review*, 1844, 248), the dates did not agree with the facts, and the forgery was so obvious, that the Supreme Court of Aveyron pronounced that the crime was committed without premeditation. Gisquet, who had been Prefect of Police in 1833, in his *Memoirs* published in 1840, repeated the charge against Mazzini; Mazzini brought a libel action against him, and the court at Paris, which tried it, acquitted Gisquet on the ground that the charge must have referred to another Mazzini! (Mazzini, *Opere*, III. 35-41). In 1845 Sir James Graham again revived the charge in the House of Commons, but after seeing the documents of the Aveyron trial, publicly retracted it (*Hansard's Debates*, LXXX. 238). It was reserved to the Paris corres-

pendent of the *Times*, to rake up twenty years later the oft-refuted calumny (*Times* of March 25, 1864). [It was at this time that the disgraceful attempt was made by the French government and some English Conservatives to connect Stansfeld with projects of assassination (Hansard's *Debates*, CLXXIV. 259-263)].

According to Tivaroni, *L'Italia*, III. 143, Mazzini's organ, *L'Italia del Popolo*, in 1850, commenting on an assassination at Pesaro said, "Silence, it is the people acting for itself," and the same author instances other assassinations at the time, which were ascribed to Mazzinians. But there is no evidence to connect either the article or the assassinations with Mazzini, any more than there is to connect Orsini's plans for assassinating the officers of the garrison at Milan in 1853.

The French police attempted to connect Mazzini with Grilli and Tibaldi's plot against the Emperor in 1857. The evidence produced is vague or suspicious, though a letter said to be by Mazzini rather points to complicity (Taxile-Delord, *Second Empire*, II. 110-112; La Gorce, *Second Empire*, II. 201-202); but one cannot accept documents produced by the police of the Second Empire without corroboration of their authenticity. Mazzini was certainly ignorant of the Orsini plot (*Opere*, X. xiv-xv).

The Greco plot. Pasquale Greco was a Calabrian, who took a part in the revolutionary movements of 1860 and 1862, and was not improbably a paid agent of the Piedmontese police (Mazzini, *Opere*, XIV. lxxiv). Early in 1864 he was arrested for complicity in a plot to assassinate the Emperor; according to Kératry (*Le 4 Septembre*, quoted in Taxile-Delord, *op. cit.*, III. 470) the police had a hand in the business. At his trial Greco said that Mazzini concocted the plot, and Mazzini was condemned in contumacy. Mazzini in a letter to the *Times* (January 15, 1864) categorically denied Greco's statements, and the *Times* thought there was "a glaring improbability about the whole of Greco's story." According to Diamilla-Müller (*Politica segreta*, 24-27), Mazzini had a small and unwilling part in it, but did not condemn it when he first heard of it. "Melena" (*Garibaldi*, 172) says that the authoress met in October 1863 a woman sent by Mazzini to buy Garibaldi's support for the plot; but like others of "Melena's" statements, the story is intrinsically improbable and has no evidence to support it.

C

THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT AND THE BANDIERAS

(Vol. I. p. 148.)

MAZZINI, when living in London in 1844, discovered that his letters had been opened before delivery (*Opere*, V. 364-365; VI. 117-120), and charged the government with communicating their contents to the government of Naples. The matter was brought before the House of Commons by Thomas Duncombe. Sir James Graham did not deny that information had been given to the Neapolitan government, but Lord Aberdeen dishonoured himself by the quibble that "not one syllable of the correspondence had been communicated to any person whatever" (Hansard's *Debates*, LXXVI. 313); and Sir Robert Peel stated that Lord Aberdeen knew nothing of an attack from Corfu and never communicated anything relating to that (Ib., LXXVII. 748-749). Secret Committees were appointed in both Houses to inquire. The Lords' Committee reported that information from Mazzini's letters was communicated to a foreign government, "but without names or details, that might expose any individual then residing in the foreign country to which the information was sent to danger" (*sic*). [N.B. The Bandieras had not yet landed.] The Commons' Committee reported that "representations had been made to the British government, that plots, of which M. Mazzini was the centre, were carrying on . . . to excite an insurrection in Italy. . . . The British government issued . . . a warrant to open and detain M. Mazzini's letters. Such information deduced from these letters as appeared to the British government calculated to frustrate this attempt was communicated to a Foreign Power." But "the information so communicated was not of a nature to compromise and did not compromise the safety of any individual within the reach of that Foreign Power."

Nisco (*Ferdinando II.*, 65), whose book is based on the Neapolitan archives, says that "the Austrian and Neapolitan governments had notice from the English police of an approaching attack by Italian exiles." It is clear from the official documents published in *Carte secrete*, II. 431 and Orsini, *Memoirs*, 270, that both the Austrian and Papal governments had been informed beforehand. Of course the information, once sent to any Italian government, would be passed on to the others. See also Hansard's *Debates*, LXXV.

892, 973; LXXVI. 212; Gualterio, *Rivolgimenti*, II. 352. It is clear, that the Foreign Office sent enough information to the Bourbon government to enable it to be prepared for the attack, and to it must be charged in part the fate of the Bandieras. For the intense indignation with the government in England see *Westminster Review*, September, 1844; Carlyle's letter to the *Times* of June 19, 1844; Molesworth, *History of England*, II. 133.

D

ROSSI'S ASSASSINATION

(Vol. I. p. 281.)

I HAVE not seen the full published minutes of the trial of the alleged murderers of Rossi; but I have seen the summary, evidently from a clericalist hand, in "*Storia dell' assassinio di P. Rossi tratta dai processi e descritta dalla Civiltà Cattolica*" (Torino, 1854), and extracts may be found in Gennarelli, *Governo pontificio*, II. 361; D'Ideville, *Rossi*; Trollope, *Pius IX.*, 277 *et seq.* The theory of the prosecution was that a republican plot had been maturing all through the summer and autumn under the leadership of Sterbini and Ciceruacchio, and to which Galletti also was privy; that about the beginning of November the conspirators' plans were betrayed to Rossi, and that they, discovering this and fearing arrest, decided on Rossi's death; that the assassination was entrusted to a band of about sixty returned volunteers, and that they carried it out without any concealment. The findings of the trial are suspicious; the most important evidence came from a criminal, who was promised pardon if he gave information (*Storia dell' assassinio*, 7); and as Tivaroni says, "a Papal trial cannot serve as a historical document." But in the main I think they are correct. The true theory I believe to be that a small band of extremists, believing the exaggerated versions of Rossi's policy, and expecting a suppression of the constitutionalists by force, determined to forestall him by murdering him. This is supported by the facts alleged by Rusconi, *Memorie*, 47; Leopardi, *Narrazioni*, 368-369; Trollope, *op. cit.*, 276. The Papalist writers and on the whole "*Un Romano*" (*Sulle questioni urgenti*, 19) take the same view. The fact that Rossi had warnings of his fate (*Storia dell' assassinio*, 79-80; Bianchi, *Zucchi*, 149) point to the plot being premeditated and not being the work of a single fanatic; the paper, *Don Pirlone*, seems to

have hinted at it beforehand (*Storia dell' assassinio*, 71). The passage referred to in Trollope, *op. cit.*, 276, seems to implicate Sterbini.

Niccolini (*Pontificate*, 79), who was in Rome at the time, ascribes it to a single fanatic. Gazola (*Gazola ed il vicariato*, 34) ascribes it to the reactionaries, but the only evidence for this theory appears in Leopardi, *loc. cit.*, which suggests that Papalist *agents provocateurs* had a hand in it. The Papalists at Rome rejoiced at the deed (Farini, *Roman State*, II. 129); but against this may be set the approval of the Tuscan Liberals (Pigli, *Risposta*, 103; Guerrazzi, *Appendice*, 85), of Garibaldi (*Memorie*, 213-214), and of Mazzini (see Appendix B), all of whom certainly were unconnected with the plot.

There is not a scrap of evidence to connect it with the Albertists, in spite of clericalist attempts (see *Storia dell' assassinio*, 57); though they denounced him at a prior date as a public enemy (*Archivio triennale*, I. 116).

E

THE INQUISITION DUNGEONS

(Vol. I. pp. 79, 330.)

THERE is no doubt that when the offices of the Inquisition were opened to the public on April 1, 1849, a large quantity of human bones and instruments of torture were seen. There is ample evidence as to this from republican and clerical and independent sources. The clericalist Spada visited the offices and speaks of the "holes here and there with fragments of bones," "the irons and hooks and chains and ropes" for purposes of torture. The *Roman Advertiser* (the organ of the English community) says that crowds of sightseers saw "the dark dungeons, the arched caverns full of bones, the pitfalls," &c. Gavazzi found a trap covering a hole seventy feet deep, which contained "much human hair . . . no bones, nothing but hair and ashes," and another cave in which were "some dozens of skeletons . . . buried in lime," the skulls belonging to them being piled in a corner. Pianciani (who was a member of the Assembly, and therefore was probably in Rome at the time) says that all who visited the Inquisition prisons saw "bones of all sexes and ages, . . . the torture benches, the horrible chafing-dishes, the chairs of the judges and the instruments of the executioner. . . . Some were hanging on the walls, others were hidden in corners; all were in good preservation and

carefully kept as if for daily use." Pianciani's book is however somewhat of a *chronique scandaleuse* and not always accurate. Beghelli and others mention that in the cells were found a Livornese, who had been imprisoned for 18 years for blasphemy, and an Egyptian bishop named Cashur, who had been imprisoned since the days of Leo XII. and could no longer walk.

The doubt lies as to whether the bones and instruments of torture had been brought there after the government took possession of the offices, in order to excite indignation. It is quite certain that the Triumvirs would not have connived at the deception, but it may possibly have been done unknown to them by underlings. Spada, who is generally accurate and trustworthy, thought that the bones and instruments of torture had evidently been brought there recently, and says that "a piece of pavement underneath the soil and bones had been unintentionally left in view (this however does not explain the presence of the skeletons mentioned by Gavazzi); he asserts too that many Romans, who visited the dungeons before April 1, found no trace of the bones. Maguire, who visited the offices after the fall of the Republic, says that there was only one trap-door and that an improvised one, that the bones had been dug up from beneath the foundations, which were on the site of an ancient graveyard, and that the cells were on the second-floor and well lit; but his evidence is discounted (a) by his general inaccuracy, (b) by the obvious conclusion that he did not see the dungeons (see the evidence of Gaiani and Pianciani, below). There is negative evidence against the genuineness of the discovery in the fact that neither Rusconi nor Gabussi (both moderate republicans) mention it. On the other hand Gavazzi says that "when the doors of the Inquisition were opened in Rome, I was the first to enter." He does not make it absolutely clear whether he entered when the Republic first took possession or on April 1; but the context seems to point strongly to the former, and if this is so, his evidence would be almost conclusive. It is clear that the writer in the *Roman Advertiser* had no suspicion of any trick.

There is some indirect evidence in favour of the genuineness of the discoveries. Gaiani, when imprisoned by the Inquisition in the '30s, was put in an underground dungeon with unpaved floor, in which lay bones and skulls. (Pianciani quotes the evidence of a friend, who was imprisoned there, as to the fearful state of the dungeons.) Pianciani believes in the practice of torture from the allusions of men known to him, who had been imprisoned by the Inquisition. It must be remembered that torture was practised in Sicily at a later date than this, and that even the Austrians resorted

in Lombardy to starvation, repeated floggings, and drugs to extort confessions. Pianciani also mentions that human bones were found under a trap-door in the offices of the Inquisition at Perugia in 1849. On the other hand, when the French entered Rome in 1798, they found the Inquisition prisons healthy and almost empty.

On the whole I find it so difficult to balance the evidence as to the genuineness of the discoveries, that I give it in full and leave the reader to draw his conclusions. (See Spada, *Rivoluzione*, III. 335; Campanella and Niccolini, *Gavazzi*, 249-251; *Roman Advertiser* 1848-9, 398; Pianciani, *Rome des Papes*, II. 75-85; Gaiani, *Roman Exile*, 148; Beghelli, *Repubblica*, II. 78; Maguire, *Pontificate*, 164-168; La Farina, *Storia*, I. *proemio*; Tournon, *Études*, II. 51-52.)

F

GARIBALDI, RATTAZZI, AND VICTOR EMMANUEL

IN 1862

(Vol. II. pp. 236-244.)

(a) *March—April*

It is impossible, until further evidence is forthcoming, to pronounce decidedly as to what was the understanding between Rattazzi and the King on the one hand and Garibaldi on the other. Rattazzi told the Chamber (speech of June 3, 1862) that he promised Garibaldi to consolidate Italy, but refused to consent to any irregular programme; that he had the promise of Menotti Garibaldi that the mobilized guards should be used to combat brigandage only and should act under the orders of the government; that he neither suggested nor in any way was privy to any expedition either to the Tyrol or over sea; that he had promised Garibaldi a certain sum of money, but only to assist some of the refugees to emigrate, and on condition that they left the country without arms. Bixio (speech of June 3), who was present at the interview between Rattazzi and Crispi, when many of these details were arranged, gives a rather different version. Rattazzi, he says, told Crispi that the government could not prevent few or many individuals leaving the country, but that it would not allow any kind of expedition; he confirms Rattazzi's statement as to Menotti Garibaldi's promises; he says he knew positively, that the government was not informed of Garibaldi's projects, but he owns that he communicated them to Guerzoni, who was Depretis' secretary.

In his speech of June 6 he qualifies his first statement considerably by saying (1) that if the government knew of the projects, it gave no approval, (2) that he asked Rattazzi himself whether he would assist an expedition, (3) that Rattazzi promised to pay him over a fixed sum, on condition that it should be spent only in such manner as the government wished. (Rattazzi in a subsequent speech evaded the latter point.) Nicotera (speech of November 25, 1862) stated that Rattazzi, before he took office, invited him to an interview, and there pledged himself to the arming of the nation and a radical change of administration. According to Nicotera, Depretis was given a place in the ministry, as a guarantee to the Left. Mme. Rattazzi (*Rattazzi*, I. 619) states that her husband knew of Garibaldi's plans, but opposed any raid on Venetia, and tried to dissuade him through Bixio and Depretis. According to G. Torelli (*Ricordi*, 283-285), Rattazzi professed a wish to continue Ricasoli's policy, to conciliate Garibaldi through the King and others, but keep him from imprudent acts, if necessary by force. Castelli, who knew Rattazzi well, thinks (*Ricordi*, 205) that he struggled against great difficulties to maintain the authority of the government.

But the more charitable view of Rattazzi's policy found little credit inside or outside of the Chamber (Boggio's speech of June 4; Tavalini, *Lanza*, I. 283). Ricasoli said (*Lettere*, VII. 28) that he had trustworthy evidence that in December 1861 Rattazzi promised to assist Garibaldi in an expedition to Dalmatia and send him to organize volunteers in South Italy. Crispi (speech of June 3) asserted definitely that Rattazzi promised a million lire to Garibaldi to arm an expedition in support of the Greek insurgents, but denied that there was any intention to raid the Tyrol. He stated that Rattazzi, while at Naples with the King, sent a cypher telegram, "I am ready to give the arms, the General to send receipts and indicate the place." Guerzoni (*Garibaldi*, II. 283) gives additional evidence in support of the promised million. (See also Cantù, *Cronistoria*, III. 578.) It is quite clear from Guerzoni, *op. cit.*, II. 295, that at the end of April there were communications between Garibaldi and Depretis respecting a raid into the Tyrol. About May 7 in consequence of a message from the King Garibaldi seems for the moment to have abandoned the Tyrol expedition and gone back to the Greek plan (Guerzoni, *op. et loc. cit.*). Not only men and arms and red shirts, but ambulance and biscuits were collected on the frontier (Boggio's speech of June 4).

There can be no doubt that Garibaldi expected much from Rattazzi's appointment. In March 1862 he said that Rattazzi had promised to be independent of foreign influence and try to get Rome (Chambers, *Garibaldi*, 179). When he saw Rattazzi after his appointment, he returned enthusiastic about him and the King (Guerzoni,

op. cit., II. 279-280). "With Rattazzi in power I can always do something" (Tavallini, *op. cit.*, I. 288). He counted on Depretis' devotion. Mario (*Bertani*, II. 293) states that Garibaldi thought that Rattazzi would at once undertake the liberation of Venetia. It is true that Garibaldi in his letter to the Chamber after Sarnico stated that Rattazzi only gave him large hopes that Italy would be definitely constituted, and made offers as to the arming of the nation; but there can be little doubt that Garibaldi only signed what others wrote, and that at the best the letter told only half the truth (Guerzoni, *op. cit.*, II. 294). But Garibaldi seems as early as March 28 to have been disappointed and bitter towards the government (Castelli, *Carteggio*, I. 418; Chambers, *op. cit.*, 193). It would seem that Crispi, Bertani, and others played on these suspicions and suggested that the government had ulterior objects in sending him out of Italy (Mario, *Garibaldi*, 679; see also Mazzini, *Opere*, XIII. cxiii). They however opposed equally any attack on Venetia or the Tyrol, and Garibaldi accused them of conspiring with Mazzini to spoil his plans (Mario, *op. et loc. cit.*).

Vecchi (*Garibaldi*, 338) states, without giving his authority, that the plan was to raid the Tyrol in connection with an expected rising in Hungary; but that when Deak came to a compromise with the Viennese government and the hope of Hungarian cooperation vanished, the government saw the danger of the raid and hence its suppression at Sarnico. Saffi gives a similar explanation in Mazzini, *Opere*, XIII. cxiii. For Garibaldi's secret interview with the King and Rattazzi after Sarnico, see Guerzoni, *op. cit.*, II. 298.

Pasolini (*Memoirs*, 270) says that England vetoed an expedition to Albania, but he gives no evidence. Bonghi (*I partiti*, 243) gives some, but not conclusive, evidence that Garibaldi was in correspondence with the Greek court in 1862, apparently with the object of attacking the Turks. On the other hand, Vitzthum (*St. Petersburg*, II. 196) thought that the intrigues were to put Prince Amadeus on the Greek throne; so also Bideschini, *Garibaldi*, quoted in Tivaroni, *L'Italia*, II. 418.

(b) June to August

Garibaldi gave quite inconsistent accounts of his intentions in going to Sicily. According to his diary (quoted in Guerzoni, *op. cit.*, II. 299) he went to prevent an autonomist movement, which he believed was threatening. [It is possible that this was a deliberately false statement, in order to screen the King. See Mario, *Nicotera*, 61.] According to "Melena" (*Garibaldi*, 151), he confessed at the end of May that he was projecting a conquest of Rome, and was

going to Sicily with that object; but "Melena's" statements are often suspicious. He had already before Sarnico talked confidently of going to Rome, and when he was at Milan, it was fashionable to wear legends of "Rome or Death" in hats (Cantù, *op. cit.*, III. 574). Three days before his speech at Palermo he wrote to a friend that he was "hoping to do something for King and country" (Vecchi, *op. cit.*, 342). Saffi (Mazzini, *Opere*, XIII. cxxii) thinks that he intended going to Greece, but that when the government denied the promised help, he changed his plans and made Rome his objective. So too Salazaro (*Cenni*, 106). Guerzoni (*op. cit.*, II. 300) thinks that he had no clear end in view, when he left Caprera.

Probably one of Rattazzi's objects was to play Garibaldi so as to extort concessions from the Emperor (Bianchi, *Matteucci*, 385).

As to the part taken by the King, Garibaldi read to some of his followers a letter from him, offering means for an expedition to Greece. This was according to Mario (Mazzini, 423) on the voyage to Palermo, according to Saffi (Mazzini, *Opere*, XIII. cxxiv) a few days before sailing. Garibaldi told "Melena" that the King gave his private consent to an attack on Rome, if he were ready to take the punishment on himself in case of failure (Melena, *op. cit.*, 158). Garibaldi certainly maintained almost up to the last that the King was behind him and that therefore the ministers dared not stop him (Salazaro, *op. cit.*, 104; Chambers, *op. cit.*, 194-196, 207; Vecchi, *op. cit.*, 344). On the other hand the King said that the expedition to Rome was a breach of a solemn promise (Diamilla-Müller, *Politica segreta*, 85); and this is confirmed in the main by N. Bianchi (*op. cit.*, 386), who claims access to authentic documents.

As to the part taken by the government, there was doubtless for some time an absence of any clear instructions to the officials in Sicily. Even Cugia, the military governor, was puzzled how to act (Adamoli, *Da San Martino*, 194; Tavallini, *op. cit.*, I. 291; Vecchi, *op. cit.*, 345). Soldiers were allowed to desert to the volunteers (Chambers, *op. cit.*, 206; Mazzini, *Opere*, XIII. cxxx). According to Vecchi (*op. cit.*, 343) 3000 rifles were publicly landed for Garibaldi by the government. Garibaldi asserted before Catania that he had a letter from the admiral in command of the Italian squadron, offering to take him to any port he liked (Guerzoni, *op. cit.*, II. 309), but according to Zini (*Storia*, II. 1039) it was merely an offer to take him to Caprera under an impression that the volunteers had broken up. Garibaldi afterwards thought (*Memorie*, 401) that the frigates at Catania had orders to prevent his escaping, but that the captains turned a blind eye. Vecchi (*op. cit.*, 346-347) says the same, and gives evidence, which, if true, shows how un-

decided the officers still were. Adamoli (*op. cit.*, 214) implies that they must have seen Garibaldi sail. But the government did everything to prevent volunteers from joining Garibaldi (Ib., 183, 190-191). There appears again to have been some understanding between Garibaldi and Depretis. If Cordova is correct (*Discorsi*, I, 141-142) Garibaldi thought that the proclamation of August 3 was a mere blind, and said, as soon as he saw Depretis' signature to it, "we are in agreement with the government."

It is said that a relative of Benedetti told Fabrizi that the object of the government was to get rid of Garibaldi (Mario, *op. cit.*, 423). This was communicated to Garibaldi. Ricasoli (*op. cit.*, VII. 701) also thought that it was a trap laid by Rattazzi to wreck Garibaldi. But in spite of similar and better-grounded suspicions in 1864 and 1867 (see above, Vol. II. pp. 255, 350), I do not think this probable.

In weighing the evidence all through it must be remembered that no implicit reliance can be placed on the statements of Rattazzi or Crispi or Garibaldi. The two former were notorious equivocators, and too many of Garibaldi's statements in his *Memorie* and *Les mille* are too glaringly untruthful to allow of dependance on his other statements.

G

POLITICAL NOMENCLATURE

I HAVE uniformly used the names of political parties in their Italian significance. Down to about 1844 **Liberal** includes all sections of nationalists, the majority of them being of course constitutionalists as well. From 1844, while **Liberal** remains on the whole the generic term, the common nomenclature is **Moderate** and **Democrat** for the conservative and advanced nationalist wings respectively, the anti-nationalists being **Reactionaries** (*retrogradi*, *reazionari*), or **Codini** from a real or supposed preference for the old-fashioned pig-tail wig. **Radical** is also used, practically as a synonym of Democrat. After 1849 **Conservative** and **Liberal** are in common use as an equivalent for Moderate and Democrat, and are perhaps the more usual terms during the decade; but with the rise of parliamentary life in Piedmont the more defined party-names are **Right**, **Right-Centre**, **Left-Centre**, **Left**. (See Vol. I. pp. 387-389.) In the '60s Moderate is in common use again, but Democrat is almost superseded for a time by **Garibaldian**. For **Consorteria** and **Permanent**, see Vol. II. pp. 251, 267.

H

TABLES OF COINAGE, &c.

Piedmont	{ 1 lira =	{ = 1 franc	= 9.6d.	= 25 lire	= £1
(afterwards Kingdom of Italy)	{ 100 centesimi					
LOMBARDY-VENETIA	{ 1 Austrian lira =	{ = .87 franc	= 8.35d.	= 28.7 Austrian lire	= £1
	{ 100 centesimi					
TUSCANY	{ 1 Tuscan lira =	{ = .84 franc	= 8.06d.	= 29.7 Tuscan lire	= £1
	{ 20 soldi = 240 denari					
	{ 1 paolo		= 5½d.			
PAPAL STATES	{ 1 scudo =	{ = 5.3 francs	= 4s. 3.5d.	= 4.6 scudi	= £1
	{ 10 paoli =					
	{ 100 bajocchi					
NAPLES	{ 1 ducat =	{ = 4.3 francs	= 3s. 4.7d.	= 5.7 ducats	= £1
	{ 10 carlini =					
	{ 100 grani					
SICILY	{ 1 oncia =	{ = 12.7 francs	= 10s. 4.8d.	= 1.9 oncie	= £1
	{ 30 tari =					
	{ 600 grani					

Piedmontese mile = 1.53 English miles.

Tuscan " = 1.02 " "

Roman " = .87 " "

Neapolitan } " = 1.14 " "

Sicilian } " = 1.14 " "

Italian chilometro = .62 " " 8 chilometri = 5 miles.

Italian Kingdom . 1 ettaro = 2.47 acres. 259 ettari = 1 sq. mile.

Naples . . . 1 moggia = .83 "

Sicily . . . 1 salma = 4.32 "

Papal States . . 1 rubbia = 4.54 "

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